

A REPORT FROM THE

**Communications
Research
Center**



CONTENT ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL TELEVISION
COMMERCIALS OF THE PERUVIAN ELECTION
CAMPAIGN OF 1990

Augusto Hidalgo-Sanchez


Knoxville, December 1990

College of Communications

THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE/KNOXVILLE 37916


To the Graduate Council:


I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Augusto Hidalgo entitled "Content Analysis on Political Television Commercials of the Peruvian Election Campaign of 1990: A Search on Message Content and Form." I have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Communications.



Michael W. Singletary, Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:





Accepted for the Council:

Vice Provost
and Dean of the Graduate School

STATEMENT OF PERMISSION TO USE

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master's degree at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, I agree that the Library shall make it available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgement of the source is made.

Permission for extensive quotation from or reproduction of this thesis may be granted by my major professor, or in his absence, by the Head of Interlibrary Services, when, in the opinion of either, the proposed use of the material is for scholarly purposes. Any copying or use of the material in this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without written permission.

Signature _____

Date _____

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL TELEVISION COMMERCIALS OF THE
PERUVIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF 1990

A Thesis

Presented for the

Master of Science

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Augusto Hidalgo

December 1990

Dedicated to

Mom Agripina, aunt Jesus
and brother Winston.

AKNOWLEDGMENTS

My thanks go to the Universidad Nacional de Trujillo, to the Fulbright/LASPAU Commission, and to the E. Meeman Fellowship for their economic support. I also thank to Erik Stilling and Melanie Noltenius for having the patience of transforming my rustic manuscript into a decent and scholarly form; Erik, not only worked in the editing of this paper but also gave me invaluable suggestions regarding to its organization. Erik, you are tremendo!

Also, my gratitude goes to Dr. Barbara Moore for suggesting me the topic of this thesis, to Dr. Roxane Hovland for her questions on the methodological part, and to Dr. Mike Singletary for the peace he transmitted me in the most difficult moments of the elaboration of this thesis. Finally, I want to thank to my children, especially to Carolina, for understanding the deprivation of TV and VCR they suffered during more than one month while I was coding the commercials.

ABSTRACT

Despite the assumed impact of television in political campaigns, its effects are not yet completely understood. Many uncontrolled variables make it difficult to generate or even to assess cause-effect relationships.

This thesis studied 99 Peruvian television commercials from the electoral campaign of 1990. The objective was to explore the relationship between content and form of ads with their environmental variables. The question was: Is there any relationship between the verbal message and form of commercials and the political parties, broadcasting stages and offices pursued?

A content analysis was conducted on the 99 commercials. The independent variables were the eleven political parties responsible for the ads; the presidential, senatorial and deputorial offices pursued; and the four broadcasting stages. The dependent variables were five variables of verbal message and twenty eight of form.

Important patterns of variations were found. Particularly relevant was the pattern of temporal effect in the ads, both in content and form. Also, models of variation due to party sponsorship and due to office pursued were found.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. BACKGROUND.....	1
Section 1: Generalities about Peru.....	1
Section 2: Politics in Peru.....	2
Brief History.....	2
Electoral Legal Restrictions.....	4
Section 3: Mass Media in Peru.....	7
Newspapers.....	7
Magazines.....	9
Television.....	9
Radio.....	11
Advertising Agencies.....	12
Section 4: The 1990 Electoral Campaign.....	13
Discussion.....	22
The Purpose of this Study.....	26
II. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	27
The Influence of Political Advertising.....	27
The Necessity of Political Television Advertising.....	30
The Dynamics of Political Commercials.....	33
Elements of Television Commercials.....	36
Research Questions.....	42
III. METHODS.....	44
Population and Sample.....	45
Analysis Method.....	48
The Pilot Study.....	49
Independent Variables.....	51
Dependent Variables.....	51
The Coding Procedure.....	57

The Reliability Test.....	57
Analysis of the Data.....	58
IV. FINDINGS.....	62
Section 1: The Average Political Commercial.....	62
Section 2: The Analysis of the Verbal Message Components.....	68
Verbal Message and Parties.....	69
Verbal Message and Broadcasting Stages.....	74
Verbal Message and Offices Pursued.....	77
Section 3: The Analysis of the Formal Variables..	79
Parties and Form.....	80
Broadcasting Stages and Form.....	87
Offices Pursued and Form.....	91
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION.....	96
REFERENCES.....	101
APPENDIX.....	106
VITA.....	109

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
1	List of Parties Presenting Candidates for the 1990 Elections in Peru.....	14
2	Polls for Presidential Candidates.....	15
3	Television Advertising Expenditures for President and Congress Calculated at Rate Card Prices.....	19
4	Presidential Elections Outcome of 1990.....	20
5	Commercials Broadcasted and Recorded.....	46
6	Commercials Analyzed.....	47
7	Results of Reliability Test.....	59
8	Means of the Variables	63
9	Parties vs. Verbal Message Components.....	70
10	Rationality of Verbal Message vs. Elections Outcome.....	71
11	Broadcasting Stages vs. Verbal Message.....	75
12	Offices Pursued vs. Verbal Message.....	78
13	Parties vs. Form-Sound.....	81
14	Parties vs. Form-Editing.....	82
15	Parties vs. Form-Candidate.. ..	83
16	Broadcasting Stage vs. Form-Sound.....	88
17	Broadcasting Stage vs. Form-Editing.....	89
18	Broadcasting Stage vs. Form-Candidate.....	90
19	Offices Pursued vs. Form-Sound.....	92
20	Offices Pursued vs. Form-Editing.....	93
21	Offices Pursued vs. Form-Candidate.....	94

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

The first part of this study is intended to give relevant information about Peru: its politics, legal restrictions, and mass media, as well as specific facts about the election campaign of 1990, the television advertising used in the campaign, and some discussion of that election's outcome.

Section 1: Generalities about Peru

Peru is a South American republic with a population of 22 million. It covers 496,222 square miles (1,245,000 square Km.), an area approximately three times the size of California. Peru borders with Ecuador and Colombia to the North, with Brazil and Bolivia to the East, with Chile to the South and with the Pacific Ocean to the West. Politically, it is divided in 24 districts (departmentos) and nearly 200 provinces.

More than 70% of the population lives in urban areas. Peru has the highest population growth rate of any South American country, and like many other underdeveloped countries, its population is mainly comprised of the young. More than 40% of the population is less than 15 years old, and 46% is between ages 15 and 59 years old. There are also significant differences with regard to race, 45% percent of

the population are full-blooded Indian, 37% mestizo (Indian and European mixed-blood), 15% White, and the remaining 3% are Black and Asian, (World Almanac, 1990).

The dominant language in Peru is Spanish; however, more than 20% of the people speak Quechua, Aymara or other pre-Inca languages of the rainforest regions of the East of the country. The literacy rate is at 79%, with ten years of compulsory education; most of the illiterates are rural Indians who do not speak Spanish.

Finally, the per capita income is \$940 per year, and 90% of the population claims to be Roman Catholic believers (World Almanac, 1990).

Section 2: Politics in Peru

Brief History

Peru was a Spanish colony for about three centuries. After 1821, national leaders tried to shape the political and legal systems of the country mainly following the French model. During the nineteenth century, most of the rulers rose to power through the ranks of the military, and in this century, this pattern of history has not changed very much. During the last fifty years, administrations have oscillated between civilian and military dictatorships. The last military government, assumed power in 1968, and left it in 1980. Since then, Peru has been living in a fragile but

determined democracy.

In 1978, the military government called for elections for a Constitutional Assembly. Four large parties, both old and new ones, competed for and won seats in the legislature to write a new constitution. The oldest party was the Partido Aprista Peruano, also known as APRA, a moderate party founded in 1931. APRA got 35% of the national vote. A newer party was the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), a right wing party founded in 1968. This party got 18% of the turnout in the 1978 election. The other two parties were new Marxist conglomerates: Unidad Democratica y Popular (UDP) and the Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil y Popular (FOCEP) with a combined 25%. That year, another traditional party, Accion Popular (AP) founded in 1956, refused to participate in the elections.

In 1980, after 12 years of military rule, a new president was elected by Peruvians. Fernando Belaunde Terry of Accion Popular won his second presidential mandate in the first round and with an absolute majority. His first mandate was interrupted by the military coup of 1968.

Coincidentally, 1980 also marks the appearance of the maoist guerrilla movement called "Partido Comunista Peruano 'Por el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui'," later known only as 'Sendero Luminoso' (Shining Path). This guerrilla movement since its insurgence has offered armed opposition to the government, destroying public and private

property, and killing public officials, politicians, and civilians who had opposed the Shining Path. According to Amnesty International estimates, Shining Path together with another rival guerrilla movement, the Castro-influenced Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA), have already caused more than 18,000 deaths in ten years of insurgency. Among the dead are one thousand policemen and soldiers, two or three thousand insurgents, with the remaining being civilians. Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA have also caused more than five billion dollars in material damage. It is important to note that during these last five years, despite the fact that more than half of the territory is under a state of emergency, (military rule), both guerrilla forces have increased their activities inflicting more violence and destruction.

Electoral Legal Restrictions

As we stated above, Peruvian politics are ruled by the 1979 Constitution. According to this legal document, the Peruvian State is composed of three equal and separate powers: legislative, judicial and executive, with an influential president. The Peruvian Congress is composed of two chambers: Senators and Deputies. The Senate has 60 members elected at large. The Deputies Chamber is composed of 180 members, elected by each departamento (province) in a number proportional to its population, much like the House

of Representatives of the U.S.

The President of the republic and both chambers are replaced each five years; in addition, the president cannot be reelected until after another government period.

According to the voting act of 1978, all citizens between the ages of 18 and 65 are required to vote. Those who fail to do so are fined an equivalent of a month of the minimum wage(\$30). The ballot in Peru consists of three sections, one for each of the presidential, senatorial and deputorial races. Within each section, the voter is expected to endorse a party. This is indirectly endorsing the individual candidate in the presidential election, since there is only one candidate per party in the presidential race. The Constitution states that a presidential candidate must win by absolute majority (more than 50%). If no candidate attains this majority, the two leading contenders compete for an absolute majority in a run-off election. However, one of these two candidates may withdraw and the opponent will win by default. This happened in 1985 when the Marxist candidate, Alfonso Barrantes, (who had the 28% of the initial vote), withdrew from the run-off election against Alan Garcia of the Partido Aprista (who had 48% of the initial vote). Garcia won the election by default.

While there is only one presidential candidate in each party, there are many more congressional candidates than there are seats in the Senate and Deputy Chamber. In the

second section of the ballot, the voter must identify the party he wishes to win the seats in the Senate. He may choose the same or different party for the Deputy Chamber in section three. Besides naming the party in each of the two congressional sections, the voter also has the option of naming up two specific candidates for the Senate and two for the Deputy Chamber; this is a constitutional right known as the 'preferential vote.'

In the tallying process, each party is determined to have won a certain percentage senatorial and deputorial vote. By virtue of the constitutional norm of 'vote-sharing,' each party is guaranteed a number of seats proportionate to its share of the votes. Within each party, those candidates who receive the greatest number of preferential votes are selected to fill the seats allocated to their party by the vote-sharing norm. This preferential vote is important to this study because it creates competition both between and within parties. It creates the incentive for highly individualized campaigns because greater name-recognition for a candidate means a higher probability of winning a seat.

There are other specific constitutional and electoral regulations concerning this propaganda activity. For instance, advertising of all types is allowed only until 48 hours before the beginning of the suffrage; additionally, the publication of pre-electoral surveys is prohibited

during the last two weeks prior to the election day.

Finally, there are specific regulations regarding the state-owned media; the law concedes free use of the public media to all registered parties presenting presidential tickets and provided that they adhere to specific norms. Each party is given the same number of spots regardless of its constituency size. For example, in the 1990 presidential campaign, each party received 8 ten-minute television spots, 16 ten-minute spots on radio, and 10 spaces in the government owned newspapers all free of charge. Nevertheless, while this government concession may seem substantial, in reality it is merely symbolic. This is because of the small audiences of the state-owned electronic media and the very low circulation of the state-owned papers.

Section 3: Mass Media in Peru

Peru has developed a modern mass communication system composed of newspapers, magazines, television and radio stations, and outdoor advertising. Most of those media are centralized in Lima, the capital city which has a population of six million.

Newspapers

Peru has roughly 80 papers with a combined daily

circulation of 600,000; twelve of them have nationwide circulation and are published in Lima. There are no nationally circulated papers that are published outside Lima. El Comercio, founded in 1839, is by far the most influential paper in the nation. Its circulation is 145,000 per day, and has a moderate conservative orientation. Another influential paper is El Expreso, which is linked directly to certain industrial and financial power groups of Peru. Its circulation is around 75,000 per day. Another important and modern, but less conservative newspaper, is La Republica. Its main characteristic is being very graphic, mainly through the prolific use of photographs. Its circulation is also 75,000 per day (1/2 de Marketing magazine, August, 1989 Lima).

Less important papers are El Ojo, El Popular, El Nacional, Hoy, La Tribuna, Extra, La Cronica, La Tercera, Ultima Hora, El Peruano, (the official government's paper), Cambio (the unofficial speaker of the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru guerrilla), and El Diario (an underground publication of the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement).

Regarding the political endorsement for election campaigns, newspapers try not to exhibit their political preferences explicitly. In fact, they try to maintain an obvious distance from parties and candidates. Nevertheless, their editorials and pictures subtly reveal their standing.

One explanation behind such behavior is that financially successful newspapers in Peru are always the ones which are critical or independent from the government. Additionally, Peruvian newspapers get only 25% of their income from advertising; the majority of revenues comes from the purchase price paid by the readers. Therefore, pleasing readers and trying to get a higher circulation are by far the first priorities in the newspaper business.

Magazines

In Peru, the magazines are not as well-developed as the newspapers. Peru has around 20 national magazines, most of which are printed in Lima. The most representative political magazines are Caretas, Si, and Oiga; each of them have a circulation of around 100,000 per week. Among women, the most popular magazines are the foreign ones: Cosmopolitan; Buenhojar (the Spanish version of Better Homes and Gardens); and Vanidades. All three are produced in the United States.

Television

Television is the most important mass medium in Peru. It is the most attractive vehicle for advertisers and therefore receives around 60% of all Peruvian advertising expenditures. Peru has three networks which cover most of the country. A fourth network is in the process of

formation. Two of these three established networks are private: Panamericana Television (PANTEL); and America Television (AMERICA). The other one is state owned: Television Peruana. These chains have their headquarters in Lima with a few affiliated and many relay stations all across the country. Virtually every city with a population of 20,000 or more is served by at least one television channel. Peru owes this rather high state of development to the military government of the 1970's which promoted the development of the public and private networks. Lima, besides the networks, has also four local channels, which are not repeated in other areas of the country. An important technical detail is that all the Peruvian channels are allocated in the VHF band, which maximizes the signal strength and clarity. Finally, cable television has just started in 1989 targeting only the wealthiest neighborhoods of Lima. This medium is not yet well-developed.

