

The Powers of Participatory Development in the Post-Colonial City

Introduction

During the senior year of my undergrad studies at the PUCP (Catholic University of Peru) I got my first professional job at the Peruvian NGO DESCO. The salary was a typical amount for an undergrad senior and the commute from campus to the office used to take around 100 minutes and 3 different units of public transportation. Most of the people that I knew thought that the job was exploitative, but I didn't care because I actually liked it. Those 13 miles of commute were an amazing display of all the different landscapes that Lima had to offer, from the business districts to the poorest slums. Every single day of commuting I played with the transition of urban landscapes and the relationships that I found in the very different people taking the same buses that I did: from the yuppies to the old women taking hens and sacks of vegetables home. I used to listen to the stories of these people who get on the buses and tell their misfortune stories out loud before they go seat by seat asking for a tip in exchange for a pen or a miraculous herbal medicine that would improve my sex life. At the end of the commute I was in Villa el Salvador, which is a very particular district of Lima because of its history of community organization and the continuous struggle of its rural migrants to be part of the huge city. I had heard many stories about Villa el Salvador since I was in high school, and I considered myself very fortunate to have the opportunity to work there. Villa el Salvador was a large field of sand, the urban grid had a very homogenous geometrical shape and there were a few monuments (to the women, to the workers, to the poet Cesar Vallejo) that resembled the grassroots organization that gave Villa el Salvador international recognition. However, the project in which I was working was taking place in the neighboring district of Villa Maria del Triunfo. This district was much hillier and lacked the

socialist stigma that Villa el Salvador portrayed from its past. The slum was a set of 6 neighborhoods in a rift called Nueva Esperanza. The dwellers of these 6 so called “new neighborhoods” had to organize committees that would propose a project for the physical improvement of their areas. The best proposals would receive the training, the materials and the technical support. In 3 years, since the beginning of the project, 6 stairs and 4 plazas were built by the dwellers. The NGO and the dwellers considered that the biggest outcome wasn’t the physical products, but the empowerment of the people through this participative method.

For a middle class Limeño who lived most of his life in Miraflores (the touristic and commercial district of Lima) this daily commute changed my life. I realized that among most of my friends I was the only one who did a regular commute that most Limeños had to do everyday. I also realized that only as I started doing this long commute, I became familiar with a landscape of my city that was much more typical of Lima than Miraflores or the PUCP. Besides, I realized that I made a whole new group of friends who didn’t know who The Beatles were, but who did know about artists such as Los Schapis who sold 4 million copies of their CDs in Peru, yet I hadn’t even heard of them. The prices of daily needs, the products offered on the street, the music inside the grocery stores, etc. everything seemed to be different from the Lima that I was used to. Suddenly, I realized how my commute drove my life in a daily trip between two different worlds within the same city.

As I was writing the undergrad dissertation, I came across Milton Santos’ article: “The dual economy of the cities of the Third World.” It was very surprising for me to understand the article and to be able to perfectly apply what I was reading in my daily life. The article helped me to

understand how the post colonial structure of the Third World is reflected in the economy of the cities and, therefore, why a job at an NGO implied this feeling of constant moving from one world to another.

A year and a half later, I had the opportunity to do an internship with UN Habitat in Nairobi. This time I wasn't even a Limeño at the other side of his own city. I was a complete stranger to the reality of Kenya. However, my daily life in Nairobi had so many similarities with my experience back in Lima that I couldn't stop comparing these two very different, but very similar contexts. In Kenya, the office where I had to go everyday was not in a marginal zone. It was in Gigiri, an area of Nairobi that holds many of the embassies. The house that I was sharing with many other American and European students was not that far from the United Nations compound (around 8 minutes by car) but it used to take me around 45 minutes to go by public transportation because the road that links Kitisuru (my neighborhood) and Gigiri was forbidden to the public transportation by the wealthy families from the area. Therefore, I had to take 2 "matatus" one to the centre of Nairobi and the next one from the centre to Gigiri. As I waited for the first one, I used to take breakfast in a shack in the middle of the woods for 10% the price of the same food at the United Nation's cafeteria. When the matatu arrived, sometimes there were no available seats, but the driver and his assistant didn't mind seating additional people on my lap. Eventually, I was seating on other people's laps as well. These matatus usually had a large screen on which they played African American music (rap/hip hop) or gospel Kenyan music. However, nobody ever tried to sell me anything.

Once at the UN Compound, I used to take a UN (bullet proof) van to go to Kibera, the second largest slum in Africa (or the first one if we don't consider Soweto a slum, since it is a housing

project for blacks built during the South African apartheid). Even though I don't consider myself white, I was still a mzungu (white person) to everyone in Kenya, and the dwellers from Kibera thought that Peru was a wealthy white country just because I was an intern at the United Nations. I was always insisting that in Peru there were also slums and poor rural communities, and that Peru and Kenya had much more in common than they have in difference.

This time I wasn't working from the executor NGO, but from the funder: UN Habitat. However, I had a very close look at the methods that the NGO Maji Na Ufanisi used in Kibera for the project K Watsan. Through a participatory approach, the people got organized in committees to build public water and sanitation facilities. I didn't get to see the facilities 100% done, but I did see what the committees achieved to maintain the facilities safe after the riots of December/January 2008. For the levels of violence reached in Kibera, to have kept those facilities safe was a big indicator of the commitment that the people felt towards this work.

Being in such a foreign country made me feel very alienated at the beginning, but analyzing things I realized that the commonalities of both experiences were more numerous than what I felt. For example, even in Nueva Esperanza many people used to ask me where was I from? Even in my own country, some people would look at me and think that I am a foreigner. Also, I was thinking about the tribalism that threatens the peace and national identity of Kenya and that we don't have that problem in Peru. However, just a few years ago, there were still semblances of the terrorist movement Shining Path in Peru, which started the bloodiest episode of Peruvian history throughout the first 20 years of my life. So I realized that it didn't really matter whether you

wanted to blame it on tribalism or ideology, the human beings, in these both cases, are likely to respond with violence when they are systematically oppressed by a post colonial economy.

If my personal experience commuting from Kitisuru to Kibera had so many commonalities with commuting from the PUCP to Villa el Salvador, if there were violent reactions from the people towards poverty in both scenarios, if there were NGOs trying to apply participative approaches in 2 slums in 2 opposite corners of the world, it is very likely that these corners would face the same challenges and consider the same alternatives.

This is how this paper is born. Through a comparative analysis of my 2 major professional experiences in 2 different ethnic and geographic contexts in order to understand what are the major challenges that participatory approaches face anywhere within the current project of the neoliberal globalization.

My Strong Bias

I would like to make clear that this paper is written from the perspective of a student taking care of small tasks at development agencies. This paper does not portray the voices of the peoples living in the Gorge Santa Maria or Kibera because I (the writer) was not a resident, I did not embrace the projects described in this paper as a beneficiary. Parallel, I was always in a new position at these institutions; therefore the paper does not portray the voice of the institutions either.

My position is quite unusual as a student. In Lima I was a middle class student in a private university, but disadvantages such as not having a car made spend up to 100 minutes commuting everyday (one way) and it made me experience many of the circumstances that most of Limeños go through everyday without a choice. In Nairobi, I was a Third World mzungu, also without a car and obliged to experience many of the daily life circumstances of most of the Nairobiers.

However, the important point is that I am writing this paper as an outsider. This paper should not be taken as a reference to understand the diverse voices of the peoples in the slums of Lima and Nairobi. I am writing from the perspective of a worker of the development industry. This paper is meant to analyze the role and impacts of participatory development within the context of the neoliberal post city, the context in which I grew up and I do belong to.

I) The Slum within the Neoliberal Project

This paper's purpose is to analyze the conditions of the slums in order to plan better participatory approaches instead of defining the urban peripheries of the XXI century. Social scientists around the world will have a myriad of definitions for slums. However, all of them would agree that they are marginal urban areas; that they are clusters of poverty, and that, as excluded as they are, they do belong to a single economic system within the city. Milton Santos would argue that the Third World city depends on the slums' poverty for cheap labor and for a source of "informal" alternatives to the "formal" economy, such as illegal businesses or any kind of activity that stays detached from state regulations.

Therefore, slums should be ideal spaces for social organization because the contrast with the dominant side of the city should make these communities aware of their unfair status and this self identification as marginals should create a unifying identity for them. The poverty of the slum dwellers should motivate them to create collective strategies of survival in the city where the cooperation of its members ought to shape solidarity communities. Manuel Castells describes this capacity for social mobilization processes with a deep criticism in the book "The City and the Grassroots", where taking the squatters of Lima as an example, he explains that when the slums' movements break their relationships of dependency with the state, they may become potential agents of social change.

However, the neoliberal reforms implemented in most of the Third World during the nineties weakened the state and with the additional threats of political (or tribal) violence, the social organization of the slums was seriously harmed. Neoliberalism has brought a new set of roles for the state and political parties, the scenario described by Manuel Castells in the slums of Lima during the seventies decade has clearly shifted to a space where the slums have lessened their organizational capacities because the state is now an institution that lacks the authority to provide them with the demands for which they used to mobilize. For example, the neighborhood of José Gálvez obtained running water in the year 2006 after several years of demands to their local municipality, but the later did not have anything to do with this accomplishment. It was only because the company “Cementos Lima” needed permission from the neighbors to build an underground channel for the transportation of extracted minerals that this company paid for the connection of water pipes for the families. The local municipality, the state managed Water Lima Company (Sedapal) and even the International Cooperation failed in providing José Gálvez the access to water, unlike the private corporation.

Today, the slums of Lima and many other contexts rely on the state to receive assistentialist aid instead of building strategic political alliances for its own social development. This happens partly because, in this neoliberal context, there is not much that the state (especially local municipalities) can do for them, even if they have the will. On the other hand, political violence or any type of civil violence hinders the motivation of slum dwellers to organize in social movements. In the case of Peru, as described by the “Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad” (the official document which describes the injustices produced between 1980 and 2000, the years of

political violence in Peru) the terrorist movement “Shining Path” threatened all the local leaders in the slums of Lima because they jeopardized the authority of this terrorist movement. As an example, Maria Elena Moyano, a female leader and symbol of the women’s empowerment in Villa El Salvador was murdered by The Shining Path. After this act, the dwellers of all the slums of Lima were too scared to become faces of the civil organization. In addition to the fear of the Shining Path, the state also perpetrated several incursions against innocent citizens for their presumed links with the Shining Path, especially left wing students, and this also added fear to local leaders in the slums.

