

How could the Peruvian foreign service address the challenges posed by the recent crisis of the liberal world order? – The role of regional collaboration in the twenty-first century.

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Table of Contents

<u>INTRODUCTION.....</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>SECTION 1: EXPLAINING THE CRISIS OF THE LIBERAL WORLD ORDER.....</u>	<u>7</u>
1.1 POST-COLD WAR ORDER AND THE LIBERAL COMPONENT	7
1.2 THE NEW CENTURY AND THE QUESTIONS ON WESTERN’S HEGEMONY	9
<u>SECTION 2: FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL</u>	<u>14</u>
2.1 PREFERENCE FORMATION AND THE RAM	15
2.2 THE RAM	18
<u>SECTION 3: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR PERU’S FOREIGN POLICY.....</u>	<u>21</u>
3.1 PERU’S FOREIGN POLICY	21
3.2 APPLYING RAM TO PERU’S PREVIOUS FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS	23
3.3 THE RAM AND FUTURE POLICY DECISIONS	31
<u>CONCLUSIONS.....</u>	<u>36</u>
<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY:</u>	<u>38</u>

Introduction

By the late 1980s, the United States of America (US) emerged as the clear 'winner' of the Cold War, in a world that enshrined the unipolar hegemony of America and the West. At the same time, several countries - with a sustainable economic growth and influence in global affairs - created competition for the global superpower (Naik, 2018). Still, the US, as the new hegemonic power, had been successful in imposing his economic and liberal model in several areas (Fukuyama, 1989). The Bretton Woods agreements, and the development of its institutional organizations, as well as the adoption of the Washington Consensus by many Latin American countries, are just a few illustrations of the influence the US had across the globe.

The unequivocal world leadership role the US claimed with the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, only lasted for about two decades. By the time of the Great Recession (2007-2009), some cracks became apparent. Movements and events started questioning the legitimacy of globalization around the world, such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA for its Spanish acronym) (Cole, 2010) or the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Since 2016, populist leaders challenging the *status quo* have surged, after events like the Euro or the immigration crisis (Meyer & Wagner, 2018). Additional examples include: Donald Trump's election in the US, the success of the Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom, Marine Le Pen's percentage in the latest elections in France, the role of politicians such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, López-Obrador in Mexico, in parallel to an increased anti-globalist movement, and even the emergence of neo-Nazi discourses in some countries (BBC, 2021).

In addition to the above-mentioned surge of political movements, new alliances are in the making (like the one between Russia, Iran and Turkey) (Koleilat Khatib, 2021), priorities are being redistributed and acquiring further significance (such as the environment agenda and climate

Fernando Ramírez-Gastón Lecca
change) (Beaumont, 1993), regional powers are starting to emerge as crucial actors (China, Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa are clear examples) (Naik, 2018), and geopolitics is taking on renewed importance (Gaiser & Hribar, 2012). This new international context is generating an amplified uncertainty both regionally and globally (Duncombe & Dunne, 2018). The convictions that existed a few lustrums ago (the “Common Marketization” of the world and the reduction of conflicts between States) (Fukuyama, 1989) have ceased being consistent. Within this new reality, the route that the international relations will take is also ambiguous, and Peru is no exception to these shifts.

Indeed, one of Peru’s main foreign policy concerns in the last thirty years has been national economic growth. During this time, the country began looking to the Asia-Pacific as its new focus for better opportunities and development. This showed in Peru’s participation in international fora for this region, the hosting of international events as well as the undertaking of official visits to Asia.

In this context, Peru is confronted with several regional integration opportunities that may potentially provide the right focus in its foreign policy agenda. Accordingly, in this dissertation, I address the way in which Peru can reshape the direction of its foreign policy towards strengthening its regional collaboration opportunities in the international sphere while learning from past experiences. The main question answered therefore is: How can the Peruvian foreign service better address the challenges posed by the recent crisis of the liberal world order?

This study argues that Peru can address the previously mentioned challenges through a strengthening of its regional relations, while developing new collaboration strategies with interested parties. The country has proved to be very successful in this endeavour by shaping unexpected alliances with different partners in order to achieve its goals.

The dissertation aims to propose a new orientation for future action of the Peruvian foreign service, which could serve as a route for the country in the still ambiguous new world order. I proceed in three steps. The first section presents the principles established by Western hegemony after the Cold War era, before turning to the current turmoil that defies its ideals as well as attempting to understand the reasons behind this situation. The second segment outlines the theoretical approach of the rational-actor model (RAM) embraced by liberalism, which provides a helpful framework to comprehend the individual state-level interactions amongst different actors. Finally, the third section addresses the goals and intentions behind Peru's foreign policy priorities, as well as its existing ideological obstacles. In doing so, it applies the RAM model to former decisions of the Peruvian government, with the objective of finding alternative formulas of regional collaboration.

Section 1: Explaining the Crisis of the Liberal World Order

The crisis of the liberal world order has challenged the existing system of international relations but also unlocked new opportunities for countries when it comes to their foreign policy. In order to identify these novel prospects and be prepared for the challenges, it is important to understand how and where the crisis is happening, but also its main motivations.

There is, in fact, a large body of literature regarding the establishment of the liberal world order and its current crisis. While addressing the latter issue, authors such as Duncombe and Dunne (2018), Ikenberry (2018) and Stokes (2018), try to define the nature of the crisis and understand its root causes, either by addressing it as an ideological problem or as an issue regarding legitimacy,. Analysing the stated authors enables the reader to fully understand the limitations that the new international system will impose on countries and how they, in turn, can reshape their foreign policies to take advantage of newer opportunities.

