



**BARRIERS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PUBLIC
TRANSPORT REFORM IN THE CITY OF AREQUIPA**

A Thesis

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List of Acronyms

AFIN	National Association for the Promotion of Infrastructure (Spanish: <i>Asociación para el Fomento de la Infraestructura Nacional</i>)
BRT	Bus Rapid Transit
CAF	Andean Development Corporation (Spanish: <i>Corporación Andina de Fomento</i>)
CGTP	General Confederation of Workers of Peru (Spanish: <i>Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú</i>)
CT	Technical Commission (Spanish: <i>Comisión Técnica</i>)
DRC	Regional Directorate of Culture (Spanish: <i>Dirección Regional de Cultura</i>)
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
FDTA	Workers' Federation of Arequipa (Spanish: <i>Federación Departamental de Trabajadores de Arequipa</i>)
GC	Central Government (Spanish: <i>Gobierno Central</i>)
GRA	Regional Government of Arequipa (Spanish: <i>Gobierno Regional de Arequipa</i>)
IMPLA	Municipal Institute of Planning of Arequipa (Spanish: <i>Instituto Municipal de Planeamiento de Arequipa</i>)
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
INC	National Institute of Culture (Spanish: <i>Instituto Nacional de Cultura</i>)
INEI	National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (Spanish: <i>Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática</i>)
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance (Spanish: <i>Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas</i>)
MPA	Provincial Municipality of Arequipa (Spanish: <i>Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa</i>)
MTC	Ministry of Transport and Communications (Spanish: <i>Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones</i>)
OEFA	Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (Spanish: <i>Organismo de Evaluación y Fiscalización Ambiental</i>)
OPI	Office of Programming and Investments (Spanish: <i>Oficina de Programación e Inversiones</i>)

PIP	Public Investment Project (Spanish: <i>Proyecto de Inversión Pública</i>)
ProInversión	Agency for the Promotion of Private Investment (Spanish: <i>Agencia de Promoción de la Inversión Privada</i>)
ROF	Regulation of the Organization and Functions (Spanish: <i>Reglamento de Organización y Funciones</i>)
SIT	Integrated Transport System of Arequipa (Spanish: <i>Sistema Integrado de Transportes de Arequipa</i>)
SNIP	National System of Public Investment (Spanish: <i>Sistema Nacional de Inversión Pública</i>)
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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Abstract

This thesis starts with a literature review regarding the process of implementation of public policies, the gap between the formulation and implementation stages, and the role that actors play in this public policy phase. Subsequently, it develops the context of the city of Arequipa describing the current situation of the public transport, and the implementation of the public transport reform over the past few decades. The thesis mostly seeks to identify the barriers of the implementation of this public policy, which actors were not contemplated in the initial stages, and to what extent they have influenced throughout the process.

This study primarily will do this guided by the analytical framework of Subirats (2008), in order to arrange the actors in the public policy process, based on the set of ten resources that the author proposes to analyze the degree of prevalence of interests of the actors. In addition, semi-structured interviews with public officials and leaders from different institutions involved somehow in the process of the public transport reform, providing meaningful inputs to endorsement the analysis of the power of the crucial actors not contemplated and the relation with the impacts of the implementation gap. Base on the case study, it finds that the gap in the policy implementation was generated from capacities and resources of external actors despite the fact that this public policy had a favorable environment and resources for its execution. The study reinforces the non-linearity of the public policy cycle, since its progress may be influenced by unforeseen factors that in reality shape the policy of agreement, not only the public problem to be solved, but also to the correlation of forces of the various actors and their resources around it.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Public policies are the primary tool available to public institutions to materialize political purposes and modify the living conditions of beneficiaries. That is why the understanding of these in its cycle as a public policy is necessary for the entire community, with the aim of improving processes and optimizing the results obtained as opposed to initially desired as beneficial for the community. However, it is typical to assume that the success or failure of public policy depends on its implementation, since this stage covers several elements, from its conception as a solution to a social problem to the efforts of professionals and officials to design them. Notwithstanding, this stage is susceptible to any change in power relations, to the institutional structure responsible for its execution, or to the participation of actors.

In the case of Peru, public policies that contribute to its development process are required through the efficient provision of infrastructure services as part of development policies. According to the National Infrastructure Plan to 2025 prepared by the Association for the Promotion of National Infrastructure, the infrastructure gap amounted to 159 billion dollars, where the transport sector is the one that absorbs most of this gap, estimated that it amounts to 57 billion dollars (Asociación para el Fomento de la Infraestructura Nacional, 2015). The absence of adequate infrastructure includes a significant obstacle in the development of a country, its social welfare, and its economic growth.

On the other hand, since the year 2002 when Law 27783, Law of Bases of Decentralization (Spanish: *Ley de Bases de la Descentralización*) was enacted, it is the Regional Governments and their authorities that select and execute public policies according to the needs of their regions and their criteria. In the case of the Arequipa Region, there was a political and citizen agreement on the need to implement policies that facilitate the development of new infrastructure that mitigates the urban transport problem in the Province of Arequipa, where the second city with the largest population of Peru is located. Likewise, the Provincial Municipality of Arequipa (Spanish: *Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa*, MPA), within its capabilities, and in the face of the deficiencies of the city's current urban public transport system since 2003 has developed several studies that seek the implementation of a transportation system that will meet the transportation needs of the city within the standards of service quality, environmental regulations and profitability for the investor, among others.

Additionally, more than 20 years ago local authorities in Arequipa have worked to improve their transport system and implement it massively. However, until now, no municipal management has been able to solve it. It will be one of the main tasks for those who assume the management from January of the following year.

Moreover, while studying the system of BRTs (Bus Rapid Transit) for the Integrated Transport System of Arequipa (Spanish: *Sistema Integrado de Transportes de Arequipa*, SIT), the project was suspended in 2013 by a private monorail initiative supported by the State and then abandoned in 2016. This situation weakened the relationship of the national entity with local authorities. Since two years ago, the MPA has resumed the bus project with essential infrastructure investments corresponding to the first phase of the SIT.

The transport reform through the execution of the SIT, object of study of the present investigation, is part of a public policy that aims to solve the problems described above. However, this reform has been controversial due to its cost, requirements of technical studies, and excessive implementation time. Therefore, the following question is proposed: what are the barriers in the implementation of the public transport reform in the city of Arequipa?

Consequently, the research presents as a probable hypothesis, that the MPA, among other levels of government and in general, public institutions, consider that the legal, human and economic resources are the most important and sometimes unique, to have in account for the implementation of public policies, underestimating the need for consensus with different actors. During the implementation of the reform, the corresponding agencies did not contemplate the appearance of new actors such as professional associations, unions, neighborhood associations and other public institutions; whose actions decisively impacted on the change of its technical and economic nature. In order to verify these assumptions, this research seeks to answer the following secondary questions:

- What are the characteristics of the implementation of the SIT?
- Which are the actors not contemplated in the implementation of the SIT?
- What is the influence of these actors in the implementation of the SIT?

The justification for this research is relevant because it will address a recurrent problem in the implementation of public policies, lack of consensus and coordination, and its effects. Besides, this is an important issue because there are no previous studies on the influence of actors in the implementation of policies in subnational contexts. Finally, the

relevance of this work will allow knowing the impact generated by the actions of these actors in the final decisions.

This case study is of a descriptive nature since its characteristics will be presented in a specified period. Likewise, the design of the research is qualitative, observing the case without manipulating any variable. The tools for the collection of information were semi-structured interviews, analysis of bibliographic sources and official documents of the municipality and ministries.

The content of this thesis is structured in five chapters. The first chapter corresponds to the introductory part and the parameters of the investigation. In the second chapter, the theoretical aspects and the state of the question will be covered, highlighting the public policy process, the implementation gap, the policy actors and the operationalization of the research. The third chapter describes the current situation of public transport in the city of Arequipa and the context of the SIT implementation, including background, the process that determined its adoption as public policy, the strengths of the initial design and a first approach to the problems of its implementation.

In the fourth chapter, the agencies responsible for public policy are presented, the deficiencies to execute it and the attempts to strengthen it. Likewise, it shows the set of actors around the policy, its central actions and its ability to influence to postpone or determine the implementation of it. Additionally, it analyzes the principal modifications that affected the initial design of the policy and allowed its execution, the effects that the implementation problems had, and the factors that were omitted; allowing to answer both the general question and the secondary questions of the investigation and reflect on the main finding of the research.

Chapter 2: Analytical Framework and Literature Review

2.1. The Process of Implementation of Public Policies

The study of public policies as an academic discipline within political science is not recent. According to Lindblom, the works of numerous authors were decisive to understand that the concern of policy is not only relative to power, but also to political decisions and their implementation (1991, p. 5). Therefore, while a policy is a term associated with power relations for government purposes, public policy is a term associated with practical actions of government.

On the concept of public policy, Birkland defines it as "the action of the government and the intentions that determine those actions" (2001, p. 21). While, for Kraft and Furlong (2007, p. 5) it is a "course of governmental action or inaction in response to public problems." The focus of both concepts focuses on government actions.

However, from the descriptive point of view, it is interesting to define it as a set consisting of one or several objectives considered necessary or desirable and by means and actions that are treated, at least partially, by a government, institution or organization in order to guide the behavior of individual or collective actors to modify a situation perceived as unsatisfactory or problematic (Roth, 2002, p. 27). Although the institutions have an evident weight, public policies not only emanate from compliance with institutionalized rules, but the actors have their intentions and goals. Even so, these goals are not fixed over time and vary according to the response and understanding of each actor to the institutions (Scharpf, 1997, p. 36).

Likewise, it must be taken into account that every approach reaffirms that public policies seek to solve public problems. According to Caldera (2005, p. 4), public problems are presented as particular situations that affect specific social groups. In this same line, Subirats considers them as a constituent element of public policy, the intention to solve a social problem politically recognized as public (2008, p. 38). Therefore, public policies are not an end in themselves; but a means to respond to some social issues.

At this point, it is crucial to determine a framework of analysis for public policies. It is functional for the present investigation, regarding the cycle of public policies, the proposal of five phases of Subirats (2008, p. 44) which include emergence and perception of the problem, incorporation into the political agenda, formulation, implementation, and

evaluation. To Aguilar (1993, p. 15), the policy cycle is an intellectually constructed analytical device, for modeling, ordering, explaining and prescribing a policy.