Even though Nairobi and its slums have a very different history, we can find the same problems. As is the case in many African countries, tribalism is the condition that determines most of the challenges for social integration and this was clearly proved during the civil riots in Kenya during December and January of 2008. This conflict was mainly portrayed by the media as a general discontent of the population with the electoral results that called for the victory of the already President Mwai Kibaki. However, this conflict reached the extreme of 800 deaths and 600 000 displaced people. This is basically because the non-Kikuyu tribes of Kenya saw the perpetuation of Kibaki as an attempt to maintain the Kikuyu “hegemony” that they consider takes place in the entitlement of lands (a very delicate issue in Kenya) and in the Kikuyu predominant participation in the economy. Tribes such as Luo, Luya, Kamba, etc. consider that the Kikuyus were the privileged tribe throughout history because these tribes, in comparison to the Kikuyu, received little compensation for the displacements from their lands from the British. Kikuyus were also the ones who had the most visible participation both in the Mau Mau rebellion and the independence uprising. Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first president was a Kikuyu. Actually, two of the three

presidents of independent Kenya (since 1963) have been Kikuyu and this is just one side of the perceptions of Kenyans about the “Kikuyu hegemony”. This kind of friction is much tenser in slums like Kibera, where the construction of a “slum” identity is very challenging due to tribalism. As a consequence, every number of years these type of riots happen again as an explosion of ethnic tensions, but deep inside, just as in Lima, it is a scream of desperation shaped by poverty.

Because of the lack of “slum identity” there is also a lack of slum institutions. In Lima, most of the slums do have an assembly or at least some type of organization that brings the dwellers together. But in Kibera, tribal tensions and the very large size of the slum make this a very challenging task. As a consequence, it is also very clear that Kibera lacks of any kind of planning. The dwellers do not have the organizational capacities for leaving available space for the eventual implementation of public facilities. Furthermore, nobody has the authority to proclaim a piece of space as “public”. There are no roads for trucks bringing materials or supplies for the households, no access for firemen trucks or police cars that could stop ethnic attacks. More importantly, there is no space to drain the garbage and pollution. Since there is no running water or sewage, the sanitary conditions of Kibera are indeed so terrible that it is hard for any outsider to even breathe while passing some of its most important paths. It is true that the state has not had much will or capacity to provide proper infrastructure in Kibera, but basic participatory organization attempts could make considerable differences in the living conditions of this slum. So, is tribalism the only factor to blame?

The role of the (neoliberal) state and the NGOs has also had a deep impact on Kibera. The state literally buys its legitimacy in the slums by paying the dwellers to sit at their assemblies to vote for

the approval of development projects that would affect the use of land in Kibera. The NGOs, to start promoting capacity building initiatives, willingly see themselves obliged to pay the people to participate in their own projects. This condition seriously undermines the whole purpose of a capacity building initiative because the dwellers understand that they are being paid in order for a white foreigner to get funding for his/her project instead of receiving some productive capacity building that will eventually foster strategies for the poor to alleviate their poverty. This is why in an interview with a young man from Kibera (Phillip Rajab) he confessed that when NGOs come to offer a development project they try to obtain as much as they can from these people because they know that most likely he/she will not receive the funding or feel pessimistic about the multiple obstacles to work on development in Kibera. They know that in the international development field, Kibera is some type of cliché for being such a famous slum. So, many organizations want to say that they are doing something in Kibera. But in the end, that does not happen, at least in most of the cases.

This is the slums' organizational context that the development organizations encounter when they want to improve the livelihoods of the urban peripheries. Therefore, the slums of the "neoliberal" Third World are facing a common challenge: to strengthen their organizational capacity in order to create strategies for development. This section's purpose is to describe the context of the organizational capacities of the slums for these case studies: Santa Maria in Lima and Kibera in Nairobi.

As explained above, before the 90's decade (meaning before the implementation of neoliberal reforms) in Peru, the slums of Lima were characterized by their strong links with the state and a

solid base of grassroots movements. One of the best examples is the program “Vaso de Leche” which continues to provide supplements for common kitchens for the organized women of the slums. The creation of this initiative was only possible due to the efforts of the left wing mayor of Lima, Alfonso Barrantes (AKA Frejolito 1984 - 1987) and the diverse grassroots movements from the marginal Pueblos Jóvenes of Lima. Even though there have been several attempts from the state to privatize this initiative, the mobilization of its beneficiaries has struggled for many years to keep this type of assistance by the state.

However, after Fujimori’s neoliberal reforms, the threat of the political violence caused by the Shining Path and the decay of left wing political parties, the grassroots movements in the slums of Lima were seriously undermined. Thus, now the creation of an initiative such as “Vaso de Leche” would be unthinkable. This means that the NGOs and the development organizations wishing to accomplish better development standards in the slums have had to re think the concept of a slum. Manuel Castells explains in detail how the grassroots organization of the civil community in Villa el Salvador was strongly connected to the state and this allowed the community to obtain several victories in their demand for an urban territory and eventual urban services.

Gustavo Riofrío explains that there is a positive relationship between poverty and urban grassroots organization. This does not mean that the community organization produces to poverty, it actually means that the lack of resources motivates the dwellers to unionize and organize more. However, today this famous history of organization is history because the state does not provide spaces for the active participation of its citizens (except for a few cases that will be developed further). Instead it only gives aid away in an assistentialist way, a process which actually undermines the attempts for community organization.

Different countries in Latin America have different terms for slums: Favelas in Brazil, Villas in Argentina, Ranchos in Venezuela and Pueblos Jóvenes (Young Towns) in Peru. Desco considered that the term Pueblo Joven referred to the traditional type of slum. Therefore, this NGO works with its own term: Nuevo Barrio (New Neighborhood) because it involves the following characteristics:

In previous decades, the Pueblos Jóvenes tried to vindicate their main demands towards the central city. Nowadays, the Nuevos Barrios direct their demands to the Ciudad Popular; the old Pueblos Jóvenes today consolidated (meaning, built with permanent materials and basic services). In other words, the old Pueblos Jóvenes are the Ciudad Popular of today. Their dwellers demand their needs directly from the municipalities of their districts instead of the Lima City Council or the Central State. In the case of Nairobi, there is definitely not a visual grassroots organization that would drive the unionized demands of the population to any organ of the state. Unlike the Nuevos Barrios, most of the dwellers of Kibera are tenants; therefore there is the prevalent idea that they are denied to demanding things to the state, that this should be the landlord's responsibility. In addition to this, there is such an overwhelming presence of local and international NGOs in Kibera that the dwellers consider that these organizations are more efficient channels for the obtaining of particular demands, but there is nothing like an integrated plan of development for Kibera due to all the factors explained above.

There is a differentiation between the Nuevos Barrios and the Ciudad Popular (Popular City). The Ciudad Popular is the peripheral area that began as regular slums but that have evolved today.

Desco denominates the process of evolution of the Pueblos Jóvenes “consolidation”. The process of consolidation of the Ciudad Popular has equipped it with the main basic services and it has even generated sources of formal and informal work for its population. This fact has impelled a greater independence of the Ciudad Popular in respect to the central city. This process can also be seen in Kibera but in a much more unequal way. Inside Kibera there are houses more similar to middle class neighborhoods that belong to the old landlords who rent their properties to a myriad of poor tenants. It is possible to talk about the “consolidation” (urban development) of this very particular (and gated) oasis of urbanity within the slums, but is very interesting to observe that due to Kibera’s size, the inequities produced by the post colonial city are reflected as well within a slum. Additionally, the condition of temporality of many of the tenants does not motivate them to participate in an effort of participation for a long term development plan. Therefore, it can be more challenging to talk about participatory long term development with the dwellers from Kibera.

The Nuevos Barrios are a product of the Ciudad Popular. The growth of the Nuevos Barrios is more vegetative and it does not respond to a national migratory phenomenon as in previous decades. This means that the new generations born in the Ciudad Popular have a bigger role in the expansion of the Nuevos Barrios, especially when young urban couples look for a new place to live in the city. Paradoxically, despite the condition of temporality explained above, Kibera also has a certain degree of vegetative growth. In spite of what most of the literature say about the urban growth in Africa, there is a “hidden” percentage of growth due to the natural reproduction of Kibera’s dwellers. It is impossible to walk around Kibera without seeing small children playing. Besides, there are plenty of elementary schools, and it is not hard to find youth in their 20’s who

have been born and raised in Kibera. However, because of the displacements of people due to ethnic conflicts –especially after the 2008 riots- and the lack of economic opportunities in rural areas, the growth of Kibera is more likely to be external than internal. Let’s not forget that Kibera has almost 100 years of history, so there must be families living there for generations. The slums of Lima don’t have such an old history. Unfortunately, there is no census with which this information could be detailed. The lack of accurate information is not a casualty, but this will be explained further on.

Due to this situation of being “children of the Ciudad Popular”, the Nuevos Barrios are made up of families who keep certain structural profile in common. These are young couples that leave their parents’ houses after they have their first child. For this situation, the “Vaso de Leche”, Common Kitchens and PRONOEIs (State funded Kindergartens) are very necessary for the Nuevos Barrios. Whereas in Kibera, again due to its very old history, the families have all kind of structures. Therefore, there is more diversity of civil associations, such as The Soweto Youth Group. In the Nuevos Barrios of Lima, the youth is never an important sector of the population; therefore it is much harder for them to start any kind of youth based initiative.

The Nuevos Barrios usually are positioned in undeveloped lands planned for urban infrastructure for the Ciudad Popular, which makes their legalization and eventual equipment of services more difficult. For example, in Villa El Salvador, a Nuevo Barrio is positioned where it was planned to build the only University of the South of Lima. Even the Quebrada Santa Maria occupies land for the construction of a highway that has not even had a technical plan for several years. In Kibera, but in overall Kenya, the tenure of land is a very delicate issue that is always intertwined with

tribal tensions. UN HABITAT has had to work on the reallocation of households for the construction of facilities that will promote capacity building with the dwellers of Kibera, particularly in the zone of Soweto East. For this task, they have to select people to form a committee that would convince people to leave their parcels for new ones. But this is much more complicated than what it sounds because there are many interests involved. So, this is a very common issue that is reproduced in Lima as well as Nairobi due to the lack of social organization. Unlike the Seventies, when the State had some participation in the distribution of parcels and planning of the marginal districts, the Nuevos Barrios do not have the necessary conditions for a long term development. The Nuevos Barrios can not be considered a social movement or a territorial unit; they are rather a fragmentary and disarticulated reality.