1.1 Post-Cold War Order and the Liberal Component

One of the key authors on this subject is IR scholar Ikenberry (2005), who emphasizes the supreme hegemony of the United States over the world at large after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. More precisely, he states that:

American global power (...) is one of the great realities of our age. (...) The United States emerged from the Cold War as the world's only superpower (...). For the first time in the modern age, the world's most powerful state can operate on the global stage without the fear of counterbalancing competitors. The world has entered the age of American unipolarity. (Ikenberry, 2005, p. 133)

Duncombe and Dunne (2018) suggest that the concept of 'liberal world order' is often referred to by scholars, but very rarely defined. Ikenberry, for instance, gives a general idea of how the liberal world order presented itself and the way the United States of America played its leading role. Consequently, the US "is a producer of world order (...) it has fashioned a distinctively open and loosely rule-based international order" (Ikenberry, 2005, p. 133). Although there is some consensus about the role the US has played in the establishment of this 'order', there is no agreement regarding its foundations, whether they may be the rule-based system as Ikenberry states, or the guaranteed existence of open markets and free flows of capital throughout the world (De Graaff & Van Apeldoorn, 2018).

Despite lacking a precise definition, Ikenberry (2018) identifies five elements as essential characteristics of the liberal world order:

1. An openness that can facilitate economic growth through trade and exchange.
2. The encouragement of rules.
3. Some sort of security cooperation is expected between States.
4. International society can be corrected to build relations through cooperation.
5. In this new system, states will move towards liberal democracy.

These have been some of the basic elements through which the international community has developed in the last three decades; coming now into question by a diverse number of factors, which are described below.

1.2 The New Century and the Questions on Western's Hegemony

It was not long after the twenty-first century started that the new liberal world order began to cave. Though many believed that the end of the Cold War would be “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1989), something else happened. Ikenberry (2005) stated that the US and the world seem increasingly estranged, noting how Anti-Americanism was “a prominent feature of politics in many regions of the world.” This occurred not long after the Bush administration declared the war on terror and an American unilateralism started replacing the consensual multilateralism that the US had fortified for so long. Since the economic crisis in 2008, disruptions questioning the *status quo* started appearing in different areas of the globe (Duncombe & Dunne, 2018). An example of this is the radicalism of the Tea Party¹ since 2012, creating the necessary political capital to assure Trump's nomination as the Republican candidate (Post, 2017). It is appropriate to address these challenges affecting the five above-mentioned foundations of the liberal world order by Ikenberry.

First, the openness and free market that should go hand in hand with economic growth is no longer as dominant as it used to be, and this new reality has manifested itself with less willingness and collaboration amongst States. As the president of the think tank ‘Council on Foreign Relations’ and veteran American Diplomat, Richard Haass, has mentioned:

Global trade has grown, but recent rounds of trade talks have ended without agreement, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has proved unable to deal with today's most pressing challenges, including nontariff barriers and the theft of intellectual property. (Haass, 2019, p. 25)

In addition, trade openness began to be defied by the stagnation of economic fortunes for the working and middle social classes of western countries (Ikenberry, 2018). Specifically, the election of

¹ Far right-wing section of the Republican Party in the US.

President Donald Trump in 2016 showed the world how many people were unhappy with the way globalization had developed (Stokes, 2018). Conversely, Dutch political scientist, Matthijs Rooduijn (2018, p. 352) finds mixed evidence regarding the hypothesis that supporters of populist movements are 'losers of globalisation'. Some sectors of the population expected a direct impact of liberalism's benefits in their lives, which, as has been proved by a leading scholar of inequality through his "elephant curve"², Branko Milanovic (profiled by Wellisz), has not happened in over a generation (Wellisz, 2019). Hence, the liberal order has failed in extending globalization's profits across the whole social spectrum.

Besides, multilateralism has suffered numerous setbacks with different policies and measures undertaken by its main defendants. Ikenberry (2018, p. 19) noted how "(...) the challenges to multilateral cooperation have grown" and created a diffusion of dominance amongst new power centres. Evidence of this is the increased disruption happening since the beginning of the twenty-first century between the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, especially regarding conflicts with Russian military involvement, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and other sensitive issues (Melling & Dennett, 2017).

Moreover, there is an ongoing security competition amongst rival powers happening around the world (Duncombe & Dunne, 2018, p. 28). A clear example is China, constantly increasing its military expenditure, while trying to exert its power across the Asian continent and the Southeast Asian region. In a clear defiance to US supremacy, China has managed to extend its presence in the Southeast Asia Sea, while pressuring its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, a crucial ally for the US in the region. Also, China's hopes to gain effective control over Hong Kong have recently exacerbated the disagreements between Washington and Beijing (Barron, 2020).

² The "elephant curve" shows that over the 20 years (1988-2008) that Milanovic calls the period of "high globalization," huge increases in wealth were unevenly distributed across the world. Lower middle classes in advanced economies saw their earnings stagnate.

Further, the notion of completely open cooperation has become less attractive for some countries (Haass, 2019). Some of democracy's principal ideals such as the openness that allows a free market trade across the globe, as well as the cooperation between States are now being constantly mistrusted. Elected leaders like Donald Trump in the US or Andrés López Obrador in Mexico, run on these populist and anti-globalist platforms (Bremmer, 2017).

Last, the inevitable progression towards liberal democracy is currently under challenge. Several countries, though they have managed to adapt themselves in order to compete in an open and free market, have decided to keep illiberal forms of government that challenge the American ideal. As a matter of fact, these conservative surges do not just correspond to China or Russia anymore, but also extend to Turkey, the Philippines and Eastern Europe, knocking on the door of the Western world (Haass, 2019).