It should be noted that all phases of the public policy process have the same importance; albeit for the present case study, the implementation phase is significant. According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), implementation is the most dynamic phase of the public policy cycle, as it is "the fulfillment of a basic political decision" (Cited in Aguilar, 2000, p. 329). Although in this phase the decisions of political power materialize, their analysis within the public policy process is relatively new.

In the context of Latin America, Lahera (2005), believes that the problem is not public policies, but their implementation; defining it as a deliberate and sequential set of government activities aimed at achieving objectives, thus its transformation into results. Meanwhile, Subirats (2008, p. 44), emphasizes that the implementation phase consists of adapting the policy program to the specific situation that it will face. Thereupon, it is clear from these concepts, that the implementation phase of public policies consists of the execution of the decisions adopted in the previous phase.

It is opportune to mention the three models of implementation of public policies widely accepted in the literature examined: top-down model, conceives a linear process and denies the role of other actors other than the government (Sabatier, 1986); bottom-up model, considers a non-linear and interactive process and involves the actors (Powell, 1999); and incrementalist model, which combines the previous models taking advantage of their strengths, emphasizing the negotiation of the policy (Parson, 1995).

Considering as evidence the failure in the implementation of many public policies of different types and by different levels of government, it is considered that the Peruvian State manages a hierarchical model, whose particularity lies in the influence of the technocratic approaches of the government on the implementation of policies, relying on its ability to control. This model reaffirms the perspective, according to which, once the public policy has been formulated, its implementation belongs only to the technical-administrative field. Grindle and Thomas (1991), support this vision on implementation, who assume it as an interactive decision-making process of a political elite and administrators, for which political, administrative and financial resources are indispensable.

From the opposite perspective, it is affirmed that the implementation is a complicated process, because it implies to start up multiple political and administrative actions, which are

mutually supportive; recognizing that the higher the number of actions and actors involved, the more complex the implementation (Powell, 1999). This definition gathers the points of view of the present study, because it extracts the implementation of public policies from the merely technical-administrative field, and recognizes the presence of external agents, which can eventually make the process more complicated. Hence, depending on the degree of complexity, this could mean the failure of a specific policy.

2.2. The Gap in the Implementation of Public Policies

At any level of government, the implementation of public policies does not always go according to plan, leaving a margin between the formulation and implementation stages, known as the implementation gap. Despite the frames of reference within which the bid between the actors should be developed and the hierarchy of their process, any implementation of the public policy has a gap between what was planned and what is finally obtained "the perfect implementation is perfectly unreachable" (Roth, 2002, p. 108). Lewis and Haas (2005), have defined as an implementation gap, those missing links between the process of creating a program and making it work; while for Bossidy et al. (2002), they mean the difference between the strategy and its results.

Sabatier and Mazmanian point out that successful implementation in the short term depends primarily on the force of the law and, in particular, on the degree of integration of the authorities, the commitment of institutional officials, the presence of a mediator and the resources of various groups of electors (1980, p. 370). Therefore, considering the implementation gap as a result of the interaction between government, the private sector, and civil society; they highlight as possible causes the public opposition and the limited role of civil society. Moreover, Revuelta affirms that a greater or lesser probability of success in the implementation of a policy may depend on the type of policy to be implemented (2007, p. 140).

In order to understand the position mention above, it is necessary to review the typology of public policies from the perspective of the social sciences. Alza (2012), proposes a classification based on its nature: management, which seeks to solve the problems of organization and operation of public administration; economic, referring to the management of state finances; and social, whose objective contributes to mitigating the basic needs of citizens or poverty in all its dimensions.

Social policies are, in the first instance, those that contribute to increase or decrease the welfare of individuals and society as a whole, because they directly affect the lives of people, through public services (health, education, pensions, opportunity to access to housing) or public infrastructure (transit roads, bridges, aqueducts, power plants). Even more, Revuelta (2007), indicates that the implementation of economic or management policies is given through a more formal process than social policies. That formality is due to laws and regulations; while social policies also depend on the creation of programs, plans or regulations. Therefore, this difference between types of policies is a crucial indicator at the time of implementation, which will determine with what force this process, will be carried out.

Bearing in mind that the implementation of transport infrastructure policies is part of social policy, the case study presents characteristics that allow us to foresee implementation gaps. Sometimes these gaps are expressed in situations of conflict; thus, it is necessary to define this concept and note the differences with respect to social conflict. The conflict can be interpersonal or group, and its solution usually lies in the appropriate change of the interests of individuals or groups. According to Ministerial Resolution N° 161, which approves the guidelines and strategies for the management of social conflicts, defines social conflict as a dynamic social process in which two or more parties or interdependent stakeholders perceive their interests are opposed (goals or incompatible worldviews, lack of resources, unsatisfied basic needs, and interference from the other party to achieve their goals or objectives), adopting actions that may constitute a threat to governability or public order.

2.3. The Actors in Public Policy

The actors are a fundamental element of public policy in any of its phases, including also the resources, the institutional rules and the content of the policy itself (Subirats, 2008, p. 30). According to Revuelta (2007, p. 139), points out that implementation is a process, in which a policy can be influenced by several independent variables, such as the actors, whose actions can support, alter or obstruct the fulfillment of the original objectives.

On the other hand, in spite of the fact that the institutions include a combination of legal or informal rules that delimit the possible actions of the individuals; they do not determine the courses of action, the actors are institutionally delimited by a particular spectrum of actions, but these are the ones that ultimately determine their strategic movements. Each actor is institutionally constructed since it emerges based on pre-existing

rules. Such rules not only enable its constitution but are those that ensure its permanence and performance (Paulo, 2005).

Additionally, Zurbriggen, when talking about the repercussion of the actors in public policies, it is necessary to take into account also the constellation of actors. This term refers not only to the set of actors that participate in a particular policy, but also to their positioning in the structure and their possible action strategies with respect to it, to the possible results that would take place from the different strategies of action of the actors and, finally, the preferences, expectations or assessment of the actors with respect to such possible outcomes (2006, p. 75). Therefore, when it comes to implementing public policy, it is essential to identify the constellation of actors that intervene in it, since the different strategic options that they take, result in different political outcomes.

Meltsner (1992, p. 375), indicates that an actor can be an individual, a function, a group, a committee, a bureaucratic team, a coalition or even a state, in so much as it pretends to influence for or on public policy. The actors are distinguished from each other by the positions they adopt in the face of some policy, before, during or after some of the phases of the public policy process. Although some actor may remain neutral at the beginning, it is likely that the dynamics of the political game push the actors to lean towards someplace, allowing the actors to be identified in favor or against (Meltsner, 1992, p. 374).

At this point, it is essential to identify the types of actors that exist around public policy. Subirats (2008, pp. 49-68), proposes to identify the actors according to their public nature. On the one hand, the political-administrative actors, with public character; and on the other hand, the private or non-public actors (target groups, final beneficiaries, and third parties). This classification is better suited to the actors involved in the public policy of this study.

Subirats (2008), argues a definition for these two groups of actors. Public actors are the set of institutions belonging to the political-administrative system of the State, and legally are the only ones capable of formulating or implementing public policies. Additionally, they present four specific elements: the power of coercion over society, administrative organizations and the bureaucracy that implies, interaction with society, and internal interaction.

On the other hand, private actors are natural or legal persons, or organizations that group such persons. These actors are divided into three subtypes: target groups, whose

behavior is considered politically the direct or indirect cause of the problem that is being addressed; final beneficiaries, are those to whom the problem directly and negatively affects; and third groups, whose situation can be positively or negatively modified without it being the object of public policy. The prevalence of the interests of the actors in the public policy process will depend on the resources they can appeal to and on those that finally make use of them. Subirats suggests a set of ten resources, as shown in Table 1 below:

Table 1: *Resources of the Actors in the Public Policy Process*

1. Legal	They are mainly available to public actors based on law. In the form of legal and regulatory bases, they constitute a source of legitimacy for all public actions.
2. Human	Constituted quantitatively or qualitatively by the staff, and depend on the training or recruitment that the actors possess.
3. Economic	Capacities of public and private actors, to mobilize and allocate money for the financing of goods, services or others, for or against public policy.
4. Cognitive	The technical, social, economic and political knowledge that the actors possess, related to the problem that is to be solved. It is essential for the conduct of the policy by public actors.
5. Relational	The organizational structure of each actor. In turn, formed by individual actors, administrative units and the ability to relate to other actors.
6. Trustworthy	Ability to reach agreements with the parties. In turn, this resource can reinforce the legitimacy of public policy.
7. Chronological	Time with the actors count. Although of a negative connotation, any object is a function of the deadlines.
8. Patrimonial	Made up of the set of tangible assets available to the actors. Any public policy makes use of public goods, in order to achieve its objectives.
9. Majority	Political support available to an actor, through the approval or majority support of public policy in any instance of debate contemplated by law.
10. Violence	It is constituted by the capacity for legitimate coercion through the use of physical force. The indiscriminate use of this resource can undermine the trust of other actors.

Note. Source: Subirats, 2008, pp. 69-92

In view of the fact that the present research seeks to provide the actors according to the approach proposed by Subirats (2008), it is relevant to define them. On the one hand, public actors, that is, the government and the public administration. On the other hand, private actors, which can be of different nature.

Hidalgo (2001), defines the government as a political elite responsible for channeling and filtering the demands and interests of a political and social type, whose primary function is to conceive sectoral or global-type political projects to resolve public affairs harmoniously. Likewise, Cruz (2001), points out that the primary activity of the government is the production of public policies and programs for the satisfaction of social demands. Highlighting the importance of its legitimacy, as of its actions, both definitions contribute to recognizing the competencies for the design and application of public policies, as a fundamental feature of a government.

Regarding public administration, Guerrero (1997, p. 25), indicates that it constitutes the action of the State aimed at producing the conditions that facilitate the perpetuation of society, creating the development capabilities of the elements that constitute it. Marshall (1967, p. 12), highlights that "the public administration is not merely an inanimate machine that executes the work of the government irreflexively." On the contrary, "public administration is related to the problems of the government, and is interested in achieving the goals and objectives of the State. The public administration is the State in action". The latter makes the public administration perceive as an entity or actor with its own interests.

On the other hand, when defining private actors, we must take into account that they are distinguished from each other by the positions they adopt in the face of public policy. However, they can also be differentiated by their activism in favor (supporters) or against (opponents). "Some actors show more interest than others, they have more to gain or lose than others" (Meltsner, 1992, p. 374). Consequently, the degree of interest can be used as a category of analysis and in such a case, it is essential to define the concept of interest groups.

