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Benavides, J., (2019). Prescripción Adquisitiva [Trabajo de suficiencia profesional, Universidad Peruana de las Américas]. http://repositorio.ulasamericas.edu.pe/handle/upa/768
Benavides, J., Prescripción Adquisitiva [Trabajo de suficiencia profesional]. : Universidad Peruana de las Américas; 2019. http://repositorio.ulasamericas.edu.pe/handle/upa/768
@misc{renati/4777,
title = "Prescripción Adquisitiva",
author = "Benavides Malasquez, José Carlos",
publisher = "Universidad Peruana de las Américas",
year = "2019"
}
Title: Prescripción Adquisitiva
Other Titles: Robo agravado
Authors(s): Benavides Malasquez, José Carlos
Advisor(s): Chávez De La Peña, Verónica Roció
Keywords: Robo; hurto; Prescripción adquisitiva; lanzamiento
Issue Date: 2019
Institution: Universidad Peruana de las Américas
Abstract: En nuestro país, que se rige principalmente bajo la tradición jurídica romana germánica, hablar de “derechos de propiedad” pone de manifiesto la coexistencia del sistema jurídico anglosajón y el romano germánico en Perú.
Según el Dr. Enrique Ghersi, utilizar el término “derechos de propiedad” no es igual a decir “derecho de propiedad”. Esto porque el primer término es anglosajón y mal utilizado por nuestro medio. En la tradición jurídica romana germánica hablamos de derechos reales para distinguirlos con los personales, según la división dualista de los derechos subjetivos. Esta teoría nos señala que los derechos personales vinculan una persona con otra (ejemplo Contrato) y los derechos reales vinculan a las personas con las cosas (ejemplo La propiedad). Para la división dualista solo integra tu patrimonio tu relación real.
El sustento filosófico de esta segunda postura es el consenso con todos los miembros de la sociedad. Esta posición es la más aceptada dentro de la división monista del derecho y se concretiza en lo dicho por el jurista francés Planiol cuando planteó que la propiedad es una obligación pasivamente universal, es decir, una obligación de no hacer.
Los derechos de propiedad para el mundo anglosajón son todos los derechos subjetivos (property rigth).
Para el derecho de nuestra tradición, hablar de derechos de propiedad no tiene sentido, porque para nosotros cuando hablamos de ello nos referimos sólo a la relación real, es decir, la relación de la persona con la cosa.
Para el caso concreto, podemos señalar que el derecho de propiedad sobre un bien inmueble es prueba de una titularidad (property right), porque te da la exclusividad del mismo y ésta es enajenable. En el Perú se usa indistintamente los conceptos de derechos de propiedad y derecho de propiedad cuando en realidad no se tiene clara la distinción de ambos conceptos, situación que es de suma importancia para entender nuestro sistema y la coexistencia con el sistema monista.
Pero en nuestro caso nos centramos en la prescripción de la propiedad de un inmueble se adquiere cuando se ha poseído en forma pacífica, continua y pública. Donde la demandante JULIA VALENCIA MENDOZA, interpone demanda sobre PRESCRIPCIÓN ADQUISITIVA DE DOMINIO en contra de TERESA EVANGELINA LAGUNA PARI, con emplazamiento de la colindante Clotilde Flores Huaracha. Solicitando que, la prescripción adquisitiva de dominio del inmueble ubicado en el Asentamiento Humano Asociación Provivienda Ricardo Palma, Mz. D, Lote 1, Zona A, del distrito de José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, provincia y departamento de Arequipa, el mismo que está inscrito en el Registro de la Propiedad Inmueble en la Partida N° P06053283 de la Zona Registral N° XII - Sede Arequipa. Solicita además se disponga la inscripción en calidad de propietaria respecto del inmueble materia de la presente preinscripción y se disponga la cancelación del Asiento Registral N° 00002 de la Partida registral N° P06053283 a favor del titular de esta inscripción que es Teresa Evangelina Laguna Pari.