The crisis presented above, having affected the building blocks of the liberal world order, has had specific repercussions even within its main preachers. The election of President Trump generated a vacuum regarding the classical leadership of the West, that usually rested on the US (Ikenberry, 2018). As Professor Doug Stokes, has noted, during his period in the White House, President Trump:

(...) has actively encouraged the breakup of the EU, questioned enduring US global security alliances such as NATO, and seen the advocacy of an economic nationalism that threatens to reverse globalization. (...) Trump's victory represents the end of this interregnum: a rearticulation of the primacy of the nation-state, a fracture in the post-war liberal internationalist consensus and a hardening of geopolitical revisionism. (Stokes, 2018, p. 133)

Although some academics consider that the current crisis of the liberal world order is generated by the 'deformation' of its institutions, a much more important feature is the crisis of authority that runs across all the said challenges (Koivisto & Dunne, 2010). Its main reason is that the authority of the Western hegemonic power is dwindling, as noted by Ikenberry "The crisis of liberal internationalism 2.0 is a crisis of authority. It is a crisis over the way liberal international order is governed. (...) The American hegemonic organization of liberal order no longer appears to offer a solid foundation for the maintenance of an open and rule-based liberal order." (2014 , p. 51)

Therefore, the crisis of the liberal world order exposed in this section is linked to the crisis of authority of the US. There are already several examples of how these difficulties keep appearing due to the reasons exposed before: the success of the Brexit campaign (Duncombe & Dunne, 2018), the growing importance of Marine Le Pen's far-right movement in France (Jahn, 2018), as well as the appearance of populist euro-sceptic politicians such as Wilders in The Netherlands, Orbán in Hungary, Erdoğan in Turkey, or in other areas of the world, such as Bolsonaro in Brazil, Duterte in The Philippines, López Obrador in Mexico. Still, there are some opportunities that arise and could help the development of Peru's foreign policy.

First, the incentives for the US to provide a global security network that could benefit those countries still underdevelopment have been reduced. In this sense, Peru needs to diversify its cooperation possibilities and encourage other countries to strike bargains mutually beneficial. Next, the American authority crisis is also the end of unipolarity, which could consequently create different power centres leading State coalitions looking to balance themselves against other States. This can create an opportunity for Peru, by seeking agreements that benefit its development through interactions with a newly diverse catalogue of major powers. Then, the existing norm of sovereignty is being duly questioned by what is believed as a legitimate interest of the 'international community' in what goes on within other States (especially regarding human rights) (Ikenberry, 2014). In addition, the current

crisis has also seen a shift in what security threats looked like before. New dangers such as terrorist or transnational paramilitary groups menace the stability of countries. This situation provides an opportunity for the foreign service to look for opportunities that enhance the State capacities to deal with these pressures. Finally, and most importantly, the growth of the world economy has created new powers or stakeholders that can now tip the balance in matters related to governance and world politics, such as China and India. The emergence of these new actors creates new opportunities of development for Peru and unseals new possibilities of cooperation.

Even though the reasons for the crisis of the liberal world order have been addressed by several scholars already mentioned, there is a lack of contribution as to how could a country tackle the opportunities and challenges arising with these changes. In the following sections, this dissertation applies the RAM to better understand Peru's past foreign policy decisions and consider likely scenarios in the international agenda, making it more attractive for cooperation and investments in order to enhance Peru's development through a new focus on regionalism.

Section 2: Foreign Policy and the Rational Actor Model


In order to determine which are the new opportunities and challenges for Peru in the context of the crisis of the liberal world order described in Section 1, it is important to understand the ways in which a State designs its foreign policy on the international sphere. There is a wide range of theoretical frameworks available for IR scholars to analyse and generate predictability about the behaviour of a State in a specific context, such as individual cognitive theories (Katsikopoulos & Lan, 2011), the bureaucratic politics model (Suk Ahn, 2010), the group coalition as a decision-making process (Peake, 2002), and the social-psychological theories (Lantis & Homan, 2019). All these frameworks intend to provide a basis for a foreign policy analysis from different perspectives.

Given the availability of many analytical frameworks, it is appropriate to identify a specific theory that could help better understand the conduct of a State as well as provide insights to generate tentative conclusions about its future behaviour. This section will introduce the Rational Actor Model (RAM), a theory that assumes every State (actor) intends to maximize its gains with as minimum cost as possible, with the ambition of applying it to analyse the way in which Peru shapes its foreign policy objectives in the current international context. It is important to note that the RAM has been selected as the most appropriate method to identify possible State decisions, due to the presumption that the will of the State is unified into a specific foreign policy (Morin & Paquin, 2018). In this regard, other possible theories mentioned before, have the RAM as a baseline, but focus on the influence that state-level actors have in the decision-making process. Truth is, no single foreign policy theory is enough to analyse the decision taken by a State, but the RAM provides an interesting and simplifying starting point for this work.

Additionally, before using the RAM as a framework to understand decision-making process, it is crucial to comprehend the significance of foreign policy starting from a preference formation reality,

which intends to determine the structure in which the State actor operates. As such, political scientist Derek Beach and economist Rasmus Pedersen introduce a useful structured sequence in order to comprehend the development of foreign policy from its formation to the output as shown in Graph 1 (Beach & Pedersen, 2020, p. 70):

Graph 1:



In summary, a State determines its preference by a convergence of structural-level and State-level factors (external and internal incitements, correspondingly) which will narrow the scope of decisions available for the State in accordance with its reality. After this, from the cluster of decisions that may be available, a State will determine the utility gain of each specific possibility and, by this, will logically choose the one that maximizes its value. Finally, a State will determine the route, decision, or specific output that will reflect the decision that has been taken.