Some new initiatives such as the Participative Budget of the districts of Villa El Salvador and Villa Maria del Triunfo look to include these Nuevos Barrios in processes of citizen participation. However, the dwellers of these areas may follow the trend imposed during the Fujimori's regime of just waiting to receive assistentialist aid from the state in exchange of sympathy. There is a clear need for civil engagement in order to make these participative initiatives successful.

The main problem of the Nuevos Barrios is the lack of urban planning for development. Before the 90's, the local organization of the Pueblos Jóvenes of Lima worked so that nowadays most of those neighborhoods obtained property titles, power, water, sewage, telephone, Internet, etc. This is the context in which the Project Nueva 2 intends to generate new and articulated organizational spaces complementary with the existing Juntas Vecinales (Community Boards, the neighborhood assembly which is the highest organ of decision making within the community).

Desco believes that the Nuevos Barrios organizational structure needs to be readapted to long term development visions because its long experience with projects shows that right after a concrete goal is accomplished, the grassroots organizations tend to disappear, especially after the accomplishment of property titles. These organizations have difficulties understanding that the development of their neighborhoods is a continuous process that goes beyond the equipment of infrastructure. There are plenty of activities and links with other institutions that grassroots could work on in order to strength their capacities for self development.

II) Two Slums, Two Participatory Projects

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the structure and goals of the 2 projects where the empirical data for this paper was raised. As explained above, these initiatives were participatory projects in Santa Maria and Kibera, both of them executed by local NGOs with international funding. After that overview, this section presents an analytical comparison between the methods of these participatory projects and the organizational context of the slums described in the previous chapter. In this way it will be easier to analyze how participatory these projects actually were, and if their relative success is somehow based on the understanding of the dynamics of slums in a neoliberal context.

1.- Project: Nueva Esperanza (New Hope): “Slum improvement in Villa María del Triunfo through social participation in urban management”

The purpose of this initiative was the mobilization of social capital (human resources) in the Santa Maria Gorge (Quebrada Santa Maria) to manage the territory and to achieve an improvement in quality of living. To do so, strategic alliances were established among the State, Civil Society and residents to develop a mechanism for attending to the Nuevos Barrios in Lima. The core method that DESCO developed in order to implement the project is called CPP, Concurso Participativo de Proyectos (Participatory Contest of Projects).

This methodology has 2 important dimensions: In the material dimension, it served as a device for responding to the problems of urban infrastructure by constructing means of access and public spaces with volunteer work. On the other hand, its human dimension was meant to build capacities of leadership and management that improved the self esteem of the residents. Local synergies had to be developed among local institutions and organizations such as the Municipality, the population and NGO. This type of network building is key for the obtaining of resources when the NGO does not have a large budget, and it also enhances the sustainability of the project.

The Executive Local NGO

Desco is a famous Peruvian NGO that has been “promoting horizontal relations and democracy in decision-making and participation processes” since 1965. Desco has five different branches throughout Peru. “The Urban Program” is the only branch that promotes development in urban areas, specifically in southern Lima. Desco is characterized as being an NGO that promotes social development as well as research on the sociopolitical reality of Peru and political incidence to influence on politic decision making; it does much more than the single execution of development projects, as most of the NGOs. In other words, Desco is also a research center. This is why this paper can rely on the theory of “Nuevos Barrios” (the new social structure of slums in a neoliberal context) which is a product of extensive research done by Desco. The Urban Program is located in Villa el Salvador, where Desco had strategic alliances with its leaders during the seventies and eighties, when this district began as a field of sand with nothing and managed to urbanize through its active grassroots movements and their links with the state. However the undermining of

grassroots action in this district due to neoliberalism and the old threat of the political violence does not permit an articulate structure of action between civil society and local government as in the classic times of “Villa”. Therefore, the projects of the “Programa Urbano” are focused on specific areas within Southern Lima and lack a political agenda. This may not sound very different from any other NGO, but it is different to what Desco used to be.

The International Donor

Misereor is the development agency of the German Catholic Church. It was founded in 1958 to work "against hunger and disease in the world". It maintains positive links with Desco since 1999, even though Desco is not a religious organization at all. Unlike many other church agencies, Misereor does not force or promote a religious discourse within the projects that it funds.

Misereor’s funding comes from the tithe that German Catholics have to pay as taxes. (Germany is the only country in Europe where the state collects taxes that go for the Churches.)

The method used by Misereor for monitoring Desco’s ongoing project was very flexible. Desco did have to write extensive quarterly reports every year on the ongoing projects for Misereor.

However, throughout the life of the projects there were less than 5 official visits to supervise the work, and they did not even have a specific agenda. This “freedom” is not a very common circumstance in the development world. The case of Misereor-Desco is an exception because of the good relationships built with trust between each other.

Formulation of objectives and strategies

The project team established its main objective as "*Fostering the improvement of new neighborhoods in the Gorge Santa Maria of Villa Maria del Triunfo by strengthening the participative processes for urban territorial management*". Three lines of work were developed in order to achieve this objective:

- 1) **Capacity Building:** The strengthening of capabilities to generate a process of exchanging learning among residents of the new areas and technical training in subjects such as participative management and organization.

- 2) **Urban Development:** The urban conditioning line seeks to improve the quality of the area inhabited by the population, putting participative mechanisms into practice and proving that they are relevant and effective in constructing the popular habitat.

- 3) **Communications:** The communications line seeks to sensitize the population with respect to the urban development of its neighborhoods and to motivate active participation by residents in those processes that take place in their area.

The Process of Slum Improvement and Capacity Building

The CPP process is composed of the following 5 components, where Desco is just a facilitator:

- 1) It begins with a **communications and sensitizing campaign** that seeks to motivate and spread the word, which is done through fairs, cultural activities and distributing a

newsletter that has already become a means of expression for residents. All is framed within a sufficiently horizontal relationship of mutual confidence. This seeks to change the lack of trust from the community towards external organizations and even towards their own local government. The most important outcome of this campaign was the creation and distribution of the bulletin Nueva Ciudad which was both a channel of communication from Desco to the community as well as a channel of communication from and for the community. The dwellers wrote several articles for this bulletin.

- 2) This Communications Campaign resulted in the spontaneous shaping of groups of residents (an average of 10) creating **Management Committees**. The group has to represent one of the 6 slums of the Gorge Santa Maria and 50% of the participants must be women. First they have to think of a problem in their community and then an infrastructure proposal as an alternative. Then, they prepare a project profile in consultation with Desco's technical team. A panel with experience in infrastructure projects (formed by one person from the grassroots, one from a civil society organization and one from local government) chooses the winning projects according to their impact on the neighborhood's quality of living, the number of beneficiaries and their sustainability.
- 3) The winning committees are trained in a series of workshops "**Management Module for a Better City**", where their leadership and territorial management capabilities are strengthened. They also obtain an integral vision of territory reinforced by an exchange of experiences with other committees. The workshops take place once a week and it is an

important space where the team of Desco develops relations of trust and friendship with the residents. These personal relations ended up being an important asset for the success of the project because people in need have a myriad of problems and managing an infrastructure problem while your family needs to eat can be extremely challenging. Knowing the members of the committees by name and face allowed diverse strategies to get through punctual issues that came across during the “Faenas” (component 5).

- 4) The Desco technical team supports the Management Committees that join the participative design phase, where their needs are transformed into projects and plans. Then the **technical files** are prepared by the professional team of Desco. These are formal documents that must be approved by the municipality in order to start the works. This process is also the beginning of the strengthening of relations with the local municipality, which has to approve the technical documents. For this period, the administration of the local government of Villa Maria del Triunfo was relatively well organized and transparent, so it was not challenging to build good relations with them. However, the electoral year brought up many problems because the administration was acting much more calculative. After the negotiations, it was agreed that the municipality should provide the equipment for the constructions and open up spaces of active civil participation for the residents to make the project sustainable and to expand its positive impacts on the district.
- 5) In this process, the direct beneficiaries contribute their voluntary manual labor to perform community tasks mostly on weekends (their days off). These journeys of labor are called

Faenas, as a resemblance of the traditional community work practiced by the rural villagers in the Andes. This contribution assures their commitment level, appropriation of the space and its integration into their community, because they are directly responsible for the process of improving their neighborhoods. The Faenas were the challenging component of the CPP because most of the volunteers were women who had no experience in construction. Therefore the timeframe for the construction of the infrastructure was always delayed.

- 6) The **monitoring and evaluation** methodology consists of a series of meetings during and at the conclusion of each CPP, evaluating the action of each one of this process's counterparts. Reports on the project's impact and an environmental report are prepared in order to be able to determine the effects following the realization of each CPP. This is all systematized in order to obtain material that can provide methodologies for working in new neighborhoods.

Sustainability

In financial terms, the identification of manual labor as a resource belonging to the community is the axis that provides the CPP with sustainability. Desco does not transfer money to the population; actually it considers the community's voluntary labor as a financial asset that makes the project economically feasible since it represents 50% of the budget. This is not a particular perspective developed to have a discourse of people's empowerment, it is the concrete truth: The community provides a larger amount of economic assets than Misereor.

The awareness with respect to the territory in which they live (developed at the Management Module for a Better City) allows the dwellers to see the potential in their environment of obtaining alternative and ecological resources for the construction of works, especially rocks that were used for the construction. In this way they develop an environmental consciousness based on both economic resources and quality of living. Now the neighborhood has more green areas and more trees because the residents feel more concerned about beautifying the territory that they themselves have created. The selection of those trees was based on an analysis of the geographic characteristics of the area and on the cultural symbolism of particular species of trees for the residents. This aspect gives environmental sustainability to the CPP.

In the legal framework, the national law N° 28056 (Participative Budget Framework) motivates the residents of settlements to take direct participation in decisions on using the municipal budget, so that they must continue organizing in order to have the municipality's resources invested in improving their neighborhoods; the CPP generates a mechanism for putting this idea into practice.