Que, como es verse, “La prescripción adquisitiva de dominio constituye una forma originaria de adquirir la propiedad, y se sustenta en la posesión de un bien por un determinado lapso de tiempo, siempre que se cumpla con los requisitos exigidos por ley. El primer párrafo del artículo novecientos cincuenta del Código Civil, regula la llamada prescripción “larga u ordinaria", establece que la propiedad inmueble se adquiere por prescripción mediante la posesión continua, pacífica y publica durante diez años. Interpretando los alcances de la norma, es evidente que la concurrencia de los requisitos de continuidad, pacificidad y publicidad de la posesión, deben configurarse dentro del periodo de tiempo establecido para la prescripción, esto es, dentro de un lapso mínimo de diez años, cumplidos los cuales, se genera un derecho expectaticio sobre el derecho de propiedad que necesariamente debe ser declarado por la autoridad competente y mediante sentencia firme que declare propietario al beneficiario, pues la autoridad, y no el beneficiario, la llamada a verificar si en efecto concurren los presupuestos exigidos por la ley que , permitan al poseedor concretizar el derecho expectaticio de propiedad que se atribuye.
En líneas generales, sorprende la motivación de las resoluciones de primera y segunda instancia, ya que creemos no fueron idóneas. Por ejemplo, a pesar de estar de acuerdo con la resolución de primera instancia, soy consciente de que la motivación de la misma fue deficiente.
Ni que decir de la resolución de segunda instancia – si bien es cierto, la motivación adecuada no implica la realización de grandes textos – estamos ante una motivación de un corto texto que deja más dudas que soluciones; esto a pesar de que nos encontramos ante un proceso abreviado que implica abreviación del tiempo en el que se revisará el caso concreto, pero existiendo plenitud en el conocimiento de los jueces sobre el tema sobre el que versa el proceso, debido a la libertad que tienen las partes para aportar los medios probatorios que estimen convenientes. Esto, lógicamente, orientado a lograr una adecuada motivación del juez que resuelve, quien interpretará y actuará los medios probatorios presentados para llegar a la resolución del caso.
Segunda instancia señala, que se ha dado la interrupción del término de la prescripción hasta en dos oportunidades: siendo la primera cuando se inicia proceso desalojo, llevado en el expediente N°: 1999 – 0807 en fecha diecinueve de abril de 1999 (presentación de la demanda), la misma que concluye con lanzamiento que por cierto, una vez efectuada, la ahora demandante, hizo caso omiso al mandato judicial; lo cual de ninguna forma puede ser amparado por el derecho, poseyendo del bien de manera ilegítima, asimismo en el expediente 2007 – 05974, se ha llevado proceso desalojo en fecha 04 de septiembre del 2007. Este colegiado señala que, la posesión de quien pretende ser declarado propietario por prescripción debe transcurrir sin generar conflicto con los derechos de los demás; siendo de considerar que dicho precepto legal se vulnera cuando se aprecie que la posesión ha sido cuestionada
En sede casatoria, se subsana la falta de motivación adecuada de las resoluciones señaladas, sin embargo, la Sala Suprema sorprende al señalar que no existió infracción normativa respecto al inciso 5 del artículo 139°, siendo que – a decir de la Sala – la Sala Superior habría empleado en forma suficiente los fundamentos que le han servido de base para desestimar la demanda.
Sin embargo, estoy de acuerdo con el sentido de la resolución final de la Sala Suprema, puesto que -además- llega a motivar de manera adecuada la sentencia expedida, desarrollando los temas que tienen incidencia directa en el problema resuelto y declarando la infracción normativa al artículo 953° del Código Civil.
Que, ante al análisis de mi caso estoy conforme con la Casación N°: 3070 – 2016- Arequipa – emitida por la Sala Civil Transitoria de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Republica, de fecha 25 de octubre de 2017, que DECLARA FUNDADO el recurso de casación interpuesto por Julia Valencia Mendoza y por consiguiente, CASARON la resolución impugnada; en consecuencia NULA la sentencia de vista, de fecha 09 de mayo de 2016, emitida por la Segunda Sala Civil de la Corte Superior de Justicia de Arequipa; y actuando en sede de instancia: CONFIRMARON la sentencia apelada de fecha 01 de setiembre de 2015, que declaro fundada la demanda sobre Prescripción Adquisitiva de Dominio, con los demás que contiene; DISPUSIERON la publicación de la presente resolución en el Diario Oficial “El Peruano”, bajo responsabilidad; en los seguidos por Julia Valencia Mendoza contra Teresa Evangelina Laguna Parí, sobre Prescripción Adquisitiva de Dominio.