According to Asensio (1972, p. 91), are those associations that maintain among their usual means of action the influence on public bodies with the intention of orienting them in the sense of the interests of the group. Quoting other authors, Asensio adds that "they express demands, claim claims or take positions on the basis of a community of attitudes (interest or opinion)".

2.4. Research Operationalization

2.4.1. Methodology

The present research is a case study and is qualitative. Due to the public policy of transport planning is a policy aimed at improving the quality of life in the city; thus it is a transport policy in the city; the gathering of information focuses on using the methodology proposed in the case study.

As indicated in the introduction, the central research question "what are the barriers in the implementation of the public transport reform in the city of Arequipa?". To answer this question, the study has been proposed as a descriptive one and has been approached based on a deductive perspective, analyzing the particular from the general (Aktouf, 2001). That is to say, from the bibliographic review and the analysis of the constructed theoretical body, the elements that explain and affect the implementation barriers were identified and an operationalization of the concepts was carried out in order to be able to apply them in the analysis chapter of the failed process of the implementation of public policy.

According to Barzelay and Cortázar (2004), the case study is an adequate research strategy to analyze management practices precisely because of its capacity to allow a holistic reconstruction of the processes. When proposing the applicable method for the study of social management practices, the reader is invited to elaborate a story about the experience that is interested in studying (2004, p. 22). Likewise, Gerring states that a case study is "an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units. A unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon such as a nation-state, revolution, political party, election, or person-observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time" (2004, p. 302).

Consequently, this research is guided by the analytical framework of Subirats (2008), in order to arrange the actors in the public policy process, based on the set of ten resources that the author proposes to analyze the degree of prevalence of interests of the actors. Moreover, to answer the central question of the study according to the analytical framework, sub-questions have been proposed to address the general research topic:

- What are the characteristics of the implementation of the SIT?
- Which are actors not contemplated in the implementation of the SIT?
- What is the influence of these actors in the implementation of the SIT?

2.4.2. Data Collection

This study is based primarily on the review of information and secondary data. This includes official documents of the municipality and ministries, academic studies on public transport reforms in Peru, news, reports and other analyzes of civil organizations related to the implementation of public policy, among others. As a whole, this data will allow knowing under which axes this public policy was worked and the occurrence of the most significant incidents that contribute to the investigation of the case.

Similarly, semi-structured interviews with public officials from different institutions responsible for the reform of public transport such as the MPA, professional colleges and civil society organizations are used for the development of the research (see Appendix 1 and 2). The use of the case study Barzelay and Cortázar (2004), it will allow us to highlight the changes, events and development of public policy that occurred at certain moments of the reform to appreciate changes of positions or shared or conflicting interests among the actors involved.

Chapter 3: Background of the Public Transport Reform in Arequipa

3.1. Current Situation of the Public Transport in Arequipa

The Province of Arequipa is located in southern Peru, in the Arequipa Region (see Figure 1) and it is constituted by 29 districts, 19 of which are part of the metropolitan area of the capital of the province and greater city of the Arequipa Region (City of Arequipa). Following Law 23853, the Province of Arequipa is the administrative and political jurisdiction of the MPA (Instituto Municipal de Planeamiento, 2016).



Figure 1. Location of Arequipa in Peru.

Retrieved from: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=7310706>

According to the last census carried out in 2017, the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (Spanish: *Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática*, INEI), indicates that the city of Arequipa has a population of 1'080,635 inhabitants with a density of 101 people per hectare (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, 2018). This population

density is too low for a city of limited soil resources¹. For its part, the Municipal Institute of Planning of Arequipa (Spanish: *Instituto Municipal de Planeamiento de Arequipa*, IMPLA), has calculated that more than a quarter of the current area of the city has grown in the last decade, due to the fact that in recent years it has undergone a process of explosive expansion due to invasion and speculation (Instituto Municipal de Planeamiento, 2016). The urban dispersion generates less density in the city, which produces greater dependence on the automobile and increases, finally, energy consumption and social exclusion.

On the other hand, the city offers many tourist and cultural attractions and is proud to have a Historic Center declared Cultural Heritage of Humanity by the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). The road network of Arequipa has a length of more than 1,040 km, distributed in trunk roads, road rings, collector roads, and local roads with minimal capacity, where about 1 million trips are made daily. Users describe the current transport system as chaotic. The fleet is almost 84% obsolete, levels of congestion are increasingly alarming, and there is no road culture between drivers and pedestrians, which causes the vehicle to be approached anywhere, as well as passenger drops (EMBARQ Andino, 2011).

The service provided by public transporters is qualified as terrible; thus, there are needs to opt for substitute means of transport service among which are: buses, taxis and, private vehicles. These alternative options generate an alarming increase in congestion implying loss for the city in terms of man-hours, fuel consumption, devaluation of property in areas of greatest pollution and congestion, pollution from vehicle emissions, noise pollution and traffic accidents.

Also, the current urban public transport system of the city of Arequipa, is a result of various factors, from migration phenomena, rules of business deregulation of transport, import of used vehicles, overlap of routes, informality in public transport, insufficient resources for the construction of road infrastructure, and the current situation of the SIT implementation.

3.2. The Integrated Transport System

In the sector of the public passenger transport service of the city of Arequipa, a comprehensive reform is being carried out, that will allow to have an urban order and an

¹ Cataloged as low thus the range established in the Supreme Decree N° 004-2011-VIVIENDA, fluctuates between one and 165 inhabitants per hectare (Instituto Municipal de Planeamiento, 2016).

organization of the sector, oriented to provide quality services. This requires a process of institutional reform of the companies that currently provide the service of regular transportation, accompanied by the strengthening of their capacities and the modernization that implies a change of 100% of their vehicle fleet.

The MPA, after several years of studies since 2000, has been implementing the first Integrated Public Transport System in the country, with the support of the Andean Development Corporation (Spanish: *Corporación Andina de Fomento*, CAF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Ministry of Transport and Communications (Spanish: *Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones*, MTC) and EMBARQ Andino which consists of studies of origin-destination, plan regulating routes, technical files, and execution of works (MPA, 2017).

The Integrated Transport System is understood as the massive sustainable urban mobility system, composed of several transport services, which work operationally, physically and technologically integrated to provide a more efficient optimal service with spatial coverage throughout the city. The SIT consists of: 79 routes grouped into 12 business units (see Table 2), operationally and technologically integrated in a virtual and physical way in special stops or transfer points, with spatial coverage throughout the city and operated with an operational component and a technological component. In addition to the two mentioned components, the SIT considers the need for road infrastructure.

The income from the SIT will be collected and transferred to a trust that will distribute the corresponding compensation of each operator of the management units of the system, in accordance with the provisions of the respective concession contracts. The operation of the different management units that make up the system will be in charge of private operators, under the concession contracts granted by the MPA (see Figure 2). The term of the concession will be 15 years, and may be renewed for the same period, counted from the start date of the effective operation of the SIT. However, the starting date of the effective operation will not exceed 24 months from the date of signature of the concession contract, these 24 months being the pre-operative stage of the concession (Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa, 2017a).

Table 2: *Composition of SIT routes*

Business Units		Number of Routes
1	C1A	1
2	C1B	1
3	C2	9
4	C3	6
5	C4	11
6	C5	4
7	C6	6
8	C7	6
9	C8	4
10	C9	9
11	C10	12
12	C11	10
Total	12	79

Note. Source: Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa, 2017b

3.3. The Programmatic Framework of the SIT

The Public Investment Project (Spanish: *Proyecto de Inversión Pública*, PIP) "Integral and sustainable improvement of public transport services in the city of Arequipa", commonly referred to as the SIT, was conceived as an ambitious project with the objective of providing adequate, efficient, equitable and sustainable public transport. The project consists mainly of three components: road infrastructure works, tendering for the operational and technological component, and tendering for the operation of routes. In 2007, the profile of the project is prepared by the economist Lizardo Calderón, who is currently the technical coordinator of the SIT.




Figure 2. Tender for Route Concession: Business Units.

Source: Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa, 2017b

The Office of Programming and Investments (Spanish: *Oficina de Programación e Inversiones*, OPI) de MPA, made the registration of this project in the Project Bank of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Spanish: *Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas*, MEF) in February 2008². The Registration Form - Project Bank (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2018) establishes:

According to the census conducted by the INEI for the year 2007 the city of Arequipa has a population of 864,250 inhabitants, being 49.22% men and 50.80% women, having a 26.4% of 0 to 14 years, 66.2% of 15 to 64 years and 7.4% of 65 years plus. There is a consensus that public transport services have worsened in recent years (68% of respondents). The safest ways to travel are: taxi 41% and bus 26%. The least safe way is the small bus 49%, followed by the motorcycle 30%.

Regarding the most comfortable way to travel, the answers are similar, with 54% opting for the taxi and 22% for the bus. The most uncomfortable way is the small bus

² According to the SNIP regulations, a PIP is approved and registered in the Project Bank by the OPI of the applicant entity, as a prerequisite to the preparation of pre-investment studies.

79%. For 70% of users, the services are good or reasonable. For 29% they are wrong or awful and for these users, the services are inadequate in every aspect. Almost all users 94% consider that transport contributes to air pollution and also affects the health of their family 97%. Most use transport twice a day 52%, and 35% travel four times. In terms of double fare, 15% of users need to take two or more units to complete the trip. The 70% of users want new, comfortable, safer vehicles, with trained drivers and more direct routes. The cost was mentioned as an essential element by only 7% of the interviewees.³

In addition, the SIT was contemplated in the Master Plan of Metropolitan Arequipa 2002-2015, a document that includes the execution of new infrastructure projects for the urban development of the city, approved in November 2002 by the Provincial Council of Arequipa through the Ordinance Municipal N° 160. Moreover, there are legal provisions stipulated that this was the exclusive competence of the MPA:

- Law 23853, Organic Law of Municipalities (Spanish: *Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades*), in force at the time of the approval of said plan, which declared the competence of the municipalities to plan the development of their constituencies and execute the corresponding plans.
- Law 27680, Constitutional Reform Law (Spanish: *Ley de Reforma Constitucional*), which specifies the competence of local governments, to plan the urban and rural development of their constituencies, including zoning, urban planning and territorial conditioning.
- Law 27972, New Organic Law of Municipalities (Spanish: *Nueva Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades*), which also established that the approval of the Territorial Conditioning Plan at the provincial level, identifying urban areas and urban expansion; and the Urban Development Plan, corresponded only to the municipalities.