Of the three networks, PANTEL is the most popular with a 60% share, and the least popular is the state-owned network with less than 5% share at the national level. AMERICA has the remaining 35%. All stations broadcast in the Spanish language even though there are more than two million people whose native tongue is Quechua or Aymara.

Regarding the penetration of television set ownership, the figures are not clear. For instance, the UNESCO estimates give a ratio of 51 sets per thousand people,

roughly one set per four households, (UNESCO, Report # 29, 1987). However, other calculations made by Peruvian pollsters say that two and half million households have TV receivers, almost two sets per three households. The city believed to have the highest ratio is Lima, where it is estimated that 92% of the households have a receiver. In general, TV receivers tend to be located in the larger cities of Peru. The households without TV receivers are located in the rural zones of the Andes and in the jungle East of the Andes. In these zones the degree of poverty and illiteracy is the highest, and as we repeat again, their language is other than Spanish. That is perhaps the reason why advertisers and media organizations, in general, have no interest in developing media in those areas. Finally, a pertinent detail is that around 80% of the voting public does have access to television.

Radio

Radio is another important medium, especially for the rural zones, the Andes and the jungle, where transportation is poorly developed. Radio is the third medium in importance falling behind television and newspapers. It gets about 15% of the total Peruvian advertising expenditures (UNESCO, Report # 29, 1987). There are around 300 radio stations; yet, analysts say that nobody really knows the exact number of stations on the air (Gargurevich, 1987). Seventy percent

of the registered radio stations are either located on the AM band or on the shortwave.

Ownership of radio receivers is very high. Figures from 1983 report 166 receivers per thousand people or 84% of the households (UNESCO, Report # 29, 1987). That estimate matches fairly well with the 90% reported by Peruvian pollsters.

With respect to programming, radio formats were first introduced during the past decade, and the most successful are salsa music, rock (top 40's), and chicha music (the Andean cumbia). However, the most popular radio station in Peru is Radio Programas del Peru, a nationwide all-news chain.

Advertising Agencies

Advertising agencies as middle-people between announcers and the media are also very competitive businesses; there around one hundred of them in Lima. The highest ranked are: McCann-Erickson, J. Walter Thompson, Publicistas Asociados, Causa, ^(Associated to Leo Burnett) and Pro-Peru. Most of the commercials are also produced locally; the most important commercials are produced by Canal Uno, Cine Setenta, Chroma, and Primer Plano (1/2 de Marketing, Feb. 1989, Lima). However, during electoral campaigns, the parties normally do not use the services of advertising agencies; on the contrary, they organize special teams to produce and manage

their commercials.

Section 4: The 1990 Electoral Campaign

Nine parties competed in 1990 for the presidential post. The number of parties competing for the Senate was 16, each offering scores of candidates. The number of parties for the Chamber seats for the Province of Lima was 28. Again there were dozens of candidates within each party. Therefore, the total number of individual candidates was nine for President, 960 for 60 seats in the Senate, and 1,120 for 40 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Table No. 1). However, since the beginning of the campaign, not all the parties or candidates had the same chances. Just before the election of the 8th of April, only five parties seemed to have real chances for the presidential and congressional posts: the coalition Frente Democratico (FREDEMO), the Partido Aprista Peruano (APRA), the Izquierda Unida, the Izquierda Socialista, and the Cambio '90 parties. And for congressional posts, only the Frente Independiente Moralizador, the Somos Libres, and the Union Civica Independiente parties seemed to have good possibilities.

The Frente Democratico, Democratic Front, was a coalition consisting mainly of three right wing parties: the Movimiento Libertad of Mario Vargas Llosa, the Accion Popular party of Fernando Belaunde Terry, and the Partido

Table No. 1

LIST OF PARTIES PRESENTING CANDIDATES FOR THE 1990 ELECTIONS IN PERU

PARTY	For PRES	For SEN	For DEPUTY
1. Frente Democratico	X	X	X
2. Union Democratica	X	X	X
3. Partido Aprista Peruano	X	X	X
4. Izquierda Socialista	X	X	X
5. Frente Popular Agricola del Peru	X	X	X
6. Izquierda Unida	X	X	X
7. Union Nacional Odriista	X	X	X
8. Cambio '90	X	X	X
9. Frente Nac. de Trabajadores y Campesinos (FRENATRACA)	X	X	X
10. Union Civica Independiente		X	X
11. Movimiento de Bases Hayistas		X	X
12. Agrupacion Politica Independiente Cooperacion Nacional		X	X
13. Frente Independiente de Retirados		X	X
14. Movimiento Independiente Solidaridad		X	X
15. Confederacion Honorifica de Lucha Organizada Independiente-CHOLO		X	
16. Somos Libres		X	
17. Movimiento Social Independiente			X
18. Acuerdo Independiente para el Desarrollo Nacional.			X
19. Alianza Democratica			X
20. Alianza Peruana Popular Independiente			X
21. Lista Independiente de Trabajadores Socialistas.			X
22. Movimiento de Reconstruccion Nacional-MORENA.			X
23. Frente Independiente Nacionalista			X
24. Organizacion Democratica Independiente			X
25. Partido-PASOP			X
26. De Unidad Nacional			X
27. UNIDOS			X
28. Union Renovadora del Peru			X
29. Frente Independiente Democratico			X
30. Frente Independiente Moralizador.			X

Source: National Election Board

Table No. 2

POLLS FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

Candidate	Oct.'89	1/27/90	3/1/90	3/19/90
1. Mario Vargas L.	56%	46%	44%	42%
2. Luis Alva Castro	8%	6%	13%	16%
3. A. Barrantes L.	9%	11%	11%	11%
4. H. Pease G.	8%	7%	8%	10%
5. A. Fujimori F.	ns	ns	1%	3%
6. Otro	2%	1%	5%	5%

Source: APOYO S.A. (Pollster company of Lima). Published in Caretas magazine.

Popular Cristiano of Luis Bedoya Reyes. Mario Vargas Llosa, a novelist and presidential candidate for Frente Democrático, entered in Politics in 1988 when the Aprista government attempted to nationalize the banking system of Peru; Vargas Llosa was successful in his opposition, and so many people followed him that he organized the Movimiento Libertad party. In the past year, when Vargas Llosa announced his candidacy for the Presidency of Peru, polls gave him a sure and easy victory. Additionally, during this campaign a new party called Somos Libres, linked to banking interests, which run for congressional posts gave its support to him.

Perhaps, this initial confidence made him develop his electoral campaign more in a pedagogical and frank way rather than trying to lure people with easy promises. His crusade, as he called his campaign, was oriented mainly to make people understand the roots of the problems in the government and of the economic crisis. It was precisely the radical ultra-liberal economic policies which he presented in a naked form that made people hesitate. He wanted to stop the current economic crisis through policies of free market, elimination of the state subsidies to imported food, elevation of taxes, and diminution of the public apparatus. This proposal was known only as "el shock". However, his percentage was over 40% in the last poll taken three weeks before the election day (Table No. 2). The lead never seemed to be at stake, and the last part of the Frente Democrático

television campaign was aimed to encourage people to elect Vargas Llosa in first round, in other words, to get more than 50% of the vote.

Regarding its advertising campaign expenditures, the Frente Democratico was the largest spender on television both for president and for congress. To illustrate this, table No. 3 shows the estimated expenditures on television for the 60-day period covering from Jan. 1st to Feb. 28 (Table No. 3). Some analysts speculate that this party spent no less than six million dollars for the whole campaign.

The Partido Aprista, as mentioned above, is a centrist party. It was founded in 1931 under Marxist influence. It is formed mostly of workers and middle-class people and considered the best organized party of the country. In 1985, after having struggled more than half a century, this party rose to power under Alan Garcia and with a complete majority in the parliament. Alan Garcia's nationalistic administration was a success, however, only at the beginning. After its first year, bad economic policies and poor governmental decisions sent inflation sky-rocketing to more than 3000% (three thousand percent) each year by the end of his term.

During the 1990 election, nobody believed that Luis Alva Castro, the candidate of the incumbent Aprista party, would win the election. In the last survey, he received only 14% of the preferences (Table No. 2), nevertheless his

advertising campaign for president was also in the millions, (Table No. 3).

The Izquierda Unida and Izquierda Socialista parties are the result of a division of the 'Izquierda Unida' conglomerate, a big conglomerate of small Marxist parties. The moderates established the Izquierda Socialista, as a moderate left with Marxist and Christian members. The candidate of this party was Alfonso Barrantes Lingan, a former mayor of Lima, boasting a successful administration. The last surveys gave Barrantes only 10% of the preferences, (Table No. 2), despite its sizeable advertising expenditure for president (Table No. 3).

Izquierda Unida, formed mainly of small Marxist-Leninist parties was given by pollsters no more than 9% of the preferences (Table No. 2), and its advertising expenditure was very small (Table No. 3).

Cambio '90 is a party organized by Mr. Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, an engineer, ex-rector of the Agrarian University of Lima, graduated from the University of Wisconsin and was without previous political experience. This party was organized in October of 1989, just before the election and with modest expectations. Even two months before the election and according to pollsters, Fujimori received no more than 1% of the preferences, and, of course he did not merit mention even in the questionnaires until the last one. Even, the last poll made public three weeks before the

Table No. 3

TELEVISION ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES FOR PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS CALCULATED AT RATE CARD PRICES.

(From Jan. 10. 1990 to Feb. 28 1990)

Party	Number of Ads	Total Time in Seconds	Amount in \$	%
FOR PRESIDENT:				
1. Frente Demo	2,282	89,225	1,349,193	41.3%
2. P. Aprista	1,850	70,905	1,129,353	34.5%
3. I. Social.	941	24,865	710,679	21.7%
4. I. Unida	49	2,490	52,958	1.6%
5. Frenatraca	54	940	17,971	0.5%
6. Cambio '90	50	1,500	9,198	0.3%
Total Presid.	5,226	189,925	3,269,352	100.0%
FOR CONGRESS:				
1. Frente Demo	4,107	127,226	1,993,014	77.9%
2. Somos Libr.	597	17,510	292,389	11.4%
3. U. Civica I	636	14,435	200,725	7.8%
4. F. Indep. M	135	2,700	35,251	1.4%
5. P. Aprista	123	1,590	23,238	0.9%
6. Frenatraca	36	720	14,960	0.6%
7. Mov. Bases	2	60	763	0.0%
Total Congress	5,636	164,241	2,560,340	100.0%

Source: CPI-Lima, in Caretas magazine, Lima 03/12/90.

Table No. 4

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OUTCOME OF 1990

Candidate	First Round	Second Round
1. Mario Vargas Llosa (FRENTE DEMOCRATICO)	2,171,957 (28%)	2,713,442 (34%)
2. Alberto Fujimori F. (CAMBIO '90)	1,937,186 (25%)	4,522,563 (57%)
3. Luis Alva Castro (PARTIDO APRISTA)	1,507,905 (19%)	
4. Henry Pease G. (IZQUIERDA UNIDA)	548,386 (7%)	
5. A. Barrantes L. (IZQUIERDA SOCIALISTA)	320,108 (4%)	
6. Others	173,534 (2%)	
7. Null	576,138 (7%)	627,552 (8%)
8. Blank	631,644 (8%)	136,421 (2%)
Total emitted votes	7,866,858 (100%)	7,999,978 (100%)

Source: Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (National Election Board)

election day gave Fujimori only between 3-6% of the preferences, (Table No. 2). The party's advertising expenditure was very small for the presidential race and null for the congressional races at the national level (Table No. 3).

Other parties contending for congressional posts made, also, extensive use of television advertising. They were: Somos Libres (allied to Frente Democratico); and the independents, Union Civica Independiente and Frente Independiente Moralizador.

Despite the pre-election violence unleashed by Shining Path, the first round of the presidential elections and the congressional elections took place on April 8, and the results were very surprising. The Frente Democratico won the election but only with 28% of the outcome, and the second place fell in hands of Cambio '90 with 25% of the suffrage, (Table No. 4). The congressional outcome was very similar to the presidential one. Ironically, after the unofficial results were known, Mario Vargas Llosa, the winner of the first round, invited Fujimori to give up and negotiate in order "to save the country a second round". Fujimori refused the offer.

Therefore, a runoff was scheduled and took place the first Sunday of June. The winner was Mr. Alberto Fujimori with the 57% of the vote, which was the sum of the independent, the aprista, the communist and all the anti-

Vargas Llosa sentiment. Vargas Llosa obtained 34%, and blank and null votes were 9% (Table No. 4).

Discussion

Television advertising being a sociological tool and phenomenon which works in the middle of a complicated web of variables that advertisers cannot manage but only adapt to, some additional background to this television advertising campaign is indispensable.

What happened? Why did Mario Vargas Llosa lose an 'easy' election? Why did his multi-million dollar advertising campaign fail to produce the desired results? Why did a campaign that seemed a sure-fire winner lose? So far, there are no clear answers. The most reasonable ones blame the failure on Frente Democratico mistakes.

First, its message of economic shock-treatment scared people. This message was emphasized during the first half of the Frente Democratico campaign even with the expert advice of an American consulting firm. The Sawyer-Miller consultant Group of New York assisted the Frente Democratico campaign for an estimated fee of one million dollars. After five years under Alan Garcia, the people wanted a serious change. In fact, at the beginning, people sided with Vargas Llosa's radical proposals, however, after such proposals were discussed and attacked by the opposition, people grew

fearful. First the lower classes lost confidence in Vargas Llosa, and at the end of the campaign the middle and upper classes shifted their support to Fujimori. Most of the voters feared the economic shock policies, the recession, and the loss of jobs in the public and private sectors. (The New York Times, April 10, 1990). Until the middle of the campaign these things were not a problem for Vargas Llosa. Still confident on his status in the surveys, V. Llosa kept asking the people for an explicit mandate to apply a policy of shock treatment.

Another mistake has to be seen in its particular context. It is generally accepted in Peru that being rich is not synonymous with virtue but with sin. According to some analyses, Vargas Llosa, basically an upper middle class man, miscalculated by associating excessively with the rich of Peru. This made people identify him not as a symbol of change but of continuity of the traditional political elite. He was seen as the voice of the rich.