2.1 Preference Formation and the RAM

The process of the preference formation, or what States want, needs to consider how structural-level (external influences like policies of a hegemonic State, expected outcome from a region, international level of threat, amongst others) and domestic or State-level factors (local agents, businesses, public opinion, media, political institutions, etc.) can affect the foreign policy of a State. Therefore, the

awareness of the current environment around a specific State and in what structure it is set, can help understand the limitations and incentives such an actor could have, although this formula is not without its limitations. Robert Keohane, an American IR scholar, clarifies further the usefulness of systemic analysis in IR when he affirmed that:

Systemic analysis will not yield determinate predictions about states' pursuit of wealth and power. Even if it did, these predictions would be subject to inaccuracy insofar as great variations in state behaviour resulted from variations in their internal characteristics. Nevertheless, systemic theory can help us understand how the constraints under which governments act (...) affect their behaviour. (Keohane, 1984, p. 29)

In this regard, preference formation can be well-thought-out around different structural frameworks affecting the reality of a State, such as neoclassical realism, liberalism or constructivism. For the purpose of this dissertation, the one framework that will be used to analyse Peru's specific interests in its region and context is liberalism. In the case of Peru, there is proven deep cooperation with 'contending' countries within the region, eliminating the presumption of a constant scuffle (Chile and Peru), while speeches and public appearances from Peruvian politicians do not provide a stable view of its foreign policy priorities (constructivism), especially because of the erratic nature of its governments and ideological swings. According to Australian academic John Burton, interdependence liberalism sees the world as a cobweb, which helps bind States together and make them mutually dependant, contrary to the view of realism, where States are on their own (Burton, 1972). Bearing this in mind, liberalism describes the reality of Peru better than any of the other theoretical frameworks available.

Liberalism assumes that, even though rivalry and conflict are part of the international system and natural to the relationships between States, it is possible for these actors to find greater advantage in developing cooperation links with other countries rather than engaging in a constant clash with them. As a theory, liberalism deems that the greater the amount of cooperation between States, the

higher the cost will be to engage in a direct conflict or aggression; this consequently leads to more peaceful relationships amongst States, although this would depend on how evenly it is distributed or how the dependence is structured between them (Beach & Pedersen, 2020).

The authors introduce two different strains of liberal theories that could structure preference formation for a State's foreign policy: weak and strong liberalism. In the former, high levels of trade interdependence create a constraining nature to the foreign policy of States, while in the latter, States and their foreign policy-making decisions have been utterly transformed by interconnectedness and economic globalization (Beach & Pedersen, 2020). In the case of Peru, it is possible to determine that the weak version is more suitable to analyse the country's foreign policy than the strong one. This is because Peru, as a medium-level regional actor in Latin America, has developed cooperative relationships with most of their neighbours and partners, although these associations, contrary to what happens when there is a 'common security area'³, have not changed the nature of its foreign policies.

Consequently, the increased desire to build more cooperative relations between States upsurges the mutually beneficial bond amongst them, and this could ultimately lead to the creation of international institutions in a supra-State level that regulate those connections, such as the European Union (EU). Consequently, "(...) in issue-areas where there is a high level of institutionalization, States will have more cooperative foreign policy goals that focus on achieving absolute gains (...)" (Beach & Pedersen, 2020).

³ This term can be used to define what exists in the EU through the 'Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)', which involves collective self-defence amongst member States. See more: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-foreign-security-policy-cfsp_en.

All in all, there are different structural frameworks that can affect the preference formation process of a State. In this case, Peru's environment is better analysed through the prism of weak liberalism, which proposes that, even though a country will always look for its self-interest, it can do so in a more cooperative way, aiming to emphasize absolute over relative gains (Morin & Paquin, 2018). The selection of this structure for the States' preference formation also determines the influence that their domestic factors will have in the choice of a specific foreign policy. As such, "(...) liberal theories at the state level are very much 'bottom-up' approaches, with foreign policy goals of the state reflecting societal demands that have been aggregated by the political system" (Beach & Pedersen, 2020, p. 104).

Hence, having discussed the preference formation structure and determined it to be a weak assertion of liberalism, it is subsequently necessary to introduce the RAM model and the decision-making process that is applied in this study.

2.2 The RAM

The choice of a specific foreign policy rests on comprehending the predilection a State has in one or another situation. Since these entities are not single minded and structured upon the will of one individual, it is not easy to understand how a State eventually comes to a decision, but the RAM model can help making some of these presumptions. As such, Beach and Pedersen provide a good description of how this model works:

The RAM builds on the assumption that foreign policy actors are synoptically rational (...), an assumption that is central in rational choice theorization. (...) we can treat actors 'as if' they are human computers able to make sense out of enormous amounts of information. Actors have a set of clearly ranked goals that they want to achieve, and they are able (...) to

Fernando Ramírez-Gastón Lecca

determine which choice will result in the maximization of the achievement (...) with the lowest level of risk. (Beach & Pedersen, 2020, pp. 144-145)

As already mentioned, this logic is not without its flaws, being that the rational thesis makes it seem like the foreign policy of a State is a 'rational continuum' that has not been affected by the characters of different people and in-State actors. Although these implications should be considered in a more thorough research of the rationality behind State decision-making, the RAM does provide an initial phase in order to understand the choice a State makes by simplifying its breakdown.

In this regard, Harvard professor Graham Allison, and American diplomat and professor Philip Zelikow provide some basic notions to understand the logic behind the RAM (Zelikow & Allison, 1999). As a starting point, the basic unit of analysis for this model should be understood as governmental action, which is a decision taken by a State intended to maximize its gains and minimize its costs as well as accomplishing the desired goals and objectives (Redd & Mintz, 2013). Subsequently, three main additional concepts need to be briefly introduced:

- a. Unified National Actor: the State, conceived as a unitary decision maker, is the agent.
- b. The Problem: an action is chosen based on what the agent faces as a threat or opportunity.
- c. Action as a Rational Choice: includes the foreign policy objectives and strategies an agent looks to achieve, its options, the consequences of them, and the final choice bound to maximize its gains while minimizing the costs.