The Achievements

The very concrete and tangible achievements of the CPPs are detailed in the chart below:

	Access paths	Town squares	Residents Enabled	Residents contributing manual labor
1st CPP	2	2	24	228
2nd CPP	4	0	24	167
3rd CPP	0	2	30	Not available
Total:	6	4	78	395
Beneficiaries:	1,347	2,147		

But as explained above, the main outcome of this project is not tangible; it is based on the building of capacities and the strengthening of organizational forces for the continuous improvement of the community. The outcomes of the project will be tested in the future; when hopefully the residents use the skills they obtained throughout this process to continue the improvement of their community with initiatives planned by them. This is the aspect that makes this project participatory.

One of the most important results has been the people's participation in the administration of Management Committees, especially of the women who had a key role during the Faenas and the

whole administrative process. The project believes that it "has improved the organizational and participative management" capabilities to the extent that the works have been carried out thanks to the Management Committees' coordination, the local people in charge of planning and executing the works. Now these families are better equipped to continue developing their neighborhood. This, in turn, has generated the development of leadership, legitimacy and representation among community residents (men, women and the young) who have participated in the process. Some of them now hold administrative positions in their social organizations. For example, more women are taking active participation on the neighborhoods' boards. Even though the empowerment of the women was not an explicit objective of the project, it ended up being one its most visible outcomes.

Other indicators of improvement in management capability are that residents trained in these modules have created three new Comedores Populares, one Library and one Community Center (among others) in coordination with their neighborhoods and on their own initiative. In addition several residents have also joined their communities' Neighborhood Boards, as well as projects from the municipal district or other institutions.

Some perception indicators help to read the extent to which residents' quality of living is evolving. Around 70% of residents feel that accidents have been reduced, while 80% affirm that water transport is now easier. In addition 100% feel that at last they have a public space (referring both to the town squares and the access paths) where their children can play and mothers can meet.



47 of the 78 residents enabled in the Neighborhood Territory Management Modules were women. Eight editions of the Santa Maria Gorge New City Newsletter were published, featuring articles from 17 residents. At the beginning this was a challenging task because some residents did not feel “capable” of writing something, but thanks to the links of trust and friendship 17 residents were encouraged to perform as the voices of the community.

Finally, the Municipality of Villa Maria del Triunfo has also had a change of attitude with regard to the Gorge neighborhoods. It now maintains a much greater presence in the area and is considering the value of participative work within the execution of its works. The public spaces built by the community hold a plaque with the names of Desco, Misereor, the Municipality and the members of the Management Committee in charge of that specific facility as a monument to the power of strategic alliances.

2.- Project: Kibera Integrated Water, Sanitation and Waste Management Project

Better known as K-Watsan, this project is part of a large scale Government program in Kenya called KENSUP (Kenya Slum Upgrading Program). The purpose of KENSUP is to improve the livelihood conditions in 5 different slums in 5 different cities in Kenya (Nairobi, Mavoko, Kisumu, Mombasa and Eldoret). The project in Nairobi takes place in Kibera, which was chosen to set the pilot project for the other areas. Here, the concrete goal was set to build water and sanitation facilities that would alleviate the sanitation issues.

Kenya happens to be a hub of agencies of international cooperation. As a matter of fact, it hosts the only headquarters of the United Nations in the Third World, which includes the central offices of UN Habitat and UNEP. The government of Kenya relies on the contributions of UN Habitat to implement the projects to be set up as a part of KENSUP. Since UN Habitat is headquartered in the same city as Kibera, its role goes beyond the role of a donor, having a continuous active participation in the execution of the project. This can be helpful but it can also raise tensions with the other actors.

UN Habitat is an international organization, so it needs to partner with a local NGO enabled to execute the project. The NGO chosen for this purpose was Maji na Ufanisi (Water and Development) because of its close connections with the people from Kibera and its experience on water and sanitation issues. This organization includes Kiberans on its staff and has a discourse that promotes participatory development. Both Maji na Ufanisi and UN Habitat worked hard to implement a participatory method to involve the community on the construction of the water and sanitation facilities.

Last, but not least, is the community of Soweto East, the specific sector of Kibera where the project K-Watsan is to be implemented. At the beginning of the work there was almost no organizational structure in this community, but the whole process for this project resulted in shaping and empowering a few independent grassroots movements that were key for the success of the initiative. The most important ones are the Soweto East Community (SEC) and Soweto Youth Group.

Kenya is already a complicated country with different religions and languages. K-Watsan is a complicated project in this country that involves the government (with a controversial legitimacy after the riots of 2008), UN Habitat (a huge world-international cooperation agency), the NGO Maji na Ufanisi and the community of Soweto East (which struggles against extreme poverty and the threat of ethnic violence). This map of actors can already predict the variety of challenges that participatory development will find in this very complex context.

The Executive Local NGO

Maji na Ufanisi is a Kenyan NGO whose mission is “To improve the quality of life of the disadvantaged through participatory innovative pro-poor water and environmental sanitation solutions.” It describes itself as an organization proud of its achievements reflected by the empowerment of the disadvantaged people in raising their self esteem and confidence. In the same line, they follow the same methodology in the communities that they select to work with: “Once we have agreed to partner with a given community, we take them through a 10 steps process which includes community orientation and integration, mobilization and awareness creation, resource mapping and problem identification ultimately culminating in the development of a Community Action Plan. Once this plan is agreed upon, we then work with the communities to implement the projects but always ensuring that we maintain a balance between Community Organization and the construction of Environmental Sanitation structures”.

The International Donor

UN Habitat is the United Nations agency for human settlements. It is composed of about 15 different branches working in the same building (which can be very interesting, but also a little chaotic, especially if adding all the other branches of UNEP, UNON, etc which sometimes overlap roles). The branch that works in K-Watsan is The Water and Sanitation Branch, its main aim is “to contribute to the achievement of the internationally agreed goals related to water and sanitation in human settlements with particular focus on the urban poor, in order to facilitate equitable social, economic and environmental development”. The goals of the programme address gender equality, enhancing of awareness, strategic partnerships, etc. But it is very important to understand that UN Habitat acts like more than a regular donor, it has a constant presence in the field and the community meetings. This permits better team work with Maji na Ufanisi but also brings confusion about the roles of each other for the members of the community of Soweto East. Additionally, the relevance of UN Habitat as a world organization is extremely important for the attention of the Government of Kenya. Such a large scale project would not be possible without the international back up of UN Habitat. On the other hand, there were tensions easily felt in Kibera, especially at the meetings, where some residents looked down upon UN Habitat for being represented by “mzungus” from the First World, implying that they do not really care or understand their situation.

The Government

The Government of Kenya launched KENSUP during the administration of President Mwai Kibaki, on the World Habitat Day on October 4th 2004. The aim of KENSUP is to have improved by 2020 the livelihoods of at least 5.3 million urban slum dwellers (1.6 million households) countrywide.

The Government of Kenya approaches Capacity Building as a component to achieve the improvement of infrastructure. The Ministry of Housing and the Ministry of Land are the ones in charge of the administrative issues regarding KENSUP. Again, this can be helpful but also confusing when it comes down to making sure who is exactly in charge of what.

It is also important to address that the local Government of Nairobi also had presence in the KENSUP programme, but not directly in the managing of the K-Watsan project, except for technical assistance during the constructions.

Formulation of Objectives and strategies

K WATSAN's (Kibera Integrated water, Sanitation and Waste Management Project) aim is to contribute towards improving the livelihoods of the urban poor in Soweto East, by supporting small-scale community based initiatives in water, sanitation and waste management.

However, the large scale of this project and the big number of beneficiaries that it is trying to reach does not allow the practice of a real bottom-top methodology. The residents do not have much of participation in the design and planning of the water and sanitation facilities. But they do provide all the labor for them, in exchange for a daily wage. It is to be expected that every single resident of Soweto East appreciate the access to water and sanitation, but it is also true that many of the residents see K Watsan as an opportunity to make some money as well.

The specific objectives are:


- Support the community to **improve accessibility to water and sanitation** in Soweto East. The lack of access to water and sanitation is probably the universal main problem of every slum around the world. Only the alliance of big-name organizations such as UN Habitat and the power of two State Ministries with the resources of the City Council can provide the assets for the implementation of this kind of infrastructure, which is not only expensive, but challenging. The borders between the formal and informal in land tenure bring up constant challenges for this task.
- Establish and **strengthen governance frameworks** to regulate distribution and accessibility to water and for the upgrading of demonstrations. This particular objective regards the state institutions. It is interesting that the State addresses itself within the objectives, given that the legitimacy of the Kibaki administration is controversial and difficult after the agreement on the coalition government called National Accord and Reconciliation Act. The roles of the two political leaders (Kibaki and Odinga) are unclear as well as the roles of the Ministry of Land and the Ministry of Housing within the management of KENSUP.
- Support community organization through the **formation of Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) management committees** as a vehicle for promoting small scale waste management enterprises, increased access to water and sanitation services and access for credit to facilitate improvement of the housing sector. This objective is in the hands of Maji na Ufanisi who has done a good job shaping these committees and providing training for the construction of the water and sanitation facilities. During the collection of data for

this paper, the component of waste management was in its first phase: training. And it was in the hands of an additional NGO from the US called Worldbike. The component of access to credit consists of the formation of cooperatives that save for many years and wait also for many years for the government to find land, develop the land and move the population.

- Support the community to **improve the drainage system** in Soweto East. This objective regards the technical assistance of the Nairobi City Water and Sanitation Council, but was not started during the collection of data. Since this institution is not directly involved with K Watsan, there is not much concern for involving the community within this process, except for short term jobs.
- To enable the Soweto East community to gain basic knowledge about computers, software and internet and supply the opportunity to participate in online discussions, send emails, search for information etc through a **Technology and Information Centre**. Regarding this component, UN Habitat is working on the finding of available land to develop the facility. But this initiative will take off in the future.

The Process of Slum Improvement and Capacity Building

Four components have been identified in the process of the whole K Watsan Project:



1) Partnering

The complex map of actors is explained above. But for this section it is better to focus on the way that each one of these components addresses participatory methods.

It is probably questionable to talk about partnering at the very beginning of K Watsan because the community of Soweto East did not have the right organizational structure to provide a system of participation for the people, that is why Maji na Ufanisi facilitated the formation of the grassroots movements necessary to include the active voice of the community within the project. However, this component of partnering refers more to the creation of the space where the institutions taking place in the project are going to discuss and negotiate their roles. This space has the format of a Multi Stakeholders Forum. The challenge of this space is to focus on one particular issue instead of trying to cover all the issues taking place in all the institutions participating within KENSUP. This program receives an independent quota of funding, so there are many interests involved. After the solidification of SEC (Soweto East Community) the diverse leaders from the slum were able to participate within this Forum, sharing the same table with high end decision makers from the UN and the government, but still in a very hierarchical structure.