Such identification was aggravated by a lack of control over the rich parliamentary candidates. During the last 40 days of the campaign, many Frente Democratico candidates bombarded the television screen with commercials. This was received as a genuine show of opulence in a country where more than 50% of the people live below the poverty line. According to some analyses, voters saw the advertising blitz and interpreted such Frente Democratico candidacies as

concrete capitalistic investments. Vargas Llosa showed deep annoyance at this. In a dramatic move he broadcast a televised message to his congressional candidates, asking them to cease their advertising in order to leave room in the television programming for the ads for the final push of the presidential campaign. He failed; no Frente Democratico candidate ceased nor even limited his spots.

Both mistakes were severely exploited by the opposition. Television commercials, especially the apocalyptic ones produced by the Partido Aprista, made effective visual speculation of the consequences of the proposed policy of shock-treatment. Those impressive attacks certainly aided the Aprista party, but not enough to retain the presidency for this party.

Near the middle of the campaign the Frente Democratico stopped mentioning the shock-treatment, but it was too late. The fear of the Frente Democratico was already among the people. The Partido Aprista was also unpopular with the voters. The Izquierda (left) parties were also in trouble, not only because of the fall of the East European communism events but also because of problems internal to those parties. In sum, there was an empty space in the political spectrum as the end of the campaign drew near. People wanted neither left-wing nor right-wing parties.

It was at this moment, at the end of the campaign, when people and media started focusing on Fujimori. Suddenly his

rallies were attended by multitudes of people, a popularity which was reflected in the last polls where he gained from one to two points each day. These polls were conducted by polling agencies and by the parties; however, as mentioned above, they could not be publicized because of the legal restrictions of the election procedure.

Journalists also formulated a religious hypothesis to explain Vargas Llosa's unexpected loss. In fact, there was a gigantic underground effort unfolded by an authentic army of evangelical christians who used the last days of the campaign to visit the homes of thousands of voters in the poor neighborhoods (or 'pueblos juvenes',) and the rural areas, (The New York Times, April 15, 1990) in a genuine application of the two-step flow model (Severin & Tankard, 1987). Undoubtedly, this was an absolutely new element in politics in Peru. Peru, a country essentially Catholic with no more than 4% Protestants, faced the possibility of having a protestant occupy the second vice-presidential spot of the Cambio '90 ticket. To be more precise, he was Carlos Garcia a Baptist minister and Chief of the Council of Evangelical Churches of Peru.

The Catholic Church made a peculiar contribution. Less than ten days before election day and fearful of losing its status of official religion of Peru that it has held for more than four centuries, the Cardinal convoked to an extraordinary procession of El Senor de los Milagros.

Traditionally, this adored effigy leaves in procession from the Cathedral of Lima only in the month of October of each year.

There was no miracle for Vargas Llosa. The estimated several million dollars spent for the presidential and congressional campaign rewarded only the individual parliamentary candidates who were elected.

The Purpose of this Study

This study, on the exploratory level, intended to detect the variations in the television commercials of this campaign. Variations in verbal message and in form due to environmental factors will be analyzed. This study did not intend to answer the questions related to the effectiveness of the television commercials. It intended to shed light on the particular characteristics of these commercials caused by their party affiliation and the office pursued, and to investigate how they evolved throughout the campaign.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to examine available literature regarding the influence of political advertising, the reasons that justify its use, and the dynamics and elements of political television commercials.

The Influence of Political Advertising

There is much discussion about the influence of political advertising, which seems to put academic knowledge and folk wisdom at odds. "In contrast to popular accounts of the media's omnipotence, academic research has tended to minimize the effects of mass communication upon the electoral behavior..." (Kaid, 1976)

The first investigation concerning political television advertising was The People's Choice written by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet and published in 1948. In this book, the scholars, known later as the 'classic researchers', studied the 1940 presidential campaign propaganda. There were two main conclusions. First, only a minimal impact may be attributed to political advertising. This conclusion, known as the "law of minimal consequences," has influenced, for many years, the thought of scholars (Severin, 1987). The second conclusion was that media act only as reinforcers

rather than formers of opinion (Kraus & Davis, 1976).

Recent research tends to question these classic findings. Kraus and Davis, for instance, criticize that the classic researchers used methods based only on survey research and simple correlational techniques (Kraus & Davis, 1976). Kraus offers two criticisms. First, mass media were often not included as either independent or dependent variables in the survey research that the classics performed. Second, and most relevant, is that television was usually not included as a factor in those studies. Television was just being introduced into society in 1940. To be precise, the spot commercial inception happened during the Eisenhower presidential campaign in 1952; therefore, he concludes, the classics' studies belong to a "pre-large scale TV advertising budget era" (Kraus, 1974). Thus, those studies do not generalize across time.

The classic model stating that political information travels in a process called the "two-step-flow" is also the object of modern criticism. According to the classics, information is first received by opinion leaders, who then pass it along to other voters who are less involved in the election process. Contrarily, many researchers presently "believe that the introduction of the spot television commercial has eliminated the opinion leader as a mediator between the voting public and the media message." The alleged reason is that the spot commercial allows the

candidate to communicate directly with the voters (Berkovitz, 1985).

Another criticized conclusion is the one that states that mass media are only capable of reinforcing existing opinions; researchers now attribute greater influence to advertising. They believe "that political television commercials reinforce existing beliefs, but they also recognize that advertising has the potential to influence the voter, particularly if the person is an undecided, or low involvement, individual" (Berkovitz, 1985). One of the classic paradigms behind the "reinforcing effect" stated that voters tended to read, listen or watch whatever agrees with their beliefs, and that different information would be blocked or avoided. However, the modern thought is that the sophisticated production techniques of spot commercials "have changed the exposure patterns of the voter" (Berkovitz, 1985).

Despite the efforts of modern research and despite the optimistic new findings, much of the effects of political advertising are still unknown. As researchers say, "the effectiveness of paid political advertising... remains in question, primarily because spending a lot of money to saturate the media with a candidate's message is no guarantee to success" (Myer & Donohue, 1973). Much of the current knowledge on political advertising is, perhaps, only speculative. The reasons are various. One is the lack of

data. Political advertising tends to be a private business of politicians and advertising agencies or political consultants, so the data tend to be proprietary and non-publishable. Another reason is the inability to isolate the effects of political commercials from other sources of political information, such as, direct mail, phone banks, free appearances on news programs, political rallies, etc. Besides that, other sources of uncertainty are generated by the characteristics of voters and candidates themselves (Berkovitz, 1985).

Concluding what is truly known about the political advertising effects, Kraus states that perhaps "the reality of the condition of research in mass communication and political behavior, and Berelson's conclusion in 1948 that 'some kinds of communication on some kind of issues, brought to the attention of some kinds of people under some kinds of circumstances, have some kinds of effects', persists" (Kraus, 1974).

The Necessity of Political Television Advertising

Although television advertising research is far from establishing a solid theory, the pervasiveness of television sets in homes, the strict production control of television commercials, the possibility of targeting an audience with precision, and the possibility of repetition of commercials

make television an indispensable medium for modern electoral campaigns.

In fact, television has become the principal medium for political advertising: "Politicians spend more than half of their contributions on broadcast media" (Alexander, 1980). That expenditure is not unwarranted; the omnipresence of television in modern times is an unavoidable fact because television is the device that most attention is placed on in households. This is demonstrated, in the United States for instance, by the fact that people keep the TV sets on an average of 7.1 hr./day (Broadcasting, Mar 1990).

Additionally, there are other reasons that argue in favor of the heavy use of television advertising in political campaigns. First, TV commercials are the most reliable means of conveying what a candidate wants known about him/herself. "Political advertising offers a candidate the most controllable method of mass communication with voters, and permits him/her to select and edit the image and style shown to voters... and to manipulate and control (the message in) whatever way they desire" (Wadsworth, 1986). This quality of TV commercials leads to a true discipline of political commercials, as Sabato argues, "The candidate advertisements... are perhaps the most precisely crafted part of a modern campaign. Nothing has been left to chance; every aspect has been included for some purpose, from the colors to the background scenery to the inflections in the

announcer's voice" (Sabato, 1981).

The strict control of television commercials counterweights the interest of television news producers, who are not interested in reporting candidates and issues, but only in reporting the horserace and anecdotal aspects of the campaign (Patteson & McClure, 1976).

Concerning the target of political advertising, there is almost total agreement that the most preferred target of political commercials is the low involvement voters because of their supposed vulnerable nature. As Nimmo states, "Advertising campaigners bombard their weak perceptual defenses (of low involvement voters) attempting to effect modest shifts in perception to reinforce those shifts by repetition of gratifying entertainment, and to activate sympathetic perceptions by providing a credible voting choice" (Nimmo, 1970).

Finally, repetition and placement are basic premises in current campaign strategies. Patterson and McClure write "Sheer repetition plays a key role in learning, and political ads stress again and again the same message" (Patterson & McClure, 1976). However, it is not clear how many times a commercial should be repeated. In general, advertising practitioners suggest that the ideal number of times a viewer should watch an ad in a learning mood is around three; in order to reach such level of exposure, the recommended repetition ratio is between three and eight

times (Krugman, 1972).

However, this seems to be a rule not shared by all strategists or countries. For instance, a Peruvian magazine reports that Peruvian political advertising consultants think that a recommendable repetition ratio for one commercial is seven times a day during a period of twenty days (Caretas, Feb. 12, 1990). This results in the astonishing number of 140 times per commercial. Nevertheless, the current literature forewarns that the excessive repetition may have counterproductive effects (Severin, 1987).

Yet, the use of television in political campaigns in modern times almost guarantees that the voter will inevitably be reached by political commercials. "It does not matter if the voter follows the campaign for electoral, candidates, or issues information; it is the commercial that will seek the voter whenever he turns the television on" (Berkovitz, 1985). However, perhaps, this is not completely true for the case of underdeveloped countries, where television ownership is not quite universal.

The Dynamics of Political Commercials

Political advertising campaign approaches, usage of negative advertising, and usage of polling as a political tool are stressed in the advertising literature.

There are at least two campaign approaches; one is a theoretical, and the other is a practical one.

The theoretical approach is called DAGMAR (Defining Advertising Goals for Measured Advertising Results). According to this paradigm, political advertising campaigns are developed in four stages: first, awareness, where name identification is the basic goal; second, comprehension, which gives voters information about names, personal characteristics, and issues and positions of the candidate; third, conviction, which seeks to touch the voters attitudes and beliefs; and fourth, behavior, in this stage voters are asked directly to vote for the advertised candidate (Berkovitz, 1985). However logical this model may seem, political consultants tend to follow a much less formalized scheme (Berkovitz, 1985).

The other approach is much more practical. It was developed by Diamond and Bates. They state that political advertising campaigns progress through four phases: name-identification, argumentative or informative, negative, and resolution (Diamond & Bates, 1984).

The negative advertisement has been the object of abundant practice and research since the infamous success of the Johnson's Daisy Girl commercial in 1964. For instance, during the 1972 presidential campaign in the US, candidates used more commercials attacking the other candidates than positive ads about themselves (Surlin & Gordon, 1977). Among

advertising professionals, negative ads have gained reputation of being effective; their use has become essential especially when used by a challenger against an incumbent or when a candidate is trailing the opposition by a large margin (Berkovitz, 1985).

However, attack ads may backfire. It was found that most viewers of a negative commercial preferred the target of the commercial (45%) while only 23% preferred the sponsor of the ad (Garramone, 1984). Another study found independent sponsorship of a negative commercial to be more effective than candidate sponsorship against the targeted candidate. Consequently, this tactic may decrease the chances of counterproductive effects (Garramone, 1984).

Political polling is another highly investigated area in modern research. Polling is used as a basic means to plan and control advertising campaigns. Nimmo says, "It is rare that a candidate for major statewide, congressional or national office does not employ the services of a private political pollster in his primary and general election campaign" (Nimmo, 1970).

The use of polling has become almost standardized. Three types of polls are used: pre-campaign, benchmark and tracking polls. First of all, polls are used by candidates to decide if they should run or not. This is called a 'Pre-campaign poll'. Nimmo states, "Pre-campaign polls also reveal the issues and ideological orientation of voters,

permitting candidates to plan their campaigns accordingly" (Nimmo, 1970). Later, after the candidate has decided to run, another poll is done; this is called the "Baseline Poll" or "Benchmark Poll". According to Sabato, its objective is to assess the public's general perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the candidate as well as his/her potential opponents and also to assess the public's opinion on key issues (Sabato, 1984). After the benchmark, a series of tracking polls is done to check the effectiveness of commercials, speeches, or the campaign itself. These tracking polls in some cases are done on a daily basis, such as during the Reagan campaign of 1980 (Diamond and Bates, 1984). However, the tracking polls, are only transitory measurements of the advertising campaign effectiveness; the ultimate measurement is the voting outcome.

Now that the dynamics of television advertising has been discussed, the structural side of television political commercials needs to be introduced.

Elements of Television Commercials

Researchers suggest that political television commercials, like other types of commercials, are composed of three elements: verbal content, non-verbal content, and film/video techniques (Wadsworth, 1986).

According to Bohrer, the pioneer television advertising

content analysis was performed by George Frey in 1960. Frey inquired about the relationship between commercial characteristics and audience recall. The variables he studied were: gender of announcer, animation usage, use of background music and jingles, appearance of brand name, video aids, use of legends, and number of words per commercial. No significant relationships were found (Bohrer, 1987).

There is much discussion among researchers regarding verbal content. On the one hand, there are opinions that state that television ads carry substantial political information (Patterson & McClure, 1976). In this direction, Joslyn made a descriptive study of the message content of television political commercials. He found four prevalent types of content: issue-related, candidate-qualities, transmission of group-related information, and transmission of partisan information. Joslyn also found that "much of the issue content involves either mentioning an issue without revealing anything about the issue position of the candidate, (19% of all ads), or revealing only a vague position (38% of all ads). Very few ads reveal a candidate's issue position that could be called specific. The issues most dealt with in these ads were the economy, taxes, pollution, crime and medical care" (Joslyn, 1980).

On the other hand, Berkovitz, who based her dissertation on the political consultants' thoughts and

beliefs, writes that "the trade press and researchers consistently indicate that the presentation of issue information in political advertisements is a significant function of paid media communication, yet consultants repeatedly stated that transmitting issue information does not constitute an important objective for television advertising" (Berkovitz, 1985). Instead, consultants state that name and image recognition is the primary goal of advertising campaigns. The reason expressed is that issue information is not relevant in the voters decision-making process. Perhaps Napolitan, a political consultant, has synthesized the matter very well when he said that "people vote for people (or against people) and not for issues" (Joseph C. Napolitan, 1972).