Finally, the RAM logic is based in what is called the 'dominant inference pattern', which is built on the idea that any action taken by a nation, or its representatives, maximizes the possibility of the agent to achieve its foreign policy objectives. All the explanatory power of the RAM stems from this inference (Zelikow & Allison, 1999). Hence, in the RAM:

(...) decision-makers have a set of clearly ranked goals that they want to achieve based on their national interests, (...) to determine which choice will maximize the achievement of their goals with the lowest possible amount of risk. (Beach & Pedersen, 2020, p. 145)

Per se, the foreign policy output generated by the RAM (what States finally do) is based in several assumptions for the actions of a State: they undertake a complete assessment of the utility of each possible option, apply the utility maximization models to choose between said possibilities, and they have a single national interest (Redd & Mintz, 2013).

Until recently, the existing literature has used the RAM predominantly to analyse the different policy decisions that a State has taken in the past. This dissertation uses this model to evaluate some policy decisions already taken by Peru as an international actor and a unitary agent, while also intends to foresee other decisions yet to be taken by the State. Attempting to predict the behaviour of a country can be complex, so the focus is on discussing and considering potential scenarios that are likely to occur if Peru follows the same track of the past few years.

Section 3: A regional agenda for Peru's foreign policy

Having established the current challenges and opportunities that the international world order poses, as well as the main characteristics of the RAM foreign policy theory to guide the analysis, this section introduces first, the main features of Peru's current foreign policy and second, discusses the way in which the RAM influences previous and future decisions for the country.

3.1 Peru's foreign policy

Any discussion of Peru's national interests in the international sphere is incomplete without recurring to the thought of Ambassador Carlos García Bedoya, a renowned Peruvian diplomat that analysed foreign policy, who affirmed that “[a] state draws up certain purposes to be achieved (...). That is, indicating your objectives and the procedures by which you believe you can achieve them. This essential scheme (...) constitutes the foreign policy itself” (Garcia Bedoya, 2013, p. 80). In summary, the Ambassador concurs with the above-mentioned presumptions regarding the preference formation of the State over a wide range of options, the selection of a specific opportunity considering the main interests of the country, and the final action that strives to maximize utilities for the State.

This dissertation focuses mainly on what has happened in the last twenty years, but it is imperative to go back further in time in terms of Peruvian foreign policy in order to understand the current principles. Professor St. John introduces the government's first attempts to redirect its foreign policy from one that was based solely in an alliance with the US, towards more regional actions, starting in 1963 with Belaúnde, and growing towards consolidation during Fujimori's regime in the 1990s. The latter sought to accelerate the pace of regional integration by uplifting the Andean Community of Nations (CAN, from its Spanish acronym), strived to expand economic relations by joining the Asia-

Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1998, signed a peace treaty with Ecuador, and fixed a 70-years-old border dispute with Chile (St. John, 2017)⁴.

As mentioned before, the crisis of the liberal world order has put some pressure on the way international relations were often addressed in the Western hemisphere. Peru has felt the burden too, but its foreign policy and the way it is conducted has not changed significantly since the early 2000s. Indeed, the foreign policy guidelines, as articulated in the 2002 'National Agreement' ("Acuerdo Nacional" in Spanish), a covenant that synthesizes Peru's national interests after a process that searched for consensus following Fujimori's 10-year dictatorship, subscribed by different political movements, social organizations, and the government, have remained unchanged since (Secretaría Ejecutiva del Acuerdo Nacional, n.d.). Although the discussion about how to refocus Peru's international agenda is still ongoing, the Acuerdo Nacional is the most recent articulation of Peru's foreign policy, rising as an example of how consensual decisions in Peru are mostly unheeded by constant political ruckus.

Specifically, the National Agreement outlines as the first state policy 'Democracy and the State's Rule of Law', while the sixth subchapter is entitled 'Foreign policy for peace, democracy, development and integration'. It declared that Peru would have a foreign policy in service of peace, democracy, development, and the insertion of the country into the world market, while adhering to the laws and principles of International Law and Human Rights, as well as those within the scope of the United Nations (Secretaría Ejecutiva del Acuerdo Nacional, n.d.).

A keyword within this project is 'development'. Peruvian foreign policy analysts like Ambassador García Bedoya stated that the main areas of interest of Peru were more related to subjects like the

⁴ All these achievements happened simultaneously with unprecedented levels of corruption.

territory, the sea, integration, and navigating the interests of the superpowers during the Cold War, since most foreign policy treaties were written during the twentieth century. Still, even in the cited work of García Bedoya, which was written in 1981, it is possible to find an early mention to the development as a novel focus in Peru's foreign policy. In essence, he understood development not only as the promotion of Peruvian economic interests, but many other subjects along with it, such as education, culture, and society (Garcia Bedoya, 2013, p. 136).

Henceforth, Peru has different areas of interest that have been present in its international relations throughout history, but there are new challenges and opportunities that were not on the radar before. The foreign service has refocused its lens in order to aid heavily in generating opportunities towards a sustainable and integral development for the country. In this regard, the main idea around Peru's foreign policy during this time is to create new opportunities for the progress of its population, be them through integration, international treaties, or other mechanisms that yield plausible results. It is now appropriate to briefly analyse some of those international decisions and the results generated for the country.

3.2 Applying RAM to Peru's Previous Foreign Policy Decisions


This section applies the RAM framework to three recent emblematic foreign policy decisions by the Peruvian government – namely the Peruvian-Chilean maritime dispute, Peru's decision to become a platform for the Asia-Pacific market, and the creation of The Lima Group – to illustrate the focus of the country's main foreign policy agenda during the past few years.