2) Community Mobilization

This component was worked implemented in the field almost entirely by Maji na Ufanisi, who already had strategic alliances and networks with some key leaders, that is one fundamental piece that allowed the project to have a good start. The first gap identified by Maji was the lack of an umbrella organization in which every resident from Soweto could feel represented. So, the first action taken was the start of an Awareness Creation Campaign followed by Community Appraisal

workshops guided by PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) methods. Here, the residents created a tree of problems caused by the lack of proper access to water and sanitation. This may sound relatively obvious, as the residents definitely know that there are urgent health issues due to this situation, but it was the first time that the leaders and concerned neighbours sat down together in the same room and faced the problem as a community along with the ethnic tensions that threaten the stability of Kibera. Therefore, having one problem in common is easier to set one community goal in common and start the formation of a community organization that would articulate all the neighbours around one particular objective. This is how SEC (Soweto East Community) was formed and the community was able to bring its voice to the Multi Stakeholders Forum. Eventually, Soweto East was organized within a structure of 4 sectors and the residents were organized in Facility Management Groups according to the area they lived so they could organize their neighbours better in order to look for the most appropriate space to build the Water and Sanitation Facility.

Once the FMGs are consolidated, they can officially register for the various workshops of training that Maji facilitated for them. These workshops included training in management skills, technical knowledge, health issues and environmental conditions. Maji helped these groups to obtain legal recognition. Even though this was mainly for the purpose of starting future cooperatives, the legal formalization of these groups enabled their sustainability and their legitimacy, especially when they address their concerns with the Government and other NGOs.

The Management skills workshop focused on basic issues that were not so basic for the residents, such as the meaning of leadership, the importance of democratic elections, popular participation,

etc. But it also covered the issues that the residents raised such as income generating activities, self reliance and community organization (how to trust the neighbours from the community in such an environment threatened by ethnic tensions). Other skills covered were record keeping, financial management, transparency and accountability, conflict resolution, etc. Additionally, a very important issue raised by the attendants was “corruption”. Several sessions were dedicated to this issue.

It was important to solidify these groups because their role is not only to lead the construction of the facilities, but to maintain a permanent system of maintenance after the project moves to a new phase. Therefore, in line with the environmental workshops, the Facility Management Groups dedicated several hours to do “clean ups”, sessions of cleaning their own neighbourhood, just collecting all the garbage and learning how to make money from recycling opportunities.

Finally, there was a phase called “Detailed Surveying and Siting” which was very delicate because it involved the relocation of families occupying lands for the development of the facilities. Land is very scarce in Kibera and it is mostly managed by informal mafias. Thus, the Multi Stakeholders Forum had to take a strong action to relocate families without the use of violence. It is important to address that the Multi Stakeholders Forum goes beyond the interests of K Watsan, it is aligned with the framework of KENSUP. Therefore, they are also building a road to improve the accessibility to Soweto East and this requires the relocation of several families as well as risky negotiations with informal mafias that control the market of lands in Kibera. This is why this particular process can hardly be participative. The residents should not be encouraged to negotiate with mafias, especially after the recent violence and the growth of new tensions. Again,

this is an example of the need of powerful institutions to achieve the goals that simple participation methods would not be able to do.

3) Construction

This process was facilitated by an engineer who ended up doing the job of a social worker. He facilitated a workshop to teach the Facility Management Groups to interpret the drawings for the design and planning of the facilities so that they could have an active participation giving feedback and recommendations according to their own conceptions regarding water and sanitation.

Another problematic issue was the recruitment of workers. Here is where the first gender differentiations showed up. The men expressed an expectation for a place where they could pee, take showers and use the toilettes. The women also needed an area to wash their children. So, the design of the facilities included this women's special need.

Although this is a participatory project, the workers are not volunteers, they have to be paid. A big reason for this is that the Kenyan Government normally pays people to attend their meetings so that it can rely on the "approval" of the community. For the impoverished people from Kibera this represents a strategy of survival and they are not going to agree on working for a project that has funding from the Government and the UN for free, even if it is for their own benefit. As a consequence, there are too many interests involved in the neighbourhood to belong to this crew of workers and the recruitment can easily turn into an additional delicate issue. The engineer in charge, David Kimani, affirms that he has a preference for working with women because they are

more honest, they do not drink and they have more energy. He also believes that since the women are mothers, they feel much more committed. Besides that, he emphasized that the people hired for the work should be healthy and strong.

Another challenge found by the engineer was the overseeing of material delivery. There are no roads for trucks, so the workers had to carry the materials for the construction through narrow paths. On the way, it was very easy for them to take the materials to their homes or other places so they can use them to improve their own houses or sell them in the black market. Therefore, additional groups of workers had to be hired to secure that the supplies were arriving at their destination safely. There was the fear that this kind of supervision would undermine the sense of a community working together to achieve a common goal, but there were no permanent signs that this would happen except for eventual disagreements among the neighbours.

Finally, to carry out the implementation, the following steps are to be followed:

1. To set up the storage: A site close to the entrance of the slum has to be set for the storing of the tools and materials.
2. To excavate the site: The chosen sites are usually former sites used as toilets; therefore the excavation has to be quite deep.
3. To get rid of the human waste: Even though the human waste accumulated for years is dry, it is necessary to get rid of it.
4. To reinforce the ground refilling it with murran: The big hole left has to be refilled with small stones to provide a hard safe base.

5. To start the construction of the building: The roof has to be resistant enough to hold a water tank with the capacity of 700 liters.
6. To install the water connection: It is necessary to hire people to monitor illegal connections. The group responsible for this task is the Nairobi Water Company, which is a private company that belongs to the Nairobi City Council.
7. To install the sewage connection: In some cases it is impossible to connect the water facilities to a sewage network because of the location, therefore, they are provided with pits. The ones with pits only require a responsible team that would carry out the human wastes to a main tank sewer.

4) Monitoring & Evaluation

Participatory Community Evaluations were carried out periodically during the project implementation process. Every facility's Management Group prepared its own Action Plan according to the different priorities that each FMG identified in its own sector. An *Ex-post Evaluation* was also conducted at the completion of the project, which will also form the basis of a *Handing-over Agreement and Action plan*. This document was extremely useful for Maji na Ufanisi and UN Habitat to discuss the lessons learnt and the challenges of the whole process to be incorporated in subsequent phases.

It is very hard to speak about this particular process of Monitoring and Evaluation without a strong bias. When members of UN Habitat attend these meetings, sometimes the members of the Management Groups complained about the fact that foreign mzungus were going back to their

countries and they did not really care for the continuation of the project, then they would refuse to speak English (which they all speak) and sometimes, they would then address other types of personal issues that they have with each other and they would stop speaking Swahili (which they all speak as well) and start arguing in their mother languages such as Luo, Luya, Kamba, etc so that they could not even understand each other. These kinds of arguments are very common in participative projects and they are a very strong challenge for a foreign development agent.

Sustainability

From certain points of views, the participatory dimension of K Watsan could be controversial since the neighbors are paid to work at the construction of the Water and Sanitation Facilities. However, no neighbor was paid to defend the facilities (not finished yet) during the weeks when the ethnic-politic riots were taking place, and those facilities remained untouched. Some residents argue that the riots were not very strong in Soweto East, some others support the commitment that the people felt towards the access to water and sanitation kept the facilities safe. The truth is probably something in the middle between these two theories, but the important truth is that the facilities are able to survive a civil war; therefore, their sustainability is very strong.

It is also evident at this point that despite the high degree of grassroots participation, there is a parallel high degree of bureaucracy among the two ministries, UN Habitat, Nairobi City Council and Maji na Ufanisi. However, it would be very difficult to think of the effectiveness of such a large scale project without the articulation of all of these big-name institutions. The people's

participation would not work without a proper framework. Maybe the government institutions are not working for the best participatory framework as possible, but it is clear that if they did not do anything about the mafia, the residents would have too many threats to overcome and participatory work would be impossible.

The Achievements

The concrete outcome of the project is the construction of 7 Water and Sanitation Facilities. Their names are Jeff, Nzui, Gikenye, Muhoro, World Missionary, Munyao and Top Life.

According to the discourse with which the Government of Kenya approaches KENSUP, this is the main result of the project and the proof of success of the pilot. Therefore, it is a good reference from which to start the other projects in the other 4 cities of Kenya, especially in Kisumu, which was the city most affected by the riots.

But according to the discourse of Maji na Ufanisi, the biggest achievement of K Watsan is the empowerment of the people from Kibera and the improvement of their self esteem.

A Comparative Analysis

Both projects are participatory and have developed several participatory methodologies in order to empower the residents of slums. However there is a clear difference between the way that Desco developed the whole project Nueva Esperanza against the conceptions of development between Maji na Ufanisi and the Government of Kenya. The Government of Kenya thinks in the terms expressed in the KENSUP programme, which are completely referred to the infrastructural

improvement of the slums. Instead, Maji na Ufanisi and UN Habitat emphasize the human aspect of the project based on the building of capacities.

It is likely to expect that the government of a country that does not have a strong background in democracy building does not prioritize the people's empowerment over the infrastructural development. The case of the Peruvian government is not very different, but the project Nueva Esperanza was conceived entirely by Desco and the structure of this project is very clear in terms of the distribution of institutional roles. Here, the national government does not play any role, and the Municipal government only provides machinery, supplies and legal assistance.

Additionally, it is also important to address that Desco is an atypical NGO. It has a long history of support to grassroots movements and has dedicated several of its assets for the research and the creation of theories to understand the social and political process that its projects will tackle. This ended up being a very helpful methodology. It is clear that Desco's theories on the new type of slums, "Nuevos Barrios", allows a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges that marginal urban communities go through everywhere in the post colonial world.

Similarly with the theory of the Nuevos Barrios, Desco created the CPP as a methodology that can be exported and adapted to other contexts. Its main components of Communications, Workshops, Technical Assessment, Faenas and Monitoring & Evaluation are needed in any kind of context, this is why in the year 2007 Desco released a publication called "CPP" to spread the word on the achievements of its project and hopefully promote or motivate more participative methods for other organizations. In the case of K Watsan, the methodology was not started as a plan with a concrete name, but later UN Habitat did work on the gathering of activities to write

the “Guide of Steps” of the project with the same intention as Desco. However, the publication is not released yet, therefore the title remains unknown.