The practical wisdom of political consultants seems to be backed by very rational justifications. For instance, one of the justifications found that recall of image oriented commercials is apparently higher than issue-oriented ones (Faber & Storey, 1984). Also, the use of issue-oriented commercials can be damaging to the candidates, specifically if the ad focuses on a controversial issue (Berkovitz, 1985). Moreover, "the visual components of television commercials produce that the attractiveness and appeal of the candidate may be more important in the vote than the campaign issues" (Wickoff, 1968).

The non-verbal part of the commercial is so important

that Nimmo suggests that "what a politician says (content) may seem less important to an audience than the type of language (verbal or non-verbal) he uses, or how he says it (style)" (Nimmo, 1974). The non-verbal side of television political commercials may include the following categories: a) kinesics, body movement and gestures; b) physical characteristics such as attractiveness, body height, weight, etc.; c) touching behavior; d) paralanguage or how something is said, such as fluency, pitch, and vocal variety; e) proxemics or space; and f) environmental factors such as settings and surroundings (Knapp, 1978).

The production techniques of television political commercials include several formal aspects such as format, length, sound and video framing or special effects.

According to Bohrer, who made a study of the formal side of television commercials, there is a correlation between the form of a commercial and several variables like type of product, season, target audience, time in being broadcast (Bohrer, 1987).

In a more political-focused study Kaid and Davidson also found some relationships; for instance, incumbents and challengers differ in their use of particular styles. Incumbents tend to use longer commercials, more testimonials, more slides with print, more positive-focused ads, and wear more formal dress. Incumbents also stress "competence" both verbally and visually in their ads (Kaid &

Davidson, 1986). On the other hand, challengers tend to include more opposition focus, more *cinema verite* style, more frequent eye contact, more casual dress and more "candidate head-on style" (Wadsworth, 1986).

In general, Wadsworth found that "style of presentation for presidential candidates in their ads is influenced by the context of the election, the position of the candidate, challenger or incumbent status, and the personal characteristics of the candidate." She also found that "aspects of production, such as camera angles and movements, color editing, music and sound, lighting, camera shots, and other techniques can produce emotions or feelings, convey specific information, and can cause us to interpret what we see in different ways" (Wadsworth, 1986).

Commercial length has been changing with the development of television; more specifically, political ads are tending to be shorter in duration. In the early stages of the use of television in political campaigns, politicians bought time in terms of hour or half-hour long. By 1972, the 30-second commercials were the most common (Sabato, 1981). The advantages of the short commercial are various. For instance, it is easy to produce them, less costly, and easy to allocate in the television programming schedule. Moreover, no significant differences in the content recall between 5-minute ads and 60-second ads were found. Nevertheless, the longer the commercial, the more prestige

it transmits to the candidate (Kaid & Sanders, 1978).

Sound can be used to suggest many sensations. It can convey danger, calm, or happiness (Zettl, 1976). Also, it can suggest or establish location, as well as tie scenes and events together. Music can evoke different emotions in the audience. For instance, slow music is associated with adjectives such as serious, important, dignified, and mournful, while fast music represents excitement, agility, hope or joy (Millerson, 1972).

Lighting is another structural component of political commercials. Lights or shadows placed in certain places can give the illusion of a specific place or time or simply emphasize certain areas or characters of a picture or frame. Light tones can produce a cheerful, airy, open and simple effect, while dark tones create a dramatic, mysterious, and somber effect (Zettl, 1976).

Camera angle is an area where significant research has been done; however, most of camera angle research was done on television news anchors. One aspect of the investigation was the camera height in relation to the subject. It was found that high angle shots (as if the camera subject is looking down at the viewer) will make subjects appear dominant, imposing and stronger (Tiemens, 1970, Mandel and Shaw, 1972). On the other hand, low angle shots (as if the camera subject were looking up to the viewer) makes the subject appear less dominant and give the viewer the sense

of superiority (Millerson, 1972).

The framing of the shot can produce special effects too. Long shots can establish the candidate's location, while close-ups concentrate viewers' attention on the object focused upon (Millerson, 1972). Close-ups can suggest intimacy, whereas long shots suggest distance between the viewer and the subject (Edmonds, 1982). Also, the amount of frame that the subject fills carries information; the larger the subject on the screen, the greater the subject's importance (Millerson, 1972).

Finally, editing devices are becoming more important since advances in electronics have produced almost infinite editing capabilities. There are cuts, dissolves, slow, fast, reverse motion, splits, and frozen screens. Editing devices also can be used to highlight particular scenes or parts of them (Millerson, 1972).

Research Questions

This study is an exploratory one that will look for correlations between environmental variables and message and form variables of the television political commercials in the 1990 Peruvian elections. The environmental or independent variables are party, office pursued, and transmitting stage. The dependent variables are the verbal message and the formal components of the commercial.

Specifically, six questions will be addressed in this study:

1. Is there any correlation between party identification and verbal message of political commercial?
2. Is there any relationship between party identification and formal elements of television commercials?
3. Is there any correlation between office pursued and message content of political ads?
4. Is there any correlation between office pursued and formal components of political commercials?
5. Is there any aging effect in the verbal message of political commercials due to the span in which they were broadcasted?
6. Is there any aging effect in the formal elements of television political commercials due to their airing stage?

CHAPTER III

METHODS

The reading of two studies on content analysis, Bohrer's The Form of TV Advertising: A Correlational Content Analysis of Television Commercials and their Environment (Bohrer, George F. Jr. dissertation, University of Massachusetts 1987), and Joslyn's paper "The Political Spots Ads" (Joslyn, Richard A. Journalism Quarterly , 1980, vol 57, pp. 92-98), generated an interest in the relationships between the verbal message and formal components of television commercials and the characteristics of parties, candidates, ranking in the polls, and offices pursued.

The Peruvian presidential and congressional elections that took place in April of 1990 provided the opportunity to gather the data necessary to explore this interest. Two Peruvian associates recorded all those ads televised in the Peruvian networks that met three characteristics: they appeared on nationwide broadcasts, (most of which were run on the two private networks); second, they were endorsements for candidates competing for the Presidency, the Senate, and the Deputies Chamber for the Lima district; and third, only the commercials for the first round of the presidential race were considered. The analysis was restricted to the first round of the presidential race because the second one was not really based on television commercials.

Population and Sample

The estimated number of commercials with the above characteristics for this campaign was 200; however, the total number recorded for this study was 168 (Table No. 5), but unfortunately 17 of the recorded ones were incomplete due to technical and human errors. Therefore, the number of usable commercials was 149. In addition, neither commercials asking people to attend rallies nor commercials longer than sixty seconds or shorter than 20 seconds were taken for this data; this was decided because ads shorter than 20 seconds were mostly economical versions of longer ones, and commercials longer than 60 seconds were mostly straight speeches from a desk with insignificant variations in form.

This study covers a period of six months of commercials. It includes commercials broadcast as early as October of 1989, and as late as April 6, 1990, 48 hours before the polls opened.

Regarding the number of commercials to be analyzed in this study, it was debatable whether all the commercials should be analyzed or only a sample of them. Two elements conditioned the decision on this matter: the disparity of spots per party and the time consumption of the analysis process of each commercial.

In an exploratory analysis, it took more than two hours to analyze each ad; this made the sampling procedure

Table No. 5

COMMERCIALS BROADCASTED AND RECORDED

PARTY	PRESIDENT							SENATOR							DEPUTY							TOTAL						
	J	F	M	A	T	W	W	J	F	M	A	T	W	W	J	F	M	A	T	W	W	J	F	M	A	T	W	W
	1. Frente Demo	5	1	6	10	22	48	43	1	2	33	7	43	54	54	0	5	18	6	29	69	69	6	8	57	23	94	56
2. P. Aprista	3	1	3	4	11	24	8	0	0	3	5	8	10	10	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	3	1	6	10	20	12	12
3. Somos Libre	2	1	5	0	0	0	13	0	1	10	2	13	16	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10	2	13	8	8
4. I. Socialis	2	1	5	0	8	17	4	0	1	1	2	4	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	6	2	12	7	7
5. Union Civic	0	0	2	1	0	0	8	1	0	6	1	8	10	10	0	0	1	1	2	5	5	1	0	7	2	10	6	6
6. Frenatraca	0	0	2	1	3	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	7	7	0	0	3	3	6	4	4
7. Frente Ind.	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3	4	4	0	0	6	0	6	14	14	0	0	6	0	6	4	4
8. I. Unida	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	4	2	2
9. Mov. Bases	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
10. Cambio '90	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
11. Accion Demo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
TOTAL	11	3	17	15	46	100	80	2	4	56	18	80	100	100	0	5	26	11	42	100	13	12	99	44	168	100		

Table No. 6
COMMERCIALS ANALYZED

PARTY	PRESIDENT						SENATOR						DEPUTY						TOTAL																	
	J		F		M		A		T		R		J		F		M		A		T		R		J		F		M		A		T		R	
1. Frente Demo	2	1	4	4	5	12	36	15	37	0	2	9	3	14	56	3	4	23	11	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
2. P. Aprista	3	1	2	4	4	10	30	7	17	0	0	0	11	1	4	3	5	9	9	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
3. Somos Libre	2	1	3	0	0	6	18	3	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	1	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
4. I. Socialis	0	0	2	1	1	3	9	4	10	0	0	0	1	1	4	1	4	2	2	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
5. Union Civic	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6. Frenstraca	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7. Frente Ind.	1	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	5	0	0	6	0	6	24	1	1	3	3	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
8. I. Unida	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9. Mov. Bases	0	0	1	0	0	1	3	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10. Cambio '90	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. Accion Demo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	8	3	12	10	33	100	2	3	25	11	41	100	0	2	16	7	25	100	10	8	53	28	99	100	10	8	53	28	99	100	10	8	53	28	99	100

attractive. Unfortunately, the broadcasting of commercials was uneven among parties and candidates, (Table No. 5). The Frente Democratico coalition made 56% of the total television ads, and the ten remaining parties who used television only 44%. Among this 44% is a single commercial broadcasted by the Cambio '90 party which finally won the presidential election in second round.

The final solution to the sampling problem was a mixed one. All the commercials for all parties and offices were selected, except for the candidates to Senators and Deputies of the Frente Democratico coalition. Given the extremely large number of Frente Democratico congressional race ads, only fifty percent of these commercials were drawn (Table No. 6). The method of sampling was systematic. After these ads were ordered chronologically, each second ad was drawn both for senatorial and for deputorial Frente Democratico commercials. The final collection of ads ready for analysis amounted to a set of 99 commercials (Table No. 6).

Analysis Method

With respect to the method of analysis, content analysis was selected. This is the most useful method for this type of study since it permits the dissection of the data into components. In this case, the method permitted to isolate the variables lying behind the form or verbal

message of political commercials and exposed the relationship among those variables. Another advantage is that it permitted the gathering of unbiased information directly from the broadcasts, without passing through the personalized opinions of the authors of the ads.

The Pilot Study

This study started with the intention to analyze three independent variables: party identification, office pursued and ranking of the party in the polls; also, up to forty dependent variables, both verbal and non-verbal or formal ones. To determine the most effective research procedures, a test study was executed; five commercials were randomly drawn and codified.

During this stage, the commercials were edited from their environmental material, classified, and the independent and dependent variables were measured. Particularly, the ads were classified into four broadcasting stages. Each stage considered the period between two significant polls. It is assumed here that each poll was used by parties and candidates as feedback for their advertising campaigns. The stages are: 1) before Feb. 1st, when the television advertising campaign began; 2) from Feb. 1st to Feb. 28; 3) from March 1st to March 19; 4) the last one from March 20 to April 6.

However, several problems were encountered. The main problem was the time consumption of the measurement process. This was due in part to the unmanageable number of dependent variables of form; also, many of them, taken from Bohrer's study, simply did not fit in the analysis of this type of ad. Therefore, after considering the difficulties that each variable brought and the limits of this study, they were reduced from 12 groups and 66 individual formal variables to eight groups and 28 individual variables.

The variables that were eliminated were: musical meter, pixilation, over-the-shoulder shot, superimposition, graph types, composite image, subject motion, panning, tilting, dollying, trucking, and booming of camera, also zooming of lenses.

Also, among the independent variables, one was shown to be irrelevant: the ranking position of the party in the electoral polls. The reason is that there were not significant ranking variations in the polls; the first place occupied by Frente Democratico was never challenged. Moreover, the difference between the first and second place never was lower than 25 percent. Furthermore, only the second place had changed twice in the set of four polls, (Table No. 2); the remaining positions stayed unchanged. Therefore, the ranking variable was irrelevant; nevertheless, it was included in the coding process, but not in the analysis.

For this reason, the ranking variable was substituted by another environmental variable: broadcasting stage. The purpose was to make a longitudinal analysis of the data in order to find out the aging effect of the commercials in a kind of cohort analysis (Wimmer & Dominick, 1987). The final set of variables can be seen in Fig. No. 1.

Independent Variables

All three independent variables are environmental. These variables are measurements of the program context within which each commercial was situated. They are: party affiliation, office pursued, and stage of broadcasting (Fig. No. 1). Ranking, as mentioned above, was not analyzed.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables were of two types: of verbal message and of form. The **verbal message** dependent variables attempted to measure the amount of information that commercials sent to the audience. They were: issue discussion, temporal position of the message, discussion of own qualifications and platforms, discussion of the adversaries platforms, and verbal density of the commercial.

Two of these variables deserve a short explanation regarding their formulation. First, for the issue discussion

variable, I formulated and used a list of the most important problems that were relevant to this electoral campaign; the reason to do that is that in Peru it is not common to have explicit issues on which candidates concentrate the electoral debate (Fig. No. 1). Second, the verbal density variable is the result of the division of number of spoken words during the spot by the length of the commercial, (written words on the screen have not been considered).

The dependent variables of **form** were grouped in 8 types.

The first was music. The number of seconds of *music* track was timed, as well as, the presence or absence of lyrics was tabulated.

The second type of variable was vocal usage. Two elements were studied here: the use of *voice-over* and the use of the *candidate's own voice*. Both variables were timed in seconds. Regarding *voice-over*, the sub-variable *gender* was also tabulated.

A third type of formal variable was the presence of logo and slogan. The purpose was to measure the degree of effort to facilitate the identification of the party or candidate. The presence of each variable was tabulated with one, and the absence with zero.