As previously mentioned, it is essential to start the analysis with the preference formation that influenced the decision-making process with external (structural-level) and internal (State-level)

factors, and then advance to the specific foreign policy output in order to determine whether the results maximized the utility for Peru. The three illustrative cases have been selected considering those events that have been most important for Peru in the last few years. The first related to a lawsuit before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague that marked six years of tense Peruvian-Chilean diplomatic relations and eventually brought a solution to a long-standing dispute. The second refers to a foreign policy of Peru that started in the 1990s and defined the government's efforts in its international agenda. Finally, the last scenario has given Peru a critical role in the region in endeavouring to find a solution for the Venezuelan crisis.

Starting with the Peruvian-Chilean maritime dispute, the case starts as early as 1986, when Peru first attempted to initiate negotiations with Chile regarding the maritime border between the two countries. Up until 2001, the Peruvian Diplomatic Service undertook several efforts to initiate a dialogue concerning this subject, but Chilean authorities kept refusing any possibility of discussion, declaring that there were not any pending issues. Finally, in 2008 Peru sued Chile before the ICJ (Novak & Garcia-Corrochano, 2014). By applying the RAM framework, the processes for this foreign policy decision could be depicted as follows:

Graph 2:



Source: Designed by the author.

In this regard, some external factors influencing Peru's preference formation were Chile's unwillingness to negotiate, while the conflict kept creating tensions between the two countries. Consistently, internal influences affected Peru's preference, since Peruvian fishing rights were being disturbed in the area and the population demanded a solution to the border dispute. At the same time, Chile is Peru's principal economic partner and investor in the region, so the government had a vital interest in solving this matter and moving on. Filing the lawsuit before the ICJ was a strategic decision for Peru given the country had little to lose, since Chile was already occupying most of the maritime territory and, in the worst-case scenario, the ICJ would have confirmed the *status quo*. Despite the risks and the costs, Peru took a gamble and succeeded in achieving a fair solution to its southern maritime problem, while maximizing the utility obtained from this decision. Simultaneously, the country strove to maintain its economic relationship with Chile in a separate string, and continuously cooperated with its neighbour to strengthen their relationship, even after the ICJ had pronounced its definitive sentence (Novak & Garcia-Corrochano, 2014).

The second scenario refers to Peru's decision to become a platform for the Asia-Pacific region, whose roots go as far as the government of Fujimori in the 1990s, when a clear intention appeared to negotiate with the emerging economies of Southeast Asia (Guerra-Barón, 2019). Even so, it was during the government of President García in Peru when a more concrete initiative materialised, the "Pacific Alliance", whose principal objective was to form a group of regional like-minded countries that could awaken the economic interest of the Asia-Pacific region, predominantly China. This way, Peru, Chile, Colombia and Mexico together represented the eighth economy of the world and 38% of the GDP of Latin America, attracting attention and opportunities from across the globe (Gutiérrez, 2019). The application of the RAM on this foreign policy decision is shown in Graph 3:

Graph 3:

Source: Designed by the author.


According to the RAM, regarding external stimulus for Peru's preference formation, it is worth mentioning the fact that regional economic blocks like the CAN or ALBA were either blocked by ideological differences or uninterested in advancing a free trade market with the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, China kept growing as an economic competitor for the US, bringing new trade opportunities, particularly in commodities, while Chile and Colombia were searching for the same commerce opportunities as Peru with the Asian nation. Internally, investors and enterprises were increasingly more interested in establishing a relevant exchange with China, particularly in commodities, as well as diversifying the country's offer of commercial partners.

As such, the creation of a regional initiative with allies searching for the same purpose represented a good strategy that could maximize the utilities of the countries involved. The Pacific Alliance intended to synergize the enterprises of the regional countries that were more invested in global commerce and economic trade, as well as creating a common market of services, goods and other commodities. The fact that the relation with the Asia-Pacific region has improved since the creation of the Pacific Alliance, and that it served as a soft-balancing power in the region to withstand the rise of Venezuela's and Brazil's economic and political ideals, is patent (Arias Fajardo, 2020). Despite all these positive results, a change in some of their political discourses has halted the rapid growth and prominence that the Alliance had at the beginning. Now, although it has not been rendered inoperable, it is suffering because of the current variance in priorities of its members and some of

their ideological differences, dwindling its progress and the opportunities it generates. As such, this example shows that the RAM can explain a decision that maximizes the utility of a country up to a point, but it has its limitations as to predict whether a specific foreign policy will continue to last in time.

Finally, the third case refers to the creation of the Lima Group, a regional initiative that has its roots in discussions held within the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) regarding the Venezuelan crisis (Díaz Oshiyama, 2019) and the search for a democratic solution to that situation. In 2017, Venezuela found itself with fewer allies in the region and with an economic crisis that was only growing worst by the second, causing a massive migration problem of more than three million Venezuelans to neighbouring nations. This setting called the attention of the countries involved to look for a solution that could re-establish democracy in Venezuela. The RAM framework in this decision is represented in Graph 4:

Graph 4:



Source: *Designed by the author.*

The Lima Group was a central initiative in the region and had significant accomplishments, particularly by drawing international attention to the Venezuelan crisis, and creating opportunities for cooperation and international humanitarian assistance. Some external factors influencing Peru's preference formation to lead this initiative were related to the existing weakness amongst the ALBA

States because of resource shortages, the economic sanctions already in place by the US to the regime of Maduro, the massive protests occurring in Venezuela, and the impossibility to reach a consensus within the OAS. Inside Peru, health and employment systems have been under extreme duress since the arrival of thousands of Venezuelan migrants, while internal agents (workers affected by an increased job competition, health systems under duress, etc.) demand solutions. For a moment, a government change seemed possible in Caracas, especially when the US endorsed its support to the Lima Group, but this eventually did not materialise. At the same time, this attempted solution proved to be the most ideal one for the countries involved, as resolving the economic crisis in Venezuela could cause the massive return of the Venezuelan diaspora to their home country, easing pressure in the region.