Another interesting comparison between the 2 projects is the scale of the objective. This means that it is much more feasible for an NGO to promote the construction of public spaces than the construction of a water and sewage network. Desco learnt this from a previous experience where it was clear that in a neoliberal context, private corporations are much more capable of providing this service than development or governmental agencies. K WATSAN is capable of providing this service because it relies on the power of the Government of Kenya and the funding of UN Habitat. So, despite the previous comparisons, there are also advantages brought by working with big name institutions.

Actually, both of the projects address in their documents that the establishment of good relations with the local government are necessary to guarantee the sustainability of the initiative. This does not mean that the government must necessarily outsource financial assets for grassroots movements, but it must work on the opening of spaces of civil participation where the grassroots organizations are able to take part in the decision making of the administration and the use of the municipal budget. Nowadays, slums are not characterized by the overflow of community based organizations. But these projects suggest that when the government opens spaces of decision making for the marginalized people, they would be more likely to organize in groups for common purposes and start development initiatives for their own territories.

An interesting coincidence between these two projects is that the two of them took place in electoral years. This clearly had a much bigger impact in the case of Kenya; the consequences of the riots were terrible and jeopardized the myriad of development agencies working in the country. Fortunately, this happening was useful to test the commitment that the people felt towards their own work. In Peru, this took place in a very different way. 2006 was both a year of municipal and presidential elections in Peru. The Presidential elections almost always require a second round, so Peruvians had to vote three times during that year. Even though the administration of the Municipality of Villa Maria del Triunfo was accomplishing all its responsibilities within the project, the last year of the CPPs (2006) turned out to be a very chaotic year for this administration due to its decision to run for a third period. The mayor had to split his time between campaigning and accomplishing his responsibilities. Therefore, there were many schedule issues regarding the local government. In the Desco's follow up research, the residents mentioned an awareness of the "real interests" of the local government, so they are aware that whenever they work with their municipality, they just try to obtain as much as they can but without relying absolutely or conditioning their electoral choice on the "favors" that they can receive from the government. Participatory work does not mean that the residents should not have a critical perspective on their own local governments; it actually demands a critical perspective of the government institutions. This portrays one of the big challenges of the participatory agenda: to include the people's voice in government decision making but with a degree of criticism over clientelism.

This understanding about the local government from the residents of the Gorge Santa Maria is very similar to the one of the residents from Kibera regarding the wide spectrum of non profits

that arrive in Kibera looking to include the “fetishism” of this world famous slum within their work. The youth of The Soweto Youth Group affirms that there are several organizations coming from the first world wanting to do a development project with them. So, they have to dedicate a lot of energy to organize meetings for these organizations to gather the preliminary data that they need. However, in most of the cases these development agents go back to their countries and never obtain the funding that they need. Therefore, the youth are aware that the most likely type of aid that they are going to receive from any of these development agencies is assistentialist aid in exchange for the organizing of meetings. This Kibera fetishism seriously undermines the trust that residents develop towards external organizations. One of the examples of Kibera fetishism is the award winning movie “I want to be a Pilot” where a Spanish film maker writes a poem based on what he thinks that life in Kibera is like and gives it to a child for him to read it as if it was his own person speaking about Kibera.

One big difference between these two projects is the “volunteer” quality of one vs. the “paid” quality of the other. It is rare to find institutional meetings in Peru where the people are paid to sit in them, but this is not the case in Kenya, where the government usually pays the attendants to their meetings in order to legitimize its decisions. The concept of participation depends on whether the people do something for the awareness of the improvement of their community or whether they do it for the money. In Kenya the people from the slums argue that they are extremely poor and they need the money in order to not go out of the slum looking for a job to do in the streets. Peruvians from slums sometimes argue the same statement, but the good communications skills from Desco made very clear that the project is feasible only with the financial contribution of the residents, meaning their labor. By the way, in both of the projects,

around 70% of the people who offered their labor were women. As the engineer Kimani said, “Women feel a stronger commitment to the improvement of their communities because they are mothers.” This is a key concept for participatory development that is likely to be reproduced in all the slums of the world, where the men have to go out to the city to make money while the women stay in the slum taking care of the family and participating in the grassroots activities to improve their community.

Some people may argue after reading of this whole experience that the characteristic tribalism from Africa is likely to undermine community development initiatives because it makes it very challenging to build a community identity. However, a deep look at the Peruvian social structure shows that it is not that different to Kenya’s. Peruvians are a mix of races, particularly Indigenous, Spanish, Blacks and Chinese. This makes it very difficult for Peruvians to strongly fit in one of the usual racial standards such as White, Black or Indian. But this situation still adds to the racism that threatens the unity of Peruvian communities. It is not unusual to find people in the Gorge Santa Maria saying that they distrust others based on the color of their skin or believing that they are less smart than the others because they come from the Highlands. It is true that these racist statements can not compare to the massacre that occurred in Kenya based on tribal tensions, but racism and other types of ethnic issues are a structural problem of post colonial societies that will always undermine initiatives for participatory development in marginal communities and this is a threat that both projects should have addressed in their planning.

Finally, these two projects became the main discussion topic at the community boards of every sector in Santa Maria and Kibera. The residents are always going to be excited about receiving the

opportunity to improve their communities and lives. Many challenges will arise, but as long as the NGO sees this enthusiasm in the people, everything is possible.

III) Lessons Learned for Participatory Development

After analyzing the details of two participatory urban projects in two opposite corners of the world, we may discover lessons that would say something about participatory development in any kind of context. The comparative analysis portrayed in the previous chapter shows some of the most remarkable differences in the execution and planning of these two projects. But considering the very clear differences between Lima and Nairobi, it is interesting to find the strong similarities that these two projects show in their Lessons Learned. Both Desco and Maji na Ufanisi/UN Habitat worked on publications to spread the methods that made their projects successful. The following Lessons Learned are taken from those documents, but it is important to address that UN Habitat's publication is still in progress at the time of this analysis.

The principal lessons learned from DESCO's experience with the Urban Program for Implementation of Participative Projects Contests for improving neighborhoods are the following:

- A. *Civil participation and social mobilization.*** Participation in the proposal is understood in a political sense, that is to say that it is useful to the extent that it generates awareness among the population that it is possible to achieve a change in the community, and that

this change begins with them. The population's participation in the contests and works allows people to value the results obtained even more, **generating a greater closeness among residents while breaking the welfare logic that the local or national government must provide everything for its citizens.** With participation in processes of this type, the population develops a greater awareness of its surroundings and its community's potential, of its neighborhood's needs and those of nearby neighborhoods. Those who participated and have now constructed a town square or access path to benefit their communities have learned that democratic practices such as this one can work in their favor. Community mobilization—initially linked to works – constitutes one of the central axes that allow legitimizing new spaces for coordination and generating awareness among the population (above all in those districts where leadership has traditionally been questioned).

- B. *The strengthening of neighborhood organization:*** The organization of the community around common objectives becomes fundamental for the success of any development process. Descó's experience shows that the traditional mode of neighborhood organization can not represent the totality of the interests in the community. Beyond these not very legitimate groups of leadership, there are individual interests that are not being represented by anybody and the CPPs show that it is possible to incorporate these interests with management capabilities (in Nueva Esperanza, they are called Management Committees). This is why many of the residents who took the lead at the CPPs ended up as leaders of their neighborhoods' boards.

- C. *The generation of management capabilities:*** One of the most important lessons from this experience is the importance of developing people's capabilities for the success of any local development management proposal. The CPP experience is incorporated into the training module oriented towards the Management Committees as one of the three principal components of the strategy implemented. On the other hand **it is important that the strengthening of capabilities incorporate both the political and technical dimension.** In this case both the territorial management tools and institutional and leadership dimensions were prioritized. The people who were qualified had had no previous management experience; nor were they accustomed to this type of meeting, which required the project team to adapt the module in each contest. It was made clear that **it is not possible to under- or over-estimate the participants;** what is required is that the training team adapt to the group in relation to its previous knowledge and aptitude for learning. Training is a basic component for any mobilization process.
- D. *The Strategy of Communication:*** The project Nueva Esperanza went beyond its initial objectives when it made the residents responsible for the distribution of the information regarding the project. The residents started to write articles and take responsibilities within fairs and other types of communication activities. This allowed everyone in the Gorge Santa Maria to know about the upcoming project and CPPs. The results of the project would have definitely been different if it was not for this strong communication's approach.

- E. *Infrastructure works as a pretext for social mobilization.*** The CPP constitutes a tool that has sense to the extent that it mobilizes the community to improve their neighborhood. This constitutes a key aspect of the strategy, given that small works by themselves, although they improve the quality of living, are not sustainable if they are not accompanied by processes for civil participation, strengthening of capabilities and communication for development. The central element is to have **potential leaders** manage their territory suitably; to do this they must first understand it, define its needs, identify its priorities and establish proposals that are viable. That is, neighborhood improvement is accompanied by the strengthening of **neighborhood residents' capabilities** and their participation. It is obvious that this generates a significant impact in terms of infrastructure, but simultaneously it also generates a major change on the level of the people and their visions, interests, confidence and will to accomplish something for the development of their neighborhood.
- F. *The establishment of alliances for common work:*** The sustainability of initiatives similar to the Project Nueva Esperanza will depend on the quality of alliances established in multiple layers. For example, the alliances can be among residents, grassroots organizations, institutions, and local government. The common work of all of these actors enhances the achievements and allows replicating the experience. As long as the people and their local government get involved in the experience, the opportunities of replication will be much higher. Now the municipal government of Villa Maria del Triunfo is using the mechanism of the CPP to make other infrastructure contests in different

sectors of the district and the people design projects to be managed by the local government.

G. *The role of the NGO:* NGOs are to validate methodologies for development initiatives that could be taken into charge in the future by others. However, the CPP should not work as a recipe that is assumed to work in any kind of context. It is to be adapted to every context's particularities. The NGO requires a team of professionals with commitment and will that may work as a bridge between people and state or other private institutions without replacing the role of the government because sustainable development requires the strengthening of the local government as well.