The project followed the corresponding course and after having requested some modifications in the project, the OPI approved the pre-feasibility study in January 2009; however, new modifications were required in the feasibility study, thereupon the project was returned to the Urban Transportation and Traffic Circulation Management, recommending a re-evaluation. Finally, the feasibility profile was approved in July 2009.

³ Section 3.2 on the characteristics of the direct beneficiaries - Format SNIP-0303 (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2018).

Although these initiatives were made during the management of the provincial mayor Juan Manuel Guillén (1999-2002), it is during a later management of the provincial mayor Simón Balbuena (2007-2010) that the project finally began. The documents reviewed allow observing the willingness of the MPA to implement this project, as well as the wish of the burgomaster to execute the SIT.

3.4. The Initial Strength of the SIT

The strengths for the implementation of the SIT, can be observed by the deployment of resources made by the MPA. According to Subirats (2008), it can be identified the following:

3.4.1. Legal Resources

The signing of the Framework Agreement for Interinstitutional Cooperation N° 245-2008GRA/PR, of the Regional Presidency, opened the way for the signing of Convention N° 268-2008-GRA/PR, on delegation of competences of the MPA, in matters of urban development, transport and transit. This is a resource that gives excellent facilities in the field of the PIP. It should be noted that there is a technical and legal regulatory framework, mandatory compliance throughout the national territory for the implementation of infrastructure projects:

- Law 27157, Law for the Regularization of Buildings (Spanish: *Ley de Regularización de Edificaciones*), the Procedure for the declaration of Factory and the Regime of Real Estate Units of Exclusive Property and Common Property, approved in 1999.
- Law 27181, the General Transportation Law (Spanish: *Ley General del Transporte*) establishes the general, economic, organizational and regulatory guidelines for transportation and land transit that apply throughout the country, approved in 1999.
- National Building Regulations (Spanish: *Reglamento Nacional de Edificaciones*), in force through Supreme Decree N° 011-2006-Vivienda.
- Law 29090, Law on the Regulation of Urban and Building Qualifications (Spanish: *Ley de Regulación de Habilitaciones Urbanas y de Edificaciones*), approved in 2007.

The approval of the PIP reflects that the SIT was ascribed to all of them and complied with them.

3.4.2. Human Resources

The MPA, to assume its responsibility to manage the public transport, established the Urban Transport and Road Traffic Management and from it the SIT team of Arequipa is formed. Initially, this team was created by CAF's technical cooperation in 2007 and then, in 2012, it was incorporated into the MPA. The team consists of about 10 people, including lawyers, financial specialists, transport engineers, technology specialists, in charge of concessions and infrastructure. All of them are consultants who work full time on the SIT and were hired outside the MPA.

The pre-investment studies (profile, pre-feasibility and feasibility) of the SIT were carried out by the economist Lizardo Calderón, and the supervision of the work, during its execution, are also under his charge. He has been the technical coordinator of the SIT since 2010 and worked on this project since 2007. He was in charge at the beginning of the pre-investment studies, as well as the drafting of the concession contracts and for the last two years he has been in charge of tenders of contracts. Prior to joining the SIT team in Arequipa, he was Coordinator of budgets, project and planning in the Intendancy of Protected Areas of the Ministry of the Environment, with an affinity for the projects that allow to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and experience in the PIP formulation. Additionally, he worked as Director of Agricultural Infrastructure and Irrigation of the Ministry of Agriculture between 2015 and 2016.

3.4.3. Trustworthy Resources

In order to overcome the problem of transport and the collateral effects of the implementation of the SIT, the MPA has been minimizing the interests against the modernization of public transport services with the support of all political sectors, public opinion and, especially it seeks the support of the population that is harmed by the poor service provided, undermining their health, and generating waste of time. The other essential aspect is the empowerment of the project by the actors directly involved: transporters and users. In the case of local transport companies, with the support of CAF, the SIT has been socialized directly with the partners of each of the companies that requested the training and participated in the calls of the MPA.

3.4.4. Majority Resources

The Regional Council and the Provincial Council, as organs with legislative and oversight powers, are actors whose function could have hindered the implementation of

public policy. The revised documentation allows to see that in the stages prior to the implementation of the SIT there was a relative consensus, both in the Regional Council and in the Provincial Council.⁴ As indicated in the Minutes of the Ordinary Session of the Regional Council of May 7, 2009:

The engineer Miguel Ocharán, made the visual exhibition regarding the project Interconnector Trunk Road Construction between the districts of the province of Arequipa. The Secretary, read the draft regional agreement and the President approved unanimously.

Another reason for the support of this project was the inability of the MPA to access the international economic support on its own. This determined the transfer of competence from this project and the MPA received from the Regional Government of Arequipa (Spanish: *Gobierno Regional de Arequipa*, GRA) the support needed for the CAF to disburse resources that will ensure the complete execution of the project. Thus, through the Official Letter N° 1002-2009-GRA, the regional commitment is reaffirmed by the delivery of the written communication signed by the president of the GRA, Juan Manuel Guillén, addressed to Eleonora Silva, representative of the CAF.

Likewise, the coordinator of the SIT, Lizardo Calderón, stressed that the project should be continued by the new municipal authority elected in the following periods. Failure to do so would lead to criminal complaint, because it is a project immersed in a program of national priority, which seeks to diminish environmental pollution, a task that is also regulated by municipal ordinances and the local and regional environmental agenda that is bound to be fulfilled (ANDINA, 2010).

3.5. The Implementation Gap of the SIT

As noted in the previous sections, the SIT apparently had a favorable environment for its implementation, and the need for its execution provided it with strength against its opponents, since it was a work desired by the community in general. However, the SIT is the road project of five municipal administrations⁵, more than three technical studies and has

⁴ The Article 11 of Law 27867 indicates that the Regional Council is the regulatory and oversight body of the Regional Government. It is composed of the Regional President, the Regional Vice President and the Councilors of the provinces of each region, with a minimum of seven and a maximum of 25, the same who are elected by direct suffrage for a period of four years. The mandate is inalienable, but revocable according to the Law of the matter.

⁵ In Peru, mayors are elected by universal and secret vote since 1963. These elections were interrupted between 1969 and 1979. Since 1999, the term of municipal government is four years.

changed its name four times in the last 20 years (see Table 3). The following is a summary of the events that occurred during the implementation of the public policy throughout the different municipal administrations from 1999 to the present.

Table 3: *Municipal Administration of Arequipa (1999-2018)*

Period	Mayor	Political Party
1999-2002	Juan Manuel Guillén	Arequipa, Tradición y Futuro
2003-2006	Yamel Romero	Partido Aprista Peruano
2007-2010	Simón Balbuena	Partido Nacionalista Peruano
2011-2014	Alfredo Zegarra	Arequipa Renace
2015-2018	Alfredo Zegarra	Arequipa Renace

Note. Source: Instituto Municipal de Planeamiento, 2016

3.5.1. *Juan Manuel Guillén (1999-2002)*

The first attempt to reform transport according to Montaña (2016), emerges as an idea in 1999, when Juan Manuel Guillén joined the MPA and ordered that the transport problem be evaluated through a technical study. During this process, the IDB prepared the terms of reference for the "Sustainable Transport Study" financed by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The Padeco Consortium prepared the document, which suggested implementing trunk transport routes accompanied by feeder routes. This is how the first SIT sketch came about with the delivery of Padeco's study in 2003.

3.5.2. *Yamel Romero (2003-2006)*

Upon assuming the mayor's office, the Mayor received Padeco's study, but did not implement it because it was incomplete since it was not enough to determine the demand for travel by people from one point to another. In addition, it still did not have code in the SNIP, basic requirement to start physical works to adapt the roads to this new transport. The burgomaster commissioned the study of origin and destination to the Swiss Foundation for Development Cooperation and manages the project of the Massive Efficient Urban Transportation (Spanish: *Transporte Urbano Masivo Eficiente*, TUME), that had feeder and structuring routes, plus a trunk route called "Corredor Vitrina" that went from north to south with BRTs (Bus Rapid Transit). This project was delivered in 2006. However, this plan was

neither registered in the SNIP nor performed at the end of the municipal administration (Montaño, 2016).

3.5.3. Simón Balbuena (2007-2010)

During this administration, in 2008 a new demand study was commissioned to the Spanish consultancy ALG. According to Herrera (2013), the project took the name of "Mistibus" and changed its design since for its operation three components had to be developed: infrastructure, execution of 21 road works in the city and, concession of routes and technological component. The "Corredor Vitrina" was changed by two trunk corridors, decreasing the number of feeder and structuring routes to 78.

The MPA registered the SIT project in the SNIP in February 2008. However, the OPI of the MPA approved the feasibility study of the project after one year, thus the date of the viability declaration was in July 2009 (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2018). Although the implementation of the project was scheduled for October, due to the lack of preparation of the technical file, it was not until December 2009 that the physical works for the construction of the BRT system began, with the first section. It should be noted that this delay was related to external actors who identified flaws in the process since it was intended to start the works without having the technical file approved, which caused the works to be delayed until the month of March, marking the first gap of implementation of this public policy.

In September 2010, the first tender of the routes was carried out. However, the process ended in December, declaring seven business units deserted and the MPA did not sign contracts with the winning bidders of the three business units due to the change in management (Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa, 2017b).

Likewise, in October 2010, the MPA made the first call for tenders for the concession of the operation of the technological component, a process that concluded in December 2010, by which the bidding process was declared void because the bidders had not been submitted to the act of presentation of proposals (Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa, 2017a).

3.5.4. Alfredo Zegarra (2011-2014 and 2015-2018)

On taking up his position, the burgomaster changed the name of the SIT again and called it "Arequipa Bus". On the other hand, as a result of the MPA's debts, the Government's guarantee was delayed to obtain the loan of 150 million soles (equivalent to 45 million

dollars)⁶ from the CAF for the works of the project, due to the budget was insufficient, problem that had already been identified in the previous municipal management, but by the absence of the technical file of the project, the process to obtain financing was not followed; hence, since January, the MEF assessed the viability of the project, momentarily paralyzing its implementation (Del Mar, 2017). It is relevant to mention that the SIT had the viability granted by the OPA of the MPA, but to obtain external financing it required such viability of the MEF.