A fourth type was related to motion alteration. Three types of motion are considered: *slow*, *reverse*, and *fast*. Each variation was timed in seconds

I. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:

A. Party affiliation:

- (1) Somos Libres
- (2) Frente Democratico
- (3) Frenatraca
- (4) Union Civica Independiente
- (5) Frente Independiente
Moralizador
- (6) Partido Aprista Peruano
- (7) Izquierda Socialista
- (8) Izquierda Unida
- (9) Other

B. Date of broadcast:

- (1) Before Feb 1st, 1990
- (2) Between Feb 1st and Feb 28,
1990
- (3) Between March 1st and March
19, 1990
- (4) Between March 20 and April 7,
1990

C. Government office pursued:

- (1) For President
- (2) For Senator
- (3) For Deputy

D. Length of commercial:

- (1) 20 sec. long
- (2) 30 sec. long
- (3) 40 sec. long
- (4) 45 sec. long
- (5) 50 sec. long
- (6) 60 sec. long

E. Number of words:

II. DEPENDENT VARIABLES:

A. MESSAGE CONTENT VARIABLES: five variables.

1. Issue orientation:

- (1) If there is mention of issues
- (0) If there is no mention of them

(*) Issues considered for this campaign:

- Inflation
- Unemployment and economic growth
- Terrorism and political violence
- Drugs
- Health and education deficiencies
- Administrative corruption.

2. Temporal positioning of the message:

Figure 1. CODING SHEET

- (1) If there is a present-future relationship.
- (0) If there is a past-present relationship
- 3. Position regarding the other candidates:
 - (1) If there is discussion of opponents' platforms
 - (0) If there is no mention
- 4. About own candidacy:
 - (1) If there is discussion of platform or qualifications of own candidacy
 - (0) If there is no mention of them
- 5. Verbal density:.....
 - It will be a proportion resulting from the division of number of words of commercial/number of seconds of commercial. This last variable will be a proportion around 1.

B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES OF FORM: 28 variables will be considered:

- MUSIC AND LYRICS:

- 1. Music track: number of seconds music is played in the commercial.....
- 2. Lyrics:
 - (1) If music has lyrics or 0
 - (0) If there is no lyrics.

- VOCAL USAGE:

- 3. Voice-over: # of sec. narrator speaks.....
- 4. Voice-over-gender:
 - (1) Male
 - (0) Female
- 5. Candidate Speech: # of sec. candidate speaks..

- LOGO SLOGAN:

- 6. Presence of logo:
 - (1) There is logo
 - (0) There is no logo
- 7. Presence of slogan:
 - (1) There is logo
 - (0) There is no logo

- CAMERA MOTION:

- 8. Slow motion: # of sec.....
- 9. Reverse motion: # of sec.....
- 10. Fast motion: # of sec.....

Figure 1. CODING SHEET (Continued)

- CAMERA FRAMING:

11. High camera angle: # of times during commercial.....
12. Low camera angle: # of times during commercial.....
13. Point-of-view-shot: # of times during commercial.....
14. Close-ups: # of times during commercial.
15. Extreme-close-ups: # of times during commercial.....
16. Long-shots: # of times during commercial.

- EDITING DEVICES:

17. Cuts: number of cuts during commercial...
18. Dissolves: # of times during commercial ..
19. Match action cuts: # of times during commercial
20. Parallel continuity: # of times during commercial.....

- ANIMATION:

21. Drawn:
 - (0) No drawn animation
 - (1) Total drawn animation
 - (2) Partial drawn animation
22. Computer style:
 - (0) No computer animation
 - (1) Commercial is totally computer animated
 - (2) Commercial is partially animated

- DIGITAL SPECIAL EFFECTS:

23. Squeeze frames: # of times/commercial.....
24. Rotate frames: # of times/commercial above.
25. Split fields: # of times/ commercial
26. Wipes: # of times/commercial
27. Prints only (letters on a blank frame) #/comm.....
28. Type supers (letters over a frame with other pictures).....

Instructions to the coders:

- Candidate speech: time the candidate speech both when he speaks on screen and when he is voice-over candidate. Both times have to be added in one.

Figure 1. CODING SHEET (Continued)

Camera framing was the fifth kind of formal variable. Here two sets of variables were analyzed, camera angle and closeness to the candidate. Three camera angle variations were considered: *high*, *low*, and *point of view*. The literature with respect to this point asserts that high camera angle (as if the candidate were looking down to the viewer) gives the subject the appearance of being taller, powerful, and is therefore, preferred. The closeness of the camera to the candidate was divided into three variables: *close-up*, *medium close-up* and *long shots*.

A sixth type of formal variable was related to the editing devices; *cuts*, *dissolves*, *match action cuts*, and *parallel continuity* were counted per commercial. This set of variables is important to determine the degree of visual effects of the commercial.

Animation style was the seventh group of variables. Here, two styles were tabulated: *drawn animation*, and *computer animation*. These variables are complimentary to the sixth group.

Finally, digital special effects was the eighth group of variables. They are *squeeze and rotate frames*, *split fields*, *wipes*, *print-only letters*, and *type supers*, or letters that appear over a frame with other images. The complete set of variables can be seen in the Coding Sheet (Fig. No. 1).

The Coding Procedure

The Coding procedure of each commercial took between 30 minutes and two hours, and the complete set of 99 ads took around one month. The coding task was done by two persons, a graduate student and the author of this study. A reliability test shows the degree of intercoder agreement.

The Reliability Test

The coding procedure was tested on ten commercials taken randomly from the tape where all the commercials were recorded. The commercials pretested belonged to different parties and different periods of the campaign. The average percentage of intercoder agreement across the five dependent variables of message content was 83, and the agreement across the 28 dependent variables of form was 85. The overall agreement was 85, which is a moderate degree of intercoder agreement (Wimmer & Dominick, 1987).

The variables that showed lower agreement degree in the message analysis were: temporal positioning of the message, position regarding the other candidate and position about own candidacy. In the formal analysis, the variables with lower agreement were: presence of logo-slogan fast motion high camera angle, point-of-view shot, and long shots. The variables with a degree of agreement below 70 were discarded

from the analysis as unreliable.

The variables with degree of agreement above the average were issue orientation, verbal density, music track lyrics, voice-over, voice-over gender, candidate speech, cuts, dissolves, animation, print, and print supers. The complete results of the reliability test can be seen in Table No. 7.

Analysis of the Data

The objective of the analysis was to detect the relationship existing between the independent and the dependent variables. The statistical tools used were basically averages and percentages.

Two types of application were made. First, simple description of the averages in order to describe the general commercial of this campaign, and then, crosstabulations between the independent and dependent variables were executed. Six were the areas of crosstabulation:

- Verbal Message by political parties
- Verbal message by broadcasting stages
- Verbal message by offices pursued
- Form by parties
- Form by broadcasting stages, and
- Form by offices pursued.

Verbal message was analyzed to explore the variations

Table No. 7

RESULTS OF RELIABILITY TEST
(By percentage of agreement)
N=10

VARIABLE	% AGREEMENT
A. MESSAGE CONTENT VARIABLES:	
1. Issue discussion.....	94
2. Temporal positioning of message.....	76
3. Position regarding adversaries.....	72
4. About own candidacy.....	75
5. Verbal density	97
Message content agreement.....	83
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES OF FORM:	
1. Music track.....	100
2. Lyrics.....	96
3. Voice-over.....	90
4. Voice-over gender.....	100
5. Candidate speech.....	93
6. Presence of logo	83
7. Presence of slogan	78
8. Slow motion.....	97
9. Reverse motion.....	96
10. Fast motion	73
11. High camera angle	78
12. Low camera angle	80
13. Point-of-view shot	65
14. Close-ups.....	83
15. Extreme close-ups	81
16. Long shots	59
17. Cuts	92
18. Dissolves	90
19. Match action cuts	ns
20. Parallel continuity	ns
21. Drawn animation	94
22. Computer style animation	92
23. Squeeze frames	83
24. Rotate frames	85
25. Split fields	61
26. Wipes	73
27. Prints only	93
28. Type supers	91
Form variables agreement.....	85
OVERALL RELIABILITY OF CODING PROCEDURES....	85

in the amount of relevant information that commercials carry due to the three dependent variables. It was supposed that voters would make a more rational selection if they were well informed about the issues of the campaign, where the candidates stand on them, what are the opposition thoughts about, and what are the qualifications of the candidate to aspire to the office. Additionally, to analyze these variables, a rationality index was built, following the concepts of Fibiger (Fibiger, 1981) and the procedure used by Fretz (Fretz, 1989). In general, the question here was: who (parties), when (broadcasting stages), and what type of offices pursued' commercials helped voters the most to make a more rational choice?

Form was analyzed to answer the same questions made regarding verbal message.

In general, descriptive statistics techniques were used here, and averages and percentages were the main tools used to describe the data. No inferential statistical techniques were applied here. The fundamental reason was the type of sample used in this study. Actually, the sample used was conditioned by the nature of the population; the population was unevenly distributed; some parties had only one commercial to be studied, whereas one of the parties had around 100. The peculiar distribution of the population forced to drawing of a rather convenience sample. That sample was formed by the complete set of commercials

recorded correctly and run for president and the whole set for deputies and senators, except for the Frente Democratico coalition. The congressional ads of this party were so numerous that a sampling procedure was necessary; the systematic method was applied, and only fifty percent of the spots were used.

The total sample of this study was 99 commercials belonging to eleven parties; this yields an average of nine commercials per party. This low average samples generates high standard deviations of each sample, high enough to distort inference statistical procedures. The analysis was executed using the SAS statistical software.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

The analysis was divided into three sections, the average commercial features; the message content characteristics; and a longer report on the formal components of the commercial. In the last two parts, the emphasis was placed on the crosstabulation of the verbal message and form variables with the independent or environmental variables, *political parties, stages of broadcasting and offices pursued.*

Section 1: The Average Political Commercial

For the Peruvian presidential and congressional campaign of 1990, the average television commercial was 30 seconds long. Regarding the verbal message, one third of the total ads talked about the campaign issues and had a futuristic approach (Table No. 8). Also, candidates tended to discuss their own platforms or qualifications (61%), rather than their adversaries' (14%). This suggests that the discussion of issues and the adversaries' platforms did not generally take place within the television commercials. Finally, the verbal density (the ratio of the number of words to the length of commercial) of the typical ad was 1.8

Table No. 8

MEANS OF THE VARIABLES

VARIABLE	USAGE	LENGTH/FREQ
A. VERBAL MESSAGE:		
1. Issue Orient.	32%	n/a
2. Futuristic pos.	36%	n/a
3. Mention of adver	14%	n/a
4. Mention of own	61%	n/a
5. Verbal density	n/a	1.80 w/sec.
B. FORM		
a. Music:		
6. Music track	61%	11.7 sec.
7. Lyrics	16%	n/a
b. Vocal Usage:		
8. VO	85%	12.0 sec.
9. VO gender	98% male	n/a
10. Candidate speak	59%	8.8 sec.
c. Logo-Slogan:		
11. Logo use	95%	n/a
12. Slogan use	67%	n/a
d. Motion alteration:		
13. Slow Motion	30%	2.70 sec.
14. Reverse motion	2%	0.02 sec.
15. Fast motion	2%	0.10 sec.
e. Camera Framing:		
16. High perspect.	41%	0.66 times
17. Low perspective	36%	0.62 times
18. Point of view	62%	1.82 times
19. Medium close-up	75%	1.77 times
20. Close-up	39%	0.79 times
21. Long shot	50%	1.02 times
f. Editing Devices:		
22. Cuts	89%	5.88 times
23. Dissolves	74%	2.59 times
24. Match action	3%	0.05 times
25. Parallel action	1%	0.01 times

Table No. 8 (Continued)

VARIABLE	USAGE	LENGTH/FREQ
g. Animation:		
26. Drawn animation		5% part. n/a
27. Computer anim.		34% part. n/a
h. Digital special effects:		
28. Squeeze	35%	0.43 times
29. Rotate	31%	0.49 times
30. Split screen	33%	0.46 times
31. Wipe	27%	0.43 times
32. Print on screen	63%	0.91 times
33. Typesuper	85%	2.18 times

words per second (Table No. 8).

With respect to the form of the typical commercial, eight categories of variables were analyzed. To start with the music and vocal usage, 61% of the ads had music track for an average duration of 12 seconds. However, only one fourth of them had lyrics, most of which were tailored for the occasion. With respect to the type of voice, voice-over (VO) was preferred to the candidate's voice. VO, a speaker not seen on the screen but heard, was the most frequently used type of vocal audio, with 85% of usage frequency and an average duration of 12 seconds. Here, it was confirmed that the male voice was the most preferred with 98% of usage. On the other hand, candidate's voice was present in only 59% of the commercials, for an average duration of nine seconds. In most of the ads, the combination of VO and candidate voice was the preferred vocal audio combination.

The use of logo and slogan was also very frequent. Logos were used in 95% of the commercials, whereas slogans were used in only 67% of the ads. This reflects clearly that the first priority of campaign managers was to achieve in the voters' minds the identification of the party and candidate. This emphasis is understandable in the context of the Peruvian elections; for the electoral mandate all parties had to be identified with a symbol on the ballot slip, and the candidates had to be identified by a certain number on the ballot slip.

With respect to motion alteration, only slow motion seemed to be relevant with 30% of usage and for an average duration of less than three seconds per commercial. Fast and reverse motion were rarely used.

Camera framing (or how candidates were presented on the screen) seems to be much more interesting. Here, two elements of framing were considered; one was the direction or position of candidate with respect to the camera: high, low or point of view; the other was the closeness to the candidate: medium close-up, close-up, and long shots. Needless to say, the frequency of the types of framing was a rather difficult to assess because of the use of zooms which continuously re-frames the shot in a fluid manner, without clear take changes.

The favorite type of take was point of view with 62% of the ads and two times per commercial average. High and low takes were very similar in frequency usage, which contradicts the general belief that high takes are much more desirable than low ones, (Fretz, 1989). High take of the candidate (as if the candidate were looking down to the camera) was used in 41% of the ads, and low take was used in 36%. In both cases a frequency of one time per commercial was the average. High takes were found generally within the context of political rallies, showing the candidates addressing their constituents. Low takes generally took place indoors, inside the congressional chambers for

incumbents, and point of view from speeches in the candidates' offices. One curious element noticed in the background of takes inside offices is that candidates were very often shown close to an active computer screen.

Regarding the closeness to the candidate, the medium close-up was the most preferred kind of shot with a 75% frequency and an average of two takes per ad. The longshot was the second most frequent shot, with 50%, and finally, close-ups were used only in 39% of the ads. Both for longshots and for close-ups, the average frequency was once per commercial.

