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Title: Thomas Aquinas on the Apprehension of Being: The Role of Judgement in Light of ThirteenthCentury Semantics
Other Titles: Tomás de Aquino sobre la aprehensión del ser: el papel del juicio a la luz de la semántica del siglo trece
Advisor(s): Twetten, David; Taylor, Richard; Goldin, Owen
OCDE field: http://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#6.03.01
Issue Date: Dec-2013
Institution: Marquette University
Abstract: Demuestra la posibilidad de una simple concepción del ser en la filosofía de Tomás de Aquino. Se demuestra la posibilidad de una aprehensión conceptual del ser a través de una nueva lectura de In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3., a la luz del contexto teórico del texto, en particular la teoría de la proposición y sus objetos. La afirmación de una distinción real entre esencia y existencia a la cual se corresponden las dos operaciones del intelecto, no elimina la posibilidad de una simple concepción del ser.

Aquinas’ famous comments in his early Scriptum on the Sentences (In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3) regarding the intellect’s apprehension of essence and esse have traditionally been interpreted as grounding Aquinas’ doctrine on the judgment of esse. For Aquinas, it appears, what the intellect apprehends in a simple concept is essence. Since esse, for him, is not an essence, it cannot, on the received view, be the object of conceptualization. Therefore, esse is grasped by the intellect only in judgment. The claim that no genuine concept of esse is possible, however, is inconsistent with Aquinas’ theory of signification. A term’s signification is constituted, at least in part, in its “signing relation” with some “concept” in the mind. If, as on the traditional reading, there is no concept of esse, the term ‘esse’ is left without signification. To respond that the term ‘esse’ signs, not a concept, but the judgment in which esse is apprehended is in direct conflict with Aquinas’ claim elsewhere that no term, including ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, signifies a judgment. I propose an alternative interpretation to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, one that allows for the possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse. The alternative reading explains Aquinas’ remarks there in light of the theoretical context of the discussion, in particular the theory of propositions and their objects. I show how and why Aquinas develops a distinctive theory of the object of the proposition, that it is concerned with “the esse of a thing” as a complex. Although this complex includes the simple act of being, as for the traditional position (contrary to its major critics), it cannot be reduced to anything simple. Despite the Sentences’ affirmation of a real distinction between a thing’s esse and essence, to which correspond two different operations of the intellect, it does not follow that the human intellect cannot conceive esse, just as it conceives essences, in a simple conception.
Discipline: Humanidades
Grade or title grantor: Marquette University. Department of Philosophy
Grade or title: Doctor en Filosofía
Register date: 13-Jul-2020

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