On the signature of the contracts with the consortiums that won the good in the process of granting routes in the previous municipal management, the burgomaster temporarily suspended them, calling a second tender for routes in May 2011 and the second tender for the technological component in December. The MPA declared the nullity of the decisions of the special committee regarding the granting of the goodwill of the three business units, declaring them deserted, because the OCI made observations to the bidding process of routes (Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa, 2017b).

In June 2012, the technical file of the second section was presented to the MTC for evaluation and comments. Additionally, the definitive study of the third section was developed, to which goal expansions are identified, finding the variation in the design and the budgetary estimate that far exceed the cost of work according to feasibility; and according to the SNIP regulations for projects in execution, the OPI recommended carrying out the First Feasibility Verification Study to verify the validity of the project's profitability (Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa, 2012).

In August 2012 when the mayor handed over the project to the Central Government (Spanish: *Gobierno Central*, GC) due to lack of economic resources to continue with the execution of the SIT, thus the intention of credit was withdrawn by the MPA with the CAF, after having been under review of viability of the MEF for 20 months. Consequently, Carlos Paredes, Minister of the MTC signed an agreement with the MPA allocating the investment of 500 million soles (equivalent to 152 million dollars) for the implementation of the SIT (Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones, 2012). In May 2013, after almost a year of review, the technical report of the First Feasibility Verification Study was issued, which,

⁶ Exchange rate at 3.2918 soles/dollar
(https://www.sbs.gob.pe/app/pp/SISTIP_PORTAL/Paginas/Publicacion/TipoCambioPromedio.aspx, last accessed: 28/08/2018)

despite presenting variations in the project, the OPI of the MPA verified the feasibility (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2018).

However, all these revisions and updates of studies requested by the MTC and the MEF were unproductive when in September 2013, as indicated by Palomino (2014), the Brazilian company Quiroz Galvao presented the proposal of the monorail, fostered by Carlos Paredes, then Minister of the MTC, which would replace the BRT system, completely modifying the SIT and paralyzing its implementation again. This interruption of the implementation also included the pending infrastructure works and the bidding of routes and technological component, which initiates a second gap in the implementation of the policy.

Furthermore, in December, the Committee of the Agency for the Promotion of Private Investment (Spanish: *Agencia de Promoción de la Inversión Privada*, ProInversión) rejected the viability of the monorail private initiative after two years of studies and suspension of the execution of the SIT (Montaño, 2016). ProInversión finally pronounced in March 2016 definitively rejecting formally the proposal to install and put into operation this type of transport in the city.

Although the MPA since 2014 reviewed and raised the observations that the MTC made on more than one occasion regarding the technical file of the third sector, the financing management was paralyzed, attributing the cause to the monorail proposal made in 2013. Therefore, in September 2016, due to the time elapsed, the MPA required to update this technical file through the Second Feasibility Study (Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa, 2016). Thus, in February 2017, the OPI of the MPA after reviewing the final costs of the second feasibility assessment, which added to the components or activities executed and to be executed, increased the cost of the project, verified its viability (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2018).

In April 2017, the Special Committee in charge of the second special public tender for the concession of the operation of the massive urban passenger service of the SIT, after seven years of having started this tender, announced the five winning business units of the concession of routes, leaving seven business units deserted by absence of bidders. In addition, in June 2017 the MPA, after having been in court for the annulment of the first concession of routes in 2011, in the form of conciliation delivered directly a business unit to the consortium that won the first call, to avoid this way pay a compensation of 81 million soles (equivalent to 25 million dollars) for damages. In addition, the call for the third public tender for the concession of the remaining business units was made in August 2017 and the notification of

the winning business units was delivered in September. (Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa, 2017b)

On the other hand, the second tender for the technological component was also resumed and the call for proposals was made in October 2017. However, in March 2018, the good award granted to a business unit was left without effect, because the consortium did not present the letter of guarantee to sign the contract. For this reason, in June 2018, the deserted unit was again tendered and the announce of the winning consortium is expected to be in September of this year completing the 12 business units comprising the SIT in order to begin the pre-operational phase in October 2018 (Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa, 2017b).

Likewise, according to the schedule, the announce of the winner for the concession of the technological component is expected for that month; however, the call was suspended until the MEF gives its agreement to the contract after solving the latest observations on the regulation applied, in this case for the contract with the modality of Public Private Partnership (Flores, 2018).

The widespread consensus on the need for the implementation of the SIT raised around it a support that allowed this public policy to have excellent resources for its implementation. Notwithstanding, there are gaps in the implementation, which is manifested through technical questions by actors who were not taken into account in the formulation stage, but who had an interest in the policy.

Chapter 4: The Failed Process of the Implementation of the SIT

4.1. The Functional Responsibility of the Policy

As any PIP, the SIT should follow the steps corresponding to the cycle of a public policy, leading to its execution. The approval of the pre-investment profile of the project by the OPI and the declaration of the viability of the project occurred between February 2008 and July 2009.

Table 4: *Project Cycle of the SIT according to the SNIP*

Study	Evaluation	Evaluation Unit	Formulating Unit	Date of evaluation record
Profile	In modification	OPI-MPA	Sub Management of Studies and Projects - MPA	26-03-2008
Profile	Approved	OPI-MPA	Sub Management of Studies and Projects - MPA	26-03-2008
Pre-feasibility	Approved	OPI-MPA	Sub Management of Studies and Projects - MPA	23-01-2009
Feasibility	In modification	OPI-MPA	Sub Management of Studies and Projects - MPA	16-06-2009
Feasibility	In modification	OPI-MPA	Sub Management of Studies and Projects - MPA	17-06-2009
Feasibility	Approved	OPI-MPA	Sub Management of Studies and Projects - MPA	13-07-2009

Note. Source: Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2018

As seen in Table 4, the Sub Management of Studies and Projects of the MPA was the area responsible for the actions related to the formulation of pre-investment studies, project profile, pre-feasibility and feasibility of the SIT. The approval of all the studies and files related to the project was the responsibility of the OPI of the MPA. According to the Regulation of the Organization and Functions (Spanish: *Reglamento de Organización y Funciones*, ROF) of the MPA, this was the body that acted as the Formulating Unit of the PIP of the Municipality, in coordination with the Planning and Budget Management and Urban Transport and Traffic Circulation Management. Also, within its main functions were to register in the SNIP Project Bank and the pre-investment studies formulated, thus that they can be evaluated by the OPI; prepare the definitive studies and technical files of the projects

declared viable for their execution according to the minimum parameters approved in the current regulations (Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa, 2013).

Until now, the SIT complied with the regular steps for a PIP. However, the revised documentation allows to observe that all these procedures were carried out at the level of the public entity, bypassing a procedure that is part of the current regulations for infrastructure projects, whose fulfillment was the responsibility of the Sub Management of Studies and Projects of the MPA.

There are two clearly differentiated and interrelated normative fields that both public and private infrastructure works must follow. The technical field is constituted by the set of procedures approved by the Peruvian State for the execution of infrastructure projects. The SIT, was ascribed within the National Building Regulations. The legal field is composed of laws that regulate the formalization and execution of buildings. Law 27157, Law of Regularization of Buildings (Spanish: *Ley de Regularización de Edificaciones*), of the Procedure for the declaration of Factory and of the Regime of Real Estate Units of Exclusive Property and of Common Property; and Law 29090, Law on the Regulation of Urban and Building Qualifications (Spanish: *Ley de Regulación de Habilitaciones Urbanas y de Edificaciones*).

The interrelation of both fields is reflected in the bodies in charge of ensuring compliance with these technical standards and validating the projects: the Technical Commissions. Subsection 1, Article 58, of Law 27157, specifies that the Technical Commission (Spanish: *Comisión Técnica*, CT) reviews and qualifies the preliminary projects and projects in accordance with the current building standards. Additionally, Section 5, of Article 4, of Law 29090, recognizes the TC as an actor whose function is to issue binding opinions for the granting or not of an authorization or license for urban authorization and building. These commissions are chaired by a representative of the municipality, and are composed of delegates from the College of Architects of Peru, the College of Engineers of Peru and other entities if applicable.

Through this system, all work of a public nature, after the feasibility study has been approved and declared viable by the OPI, must include compliance with the technical standards in the technical work file prepared by the formulating unit; to be approved by the CT of the competent municipality, in this case the MPA. For the case study, in the case of a project located in a property considered cultural heritage, for the qualification of the SIT, the

TC required the presence of an ad hoc delegate, representative of the National Institute of Culture (Spanish: *Instituto Nacional de Cultura*, INC).

At this point it is important to highlight that although the SIT specified the execution of 21 road works, none of them had a technical file and just started to developing them once the TC requested. Therefore, the responsibility rests with the Sub Management of Studies and Projects, because the MPA announced the start of the execution of works without the prior preparation of the technical file, which meant delays in the implementation of public policy since it was granted the viability of the project in July 2009 after the preparation and approval of the mentioned file in December of that year.

After approval, the body in charge would be the Public Works and Private Buildings Sub Management, which according to the MPA's ROF directs and conducts the technical administrative process of the PIPs and their execution through the direct administration modality until its liquidation process in concordance with current legal devices. However, despite having the technical file approved, the College of Engineers, the College of Architects, the INC and public service institutions made observations on the file, as it was necessary to incorporate new components related to the improvement of the system of water, sewage and power lines, which had not been considered in said document since these actors were not taken into account and the works were to be started as soon as possible, delaying the start of works until March 2010.

The functional responsibility of this failed policy was in the hands of the Sub Management of Studies and Projects, at a technical level; and the Sub Management of Public Works and Private Buildings at the level of its execution.

4.2. Crucial Actors Not Contemplated

4.2.1. Professional Colleges

The participation of the Professional Colleges in the period prior to the implementation stage of the SIT was key since their initial opposition brought together other actors who shared their position. The most active role was held by the College of Architects and the College of Engineers of Peru - Arequipa Region.

In the case of the College of Engineers of Peru, on May 31, 2009, they issued their opinion through a statement, after analyzing the feasibility of the project and the technical study. In the manifest, it indicated that referring to the monumental historical center and the archaeological zone of the countryside, the qualified entities are the ones that must pronounce

themselves. In addition, the technical observations were delivered to the technical working table arranged by the MPA, with the aim of contributing to the improvement of the project prepared (Colegio de Ingenieros del Perú – Consejo Departamental de Arequipa, 2009).