H. *The role of the local government:* The local government is gifted with multiple management and citizen participation mechanisms provided by the law and in the case of Villa Maria del Triunfo and other districts in Lima, there are several spaces of civil participation that have been implemented in the last years. Additionally, the CPPs have succeeded in bringing the people closer to the participatory spaces of their local governments.

Lessons Learned from K-Watsan

- 1.** The most important impact of K WATSAN is the **change in the social behavior of the community**. This is a more valuable outcome than the physical infrastructure or the capacity building programs per se. As it was demonstrated during the riots, the people

managed to look after the facilities so that they were not damaged. Even the office of UN Habitat at the entrance of Soweto East remained untouched. Holding a flag from the United Nations and being one of the very few buildings in Kibera with its own bathroom, it was very likely that the facility would become a target of the people's rage.

- 2. The engagements of community members**, especially tenants, in construction activities and monthly clean ups has increased their confidence in taking more challenging roles such as dealing with landlords and taking active roles in the management of the facilities. Some tenants participating in the construction of the facilities reported to be threatened of eviction by their landlords if they continued working in the project. The owners of land in Kibera do not want other institutions creating public infrastructure or having the tenants mobilizing in grassroots organizations. Fortunately, the tenants were strong about their commitment and nothing happened to them.
- 3. Physical construction of the facilities work as the main motivator for the attraction of community participation in poor areas.** There has been a trend of a “wait and see” attitude by the residents since many organizations have created high expectations in the past right before disappearing and losing contact with the community. As explained before, this can be an example of the negative impacts of the Kibera “fetishism”. The institutions that really want to work out a concrete project have to come up with strategies to convey to the residents that their intentions are real. Therefore, every institution has to address this as a challenge to gain the trust of the dwellers.

- 4. When community members are positioned at the core of a community project, there is a major boost for success.** UN Habitat and Maji na Ufanisi consider that the ultimate goal of the project is the capacity building of the residents so that they feel capable of taking the initiative for future plans of community development. As long as the community members are positioned at the core of the project, they will feel capable enough of identifying specific problems and figuring out alternatives for them.
- 5. A water and Sanitation project can act as an entry gate for different organizations in a slum.** For example, the Kenya Power & Lighting Company now has a presence in Soweto East thanks to K Watsan. The more network opportunities that are provided to the residents, the bigger chances that the community will have to come up with strategies for the improvements of the services in their neighborhoods, but this depends entirely on the residents' initiative. This is a challenge in which the capacity building of the neighbors gets tested.
- 6. Commercial sex business has reduced** at the Top Life area of Soweto East since most members are engaged in construction activities that take the whole day. Maji na Ufanisi attributes this fact to the works for the constructions, but there may be several other factors influencing this.
- 7. Good relationships have been created within FMG** members. Despite the conflicts that are usually raised in community work, at the end of the game, the residents become much friendlier with each other when they see the results of their work. This is taken

from the residents' testimonies, but so far neither Maji na Ufanisi nor UN Habitat has worked on an extensive research to measure the social impacts of the facilities because it is still too soon to do that. The facilities were going to be officially inaugurated by September 2008. By that time UN Habitat was working on the writing of a publication to divulge the experience in the format of a manual of steps to build participatory water and sanitation facilities in slums.

- 8. The gap between the experienced and inexperienced in Facility Management Groups members in Development Groups has decreased.** To bridge this difference, more emphasis was put on inexperienced members' participation in Facility Management Groups activities and more attention was given to them to avoid lack of confidence. Most of them were women because they have had less chances of learning construction skills, but they were the ones most motivated in the project.
- 9. Channels of communication between community organizations have been opened.** The Facility Management Group members sent a request to the members of the Multi Stakeholders Forum through K WATSAN representatives demanding multiple stakeholders' attendance to Facility Management Groups meetings and participation in the project activities.
- 10. The community in Soweto East had to create spaces of integral organization.** Other community activities interfere with K WATSAN planned project activities. This led to delayed and slow implementation of the K WATSAN activities, especially trainings. To

solve the problem members were encouraged not to plan meetings concurrently. This helped to make the participants realize that a real proposal for the improvement of their community requires real sacrifices and an integral vision of their community. It is very hard to achieve community goals from and for the community if every single family is thinking in terms of their own interests. This is very difficult to change in a neoliberal context where the best economic strategy for the poor is to look for their own source of profit making.

Comparison

The following chart is meant to illustrate the differences and coincidences in the Lessons Learned in both projects:

Coincidences in the Lessons Learned	
Desco	Maji na Ufanisi UN Habitat
A	1, 4, 7
B	1, 2, 10
C	8
D	-
E	3
F	5
G	5, 9
H	-
-	6

In some cases such as C and 8 the coincidence is very exact. In some cases such as Desco's A or B, the comprehensiveness of the lessons includes ideas from three lessons identified by Maji na Ufanisi. Just because of the emphasis that the organizations in Kenya are trying to make, it made more sense for them to separate these ideas, but the similarities of the conclusions of these projects are surprising considering that they have been planned out by 2 complete different organizations in 2 countries that share very little in similar history, but at the same time do share the meaning being a post colonial country that highly depends on foreign aid.

There are few differences, such as D. Maji na Ufanisi did implement a strategy of communications based on brochures, but this is an NGO that has been working in Kibera for a very long time and had already built channels of communications that they may have been taken "for granted", especially since they employ residents from the neighborhood. So, it would be unfair to say that only Desco thought about implementing a communications campaign, but because of the circumstances, these organizations may take these strategies under different approaches.

Furthermore, Desco had to organize a communications campaign from the beginning because the presence of the organization was absolutely new in the Gorge Santa Maria. The links of trust are not given for granted, especially with so many new political groups that show up in electoral years promising several things for the improvement of the community. The residents have lost trust in these kinds of groups and easily confuse any NGO with a new political party. This may be parallel to the so called effect caused by the Kibera fetishism. For example, there was a fair in the Gorge

Santa Maria organized by Desco in line with its Communications Strategy during a Sunday that had to compete with two other fairs organized by new political groups that were also working on their own electoral campaigns. While the residents were being told to organize in committees to work for the improvement of their community, the political fairs were just giving away “gifts” such as T-shirts, copybooks, pens, food, candies, etc as an attempt to earn the support of these voters. This is why it can be very challenging to work in a Communications Strategy.

Looking at the next difference between the projects’ Lessons Learned, it is interesting that Maji na Ufanisi does not address the role of the Government. Both local and national governments of Kenya are involved in K-Watsan. The role of the local government is much more visible in K-Watsan, but KENSUP is entirely an initiative proposed by the national government of Kenya and that has been ongoing for two presidential periods. This may be because Desco is clearly the only institution in charge to facilitate the process of the CPP. Instead of this, the actions of Maji na Ufanisi are highly dependent on the approval of government agencies.

Additionally, the last difference raised by Maji na Ufanisi regarding the decrease of sexual commerce, entirely depends on the context of Kibera. The poor people of the Gorge Santa Maria would definitely feel pushed to start in this business because of poverty, but if they do, this definitely does not happen within the Gorge because it is too small to be done anonymously. Besides, just away from the Gorge there is a busy avenue with very little of police control.

Addressing the coincidences, the first pattern that pops out is that development agencies seem to be much more aware of the importance of participative development than governments. There are several factors that explain this fact. The planners working at the government may have the

same academic and cultural background as the professionals working at NGOs. The matter here may be connected to the challenges that governments have to face in countries that are in the process of building a democratic society. The post colonial world is by concept far more diverse than the colonizer world, only in Kenya where there are 42 officially recognized tribes plus Kenyan “mzungus” and Indian Kenyans called “mhindis”. Most of the Sub Saharan countries have a very similar ethnic structure and almost all of them have had some type of violent ethnic conflict. Nationwide, the case of Peru is not very different. The rift between the urban European descendant Peruvians and the rural Andean Peruvians is the reason why the political violence in the eighties and nineties exploded for many years without causing a major concern in Lima.

Therefore, it is definitely challenging to build a democratic state in these diverse societies where the colonial history has put the power in the hands of a particular group. Neither in 45 years of independent history of Kenya nor in 188 years of independent history of Peru has the post colonial social structure changed. Participatory development is not necessarily going to heal the oppression of all of these accumulated years of history, but it can help to integrate the people of a community and help to build democracy on a smaller scale. The social rift may explain why it is so hard for the governments of the Third World to address participatory approaches within their policies. At least in the case of Peru, a few local municipalities are coming up with proposals such as the “Participatory Budget”, “Agreement Tables” and other particular projects regarding urban agriculture or improvement of skills for labor. But national states need to maintain their credibility and legitimacy with concrete results, which are much harder to obtain through participative methods. In other words, it is much easier for a government to demonstrate its efficiency through infrastructure than through the building of capacities or improvement of the

relationships within a community. The Lessons Learned number 1, 2, 4 and 7 by Maji na Ufanisi and UN Habitat as well as A & B by Desco support the argument above.

An additional relevant coincidence between these Lessons Learned is the recognized role of the women. Field research done by Desco shows that around 44% of the households of the Gorge Santa Maria have a working mother, while in 45% of the households only the fathers work. However, there is a considerable percentage of women who work at a home based grocery store or doing any kind of labor from home so that they can take care of the children. The women from any slum are more likely to stay in the neighborhood while the father is more likely to go out to the city for work. This may explain why the women are more committed to the tasks of community improvement. However this is not necessarily reflected in slums where no development initiative has been implemented yet. Desco's research shows also that the number of women taking active roles in the Community Boards greatly increased after the realization of the CPPs. As mentioned before, it is very challenging to raise this kind of data in Kibera because of multiple factors (such as the black market in lands, the multiple interests in obtaining a temporary job as a survey maker, etc.) but the Engineer David Kimani states that the women are much better to work with than the men. On the other hand, Desco had a rule that at least 50% of the people forming the Management Committees must be women, in order to have a proper gender balance and to include women who may expand the expectations of the project by adding all the hard working characteristics that Kimani mentioned (such as that they are more hard working than the men).

V) Thoughts on Participatory Development and Conclusion

A literature review of participatory development may help to conclude this document with an insight on the impacts of development agencies in the neoliberal context. Most of the literature found about participatory development approaches managed by NGOs has a critical perspective on the methods of this field. However, very few go beyond the projects on which they focus and analyze the impacts of development agents within a neoliberal context. Even though most of the authors presented below maintain a strong criticism towards participatory approaches, they still seem to agree that it is very difficult for development actors to make a real hand over of power to grassroots movements in a context in which the society is struggling to create democratic bases and the state has weak links with grassroots movements.