In our country, which is governed mainly under the Germanic Roman legal tradition, talking about “property rights” shows the coexistence of the Anglo-Saxon and the Germanic Roman legal system in Peru. According to Dr. Enrique Ghersi, using the term “property rights” is not the same as saying “property right”. This is because the first term is Anglo-Saxon and misused by our means. In the Germanic Roman legal tradition we talk about real rights to distinguish them with personal rights, according to the dualistic division of subjective rights. This theory tells us that personal rights link one person with another (example Contract) and real rights link people with things (example Property). For the dualist division, only your real relationship integrates your heritage. The philosophical support of this second position is the consensus with all members of society. This position is the most accepted within the monistic division of law and is concretized in what was said by the French jurist Planiol when he stated that property is a passively universal obligation, that is, an obligation not to do. Property rights for the Anglo-Saxon world are all subjective rights (property rigth). For the law of our tradition, talking about property rights is meaningless, because for us when we talk about it we mean only the real relationship, that is, the person's relationship with the thing. For the specific case, we can point out that the property right over a real estate is proof of ownership (property right), because it gives you the exclusivity of the property and it is disposable. In Peru, the concepts of property rights and property rights are used interchangeably when in reality the distinction of both concepts is not clear, a situation that is of paramount importance to understand our system and coexistence with the monistic system. But in our case we focus on the prescription of ownership of a property acquired when it has been peacefully, continuously and publicly owned. Where the applicant JULIA VALENCIA MENDOZA, files a lawsuit on ADQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION OF DOMAIN against TERESA EVANGELINA LAGUNA PARI, with the location of the adjacent Clotilde Flores Huaracha. Requesting that, the purchase prescription of ownership of the property located in the Human Settlement Association Provivienda Ricardo Palma, Mz. D, Lot 1, Zone A, of the district of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, province and department of Arequipa, the same that is registered in the Registry of the Real Property in Item No. P06053283 of the Registration Zone No. XII - Headquarters Arequipa It also requests that the inscription as owner regarding the property subject of this pre-registration be provided and the cancellation of the Registration Seat No. 00002 of the Registration No. P06053283 in favor of the holder of this registration which is Teresa Evangelina Laguna Pari. That, as can be seen, “The acquisition of ownership prescription constitutes an original way of acquiring the property, and is based on the possession of a good for a certain period of time, provided that the requirements required by law are met. The first paragraph of article nine hundred and fifty of the Civil Code, regulates the so-called “long or ordinary” prescription, establishes that real property is acquired by prescription through continuous, peaceful and public possession for ten years. Interpreting the scope of the norm, it is It is evident that the concurrence of the requirements of continuity, pacificity and publicity of the possession, must be configured within the period of time established for the prescription, that is, within a minimum period of ten years, after which, an expectation right is generated on the right to property that must necessarily be declared by the competent authority and by means of a final judgment declaring the beneficiary as owner, as the authority, and not the beneficiary, the call to verify whether the budgets required by law that allow to the holder to concretize the expectation right of ownership that is attributed. In general, the motivation of the first and second instance resolutions is surprising, since we believe they were not suitable. For example, despite agreeing with the first instance resolution, I am aware that its motivation was poor. Needless to say, the second instance resolution - although it is true, adequate motivation does not imply the realization of large texts - we are faced with a short text motivation that leaves more doubts than solutions; This is despite the fact that we are faced with an abbreviated process that implies an abbreviation of the time in which the specific case will be reviewed, but there is fullness in the knowledge of the judges on the subject of the process, due to the freedom they have the parties to provide the evidence they deem appropriate. This, logically, oriented to achieve an adequate motivation of the judge who resolves, who will interpret and act the evidence presented to reach the resolution of the case. Second instance indicates that the termination of the prescription period has been interrupted up to two times: it is the first when an eviction