On the other hand, after nine months of studies, the monorail proposal launched by the MTC in September 2013, was not yet defined. The MTC, together with the Spanish consultancy Deloitte and ProInversión carry out the studies to determine the ideal system. The alternatives were monorail, light rail and mixed systems; therefore, the BRTs were discarded. In this regard, the then dean of the College of Engineers of Arequipa, Víctor Rivera, stated the following:

There are several technical opinions against the monorail proposed by Queiroz Galvao. The stations, according to the project, will have an area of 2.5 meters and its structure will not fit in the narrow streets of Arequipa. On narrow roads that are part of the Historic Center declared by the UNESCO, its presence is inexplicable. Political issues prevailed in the proposal imposed by the MTC. Transportation reform must be planned and the technical aspect prioritized. (Palomino, 2014)

Moreover, at that time, the dean of the College of Architects of Arequipa, Alberto Llerena, also made feel his regret by a statement in which it makes clear that, if the monorail is chosen, this would be unfeasible and at the same time unacceptable. If the monorail is chosen, it would generate a visual barrier in the monuments, which would affect the declaration of UNESCO's World Cultural Heritage. (Mamani, 2014). To avoid this and to go through the perimeter of the Historic Center, more expenses would be generated in the users, who would have to use another transport to reach their destinations.

In addition, the current dean of the College of Architects of Arequipa, Felix Solis, according to the interview, states that several institutional communications were sent requesting the revision of the project and observations before the public policy was implemented. In addition, he noticed problems in the technical file of the third section, with the following observations referred in writing to the mayor Alfredo Zegarra:

If the observations made are not lifted, the project plan would have to be redesigned. The MPA could make this change at work, but we do not have the guarantee that the winning company will do so, but if it accepts it, it may be subject to charging more for the works. With respect to the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), the authorization to start the work is not yet available. In addition, the proposed

intersections, with outdated cruises that do not favor the continuity of pedestrian traffic. (Flores, 2017)

To this is added the subsequent observations presented by the College of Engineers to the commune, after evaluating the technical file of the third section. In this regard, the dean José Flores Castro, pointed that being a fast track, this would involve the expropriation of housing, thus generating discomfort in the surrounding population.

Moreover, discrepancies were found regarding the results of the soil study when contrasting with the data indicated in the technical file. Furthermore, the EIA was not yet available and in the sanitary study carried out, outdated data were presented with a history of rainfall drainage in 2003, which would be obsolete data that does not suit the reality (Flores, 2017). Apart from that, it indicates that on several occasions the GRA and the MPA were asked to submit large scale project files for evaluation before their execution; however, none of the institutions was interested in submitting this documentation.

According to Official Letter N° 183-2017-MPA/GDU, issued by the College of Engineers of Arequipa, suggested that the project of the third section has been designed based on a forced solution, which will eventually result in serious hazards in accidents. At this point it is worth noting that only one EIA was being considered for the entire SIT; nevertheless, given the location of each section, a separate study is required for each one. Despite these circumstances, the intention of the MPA is to start with the works without taking into account the observations in their entirety, since their solution would imply postponing the project again.

4.2.2. Organizations for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage

The INC and UNESCO are other important actors. Despite being a public body, the INC would be a private actor and an objective group, whose conduct in the framework of project implementation is considered politically as an indirect cause of the collective problem that public policy tries to solve (Subirats, 2008). Similarly, until the creation of the Ministry of Culture, the INC was responsible for the conservation and protection of the archaeological, historical, artistic and cultural heritage of the Nation.⁷ In addition, the binding nature of the "Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage" of 1972, to which

⁷ The INC was until September 30, 2010 the agency in charge of the cultural field of the country. After that date the functions and powers of this, they were executed by the Ministry of Culture, according to Law 29565. Former President Alan García, justified the merger by absorption of the INC with the Ministry of Culture, through the Supreme Decree N° 001-2010-MC.

Peru adhered, obliges States to protect, conserve, rehabilitate and transmit to future generations the cultural heritage as it is the Historic Center of Arequipa.⁸

Thus, after the monorail proposal was launched, the INC's replacement agency was the Regional Directorate of Culture de Arequipa (Spanish: *Dirección Regional de Cultura*, DRC), who did not wait and concludes the evaluation of the preliminary draft of the monorail, which according to the data reviewed, stated on more than one occasion the unviability of the project. La República (2014), refers that the Regional Director of Culture, Julia Barreda, derived the own evaluation to the Directorate of Historical Heritage and UNESCO, because the project will be developed in areas bordering the Historic Center of Arequipa. In addition, noted that the monorail is not related to the Historic Center of the city. If this is the approved option, it would be necessary to evaluate the presentation of a legal action to stop the project, if it is the case, at the time the corresponding judicial action will be seen (La República, 2014b).

On the other hand, regarding the technical files of the second and third tranches of the SIT, the DRC had to intervene on more than one occasion to make observations on the technical file before giving it final approval. In the case of the first sector executed in March 2010, the technical file did not consider historical background. Likewise, in November 2017 objected to the technical study of the second and third sectors since the Certificate of Non-Existence of Archaeological Remains was not attached, nor did have the permits of the MTC, the SIT Office or the Historical Center. To date, only the first section dating from 2010 has been completed. However, the execution of the second and third sector has not yet begun since the observations made have not been corrected, the main problem being the DRC's permission to complete the EIA and start works.

4.2.3. *Civil Society*

The neighbors of the districts directly affected by the development of the project are also an important actor. According to the data consulted, referring to the monorail proposal, through a citizen initiative "Muévete Arequipa", made up of 60 organizations, including various groups, professionals and institutions, raised their rejection of the implementation of the monorail in the city of Arequipa to the then President of the Republic, Ollanta Humala.

⁸ In November 2000, the UNESCO declared the historic center of the city of Arequipa as a Cultural Heritage of Humanity, following cultural criteria I and IV. The historical center has numerous green areas between squares and parks that add up to 26 hectares and are complemented by 22 hectares of countryside within the monumental zone.

As argued by the collective, the monorail system failed in other cities such as Sao Paulo, Las Vegas, Dubai, Sydney because it turns out to be expensive for users. In addition, the monorail would only serve 15% of the population and its budget is excessive; therefore, what the president was asked to do is respect the processes that the SIT had, which is a comprehensive project, more economical and reliable (Mamani, 2015). The manifesto was also sent to the Ministry of Culture, the MTC, the MEF, ProInversión and UNESCO, to ensure that the population is heard and that there is record of their opposition to the project proposed by the GC.

On the other hand, the MPA in order to inform the population about the benefits of the execution of the third section, made available to the population, in the facilities of the municipality, the model of the project. Nonetheless, this scale model, far from dispelling the doubts of the neighbors affected by the work, caused a social conflict with the MPA. Affected residents who live in the areas adjacent to the execution of the third section, represent approximately 50 house that will be affected by the construction of the third sector, which through the neighborhood council made their discomfort reach the MPA. The president of the neighborhood council maintains that for the construction of the third section the only information provided by the MPA was the model; therefore, they have filed a complaint against the Public Ministry against officials of the commune, for violating the Transparency Law (La República, 2017). In addition, the project did not have a schedule for the exhibition of the work, the relationship of those affected by the construction and social study, nor did it have a Certificate of Non-Existence of Archaeological Remains or UNESCO's approval to perform the work, bearing in mind that this area is part of the monumental zone.

In addition, legal actions against the MPA also reached the Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (Spanish: *Organismo de Evaluación y Fiscalización Ambiental*, OEFA). Neighbors reported that the EIA was wrongly presented.

However, the claims of the affected population continued, and in July 2017, the residents of the areas that will be impacted by this project, made a protest in the MPA with the aim that the mayor Alfredo Zegarra to reconsider this area to be used as alternative way for the vehicular traffic before the construction of the third section, because of not being the case, it would imply to cut more than 200 trees located in that route (RPP, 2017).

4.2.4. *Urban Transporters*

The issue of transport has been analyzed since previous administrations, but it is only during the municipal administration of Simón Balbuena that as a preliminary measure to the implementation of the SIT, which was still awaiting the approval of viability; through the Municipal Ordinance N° 574-2008, restricts the circulation of units used for public transport with more than 25 years old. However, this measure was not well received by the transporters, who in January 2009, agreed to a strike for five days, leaving the population without transportation (El Comercio, 2009). The union of transporters of Arequipa demanded that the Mayor repeal the Municipal Ordinance. Thus the union of transporters in the Single Front of Urban Transport of the Arequipa Region, in the Bus Trade Union Chamber, in the Single Union of Massive Transport of Arequipa, together with taxi drivers who they did not have traffic permits, added forces to face the municipal intention to reorder traffic and transport.

On the other hand, regarding the second bidding of routes, the transporters, also tried to intervene in the bidding process. In March 2011, after the members of the commission in charge of the new SIT route concession were revealed, the representatives of urban transport rejected the permanence of the commission's president, Ricardo Lira, who presided over the first tender and had a complaint by one of the transport consortiums, for abuse of authority when verifying that no notification was made about the modification of referential values of the costs in the previous tender to the applicant consortium, reason for which it was disqualified (El Búho, 2011).

Additionally, at the end of December 2017, a protest was carried out by the urban transport companies, which left their routes to go out to protest, causing half of the city to be unsupplied in the public transport service, besides causing chaos in the fence due to the blocks of several streets with dozens of buses. According to Orihuela (2018), transporters suggested that the provincial commune seeks to favor foreign entrepreneurs in the third bidding of routes that are part of the SIT. Despite this, the demonstrations continued in January 2018, as the representatives of the urban transporters from eight districts again started a protest action when they were not served by the MPA authorities, whom they questioned for not including them in the SIT and privatizing the transport. On behalf of the municipality, they set up a dialogue table with the opposition transporters and only listened to their complaints since no SIT process could be canceled.

4.3. Late Reaction to Strengthen Politics

One of the measures for strengthening the policy, indirectly, came from a private actor, appealing to the use of a political pressure mechanism. As trade union organizations, the Workers' Federation of Arequipa (Spanish: *Federación Departamental de Trabajadores de Arequipa*, FDTA) and General Confederation of Workers of Peru (Spanish: *Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú*, CGTP), Their main objective was to improve the working conditions of their members, but also within the context of strengthening civil society, they were interested in demanding from the State certain public policies. Therefore, they are also interest groups (Miró Quesada, 2012).

