Bibliographic citations
Arellán, L., (2022). El marco regulatorio de la Calidad del Servicio Público de la Electricidad y la gestión de las empresas estatales de distribución eléctrica [Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú]. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12404/21305
Arellán, L., El marco regulatorio de la Calidad del Servicio Público de la Electricidad y la gestión de las empresas estatales de distribución eléctrica []. PE: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú; 2022. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12404/21305
@mastersthesis{renati/22476,
title = "El marco regulatorio de la Calidad del Servicio Público de la Electricidad y la gestión de las empresas estatales de distribución eléctrica",
author = "Arellán Yanac, Luis Alberto",
publisher = "Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú",
year = "2022"
}
This thesis seeks to analyze the current situation of the regulation of the quality of public electricity services - supply quality - and to propose a regulatory framework that helps to obtain better levels of quality. The Electric Concessions Law of 1992, promulgated by Decreto Ley No. 25844, defined the most representative characteristics of the current Peruvian regulatory model, in the activities of generation, transmission and distribution of electrical energy. By Decreto Supremo No. 020-1997-EM, the ‘Technical Standard for the Quality of Electrical Services’ (hereinafter NTCSE) was promulgated for urban areas, where the minimum levels of quality of electrical services were established. The NTCSE is of imperative application for service activities related to the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. For rural areas, through Law No. 28749, General Law of Rural Electrification and its Regulations, approved by Supreme Decree No. 025-2007-EM, regulations were issued for the development of electrification projects in rural areas by the State. Since the promulgation of the Standard that regulates the Quality of Electric Services in the country to date, the state has done little or almost nothing to improve this regulation. In recent years, the quality of service has worsened. In this study, it is proposed that the reason is that the current Cost of Energy not Served in force “e”, to compensate for the breach in the quality of supply and considered in its opportunity, is very low, compared to the costs of neighboring countries (US $ 0.35 / kWh). Therefore, it is not a deterrent; which means that electricity companies prefer to pay compensation to users and not make investments to reduce failures that occur in their facilities. This, accompanied by government restrictions on spending and investment. A research methodology that establishes a regulatory framework is presented, where it is intended to relate an Optimal Cost of Quality with a more dissuasive Compensation Cost. Through a statistical analysis in three scenarios: Pessimistic, conservative and optimistic and a variable based on the Cost of Compensation. Where it is intended to demonstrate the cost - benefit that companies will have with the new compensation values. Considering that the application of these approaches will resolve the poor quality of the electrical service in Peru.
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