The only two authors that decry the purposes of development agents (NGOs) come both from India. Ilan Kapoor states in "Participatory Development, Complicity and Desire" that participatory development (PD) "reconfigures power and value systems which may end up being exclusionary, if not tyrannical...it supposedly puts local Third World communities at the center of development, but actually centers on First World and/or elite institutional interests".

His critique continues on the values and goals of PD:

1. PD is narcissistic samaritanism: The community development worker is always the center of attention, championing doing good in an almost religious manner, but as facilitator is always in control.
2. Transference: "PD is the consequence of transference onto Third World communities of the perceived inadequacies of our own liberal democratic political systems."
3. The fantasy of consensus: "consensus is an attempt at making development smooth and complete, it is a fantasy. To the extent that it is used to seek definitive decisions, thereby avoiding the risks and messiness inherent in participation. When consensus-based decisions are single, as they most often are, they overlook or suppress community differences and tensions. Frequently they ignore precisely those issues that are most difficult to address – class inequality, patriarchy, racism."

The other Indian author is Rajni Kothari who believes that NGOs in India are being co-opted by the state. He actually goes beyond by explaining how the NGOs become branches of transnational corporations to make the peripheries profitable for capitalists. Although he does propose an alternative for a real transference of power, it is not very well developed and it lacks of an explanation of how to bring it to the neoliberal world: "Such centralization, devoid of the political framework of a democratic process, cannot by its nature be participatory and people-oriented.

Democratic participation needs a reversal – a transfer of power back to lower levels, back to the people, to the marginalized among them, to those deprived of resources and livelihoods by the development process.”

Trevor Parfitt’s “The Ambiguity of participation: a qualified defense of participatory development” answers directly to Kothari’s and Kapoor’s articles emphasizing that participatory development is a complex network of factors, so it has to be analyzed from the insight of “the broader picture” to rescue its values. This means that in the long term, participatory development can achieve empowerment in marginalized people despite all the manipulation that NGOs go through. Parfitt does consider all the criticism brought up by Kothari and Kapoor, but he emphasizes that participatory development is a process that goes beyond PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) methods, which are often used to manipulate the group’s goals in order to undermine the individuals’ goal, indicating that PRA is close to brainwashing. He trusts that the facilitator of capacity building activities will grow consciousness about the need to achieve the real goals of the project and this will definitely bring outcomes in the long term. However, Parfitt concludes in recognizing the ambiguity of PD: “What this ambiguity means is that (as in the case of the law) participation is a contested ground between those who would prefer to use it as a means to achieve certain ends and those who wish to emphasize its possibilities for emancipation”, referring to emancipation, as the ultimate goal of every single participatory development project.

Kapoor on the other hand believes that the participative processes can make a real up-bottom transfer of power pass if “Politicising and publishing the prejudices and prerogatives of the facilitator should help de-center and democratize power relationships. It will entail, for the

facilitator, tempering and contextualizing one's claims and commitments, and for the participants, lowering one's hopes and expectations." Also, Kapoor's second point consists on extending participation to the economy and development decision making by enabling greater social regulation of both the market and of the freedom of capital. "This would mean the establishment, for example, of worker management schemes, peasant co-operatives or community-run enterprises." Finally, Kapoor proposes "Linking up with democratic politics: This would involve building bridges between PD projects and wider local and transnational efforts for democratizing state market and politicizing new spaces/issues (eg. urban slums, sexual politics, biotechnology, water)." This way it will be possible to hijack participatory development, meaning that the beneficiaries of PD projects will be the real protagonists of social change.

On the other side of the spectrum of this literature review we can find Erhard Berner's "Learning from Informal Markets: innovative approaches to land and housing provision" where he proposes that NGOs facilitate processes for shortening the gap between formal and informal land markets because informal ones have achieved much more than official initiatives from the government. This author does not question the roles of the NGOs but the role of governments as providers of housing and the efficiency of formal land markets to resolve the housing needs of the poor. Berner states that in some post colonial cities, most of the labor force working for the formal economy live in informal settlements. Here there is recognition of the duality of the post colonial city presented by Milton Santos, and a strong support for Kapoor's proposal of extending participation to the economy. Berner develops two case studies (Manila and Hyderabad) where he tells how NGOs had a key role within these initiatives. Unlike Kapoor or Kothari, Berner is not bringing down the good intentions of the NGOs nor rejecting official development agents for

being agents of capitalism. However, his proposal is still very revolutionary in terms of the priority that governments are meant to put in the formal economy within the current neoliberal global agenda.

An additional example that supports Kapoor's propositions is Caroline Moser and Peter Solis' "Did the Project Fail? A community perspective on a participatory primary health care project in Ecuador". This is a very particular perspective in which the authors argue that a health care participatory project failed on the specific project goals, but this meant the success of the ultimate goal of the project: to empower the people to raise and rebel for their demands. Due to a payment conflict, namely, what kind of salary the health workers were going to be paid, the project ended up failing. But at the same time, this meant that the community dwellers became motivated and active as a result of the participatory aspects of the project. Here, the authors recognize a real way in which the power is handed from the NGO to the grassroots level.

Vandana Desai has a different criticism of the work of the NGOs. She does not recognize a context of capitalism in a post colonial environment. She indicates that the rapid changes occasioned by globalization bring constant new challenges for the NGOs operating particularly in Mumbai and she emphasizes how these processes widen gender gaps. She concludes saying that "NGOs should build in future relationships with feminist movements and be open to change in their own organizational culture, structure, systems, and procedures at the grassroots level", with which she demonstrates her belief in NGOs as potential agents of social change, but without addressing an overthrowing of the structural mode of production or even globalization.

Some authors (especially Kothari and Kapoor) would have to reconsider the type of relationship built between the NGOs and the state after the turmoil occasioned in the year 2006 for the NGOs by the Peruvian central government. The crisis began when the government of Peru considered that NGOs received “too much” funding from international institutions, so that it needed to take the control of this funding to make sure that the development projects match with the government’s agenda. According to the Peruvian Agency of International Cooperation (APCI), there were around 3000 NGOs receiving a total of 500 million US dollars per year. The administration of Alan Garcia (elected on 2006) proposed a law that would allow the government to appropriate these funds and filter them to the NGOs according to its own criteria.

It is important to mention that the Peruvian government has identified NGOs as strong opposition institutions, meaning that there have been multiple criticisms towards the government coming from these organizations. Some people would argue that the establishment of institutions that criticize the government policies is an important procedure for the construction of a solid democratic society. However some others would argue that it would be very easy for NGOs to channel international funds for the support of terrorists or drug traffic. Disregarding this debate, it is relevant to address that non governmental development agents are also important agents of political opposition, and this very recent case which took place in Peru shows that NGOs are not necessarily agents for the expansion of the power of the state.

Jaime Joseph argues in “NGOs Fragmented dreams” that these organizations are very likely to be co-opted by the agendas of donors and larger projects, but that their reason to be is to maintain the autonomy, initiative and flexibility that their non-governmental status confers upon them: “...NGOs are not only losing their role as radical social critics, but their capacity to put forward

broad alternatives". The author has an interesting approach to NGOs. He states that they have been crucial in the process of the creation of concepts that began social struggles, such as gender, youth, sustainable development, citizenship, civil society, consensus building, but they have not been able to articulate all of these fights within a global development strategy. It could be inferred from his article that this nonexistent "global demand" would have to fight directly against the neoliberal agenda, which is the existent global project. This makes us ask ourselves whether the NGO strategies should be limited to combating the effects of this global project or its causes, yet, in any case, the NGOs have not succeeded in the construction of a network of development agents that focus on the roots of neoliberalism. As a reflection of this, many of the projects and programs specifically designed to strengthen democracy are not based on a critical analysis of the democratic political system itself. For example, a group of neighbors in Barcelona opposed the construction of a building for retired people because they did not want to share the neighborhood with elderly men. "This is an example of civic participation but with a clearly anti-democratic content". Finally, Joseph makes a very insightful statement to understand the relation between neoliberalism and Participatory Development: "This demobilization is intensified by the universal discourse of the one-thought world that accompanies the neoliberal model. According to that discourse, success and development are the fruit of individual effort, of individual competitiveness" ...so, how does the creation of community mobilization fit within this one thought world that praises the individual effort?

Now, looking at all of these diverse views on PD, we can identify two main positions. The first one is represented very well by the positions of Kothari and Kapoor who see the NGOs as branches of capitalism in order to adapt the peripheries to the needs of corporate interests, where the state is

a one sided referee. On the other extreme we can identify Jaime Joseph's position who sees NGOs as institutions (easily co-opted by corporate interests) willing to create community development through participation in the context of a one-thought world that praises individual effort.

But what happens when nothing is done? A few weeks ago, Slum Dog Millionaire was awarded the Academy Award for the best film of the year, which put the attention of the world on the social injustices that the children from the slums of Mumbai face every day. In that movie, the slum collapses after an ethnic revolt. The children get to escape the riots and when they come back to Mumbai, it is only to see the land of their old community swept away by projects of luxury apartments that their old neighbors would clearly not be able to afford. Instead of developing a position against this injustice, the two kids (now teenagers) look at the lives of the privileged, and they say that they want to become part of the new India, the India that expands its apartment buildings over old lands of slums (which doesn't make it any different from any other post colonial neoliberal economy). The older brother joins a gang and the younger brother works at a call center serving tea before he gets the opportunity to participate in a TV show where he earns a lot of money. Beyond all the complexity of the story of this great movie, there is an embedded vision of the collapse of community development against individual strategies of survival. And this represents in a very concrete way the threat that the slums of the post colonial neoliberal city are facing: the collapse of their communities.

Kibera and Santa Maria face that challenge as well, the undermining of their communities. That's why the kids from the movie could be living in any slum, from Lima or Nairobi, right now. The intervention of those NGOs has definitely helped to create some degree of union among the dwellers, but on no level have they helped to attack the root of the problems. Desco and Maji na

Ufanisi/UN Habitat thought about improving the livelihoods of the dwellers in the context of a neoliberal post colonial city, however NGOs don't think yet about applying these methods in a global scale, so there is no way we can talk of PD as an alternative against neoliberalism (yet). Participatory Development comes as a strategy that may help the slums to survive that collapse, but that will depend on the dwellers, not on the NGOs.

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