These and other organizations demonstrated their support for the project in the march organized on November 20, 2012, bringing together representatives of the various social organizations of Arequipa, such as the Social Policy Coordinator of the Arequipa Region, Civil Construction, Defense Fronts, GRA and municipal authorities, who mobilized through the streets of the city of Lima to demand the government to execute various projects vital for the development of the Arequipa Region. The Arequipa unions demanded the start of the SIT project and the CGTP backed the demands of the city of Arequipa and demanded that the government solve their demands, taking into account that many of them are part of the electoral promises of the then presidential president, Ollanta Humala (Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, 2012). As Alonso (2000) states, street demonstrations are a direct action technique, constituted by the use of force without reaching a state of subversion.

Apart from that, on October 23, 2014, hundreds of residents of the North, East and South districts marched through the historic center of Arequipa demanding the immediate start of construction of the SIT and other priority works that will generate dozens of jobs (Diario Correo, 2014). After leading a meeting in the Main Square of Arequipa, the leader of the North Cone Defense and Integration Front, Felipe Domínguez, announced that, if the works are still postponed, they will carry out more forceful measures of struggle.

However, the attempts to strengthen the policy did not only come from private actors. In July 2012, an inter-institutional coordination meeting was held between the OPI of the MTC, the General Directorate of Investment Policy of the MEF, Urban Development of the MPA, OPI of the MPA and the Transportation Management of the MPA agreed the reduction of SIT goals, all from the new financing scenario of the project by the CG through the MEF (Municipalidad Provincial de Arequipa, 2012).

As a result, in August 2012, the mayor Alfredo Zegarra delivered the SIT to the CG and signed the framework agreement with the MTC for its implementation, whose purpose was to establish mechanisms and instruments of inter-institutional collaboration between the parties for their proper implementation; those that include the execution of works and the supervision of contracts in general. To achieve these objectives, the expansion of the Final Complementary Provision of Law 29812 was negotiated with the MEF, in order to enable the MTC to have the necessary financial and non-financial resources to intervene comprehensively in the implementation of the SIT de Arequipa, which took place in September 2012 with the publication of Law 29914, which establishes measures regarding public expenditure.

Despite the fact that the SIT had the necessary financial resources to be implemented, the MTC that was in charge of executing the components of the project did not continue with the review and respective approval of the technical files of the second and third tranches, which were made economic observations, project design, soil studies, hydraulic, among others. As stated by the technical coordinator of the SIT, Lizardo Calderón, "it is regrettable the unwillingness of the MTC to help raise these observations" (Herrera, 2013). In addition, it is noticeable that it is worrying that the progress of the remaining files that were under the responsibility of the MTC has not been reported.

Moreover, after the monorail private initiative presented by the company Queiroz Galvao in September 2013 and supported by the MTC, the process of implementing the SIT was halted until March 2016, when the mentioned alternative was officially rejected by ProInversión, date from which the SIT could be resumed with the initial proposal of the BRTs. Therefore, to continue the implementation of the components of the SIT, another measure to strengthen the policy was made in June 2016, when the MPA rescinded administrative sanctions against public transporters with the Mayor Decree N° 0003-2016 . Although mayor Alfredo Zegarra was impartial in dismissing administrative sanctions for all carriers alike, it should be highlighted that he did not respect the Municipal Ordinance N° 640-2010-MPA, which approved the MPA's Supplementary Transportation Administration Regulation. However, without this decree, the majority of transporters that participated in the process of the second bidding of the SIT routes would not have been able to apply for the contest, since they did not comply with the requirement of not having administrative infractions.

4.4. The Power of the Actors Not Contemplated

The Professional Colleges became an interest group that made use of several resources to object to the implementation of the SIT. Both the College of Architects and the College of Engineers each produced technical reports from documents requested from the MPA, on which they based their opposition to the project. These reports focused on the design of the project, and its possible effects on the city.

Another strategy of the Professional Colleges were pronouncements through the media. It is worth mentioning that the first statement is issued by the College of Engineers, generating a stream of opinion, where other Professional Colleges appear, especially the College of Architects, supporting their position, always from an eminently technical criterion. The dissemination of press releases was also part of these actions. It was possible to observe, based on the newspaper coverage, that the journalistic coverage provided to the SIT was intense during 2009, the year in which implementation began, and from 2013, the year in which the monorail alternative was proposed.

The organization of extraordinary assemblies, by the Regional Council of Deans, through the College of Lawyers of Arequipa, was another mechanism of pressure since these meetings were open to the local press. In them, not only the technical evaluations of the professional associations were exposed, but also points of agreement were reached on the SIT, which served to be supported by the technical panel and public audience organized by MPA, on the same subject. According to some interviewees in the present investigation, they refer that the observations made by the College of Architects and Engineers about the SIT, were debated in assembly and served to elaborate the pronouncements that were reached to the commission formed by the Provincial Council and the Region.

On the other hand, due to the nature of the INC as a public body, the pressure exerted to object to the implementation of the SIT is limited to the use of legal resources. These resources were used at first by the INC, and then by the DRC, under the protection of its powers, for the conservation and protection of the historical heritage of the Nation. It is important to point out that these powers allowed him to have the backing of a private actor, of a supranational nature, such as UNESCO. This, because the declaration of the Historic Center of Arequipa as Cultural Heritage of Humanity, presents obligations to the Peruvian State. It is necessary to highlight that the DRC is the actor that up to now continues to exert pressure for the implementation of the sections of the SIT, since until the observations made to the

technical files are corrected, it will not authorize the EIA, a primordial requirement to begin the execution of works.

Taking into consideration that the DRC is a public institution, it was expected that its action would be given in the framework only of its functions, that is to validate or invalidate the project profile or technical files. However, the exchange of communications between this, and the professional associations is constant, becoming evident in the development of technical tables installed by the MPA, when the DRC cited the technical observations made by the professional associations, as part of their opposition to the project. The DRC issued public pronouncements requesting that the SIT works be paralyzed until the respective technical file is available. The opposition of this institution articulates a series of personalities and institutions that shared this vision, and generates powerful adhesions, among them, other professional associations. As it was described in the previous point, the revised hemerography, allows to see that the professional associations and civil society also supported their opposition to the implementation of the sections of the SIT, based on the criteria of the DRC.

The late identification of the actors as occurred in the present case, civil society and public transporters, who, being part of the process of planning and implementing public policies, deserve to rethink the channels and the quality of their contributions, because although it is true, workshops, panels and presence of consultancies were proposed, where the different actors should propose both in the diagnosis and in the alternatives of solution, these mechanisms were insufficient in the search for a dialogue and debate that generate consensus and community commitments, hence ensuring that these participation devices were representative and failed to strengthen social awareness, generating discomfort in the population, which is reflected in the protests opposing the SIT, delaying its implementation.

It is necessary to note, always taking into account the public policy framework, that the opposition to the project in question, for technical reasons or related to its functions, activates two interest groups (Asensio, 1972); and in a certain moment of the conflicts with other actors, they use mechanisms of political pressure. The limited disposition of the units in charge of the formulation and implementation of the SIT for responding to technical questions through institutions such as the TC, pushed the opposition actors to resort to the use of direct actions and pressure mechanisms to prevent the development of the project until the observations made are lifted. This scenario produced a response from public actors, which

failed to reduce the implementation gap, until the reformulation of public policy, which could only be carried out when the monorail proposal was ruled out as a massive transport system, activating the MPA again the BRT, which was the initial concept of SIT.

4.5. Impacts of the Implementation Gap

The implementation gaps had mixed effects on public policy. If the arguments presented by the opponents of the project are considered valid, then the changes described in the previous section can be assessed as positive with respect to the requirement by the main actors in which the MPA complies with the elaboration of the technical files, correcting the observations before the works are executed and the rejection of the monorail alternative, which means less impact on the landscape and without committing too much public resources.

The most remarkable adverse effects found in the present investigation are:

4.5.1. Increase in Costs

According to Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (2018), the Registration Form with SNIP code 77545 of the MEF project Bank, corresponding to this project, the total cost of the work initially, when its viability was declared in July 2009 was 277'893,197.00 soles (equivalent to 84 million dollars), an amount that it would be assumed by the MPA's own resources. Nonetheless, after the first feasibility study, through which the OPI of the MPA carried out a new evaluation of the project, due to the change in financing, as from August 2012, the SIT was delivered to the CG, in charge of its implementation on MTC and financing through the MEF. According to Technical Report N° 001-2013-SIT-MPA submitted in May 2013, the OPI indicates that there were variations in the project, despite this, the viability was verified with a verification amount of 110'196,423.34 soles (equivalent to 33 million dollars).

Notwithstanding, a second feasibility study was necessary, due to the time the SIT was paralyzed due to the monorail proposal in 2013 and the change in project financing, which is why Technical Report No. 061-2017- MPA / GDU the OPI verifies its viability in February 2017, even though the verified costs, which added to the components or activities executed and to be executed, increased by more than 20% the amount of the first feasibility verification, involving a sum of 164'562,608.00 soles (equivalent to 50 million dollars).

According to the information obtained from the interviews with the SIT officials, in August of this year, after considering the feasibility study carried out by the MEF, the current

cost of the project, including works carried out and those pending to be executed, amounting to 458'587,071.19 soles (equivalent to 130 million dollars).

If it is taken into account that the current total amount of the project has increased its value by 40%, mainly due to the modifications made that affected its initial design and the time elapsed since the declaration of the initial declaration of its viability, approximately ten years; then the final cost of this public policy can be considered as a negative effect.

4.5.2. Continuity of Public Issues

The viability statement of the PIP of the SIT initially contemplated its execution within a period of six years (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2018), that is, if the work schedule had been followed, it would have been completed in the first half of 2015. Likewise, after the second feasibility study, it was determined that the new date for the end of the implementation would be in 2018. However, the delays caused by the process of reformulation of the project, the change of financing modality and the monorail proposal, caused its execution to begin in March 2010.

Another negative effect of the implementation gap was that in the period of time between the formulation of the policy and its implementation, the public problem continued to grow. This is due to the fact that the vehicle fleet has doubled, since in 2009 there were 120 thousand vehicles and now they reach 245 thousand vehicles. In addition, several interviewees report that the problem of traffic in the city of Arequipa became more acute, especially in the historic center, deteriorating the environment due to excessive environmental pollution. Consequently, economic and time loss, when considering working hours due to vehicular traffic jams.

4.6. Factors Omitted in the Implementation

Here it is pertinent to analyze the aspects that would have made possible a better implementation of this public policy. As it was described in the third chapter, there was an imperceptible omission of the Sub Management of Studies and Projects, regarding compliance with the current regulations, when the SIT did not have the technical study approved by a TC. Fact that later evidenced its failures. This deliberate omission expresses the lack of institutionality in the field of public policies on infrastructure.