Disappointingly, all the diplomatic efforts of the Lima Group members were insufficient, showing that, despite the utility maximization for Peru did happen as per predicted by the RAM, this tool has its limitations in predicting how long these gains can last. Still, the attention of the world was driven to the crisis, possible solutions started appearing, Peru was perceived as a regional leader in search of a positive result, and the opposition gained legitimacy. However, the RAM could not predict the election results in Mexico and Argentina that would cause that two of its principal members would leave the initiative. Additionally, the fact that Nicolás Maduro avoided the efforts to depose him from the Presidential seat, and the extent of the support that he enjoyed from the Armed Forces, was somewhat unseen by the countries conforming the Lima Group. As of now, the group is currently dormant and with fewer members, most of which are concerned about their own internal issues, for the moment.

After having analysed the three main foreign policy subjects in the agenda of Peru during the last 20 years through the RAM framework, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions. First, the RAM has its limitations as to predict how much the maximization of utility will last, although it can usually

determine which was the best course of action for the country in order to maximize its utility and minimize its losses in a specific moment. Second, two of the three examples analysed were struck by the same problem any regional integration initiative has in South America: disintegration (Thakur & Van Langenhove, 2006). Historically, the different beliefs that exist in the region have always ended up causing more trouble than good, overwhelming any attempt of integration in the continent and highlighting its differences rather than its similarities. IR Professor Gian Luca Gardini summarizes this reality when he establishes that “(...) when Latin America is unable to address the current limitations of its integration, it simply creates yet another scheme that suffers from the same problems (...)” (Gardini, 2011, p. 247)


Despite all this, Peru has always considered regionalism as an important factor of its foreign policy agenda. Several regional integration or consensus efforts, such as the CAN, the Pacific Alliance, the Lima Group, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, from its Spanish acronym), have counted with its support and active participation. The most obvious deduction from these failures is that the region is not ready for an integration scheme that could strive to become a humbler version of the EU in the future. However, a new possibility arises if Peru stops aiming for deep integration opportunities and searches for innovative possibilities of collaboration with like-minded countries.

In this sense, a recent example shows how this prospect can be successful. In 2012, Peru and Colombia partnered together in order to negotiate with the EU, closing the Multi-Party Trade Agreement between the EU, Peru and Colombia (the “Multi-Party Agreement”). This treaty has erased tariffs between the two blocks and has had a direct impact on growth and employment in both Latin American countries (European Parliament, 2021). In a preliminary stage, the covenant was negotiated between all the members of the CAN and the EU, but because of ideological differences, Ecuador and Bolivia withdrew, almost causing the agreement to fail (Zygierewicz, 2021). When Peru and Colombia could not recruit extra support for the agreement, they decided to maintain

negotiations directly with the EU, strengthening their international position as a block of promising Latin American countries and achieving a successful and beneficiary result for every party, in 2012. This is a clear example of how a situation that is regularly halted by conflicting interests in Latin America can be turned in another direction by allies with synchronized interests.

Is this possibility in accordance with the RAM? Briefly taking the example of the Multi-Party Agreement, it would look as follows:

Graph 5:



Source: Designed by the author.

The RAM shows that external factors influencing Peru's preference formation are related to the ideological differences affecting negotiations within the CAN, preventing a unified position for the agreement with the EU, while Colombia and the EU showed a significant interest in signing the agreement. Meanwhile, within Peru, businesses demanded new possibilities for commerce and trade. Therefore, as an agreement that remains for the long-term, the ideological swings of Latin America do not threaten its existence. Also, the reality is that pairing up with a country that has similar priorities, helped strengthen the bargaining position of both countries before the EU, which, consequently, caused Peru and Colombia to have a stronger position together rather than individually.

All in all, despite the ideological differences existing in the region, partner countries can find common ground to negotiate, sign or converge into a beneficial situation for each country, and this is exactly the type of deals Peru's foreign policy should strive for, as the RAM shows the expected maximization of utility from it.


3.3 The RAM and Future Policy Decisions

Following on from the previous section, the RAM's framework is now tentatively applied to consider possible future outcomes or choices in Peru's foreign policy. Two main foreign policy priorities stand out for the soon to be next government to have to deal with: first, the long overdue Peruvian objective to be admitted into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and second, the generation of capabilities in the region to produce its own vaccine for a future global pandemic.

Admission into the OECD has been a fundamental foreign policy objective since 2011, and Peru was formally invited to initiate accession talks in 2015 (Andina - Agencia Peruana de Noticias, 2021). The OECD is an inter-governmental economic organization composed by the 37 richest countries of Earth that looks to stimulate economic progress and development. While Peru has displayed significant efforts to be admitted, it has failed to do so. In this sense, the last two governments of Presidents Vizcarra and Sagasti have been too preoccupied with internal turmoil to prioritise this objective. However, this is a situation that ought to be amended in the next government, so as not to lose the progress already made towards this goal.

In this regard, the uncertainty of Peru's accession into the OECD could be overturned by a strategic alliance that includes like-minded countries. As previously noted, the world is suffering from the surge of either populist or extreme views that threaten globalisation and its liberal ideals, and Peru is no stranger to this menace. Currently, Peruvian elections are indecisive as to who will be the next President of the country, be it extreme left-wing labour unionist Pedro Castillo or right-wing Keiko Fujimori (France24, 21), a situation that has brought increased polarization. While both views are extreme, Castillo is running for President in a platform that takes Venezuela and Cuba as countries with ideal governments, while Fujimori endorses free trade and capital. In the case Castillo wins, nobody is quite sure what will happen (Wall Street Journal, 2021), but in the circumstance of a victory from right-wing Fujimori, there may be some possibilities that the country could use to its advantage and avoid a future Venezuelan-style type of regime.