In editing devices, cuts and dissolves seemed to be the most preferred ones. Cuts were used in 89% of the commercials, averaging about six times per ad. Dissolves were used almost as frequently but with less intensity. They were found in 74% of the ads in an average frequency of 2.6 times per commercial. Match action and parallel action, on the other hand, were not relevant.

The animation technique was very rarely used. The computer animation technique was used in only 34% of the ads. Drawn animation was used in only 5% of the total ads. Neither variable was crosstabulated.

Digital special effects, such as squeezes, rotations, split screens and wipes were used in less than a third of the commercials. However, the frequency of use was less than 0.5 times per commercial.

Finally, the use of prints on screen were amply represented. Plain print of messages on screen had a 63% use with a frequency of 0.91 times per commercial. Type super, (words or messages written over, or by another image) was used in 85% of the commercials with a frequency of 2.2 times average. This has a positive correlation with the logo-slogan usage.

Section 2: The Analysis of the Verbal Message Components

The verbal message analysis took into consideration five variables: issue discussion, temporal approach, mention of own platform and qualifications, discussion of the adversaries' platforms, and measurement of the verbal density of the commercial, (the number of words divided by the length of the commercial).

These variables are a modified version of the ones used by Fibiger (Fibiger, 1981). Following his paradigm, commercials have the ability of transmitting to voters useful information to make their vote decision more rational. In this sense, all the message variables studied here are considered desirable to provide useful information to voters, and therefore, to give the ad a rational approach. In other words, the higher the frequency of all five variables, the higher the level of rationality of the message. Based on these assumptions, a rationality index was

built to assess the verbal message of commercials of each political party.

The verbal message analysis yields important differences in commercials due to their party sponsorship, broadcasting periods, and offices pursued.

Verbal Message and Parties

There were some differences in the overall verbal content index due to party identification, (Table No. 9). Specifically, the small parties behaved in different and apparently erratic modes compared to the large parties (Frente Democratico and Partido Aprista). For instance, the new and small independent parties, Frente Independiente Moralizador and Union Civica Independiente, had the highest rate of issue discussion; more than 60% of their commercials argued about them. On the other hand, other not-so-new small parties such as Izquierda Unida and Frenatraca avoided almost completely to discuss issues in their ads. But the Cambio' 90 party deserves special mention. This party was the winner of the presidential election, yet did not address the issues at all in its single television commercial. For this variable, the average mention was 32%.

Regarding the temporal approach, only the Frenatraca party gave its commercials a past approach, and in some cases simply ignored the temporal element. In the other extreme were the Izquierda Socialista and Cambio '90

Table No. 9
 PARTIES vs. VERBAL MESSAGE COMPONENTS
 (Rationality Index # 1)

PARTY	Number of Ads	Issue Mention	Temp. Orient.	Mention Oppon.	Mention Own	Verbal Density	Total Points
1. Somos Libres	9	0.22	0.14	0.00	0.44	1.57	2.37
2. Frente Democratico	41	0.34	0.51	0.15	0.66	1.86	3.52
3. Frenatraca	5	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.40	1.80	2.20
4. Union Civica Ind.	5	0.60	0.60	0.00	0.80	1.90	3.90
5. Frente Ind. Moral.	6	0.67	0.17	0.00	0.67	2.37	3.88
6. Partido Aprista	18	0.39	0.41	0.33	0.56	1.70	3.39
7. Izq. Socialista	9	0.22	1.00	0.22	0.67	1.57	3.68
8. Izq. Unida	3	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.67	1.63	2.80
9. Cambio'90	1	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.73	2.73
Average	97	0.32	0.44	0.14	0.62	1.80	3.32
Std. Dev.		0.47	0.50	0.35	0.49	0.46	0.67

Table No. 10

RATIONALITY OF VERBAL MESSAGE vs. ELECTIONS OUTCOME

Party	Verbal Message	Presidential Outcome (%)	Senate Seats (nation)	Deputy Seats (Lima)
1. Union Civica Ind.	3.90	n/a	0	0
2. Frente Ind. Moral.	3.88	n/a	n/a	7
3. Izquierda Socialista	3.68	4	3	2
4. Frente Democratico	3.52	28	20	14
5. Partido Aprista	3.39	19	16	6
6. Izquierda Unida	2.80	7	6	2
7. Cambio '90	2.73	25	14	9
8. Somos Libres	2.37	n/a	0	n/a
9. Frenatraca	2.20	1	1	0
Others		2		
Null		7		
Blank		8		
Total		100%	60 Sen.	40 Dep.
Spearman (rho) Test		+0.26	+0.12	-0.01

n/a = Not applicable

parties' which used only the futuristic approach.

With respect to the adversaries' platforms discussion variable, the small parties also tended to ignore their adversaries' positions. The Partido Aprista attacked its adversary' platform in 33% of its ads. It is important to observe that the Partido Aprista was the incumbent party, and despite being so, launched an attack campaign against the Frente Democratico coalition which, as we explained in the background part of this study, was the expected winner of the elections even in the last poll. The Izquierda Socialista party launched the second most negative campaign. Its target was the Frente Democratico party too. It is important to explain the context here: the Partido Aprista and Izquierda Socialista, second and third in the surveys, hoped that they would enter to the second round, to dispute the presidency with the Frente Democratico.

The parties that made their commercials free of preoccupation of their adversaries' platforms were Somos Libres, Frenatraca, Union Civica Independiente, Frente Independiente Moralizador, Izquierda Unida, and Cambio '90. All of these were small parties, except Cambio '90, who experienced an enormous surge of support at the last moment.

Discussion of own platforms or qualifications did not show important differences among parties. Each party discussed these issues to a similar degree.

The word-density of commercials was quite varied. The

highest rate belonged to the Frente Independiente Moralizador, and the lowest to the Cambio '90 commercial. The latter commercial, although it will sound redundant, was a very visual one. The average in this variable for all parties was 1.80 words/second. The largest parties were near this average.

Finally, applying the Fibiger rationality paradigm and the Fretz index, our particular conclusion is that there were differences in the degree of rationality of commercials due to party sponsorship. Nevertheless, this was not evident in a clear or uniform pattern.

As a manner of supplementary conclusion, even though this study does not take into account the election outcome variable, it is legitimate to say that there was little correlation between the degree of rationality of commercials and the final election outcome. Particularly, the Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Test (ρ) is very clear to this regard; the correlation of rationality degree with respect to each office is around zero (Table No. 10). For example, the most rational commercials belonged to Union Civica Independiente, which did not get a single seat in the parliament despite its heavy television expenditure. Contrarily, another rational announcer was the successful and small Frente Independiente Moralizador, which got 7 of the 40 seats for Deputies for Lima. On the emotional side, the most emotional television campaigns belonged to

Frenatraca, Somos Libre and Cambio '90. The first won only one Senator seat despite its high advertising investment. Somos Libres, was a complete failure with zero seats, and Cambio' 90, was the biggest winner of this campaign despite its modest expenditure (Appendix No. 1).

Verbal Message and Broadcasting Stages

Clearly there were differences in the issue content of the commercials broadcasted in different stages of the campaign.

As stated in the methods chapter, the television propaganda campaign lasted from October 1989 to the 6th of April of 1990. This period was divided into four stages. The first goes from the very beginning in October of 1989 to the 31st of January of 1990. The second stage covers all the month of February. The third stage extends from the 1st to the 19th of March, and the last stage covers from the 20th of March to the 6th of April of 1990. The actual election took place on the 8th of April. The criterion to divide the campaign into the four stages is the release of the three most important and publicized polls by the principal polling agencies of Lima. It should be noted that the last stage covers the days following the last legally-allowed publication of a poll until the last day of legally-allowed propaganda.

In general, the rationality index, created following

Table No. 11
 BROADCASTING STAGES vs. VERBAL MESSAGE
 (Rationality Index # 2)

STAGE	Number of Ads	Issue Mention	Temp. Orient.	Mention Oppon.	Mention Own	Verbal Density	Total Points
1. Before Feb 10.	16	0.62	0.79	0.25	0.75	1.72	4.13
2. Feb 10.-Feb 28	7	0.43	0.57	0.14	0.71	1.74	3.59
3. Mar 10.-Mar 19	50	0.28	0.33	0.08	0.64	1.81	3.14
4. Mar 20- Apr 7	26	0.19	0.36	0.19	0.46	1.83	3.03
Average	99	0.32	0.44	0.14	0.62	1.80	
Std. Dev.		0.47	0.50	0.35	0.49	0.46	

the Fibiger concepts and the Fretz instrument (Fretz, 1989), shows a clear cohort effect, a temporal effect in the commercials. The index fell substantially and steadily during the four stages from 4.13 in the first period to 3.03 in the last one (Table No. 11). And curiously, this diminution process is the result of the decrease of all the components of the verbal message considered in this study, except one, verbal density. Individually, the issue discussion variable fell from 0.61 the first period to 0.19 in the last one. A similar phenomenon occurred with temporal approach of the message. Ads in the first stage showed a 0.79 coefficient and finished with 0.39. In other words, campaigns began by looking to the future and finished looking back at the past. Additionally, the mention of own platform or qualifications also fell, from 0.75 to 0.46.

However, there was an element that gained certain robustness with the unfolding of the campaign. This was verbal density. It started with 1.72 and finished with 1.83 coefficient.

The question is, then, what substitutes for issue content, or rational content in general, since there is an increase in verbal density? Although the answers were not tabulated in this study, several elements were evident. First, there was a greater persistence in candidate identification. Second, more use of lyrics in songs combined with images seemed to attempt to make use of the band wagon

propaganda technique (Severin and Tankard, 1987). Third, there were man-on-the-street interviews. None of them discussed issues or platforms or had an explicit futuristic approach.

Verbal Message and Offices Pursued

The commercials showed some variations regarding the offices that candidates were pursuing. The most outstanding element here is the discussion of the adversaries platforms. Only presidential candidates seemed to take them seriously in their ads. The index of this variable for presidential office was 0.30, whereas for deputies 0.08 and for senators only 0.05 (Table No. 12).

In the temporal approach variable, presidential commercials also showed a more futuristic perspective with a 0.61 coefficient, whereas the senators scored a 0.31 and the deputies a 0.39. Neither issue nor own platform discussion showed significant variations.

Verbal density again proved to be interesting: the higher the level of the office pursued, the lower the words per second the ad employed. The verbal density for president was 1.65, for senators 1.83 and for deputies commercials 1.95. This suggests that presidential commercials were more elaborate and had a lower rate of speech, perhaps in order to assure greater message comprehension.

Table No. 12

OFFICES PURSUED vs. VERBAL MESSAGE

(Rationality Index # 3)

OFFICE	Number of Ads	Issue Mention	Temp. Orient.	Mention Oppon.	Mention Own	Verbal Density	Total Points
1. For President	33	0.39	0.61	0.30	0.55	1.65	3.50
2. For Senator	41	0.24	0.32	0.05	0.71	1.83	3.15
3. For Deputy	25	0.36	0.39	0.08	0.56	1.95	3.34
Average	99	0.32	0.44	0.14	0.62	1.80	
Std. Dev.		0.47	0.50	0.35	0.49	0.46	

Section 3: The Analysis of the Formal Variables

Eight categories containing 28 variables were analyzed in the non-verbal or formal side of the commercials (Fig. No. 1). The categories were: music, vocal usage, presence of logo-slogan, motion alteration, camera framing of the candidate, editing devices, animation, and digital special effects.

As it was stated above, the variables used here are an adaptation of the 12 groups and 66 independent variables that Bohrer used in his study of the formal features of common commercials (Bohrer, 1987). Many variables were omitted simply because they are not applicable to political commercials. On the other hand, others were so intricate that they exceeded the limitations of this study. Among Bohrer's variables not included were: musical meter, pixilation, over-the-shoulder shot, superimposition, graph types, composite image, subject motion, panning, tilting, dollying, trucking and booming of camera, and also zooming of lenses.

Of the 28 variables studied here, only 19 seemed relevant, and the crosstabulations between the dependent variables of form and the independent ones are reported here (Tables Nos. 13-21).

Parties and Form

Significant differences among parties regarding the formal variables were found.

In music track, Union Civica Independiente averaged 25 seconds per commercial. The Partido Aprista ranked second in musical use with 83% of frequency and 14 seconds average duration. The lowest ranking user of music was the Izquierda Socialista with only 22% frequency and only 5.6 seconds. The mean for this variable was 11.7 seconds per commercial (Table No. 13).

In the vocal usage area, the Somos Libres party had the candidate's voice in 89% of their commercials. However, the party that used the candidate's voice for the greatest duration per commercial was the Partido Aprista with 9.9 seconds. The most infrequent user was Frenatraca with only 40% of the ads and 1.2 seconds per commercial. The overall average usage was 8.9 seconds per commercial.

The use of the voice-over seemed to be an alternative to the use of the candidate's voice. For instance, Somos Libres only used VO in 56% on its ads with 5.8 seconds average, but Izquierda Socialista relied heavily on VO for the delivery of its message with 100% usage and 15.8 seconds average. The overall average use was 12.1 seconds.