As Urcuyo (2010) states, human interaction is shaped by institutions, represented by norms and laws (laws, regulations and manuals related to the construction sector) and by organizations (TC). In this case, the MPA did not timely consider the revision of the technical

file of the project by a TC, which would have allowed the Sub Management of Studies and Projects to acknowledge its shortcomings, in which case the implementation gap would have been smaller.

As suggested by Mujica (2014), two scenarios can be recognized for the management of interests in the SIT process. The first scenario begins when the College of Engineers of Peru - Arequipa Region, makes a statement in 2009, to request the solution of observations made to the project for reasons already discussed. At this point, a scenario of negotiation of opposing interests of two non-antagonistic positions is perceived, in view of the fact that this professional college did not oppose the SIT, but requested a reformulation of the project.

If one considers the assumptions that motivated the management of interests of the group favorable to the project, with its original characteristics. This scenario represented the ideal opportunity to make the implementation of the policy viable, since it allowed a negotiated agreement, based on a review of the characteristics of the project and a more active participation of the professional colleges and qualified entities without reaching the broad media exposure.

Likewise, a new scenario is configured from September 2013 since following the proposal of the monorail to replace the BRT, the implementation of the SIT is paralyzed until March 2016, when this proposal is discarded, although during all that time It was the MTC itself that promoted it, through Minister Carlos Paredes, who proposed the idea originally. Both the College of Architects and Engineers, DRC and Civil Society, move their views to the media field where they begin to be part of the agenda in order to dismiss this proposal for the reasons discussed above.

Up to this point, the interest management capacity of the opposite group takes a turn and becomes the main group in favor of the implementation of the first scenario. However, this management is diminished and finally depleted, because this second scenario gathers new actors after its position, especially the GC. The transit between these scenarios, granted to the public actors, from the GC, MTC and MEF to the Managements and dependencies in charge, the possibility of a negotiation with agreements. However, the role of these private actors, the Professional Colleges, the DRC, the Civil Society and the transporters seems to have been underestimated, because finally the monorail proposal was rejected.

Despite the fact that the traffic problem required solutions in the short and medium term, the interviews conducted with public officials of the MPA, allow observing that from

the beginning there was controversy surrounding the project due to its cost, since the MPA did not have the economic capacity to take on this project and in its realization, he went to the GC years later, when the advance of the SIT and the relationship with the population was unsustainable. In addition, the lack of political decision and its short-term vision caused the delay in the achievement of this project.

It can be deduced that the public policy that sought to provide the city of Arequipa with this system was not properly coordinated with civil society. According to some interviewees in the present investigation, a transparent methodology aimed at facilitating consensus was needed, it should have been dedicated to promoting a collective awareness that was clear about the purpose of the SIT implementation and that the advances were published in a timely manner for a validation and internalization of the project's objectives. It should be noted that cities must be planned with the participation and acceptance of citizenship. For these purposes, there are management means such as the Local Coordination Council and Participatory Budget that must be duly taken into account by the authorities, according to current regulations. It is also notable that there were no more workshops to contribute to the awareness of the population of Arequipa with the SIT, as well as the execution of a popular consultation on this project.

Another notable lack that could be improved is the low degree of commitment of the media in disseminating the progress of the implementation of the SIT, lacking a sustained strategy that emits the effective involvement not only of the media, but also of the civil society. Several interviewees mention that the population was indifferent, due to absence of awareness and adequate information, that is why both the population and the transporters, protested more than once and took precautionary measures against the MPA.

Moreover, they also indicate that the SIT implementation corresponds to three continuous processes: political, technical, and social. Being the technical and social the one that has continued despite the obstruction of the politician by the changes of authorities, because each municipal administration gave it a bias, existing several versions of the SIT. The most appropriate in this case, would have been to have an independent authority that is outside the municipal management.

The implementation gap of this public policy has not yet closed, despite having various changes in the initial configuration of the project, the design, the main demand of the opposition actors, and the financing modality. Notwithstanding, the increase in costs and the

temporary persistence of the public issues are the negative effects of the gap. The implementation of this policy was the result of the interaction of private and public actors, since overcoming the implementation gap depends on it, and not on the normative or institutional structure.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

The present case reinforces the non-linearity of the public policy cycle, since its progress may be influenced by unforeseen factors that imply a regression in the alleged linear nature of the cycle, but that in reality shape the policy of agreement, not only the public problem to be solved, but also to the correlation of forces of the various actors and their resources around it.

The SIT implementation gap was generated from the capacities and resources of external actors to demonstrate their technical failures, despite the fact that this project had resources, including little or no opposition within the government. Another important aspect, closely related to the previous, is the need to improve the quality of the technical teams of the MPA so that it can implement better policies. Technical strengthening is a fundamental aspect to improve the management of policies.

The SIT could be strengthened for its implementation, if it had complied with the revision of the Technical File by the CT of the MPA. However, none of the corresponding agencies, Sub Management of Studies and Projects, at a technical level; and the Sub Management of Public Works and Private Buildings, respected the institutionality of this entity. It can be affirmed that the MPA has very few technical resources that allow them to implement policies and long-term planning. This situation places the MPA more as recipient of policies than as implementer of them. Technical strengthening is also part of a political will to establish policies with a greater degree of specialized knowledge.

Opponents to the initial proposal of the SIT developed several actions to prevent its implementation. In the case of the Professional Colleges and the DRC, they made use of technical reports, public pronouncements and legal recourses. Regarding civil society and transporters, they carried out marches, manifestos and also resorted to legal resources. Nonetheless, when introducing the monorail proposal, this scheme changes, since CG actors take advantage of the deficiencies of the original proposal to impose theirs. It is necessary to note that these actions were only effective when the media introduced the issue as part of the media agenda, which also demonstrates how press exposure of the deficiencies of a public policy can lead to its reformulation or even cancellation.

The consequences of the SIT implementation gap are varied; in general, the reformulation of the project can be valued as positive, without altering the natural landscape too much, and the financing modality, without compromising the MPA's public financial

resources. On the negative side, one can find the persistence of the public problem and the high increase in the final costs of the project.

Although municipal policies are being strengthened in the country due to greater political will of the actors that make up the space, there is still a relative lack of knowledge on the part of the MPA of the policies that are being implemented in their jurisdiction. In general, this has led to a duplication of efforts in a number of aspects that can be addressed together. The challenge lies in how to promote a more efficient management of those policies of direct action on the territory and that manage to overcome the political-administrative barriers in the phase of its implementation.

Beyond the settlement of interinstitutional agreements, it seems clear that the generation and implementation of public policies in a subnational context is also limited by existing institutional restrictions. The establishment of jurisdictions and competences within the Peruvian institutional order leaves in many cases gaps or overlapping of competences that hinder coordination, and even inhibits intergovernmental action, allowing the Central Government to interfere in the implementation of policies at the subnational level until the point of delaying and even paralyzing its process without justification.

The implementation of policies in Peru is still in the early stages and there are many aspects that can improve this coordination at the political and institutional level. Placing the municipal and regional problems as a key issue in the political agenda of the Central Government is the main challenge for the development of these policies. Only through the clear definition of the objectives and the improvement in the management of the resources can promote a social and sustainable development in those that improve the quality of life of its inhabitants.

Appendix 1: Questionnaire to Public Officials

Introduction

1. How long have you been working or worked in the Provincial Municipality of Arequipa, and which are or were your functions?

Objective 1: Describe the characteristics of the implementation of the SIT (Integrated Transport System) by the Provincial Municipality of Arequipa.

2. What were the antecedents that led the authorities to consider the implementation of the SIT?

3. Did you consider that the process followed by the SIT was adequate? Why?

4. What resources do you think were not enough for the Provincial Municipality of Arequipa to implement the ITS?

Objective 2: Identify the actors not included in the implementation of the SIT by the Provincial Municipality of Arequipa.

5. What institutions or organizations supported or opposed the implementation of the SIT?

6. Do you consider that their arguments were valid? Why?

7. What actions did these actors take to support or prevent the implementation of the SIT?

8. Was the action of the actors opposed to the SIT foreseeable? Up to what point?

9. What actions did the Provincial Municipality develop to counteract the action of the opponents of the SIT?

10. Do you consider that these actions were effective? Why?

Objective 3: Understand the influence of the actors not contemplated in the implementation of the SIT by the Provincial Municipality of Arequipa.

11. How much did the opposition actors in the SIT influence the decision of the authorities?

12. What were the main consequences of the delay in the implementation of the SIT?

13. How do you think that scenario could have been avoided around the SIT?

Closing

14. In this and other cases, what participation mechanisms exist to promote consensus regarding large Public Investment Projects?

15. Is there anything which you think is important which I have not asked?

Appendix 2: Questionnaire to Leaders of Other Organizations

Introduction

1. How long have you been working or worked in the organization, and which are or were your functions?

Objective 1: Describe the characteristics of the implementation of the SIT (Integrated Transport System) by the Provincial Municipality of Arequipa.

2. What were the antecedents that led the authorities to consider the implementation of the SIT?

3. As a Public Investment Project, were you aware of the process followed by the SIT? Could you describe some aspects?

4. Do you consider that the process followed by the SIT was adequate? Why?

Objective 2: Identify the actors not included in the implementation of the SIT by the Provincial Municipality of Arequipa.

5. What was the position of your organization regarding the implementation of the SIT? Why?

6. Do you consider that the arguments of your organization were valid? Why?

7. What actions did your organization take to support or prevent the implementation of the SIT?

8. Do you consider that these actions were effective? Why?

9. What was the response of the Provincial Municipality to the position of your institution towards the project?

Objective 3: Understand the influence of the actors not contemplated in the implementation of the SIT by the Provincial Municipality of Arequipa.

10. How much did your organization influence the decision of the authorities on the SIT?

11. What were the main consequences of the delay in the implementation of the SIT?

12. How do you think that scenario could have been avoided around the SIT?

Closing

13. In this and other cases, what participation mechanisms exist to promote consensus regarding large Public Investment Projects?

14. Is there anything which you think is important which I have not asked?

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I, Sheyla Luciana Granda Acosta, herewith certify that in the course of preparing this Master Thesis, I did not consult the help of another person or made use of a different source other than the one states above. I have indicated the positions where I adopted the exact or abstract content of a source and credited its origin. This document has never been presented to any other examining board in this or any similar format.

I am aware of the fact that any false declaration will lead to legal consequences.

August 30, 2018