Hence, the newly elected Peruvian government could search for opportunities of accessing the OECD while tackling the populist threat. From this point of view, Chile and Colombia are the two main countries in the region that have always acted as economic allies for Peru. Not only do they already share a membership within the Pacific Alliance, but their last governments have always strived for free trade, commerce and investment, as well as, in numerous occasions, cooperated amongst themselves to achieve such purposes (Veloza Acosta, 2015). Since Chile and Colombia are both members of the OECD, Peru could propose a strategic alliance with these two countries in order to receive fundamental help to finally access the organization. In return, Chile and Colombia will gain a lasting ally in the region with similar economic policies, and Peru could guarantee its support to the Chilean-Colombian initiative of the Forum for the Progress and Development of South America (PROSUR), a South American integration mechanism destined to replace the UNASUR. A RAM analysis of this possibility looks as follows:

Graph 6:


Source: Designed by the author.

In this sense, external factors determine preference formation when considering that populism surges in the region threaten the economic and globalisation agenda, while there is an increased competitiveness for OECD membership. Additionally, Peru's internal agents, such as government institutions and private sectors, are interested in learning from positive public policies within the scope of the OECD, as well as determining how to maintain the economic model while reducing the inequality gap.

Hence, the objective of this policy would be to grant access to Peru into the OECD by convincing allied countries that it will be in the best interests of them all for Peru to access the organization. Even though the RAM as a prediction element may have its flaws, the possibility of this alliance will maximize Peru's utilities and minimize its costs, while strengthening its regional agenda with countries it already has a close relationship with. As a result, a reinforcement of existing relationships with Colombia and Chile could lead to the accession of Peru to the OECD, in exchange for a full support of the PROSUR initiative, which would also be advantageous for the country.

On the other hand, it would be irresponsible not to address the current global pandemic and how it has affected Latin America, while also showing its lack of capabilities to address present-day constraints. The reality is that the region was not prepared to endure a pandemic of this magnitude, and it is showing every day in mostly every country (Burki, 2021). As such, and despite the ideological differences in the continent, now that there is some hope for the pandemic to eventually be over when vaccines are distributed, the region needs to collaborate into increasing their capabilities in order to be prepared for a similar situation in the future. The world now seems to increasingly understand that having vaccinated every single person in the most developed countries will not be enough if the citizens of the rest of the world are not vaccinated as well. There are already some initiatives to facilitate vaccines production, such as the one proposed by US President Joe Biden to waive the vaccine patent in order to increase its supply (BBC, 2021). Still, there is a need for further collaboration in matters like these, and Latin America should strive to improve its preparedness for a possible similar situation in the future. In this regard, a RAM analysis of this possibility shows in Graph 7:

Graph 7:



Source: Designed by the author.

This initiative would not just maximize the utility possibilities of prevention for Peru, but also for the whole region. Latin American countries on their own do not have the required competences to deal with a pandemic of the magnitude of Covid-19, but within a regional scope the situation might change. In this sense, Peru could be a pioneer in the proposition of this enterprise, not only with

countries that seem most ideologically similar, but being it a matter of common interest, with every country in the region despite differences. An unpolitical initiative would be best to gather the required support within the region, such as an association between the representatives of science and medical institutions of each country that shows interest. After this, the project could use public funding from every subscribing nation, conforming a team of valued scientists that belong to different nationalities with the objective of developing facilities that could face a possible future pandemic peril such as the current COVID-19.

The current emergency of populism and extreme views in the region and the world, have transformed once certain options and agendas into unreliable sources of opportunities and development for Peru. In this regard, and bearing in mind Peru's context in the region, which has been defined as a weak liberalism, the country should seek for common ground opportunities that can maximize its gains under difficult circumstances, without investing so much effort or resources in an initiative that may end up frustrated because of external factors such as ideological differences or personal interests.

Conclusions

The crisis of the liberal world order has brought with it important and new threats into the way the globe has been managed in the last 30 years. Globalisation is being constantly questioned and the certainties based on liberalism and free market are no longer a given for everyone. In this sense, liberalism needs to find a way to bring the benefits of free trade into every person, not just a profited few. As a result, this creates new challenges, but also opportunities for actors on the international sphere.

This dissertation used the RAM framework in order to analyse recent Peru's foreign policy decisions and contemplate some future scenarios. The RAM constitutes a useful foreign policy evaluation tool that can serve to analyse specific foreign policy outputs in the short-term, but it lacks instruments to predict the consequences in a medium to longer-term of the taken decision. Nonetheless, the RAM shows that short-term agendas that lack an ideological component (such as the Multi-Party Agreement) can have effective results for the population and not be constrained by the constant regional mood swings or political turmoil. There are several initiatives Peru could commence under this framework of utility while minimizing its losses, but the two main ones analysed in the previous section are Peru's accession as a member of the OECD and the need to address the region's lack of capabilities to withstand a global pandemic. Both possibilities promise to be critical in the next few years for the country, and Peru has much to win in the international forum by addressing these issues at an early stage.

Additionally, regionalism has been a constant item in Peru's foreign policy agenda, but it has failed several times and through different initiatives, mainly because of ideological differences, a regime change, or personal interests. There is a lack of permanence in regional initiatives that ends up causing them to be unofficially deactivated because of the subsequent absence of political support.

The efforts of the Diplomatic and foreign service should focus on initiatives that can bring lasting results without depending on external factors such as the region's ideological similarity, because this has proved to be unsatisfactory for its foreign policy goals in the past.

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