In the logo-slogan area no dramatic differences were found. All parties tended to make extensive use of their logos and somewhat less use of their slogans. The average

Table No. 13

PARTIES vs. FORM-SOUND

PARTY	# of Ads	Ave. Long	Used Sec.	MUSIC TRACK	VO TIME	CANDID SPEAKS	LOGO USE	SLOGAN USE	SLOW MOTION
1. Somos Libres	9	29	Used Sec.	56% 8.3	56% 5.8	89% 8.0	100%	67%	22% 1.6 seconds
2. Frente Democratico	41	34	Used Sec.	59% 11.7	83% 11.7	59% 9.9	95%	73%	39% 2.8 seconds
3. Frenatraca	5	24	Used Sec.	60% 9.6	100% 12.2	40% 1.2	100%	60%	0 0 seconds
4. Union Civica I.	5	34	Used Sec.	100% 24.8	60% 6.8	80% 8.4	100%	60%	40% 8.4 seconds
5. Frente Ind. Moral.	6	25	Used Sec.	67% 9.3	83% 13.8	50% 8.5	100%	100%	17% 2.3 seconds
6. Partido Aprista	18	34	Used Sec.	83% 14.4	94% 14.6	61% 9.9	94%	50%	33% 3.3 seconds
7. Izq. Socialista	9	33	Used Sec.	22% 5.6	100% 15.8	33% 9.7	100%	78%	0 0 seconds
8. Izq. Unida	3	33	Used Sec.	67% 10.3	67% 15.7	33% 6.0	67%	33%	67% 7.3 seconds
9. Cambio '90	1	30	Used	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0
TOTAL		97		Average	11.7	12.1	8.9	96%	68% 2.7 seconds

Table No. 14

PARTIES vs. FORM-EDITING

PARTY	Used Times	CUTS	DISSLV	SQUEEZ	ROTATE	PRINT	TYPESUP
1. Somos Libres	89% 3	56% 1.8	67% 1.8	67% 0.7	44% 0.8	100% 2.3 times	
2. Frente Democratico	88% 5.1	63% 2.6	51% 0.6	46% 0.9	56% 0.9	95% 2.6 times	
3. Frenatraca	80% 2.4	100% 3.6	0 0	0 0	20% 0.2	80% 1.2 times	
4. Union Civica I.	80% 8.6	60% 3.6	20% 0.2	0 0	80% 1.2	40% 1.2 times	
5. Frente Ind. Moral.	83% 3.7	67% 3.5	50% 0.5	0 0	67% 0.8	67% 0.8 times	
6. Partido Aprista	89% 10.6	67% 2.5	0 0	17% 0.2	94% 1.2	72% 1.8 times	
7. Izq. Socialista	100% 5.1	89% 2.6	11% 0.6	12% 0.4	67% 1.1	89% 2.7 times	
8. Izq. Unida	67% 2.7	67% 2.3	0 0	33% 0.3	67% 1.0	67% 1.3 times	
Average	5.9	2.6	0.4	0.5	0.9	2.2 times	

Table No. 15

PARTIES vs. FORM-CANDIDATE

PARTY	Used Times	HIGH	LOW	PNTVW	MCU	CU	LONGSH
1. Somos Libres	22% 0.3	22% 0.3	56% 0.6	100% 0.8	33% 1.0	33% 0.6 times	
2. Frente Democratico	44% 0.7	36% 0.6	76% 2.4	100% 2.0	54% 1.0	54% 1.4 times	
3. Frenatraca	40% 0.6	60% 1.0	60% 1.0	100% 1.6	0 0	60% 0.8 times	
4. Union Civica I.	60% 0.8	40% 0.8	60% 1.2	100% 1.8	40% 1.0	60% 0.8 times	
5. Frente Ind. Moral.	0 0	17% 0.2	100% 2.3	100% 1.2	83% 1.5	50% 0.5 times	
6. Partido Aprista	61% 1.2	33% 0.7	28% 1.3	100% 1.8	17% 0.3	50% 1.0 times	
7. Izq. Socialista	33% 0.3	33% 0.9	56% 1.7	100% 2.2	22% 0.4	11% 0.1 times	
8. Izq. Unida	0 0	100% 1.3	33% 1.0	100% 1.3	0 0	100% 1.7 times	
AVERAGE	Times	0.7	0.6	1.8	1.8	0.8	1.0 times

usage was 96% for logo and 68% of slogan.

Differences in the use of motion alteration were only evident regarding the use of slow motion. In this variable, some of the smaller-parties' commercials had no slow motion at all. This may reflect their modest elaboration and low budgets. On the other hand, parties that spent large amounts of money on television commercials had a higher frequency of slow motion use. Such is the case with the Frente Democratico (39%), with the Union Civica Independiente (40%) and with the Partido Aprista (33%) (Table No. 14).

How candidates were portrayed is another area where important findings can be reported. First of all, on the average, there was no important difference in the high and low framing of candidates; high frame scored 0.7 and low frame 0.6 times per commercial. However, not all behaved in a similar way; for instance, the Partido Aprista and Union Civica Independiente showed a notable similarity here. They framed their candidates in a high perspective with greater frequency per commercial and in more than 60% of their number of ads, averaging one take per commercial. On the other hand, the Frente Independiente Moralizador party scored zero high frames; this party used the point of view frame in 100% of its commercials and average of 2.3 times per ad. Other party relying heavily on point-of-view framing was the Frente Democratico, with a 76% frequency and an average of 2.4 times per commercial. The overall average

usage of point-of-view frames was 1.8 times (Table No. 15).

With respect to how close candidates were shown in the commercials, the medium close-up was the most preferred. In fact, it was used in all the commercials in this study, and the difference of use among parties was not notable. Regarding close-ups, the Frente Independiente Moralizador was the heaviest user, with 83% frequency and 1.5 times per commercial. On the other hand, a party that almost totally avoided close-ups was the Partido Aprista with only 17% frequency and 0.3 times per commercial. Other parties with even fewer close-ups were Frenatraca and Izquierda Unida. The overall average usage of this variable was 0.8 times per commercial. Finally, long-shots were a bit more frequently used than close-ups but without much difference among parties. The average usage of long-shots was 1.0 times per commercial.

Regarding the editing devices, the use of cuts and dissolves were the most important. By adding the frequency of cuts to the frequency of dissolves, to form some impression of the pace of the editing in the commercials, again, it is evident that the Partido Aprista and the Union Civica Independiente had the most highly paced commercials, averaging 13.1 and 12.2 dissolves and cuts per commercial respectively. The average sum of cuts and dissolves was 8.5. On the other hand, Somos Libres and Izquierda Unida placed less emphasis on visualization, averaging only five cuts and

dissolves per commercial. Individually, cuts were used much more frequently than dissolves.

Squeeze was a technique used mostly by three parties: Somos Libres used it in 67%, Frente Democratico in 51% and Frente Independiente Moralizador in 50% of their commercials. Regarding rotation, again, Somos Libres and Frente Democratico had the highest frequencies. Both had in general more elaborate ads and high television advertising expenditures.

Finally, regarding the words printed on the screen used as reinforcing tools, type super print was the preferred technique; its use was 2.2 times per commercial, whereas only 0.9 times for print. There were not significant differences among parties.

In conclusion it can be said that the Partido Aprista and Union Civica Independiente commercials showed much similarity in the formal variables of commercials. This may reflect the common origin and philosophies of both parties. Union Civica Independiente was born after a division of the Partido Aprista, the oldest and best organized political party of Peru. To be more precise, the presidential candidates of both parties during their youth were close comrades in the Aprista party, and were trained in propaganda techniques. Finally, it was observed that small parties with small campaign budgets showed some poverty regarding the use of formal devices.

Broadcasting Stages and Form

An aging or temporal effect was found in the form also. Specifically four noticeable phenomena were found in this crosstabulation. First, the use of music track increased over the duration of the campaign; it rose from an average of 8.1 seconds per commercial to 13.7 (Table No. 16). Second, the voice-over time also increased substantially from 8.8 seconds per commercial during the first two stages to 13.3 seconds per ad during the last two stages on the average. Third, the candidate speech variable dropped from an average of 15.2 seconds in the first two stages to 7.1 seconds per commercial during the last two stages.

And fourth, commercials tended to be more visual over time. The number of cuts and dissolves considered together, increased from 6.7 to 9.5 times per commercial. This feature was particularly remarkable for cuts, which jumped up from an average of 4.4. to 7.8 times per commercial (Table No. 17). The rest of the variables did not show notable variations (Table No. 18).

It must be noted that the variations in the formal side of commercials due to the broadcasting stage are perfectly complementary with the aging effect detected for verbal message. Definitely, the loss of the rational component of the messages is correlated with less time of candidates speaking and is filled with more music, more visualization and more voice-over to gain final identification of

Table No. 16

BROADCASTING STAGES vs. FORM-SOUND

STAGE	Number of Ads	Ave. Long	Used Sec.	MUSIC TRACK	VO TIME	CANDID SPEAKS	LOGO USE	SLOGAN USE	SLOW MOTION
1. Before Feb. 10.	16	34 s.	Used Sec.	63% 8.1	75% 7.3	69% 14.8	100%	75%	31% 2.4 seconds
2. Feb. 1-Feb. 28	7	36 s.	Used Sec.	29% 3.0	86% 10.4	100% 15.7	100%	57%	14% 1.0 seconds
3. Mar. 1-Mar. 19	50	31 s.	Used Sec.	62% 13.0	84% 13.4	58% 6.8	96%	74%	30% 2.6 seconds
4. Mar. 20-Apr. 6	26	33 s.	Used Sec.	73% 13.7	88% 13.1	42% 7.4	92%	54%	31% 3.5 seconds
AVERAGE	99			11.7	12.1	8.9	96%	68%	2.7 seconds

Table No. 17

BROADCASTING STAGES vs. FORM-EDITING

STAGE	USED TIMES	CUTS	DISSLV	SQUEEZ	ROTATE	PRINT	TYPESUP
1. Before Feb. 10.	Used Times	81% 4.4	56% 2.3	31% 0.4	69% 0.4	69% 0.8	81% 1.4 times
2. Feb. 1-Feb. 28	Used Times	100% 5.9	86% 2.6	29% 0.4	71% 0.3	57% 1.0	100% 2.1 times
3. Mar. 1-Mar. 19	Used Times	86% 5.4	74% 3.1	46% 0.6	72% 0.4	60% 0.9	86% 2.5 times
4. Mar. 20-Apr. 6	Used Times	92% 7.8	58% 1.7	15% 0.2	65% 0.7	65% 1.0	81% 2.1 times
AVERAGE		5.9	2.6	0.4	0.5	0.9	2.2 Times

Table No. 18

BROADCASTING STAGES vs. FORM-CANDIDATE

STAGE	Used Times	HIGH	LOW	PNTVW	MCU	CU	LONGSHT
1. Before Feb. 10.	44%	37%	38%	69%	37%	37%	37%
	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.3	0.8	1.1	Times
2. Feb. 1-Feb. 28	43%	0	57%	86%	57%	29%	29%
	0.4	0	2.0	1.1	1.0	0.3	Times
3. Mar. 1-Mar. 19	40%	42%	78%	78%	48%	62%	62%
	0.7	0.7	2.3	2.0	1.0	1.2	Times
4. Mar. 20-Apr. 6	38%	31%	46%	69%	15%	38%	38%
	0.6	0.5	1.5	1.7	0.3	0.8	Times
Average		0.7	0.6	1.8	1.8	0.8	1.0
							Times

candidate for the voter.

Offices Pursued and Form

Form of commercials also showed some variations due to the office pursued. First, music track was much more widely used for congressional candidates than for presidential ones. Presidential spots used music in 51% of the ads with 8.7 seconds on the average. Senators' and Deputies' commercials coincided with 68% frequency and 13.2 seconds of usage on the average (Table No. 19).

Also, the higher the office, the more visual the ads. Between cuts and dissolves, presidential spots had an average of 9.7 cuts or dissolves, senatorial spots 8.2, and deputorial spots had 7.2 (Table No. 20). Editing techniques confirm something detected above: squeeze and rotate were used only in around 18% in presidential ads, but in congressional spots, both variables had a frequency of 40% (Table No. 20).

Finally regarding the portrayal of the candidates, high and low shots did not yield significant variations among offices; however, in the closeness to the subject variables, close-ups were much preferred for congressional than for presidential candidates, and the same phenomena applies to medium close-up takes (Table No. 21). The rest did not show relevant differences.

In conclusion, if we compare the degree of use of

Table No. 19

OFFICES PURSUED vs. FORM-SOUND

OFFICE	Number Ave. of Ads Long	MUSIC TRACK	VO TIME	CANDID SPEAKS	LOGO USE	SLOGAN USE	SLOW MOTION
1. For President	33 38 s.	Used Sec. 51% 8.7	88% 11.5	42% 9.5	94%	79%	24% 2.3 seconds
2. For Senator	41 30 s.	Used Sec. 68% 13.2	78% 12.6	73% 9.1	95%	54%	32% seconds
3. For Deputy	25 28 s.	Used Sec. 68% 13.2	88% 12.0	56% 7.6	100%	76%	32% 3.4 seconds
TOTAL	99	Average 11.7	12.1	8.9	96%	68%	2.7 seconds

Table No. 20

OFFICES PURSUED vs. FORM-EDITING

OFFICE	Used Times	CUTS	DISSLV	SQUEEZ	ROTATE	PRINT	TYPESUPER
1. For President	82%	76%	18%	15%	79%	76%	76%
	7.2	2.5	0.3	0.2	1.1	1.6	Times
2. For Senator	93%	71%	39%	37%	59%	93%	93%
	5.3	2.9	0.5	0.5	0.9	2.8	Times
3. For Deputy	88%	52%	48%	40%	48%	84%	84%
	5.1	2.1	0.5	0.8	0.8	1.9	Times
Average	5.9	2.6	0.4	0.5	0.9	2.2	Times

Table No. 21

OFFICES PURSUED vs. FORM-CANDIDATE

OFFICE	HIGH	LOW	PNTVW	MCU	CU	LONGSHT
1. For President	42% Used Times 0.7	33% 0.7	39% 1.5	55% 1.4	18% 0.3	48% 1.0 Times
2. For Senator	41% Used Times 0.6	37% 0.6	66% 2.0	88% 2.2	44% 1.0	49% 1.0 Times
3. For Deputy	36% Used Times 0.7	36% 0.6	84% 1.9	80% 1.6	56% 1.1	52% 1.0 Times
Average	0.7	0.6	1.8	1.8	0.8	1.0 Times

formal techniques between presidential and congressional ads, presidential commercials were much more spartan than congressional ones. Presidential commercials showed a shorter use of music track, and a lighter use of other editing techniques; however, their pace was a little higher than of congressional ads.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Patterns of differences due to several factors were found in political television commercials of the Peruvian campaign of 1990.

In general, the verbal messages of political commercials appealed mostly to the emotional side of potential voters. Only about one third of them talked about election issues or were future oriented; this finding, however, is not far from the 32% that was found in American commercials. Also, most of the ads tended to ignore their opponents' platforms. The transmission of their own candidacy information was, however, important; about two thirds of the ads referred to the candidates' own qualifications or platforms. This perhaps confirms that ads tend to carry only limited information to voters, information that helps to identify the candidates directly. In the Peruvian case, the information carried seemed to look for mechanical identification, with party symbol and candidate number. This emphasis contradicts in some way the ad campaign models that the literature shows, especially the DAGMAR model.

As regards form, Peruvian political ads confirmed the literature finding that the male voice-over was the most

preferred. However, confirmation was not made with the preference of high camera angle to low; both angles received almost the same frequencies. That was surprising. As regards editing devices, cuts and type-supers were the most used.

When the independent variables were cross-tabulated by parties, broadcasting stages and offices pursued, interesting elements of discussion were found. Regarding parties, only larger parties seemed to be involved in issues and adversarial platforms. Additionally, it seems that the degree of rationality of verbal messages of commercials were not related at all to the election's outcome. No pattern was found to this regard. In form analysis, the only pattern that seemed relevant was that the Partido Aprista and Union Civica Independiente had substantial resemblance which may be explained by the common origin of both parties. Another pattern found was that parties which spent large budgets in television ads had also much more elaborate commercials whose degree of sophistication was high enough to compete internationally.