process is initiated, taken in file N °: 1999 - 0807 on the nineteenth date of April 1999 (presentation of the demand), which concludes with a launch that, by the way, once made, the now plaintiff, ignored the judicial mandate; which in no way can be protected by law, possessing the property in an illegitimate manner, also in the 2007 - 05974 file, an eviction process has been carried out on September 4, 2007. This collegiate points out that the possession of the person who intends to be declared owner by prescription must pass without generating conflict with the rights of others; being of considering that said legal precept is violated when it is appreciated that the possession has been questioned In cassary headquarters, the lack of adequate motivation of the aforementioned resolutions is remedied, however, the Supreme Chamber is surprised to point out that there was no regulatory infraction with respect to paragraph 5 of article 139 °, being that - according to the Chamber - the Chamber Superior would have sufficiently used the fundamentals that have served as the basis for dismissing the lawsuit. However, I agree with the meaning of the final resolution of the Supreme Chamber, since - in addition - it adequately motivates the sentence issued, developing the issues that have a direct impact on the problem solved and declaring the regulatory infraction to the Article 953 of the Civil Code. That, before the analysis of my case, I agree with the Cassation No.: 3070 - 2016- Arequipa - issued by the Transitional Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic, dated October 25, 2017, which DECLARES FOUNDED on Appeal filed by Julia Valencia Mendoza and, consequently, THE contested resolution WAS married; consequently NULL the judgment of view, dated May 9, 2016, issued by the Second Civil Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Arequipa; and acting at the headquarters of the instance: CONFIRMED the appealed judgment dated September 1, 2015, which declared the claim on Acquisition of Domain Prescription founded, with the others it contains; DISPOSED the publication of this resolution in the Official Gazette "El Peruano", under responsibility; in those followed by Julia Valencia Mendoza against Teresa Evangelina Laguna Parí, on Acquisition of Domain. KEYWORDS: Purchase prescription, release, eviction, usucapion, possession, precarious occupant, cassation, appeal, property, usurper, landlord and tenant.
In our country, which is governed mainly under the Germanic Roman legal tradition, talking about “property rights” shows the coexistence of the Anglo-Saxon and the Germanic Roman legal system in Peru. According to Dr. Enrique Ghersi, using the term “property rights” is not the same as saying “property right”. This is because the first term is Anglo-Saxon and misused by our means. In the Germanic Roman legal tradition we talk about real rights to distinguish them with personal rights, according to the dualistic division of subjective rights. This theory tells us that personal rights link one person with another (example Contract) and real rights link people with things (example Property). For the dualist division, only your real relationship integrates your heritage. The philosophical support of this second position is the consensus with all members of society. This position is the most accepted within the monistic division of law and is concretized in what was said by the French jurist Planiol when he stated that property is a passively universal obligation, that is, an obligation not to do. Property rights for the Anglo-Saxon world are all subjective rights (property rigth). For the law of our tradition, talking about property rights is meaningless, because for us when we talk about it we mean only the real relationship, that is, the person's relationship with the thing. For the specific case, we can point out that the property right over a real estate is proof of ownership (property right), because it gives you the exclusivity of the property and it is disposable. In Peru, the concepts of property rights and property rights are used interchangeably when in reality the distinction of both concepts is not clear, a situation that is of paramount importance to understand our system and coexistence with the monistic system. But in our case we focus on the prescription of ownership of a property acquired when it has been peacefully, continuously and publicly owned. Where the applicant JULIA VALENCIA MENDOZA, files a lawsuit on ADQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION OF DOMAIN against TERESA EVANGELINA LAGUNA PARI, with the location of the adjacent Clotilde Flores Huaracha. Requesting that, the purchase prescription of ownership of the property located in the Human Settlement Association Provivienda Ricardo Palma, Mz. D, Lot 1, Zone A, of the district of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, province and department of Arequipa, the same that is registered in the Registry of the Real Property in Item No. P06053283 of the Registration Zone No. XII - Headquarters Arequipa It also requests that the inscription as owner regarding the property subject of this pre-registration be