Broadcasting Stage is the independent variable that yielded the most relevant and surprising information. This study reveals that there was a temporal effect in the commercials with the progression of the campaign. This temporal effect seems visible both in verbal message and in form, in a interrelated way. In fact, the frequency tables show that at the beginning of the campaign, ads tended to be

more rational in content and more plain in form. And at the last stages of the campaign, ads tended to have more emotional verbal messages, and to use more editing devices, as well as more music, more voice-over and less candidate speech.

Offices pursued yielded also some important differences but not as noticeable as the broadcasting stages. Presidential commercials seemed to use more rational verbal content than congressional ads. Also, presidential ads tended to be more plain in form, with less use of computer aids, such as rotate or squeeze screens.

Regarding the effectiveness of political television advertising and the generalizability of the conclusions of this thesis, at least three particular characteristics of the Peruvian elections must be taken into account: parties and partisanship, sociological state of mind of people and overloading of the television channel.

Peru is a country that has a political multi-party system. Some parties are old such as the Partido Aprista, with more than 60 years of existence; others are as new as the Cambio '90 party, at less than a year. The older the party the more loyal constituency, either for ideological reasons or for emotional ones. This loyalty to the party and leaders becomes a strong barrier to the messages of other parties. According to the polls and elections in Peru during the last thirty years, only between 35 % and 40% of the

voters are "independent" or people without strong feeling toward a particular party or candidate. These potential voters, mostly women and lesser educated people, are the ones who are more open to different messages; however, they are at the same time less interested in politics.

Another element is the overloading of the television channel with political advertising. In fact, during the last 60 days of the political campaign, political commercials almost preempted the programs, and each candidate launched a strong and individualist campaign. The ad campaign was so heavy that even people highly interested in Politics were tired of so many commercials; such commercials were trying to achieve the voter identification with one of the symbol of each party and the number of each candidate. We have to remember that the voting procedure required the voter to check on one of the symbols and optionally to manifest his/her preference by writing two identification numbers of individual candidates in the ballot. The complications of the multiparty system, the existence of the preferential vote norm, the unrestricted funding procedures that the election rules allow to each candidate and the absence of any kind of fairness doctrine led to an individualistic ad campaign that weakened television as an advertising tool. Perhaps, under these circumstances, the use of television became counterproductive, not to achieve symbolic, numerical or mechanical identification but to achieve penetration,

digestion and pledge to messages.

The last relevant peculiarity of this election was the state of mind of voters. Peruvians, like voters of other Latin American democracies, disliked and were disappointed with the wrongdoing of classic or traditional politicians, and wanted to vote for whoever did not have political experience but appeared smart enough to lead the country honestly. It seems that this election time was not the best time for "professional" politicians to get elected, and television was unable to change that sociological trend.

Finally, as a last reflection on methodological aspects, my opinion is that this study might be strengthened in several aspects: first, if the sampling procedure included ads shorter than 20 seconds, and longer than 60 seconds; and also, if a complete set of commercials broadcast in the campaign were included in the sampling; second, if a broader set of variables were analyzed; for instance, the analysis of the verbal message of testimonial ads, the time of candidates appearing in each commercial, the use of zooming, the analysis of backgrounds used in each commercial, etc.; third, if more statistical tests were used, such as, other correlations, and inferential tools.

In conclusion, this study has demonstrated that the effects of political television commercials are limited and ads vary according to several patterns both in verbal message and in form.

REFERENCES

REFERENCES

- Arterton, F. C. (1984). Media Politics: The News Strategies of Presidential Campaigns. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
- Berelson, B. (1971). Content Analysis in Communication Research. New York: Hafner Publishing Co.
- Berkovitz, T. L. (1985). Political Television Advertising Objectives: The Viewpoint of Political Media Consultants. Detroit: Wayne State University. Dissertation.
- Bohrer, G. F. Jr. (1987). The Form of Television Advertising: A Correlational Content Analysis of Television Commercials and Their Environment. Boston: The University of Massachusetts. Dissertation.
- Caretas magazine. March 5, 12, June 12, 1990. Various articles.
- Diamond, E., and Bates S. (1984). The Spot: The Rise of Political Advertising on Television. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Faber, R. J., and Storey, M. C. (1984). Recall of Information from Political Advertising, Journal of Advertising, 13, 39-44.
- Fibiger, B. (1981). Danish Election Campaign in the Seventies. In Advances in Content Analysis. Rosengren K. E. (eds). London: SAGE.
- Fretz, C. A. (1989). Look, Mom, no Bias: A Content Analysis of Newspaper Photographs of the 1988 Presidential Campaign. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee. Thesis.
- Gargurevich, J. (1987). Prensa, Radio y TV: Historia Critica. Lima: Editorial Horizonte.
- Garramone, G. (1984). Voter Responses to Negative Political Ads, Journalism Quarterly, 61, 250-259.
- Joslyn, R. A. (1980). The Content of Political Spots Ads, Journalism Quarterly, 57, 92-98.
- Kaid, L. L., Davidson, D. K. (1986). Elements of Videostyle: Candidate Presentation through Television Advertising. In L. L. Kaid, . Nimmo, and K. R. Sanders (eds), New

- Perspectives on Political Advertising. (pp. 184-209).
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Kaid, L. L. (1976). Measures in Political Advertising.
Journal of Advertising Research, 16, 49.
- Knapp, M. L. (1978). Non-Verbal Communication in Human Interaction (2nd. ed). New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston.
- Kraus, S. (1974). Mass Communication and the Election Process: A Re-Assessment of Two Decades of Research.
Speech Monographs, 41, 432.
- Kraus S., Davis, D. (1976). The Effects of Mass Communication on Political Behavior. University Park: The Penn State University Press.
- La Industria. (various issues of May 1990). Trujillo: Peru.
- Latin America Daily Report magazine. (various Issues).
- Lazarsfeld, P., Berelson, B., and Gaudet, H. (1948). The People's Choice. New York: Columbia University Press.
- McClure, R., Patterson, T. E. (1974). TV News and Political Advertising: The Impact of Exposure on Voter Beliefs.
Communication Research, 1, 24.
- Meyer, T., Thomas D. (1973). Perceptions and Misperceptions of Political Advertising. The ABCA Journal of Business Communication, 10, 29.
- Millerson, G. (1972). The Technique of Television Production. New York: Hastings House Publishers.
- Napolitan, J. (1972). The Election Game and How to Win It. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc.
- The New York Times (April, 9, 10, 15, 1990) Various articles.
- Nimmo, D. (1970). The Political Persuaders. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Nimmo, D. (1974). Popular Images of Politics. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Patterson, T. E. (1980). The Mass Media Election: How Americans Choose Their President. New York: Praeger Publishers.

- Patterson, T. E, and McClure, R. (1976). The Unseeing Eye: The Myth of Television Power in National Elections. New York: Putnam.
- Sabato, L. J. (1981). The Rise of Political Consultants. New York: Basic Books.
- Severin, W. J. and Tankard, J. W. Jr. (1987). Communication Theories: Origins, Methods, Uses. New York: Longman.
- Stuart, H. S. and Gordon, T. F. (Spring 1977). How Values Affect Attitudes Toward Direct Reference Political Advertising. Journalism Quarterly, 54: 89.
- UNESCO (1985). Mass Communication in the Advertising Industry. United Nations.
- UNESCO. (1987). Latest Statistics on Radio and TV Broadcasting. Issue No. 29, Paris: United Nations.
- Wadsworth, A. J. (1986). Incumbent and Challenger Strategies in Presidential Communication: A Content Analysis of Television Campaign Ads from 1952 to 1984. Norman: The University of Oklahoma. Dissertation.
- Wickoff, G. (1968). The Image Candidates: American Politics in the Age of Television. New York: MacMillan.
- Wimmer, R. D. and Dominick, J. R. (1987). Mass Media Research: An Introduction (2nd. ed). Belmont, California: Wadsworth, Inc.
- World Almanac. (1990).
- Zettl, H. (1976). Television Production Handbook (3rd. ed). Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co.
- 1/2 de Marketing magazine, (1989) various issues. Lima.

APPENDIX

Appendix No. 1

LIST OF ELECTED SENATORS AND DEPUTIES

SENATORS

	Made TV Advertisng
a. FRENTE DEMOCRATICO:	
1. Felipe Osterling Parodi	Y
2. Raul Ferrero Costa	Y
3. Miguel Vega Alvear	Y
4. Manuel Moreyra Loredó	Y
5. Alberto Borea Odria	Y
6. Juan Inchaustegui Vargas	Y
7. Beatriz Merino Lucero	Y
8. Rafael Belaunde Aubry	Y
9. Ricardo Vega Llona	Y
10. Luis Bedoya de Vivanco	Y
11. Javier Alva Orlandini	Y
12. Sandro Mariategui Chiappo	Y
13. Gaston Acurio Belarde	Y
14. Miguel Cruchaga Belaunde	Y
15. Jorge Torres Vallejo	Y
16. Luis Bustamante Belaunde	Y
17. Manuel Ulloa Elias	Y
18. Andres Cardo Franco	N
19. Moises Woll Davila	Y
20. Jose Gonzalez Reategui.	N
b. PARTIDO APRISTA PERUANO:	
1. Mercedes Cabanillas	Y
2. Luis Alberto Sanchez Sanchez	Y
3. Armando Villanueva del Campo	Y
4. Abel Salinas Izaguirre	Y
5. Javier Valle Riestra	N
6. Jose Barba Caballero	N
7. Humberto Carranza Piedra	N
8. Absalon Alarcon Bravo	N
9. Eugenio Chang Cruz	Y
10. Lucio Abensur Perez	N
11. David Cifuentes Ibarra	Y
12. Jorge Lozada Stambury	N
13. Jose Linares Gallo	N
14. Benigno Chirinos Sotelo	N
15. Guillermo Baca Aguinaga	N
16. Romualdo Biaggi Rodriguez.	N
c. CAMBIO '90	

1. Alberto Fujimori Fujimori	Y
2. Maximo San Roman Caceres	N
3. Julian Bustamante Cabello	N
4. Victor Arroyo Cuyubamba	N
5. Luis Vivanco Amarin	N
6. Alicia Bustamante Morales	N
7. Rosa Kanashiro de Escalante	N
8. Max Santolaya Silva	N
9. Eulogia Cardenas Salazar	N
10. Oswaldo Lesacao Peralta	N
11. Luis Gazzolo Miani	N
12. Santiago Pacheco Gaitan	N
13. Daniel Bocanegra Barreto	N
14. Justo Escalante Bolanos.	N

d. IZQUIERDA UNIDA:

1. Javier Diez Canseco	N
2. Jorge del Prado Chavez	Y
3. Jorge Hurtado Pozo	N
4. Carlos Malpica Silva	Y
5. Gustavo Mohme Llona	Y
6. Hugo Blanco Galdos.	N

e. IZQUIERDA SOCIALISTA:

1. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros	Y	
2. Francisco Guerra Garcia	N	
3. Edmundo Murrugarra Florian.		N

f. FRENATRACA:

1. Roger Caceres Velasquez.	Y
-----------------------------	---

TOTAL SENATORS 60

DEPUTIES

a. FRENTE DEMOCRATICO:

1. Rafael Rey Rey	Y
2. Lourdes Flores Nano	Y
3. Javier Velarde Aspillaga	Y
4. Raul Diez canseco Terry	Y
5. Javier Bedoya de Vivanco	Y
6. Mario Roggero Villena	Y
7. Enrique Gheresi Silva	Y
8. Pedro Cateriano Bellido	Y
9. Edmundo del Aguila Morote	Y

10. Xavier Barron Cebreros	Y	
11. Roberto Ramirez del Villar	Y	
12. Aurelio Loret de Mola	N	
13. Antero Flores Araoz	Y	
14. Eduardo Calmell del Solar.		Y

b. CAMBIO '90:

1. Victor Paredes Guerra	N
2. Felipe Bockos Heredia	N
3. Cesar Vargas Gonzales	N
4. Jose Antonio Baffigo Torre	N
5. Wilfredo Alvarez Valer	N
6. Felix Porras Croya	N
7. Gerardo Lopez Quiroz	N
8. Roberto Miranda Moreno	N
9. Roberto Luy Wu.	N

c. FRENTE INDEPENDIENTE MORALIZADOR:

1. Fernando Olivera Vega	Y
2. Eduardo Lopez Therese	Y
3. Dennis Falvi Valdivieso	N
4. Jaime Picasso Salinas	Y
5. Fernando Flores Araoz Gratta	Y
6. Ernmento Gamarra Olivares	Y
7. Edgar Teran Iriarte.	Y

d. PARTIDO APRISTA PERUANO:

1. Jorge del Castillo Galvez	N
2. Carlos Roca Caceres	N
3. Luis Alvarado Contreras	Y
4. Bertha Gonzales Posada	N
5. Manuel Asmat Asmad	Y
6. Wilbert Bendezu Carpio.	N

e. IZQUIERDA UNIDA:

1. Cesar Barrera Bazan	N
2. Ricardo Letts Colmenares.	N

f. IZQUIERDA SOCIALISTA:

1. Manuel Dammert Egoaguirre	N
2. Esther Moreno Huerta.	N

TOTAL DEPUTIES	40
----------------	----

Source: National Election Board

VITA

Augusto Hidalgo-Sanchez was born in Lamas, a tri-centennial small town in the rain forest of Peru. His father was a civil construction worker and violinist of the church. His mother with only a third grade education and widow at 40, made of her seven children college graduates.

Mr. Hidalgo attended all the pre-college studies in Lamas. After that, in 1971, he started to study at the Universidad Nacional de Trujillo in Peru. In 1977, he graduated as Bachiller en Ciencias Economicas (B. A.) and as Licenciado en Administracion de Empresas. One year later, he started the college teaching career as Instructor of Accounting at the Universidad de Ica-Peru.

In 1984 he graduated from the Escuela de Administracion de Negocios para Graduados (ESAN) in Lima, where he got a Master of Business Administration. After graduating, he has been sharing his teaching duties with management and consulting positions. He worked for three years in a poultry corporation of Peru, where he was chief of marketing.

In 1988, thanks to a Fulbright/LASPAU scholarship and to a E. Meeman fellowship, he came to the U.S. and started studies in the Masters program of Communications at the University of Tennessee. After graduation at U.T.K., he will return to the Universidad Nacional de Trujillo to reassume

his Associate Professor position in the Department of Business Administration.

Mr. Hidalgo is married with Mirtha Elizabeth, and is father of Rafael, eight, and Carolina, five years old.