provided and the cancellation of the Registration Seat No. 00002 of the Registration No. P06053283 in favor of the holder of this registration which is Teresa Evangelina Laguna Pari. That, as can be seen, “The acquisition of ownership prescription constitutes an original way of acquiring the property, and is based on the possession of a good for a certain period of time, provided that the requirements required by law are met. The first paragraph of article nine hundred and fifty of the Civil Code, regulates the so-called “long or ordinary” prescription, establishes that real property is acquired by prescription through continuous, peaceful and public possession for ten years. Interpreting the scope of the norm, it is It is evident that the concurrence of the requirements of continuity, pacificity and publicity of the possession, must be configured within the period of time established for the prescription, that is, within a minimum period of ten years, after which, an expectation right is generated on the right to property that must necessarily be declared by the competent authority and by means of a final judgment declaring the beneficiary as owner, as the authority, and not the beneficiary, the call to verify whether the budgets required by law that allow to the holder to concretize the expectation right of ownership that is attributed. In general, the motivation of the first and second instance resolutions is surprising, since we believe they were not suitable. For example, despite agreeing with the first instance resolution, I am aware that its motivation was poor. Needless to say, the second instance resolution - although it is true, adequate motivation does not imply the realization of large texts - we are faced with a short text motivation that leaves more doubts than solutions; This is despite the fact that we are faced with an abbreviated process that implies an abbreviation of the time in which the specific case will be reviewed, but there is fullness in the knowledge of the judges on the subject of the process, due to the freedom they have the parties to provide the evidence they deem appropriate. This, logically, oriented to achieve an adequate motivation of the judge who resolves, who will interpret and act the evidence presented to reach the resolution of the case. Second instance indicates that the termination of the prescription period has been interrupted up to two times: it is the first when an eviction process is initiated, taken in file N °: 1999 - 0807 on the nineteenth date of April 1999 (presentation of the demand), which concludes with a launch that, by the way, once made, the now plaintiff, ignored the judicial mandate; which in no way can be protected by law, possessing the property in an illegitimate manner, also in the 2007 - 05974 file, an eviction process has been carried out on September 4, 2007. This collegiate points out that the possession of the person who intends to be declared owner by prescription must pass without generating conflict with the rights of others; being of considering that said legal precept is violated when it is appreciated that the possession has been questioned In cassary headquarters, the lack of adequate motivation of the aforementioned resolutions is remedied, however, the Supreme Chamber is surprised to point out that there was no regulatory infraction with respect to paragraph 5 of article 139 °, being that - according to the Chamber - the Chamber Superior would have sufficiently used the fundamentals that have served as the basis for dismissing the lawsuit. However, I agree with the meaning of the final resolution of the Supreme Chamber, since - in addition - it adequately motivates the sentence issued, developing the issues that have a direct impact on the problem solved and declaring the regulatory infraction to the Article 953 of the Civil Code. That, before the analysis of my case, I agree with the Cassation No.: 3070 - 2016- Arequipa - issued by the Transitional Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic, dated October 25, 2017, which DECLARES FOUNDED on Appeal filed by Julia Valencia Mendoza and, consequently, THE contested resolution WAS married; consequently NULL the judgment of view, dated May 9, 2016, issued by the Second Civil Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Arequipa; and acting at the headquarters of the instance: CONFIRMED the appealed judgment dated September 1, 2015, which declared the claim on Acquisition of Domain Prescription founded, with the others it contains; DISPOSED the publication of this resolution in the Official Gazette "El Peruano", under responsibility; in those followed by Julia Valencia Mendoza against Teresa Evangelina Laguna Parí, on Acquisition of Domain. KEYWORDS: Purchase prescription, release, eviction, usucapion, possession, precarious occupant, cassation, appeal, property, usurper, landlord and tenant.
Link to repository: http://repositorio.ulasamericas.edu.pe/handle/upa/768
Discipline: Derecho
Grade or title grantor: Universidad Peruana de las Américas. Facultad de Derecho
Grade or title: Abogado
Register date: 14-Nov-2019; 14-Nov-2019
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