

Master Project

**Peaceful Policies to Tackle Violent Crime on the
Northern Coast of Peru: The Case of Tumbes**

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The city of Tumbes, on the Northern Coast of Peru, has become the most violent city of the country with 37.1 homicides per 100,000 people in 2014. Inequality, precarious jobs, weak rule of law, and mistrust in institutions are the underlying conditions. In addition, some specific factors have triggered the violent crime: flagrant corruption in the regional government and municipality; the routes and prices of cocaine on the border with Ecuador; and the spread of crime networks all across the Northern region. As a result, new gangs have appeared in the city since 2011 and fights between them have prompted murders in the city.

This Master's Project attempts to find solutions to reduce violent crime in Tumbes. The policy question is "What are the policies that the government of Tumbes needs to adopt in order to decrease the high rates of criminal violence, build resilience, and foster sustainable peace?"

Policy recommendations derive from three fields—development, peacebuilding and security. After assessing each approach with case studies and research evidence, citizen security is the best umbrella and combines the best practices of each approach. The diagram below illustrates the components of a citizen security strategy to promote peaceful coexistence, reduce homicides and address fragility in Tumbes. Based on this framework, there are six recommendations for implementation of the strategy for the city:

1. **Divide the implementation in four stages:** Planning, stabilization, transition, consolidation
2. **Adopt two principles:** Citizen engagement with social cohesion, and human rights
3. **Use information:** Improve crime data collection and analysis at the local level
4. **Look at the trees:** Focus on reducing homicides in the very short run
5. **Embrace complexity:** Do not neglect other types of violence and vulnerable populations
6. **Do not forget the forest:** Address structural issues in the long run

COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK TO TACKLE VIOLENT CRIME AND PREVENT FURTHER ESCALATION IN TUMBES				
Citizen Security				
Civic Engagement and Social Cohesion	Information and Data Analysis	Addressing Risk Factors	Law Enforcement and Restorative Justice	Human Rights
	Economic Opportunities: Decent Jobs			
	Health Services: Physical and Mental			
	Education: Life Skills and Early Childhood			
	Urban Planning: Public Services for All			
Source: The author				

Some measures are recommended within this framework for various stages. Examples of these measures include:

1. **Planning:** Activate the Citizen Security Committee authorized by law; create a system for citizens' reporting, supervision and accountability; centralize all the safety and security services in a single building; dialogue with representatives of cities with similar challenges.
2. **Stabilization:** Create a task force for robberies and extortions; increase control of drugs and gun transportation from Lima and on the border of Ecuador; reduce alcohol consumption during risky periods; work on the resocialization of perpetrators and victims' healing.
3. **Transition:** Support police training on mediation and conflict resolution; implement programs to develop life skills for youth and after school activities ("Open Schools"); strengthen the current efforts to tackle domestic violence.
4. **Consolidation:** Work on Early Childhood Development involving the school and parents; increase incentives to provide decent jobs; develop crime prevention through improved environmental design in hot spots and risky areas.

The project has also found an increasing need for expertise in monitoring and evaluation of interventions to reduce crime, and all the approaches need to be completed by institutional and governance reforms to achieve their goals. Finally, it is hard to find a successful case of violence reduction in Latin American urban areas without political leadership and civic engagement.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 PERU: UNEQUAL GROWTH AND WEAK INSTITUTIONS

From 2000 to 2014, Peru had a steady economic growth with an average GDP growth rate of 5.9% (EY Peru, 2014, p. 5). Peru's robust growth increased investments in social programs and generated employment, thereby reducing national poverty. However, despite a slight improvement of the GINI coefficient (The World Bank, 2015), there are persistent inequalities, particularly across rural-urban areas and within different ethnic factions. This has resulted in a disproportional distribution of growth benefits. Approximately 25% of the population, roughly 8 million people, are still below the poverty line. Poverty is deepest among people from indigenous origins and living in remote rural areas: the national rural poverty rate is almost 50% (The World Bank, 2015). Last but not least, Peru is a country with deep-rooted racism insomuch as 28% of Peruvians feel part of a discriminated group (Latinobarometro, 2011).

Peru has become the world's largest producer and exporter of coca leaves and cocaine (UNODC, 2014). A study from the IMF found that illegal coca leaves and cocaine might have accounted for almost 1% of the country's total GDP in 2009 (Pedroni & Verdugo Yepes, 2011, p. 5). However, this figure could be much higher. In 2009, the president of the Peruvian bureau against drugs stated that the country's exports of cocaine accounted for US\$22 billion, equivalent to 17% of the GDP in that year (RPP, 2009). During the last ten years, many politicians have been prosecuted for drug trafficking and money laundering—congressmen, governors, and mayors. Thus, parts of the government are captured by organized crime. "The lesson learned by the drug traffickers over the years was that a linkage with politics in the most direct possible way is convenient. Coca leaders seek to become authorities and even parliamentarians. The most important *narcos* have 'wooded' the well-established political parties..." (Lauer, 2015)

Not surprisingly perhaps, only 12% of Peruvians believe their fellow citizens comply with the law, the lowest rate in Latin America, which has a regional average of 31% (Lagos & Dammert, 2012). One of the reasons behind the mistrust in the rule of law is corruption. Some 4 out of 5 Peruvians believe that a police officer is likely to receive a bribe; likewise, police, judiciary and Congress are perceived as the most corrupt institutions in the country (ProEtica, 2012). As the agencies and

public officers called to enforce the law lack legitimacy and capacity to do so, the fight against crime and violence is difficult, even impossible.

2.2 DECENTRALIZATION IN THE NEW CENTURY

Another important phenomenon of the last decade has been the decentralization process that started in 2002. Now there are 25 regional governments with elected governors, and both regional governments and municipalities received more responsibilities and resources to manage autonomously. In some cases, the decentralization process included managing the royalties from extractive industries because the regional government and municipalities could receive and distribute half of the total royalty amount. Nevertheless, political and fiscal decentralization did not improve the efficacy of governance and service delivery as expected: “local governments have not been able to use fully their allocated budgets, especially regarding much needed capital investment projects” (Loayza, Rigolini, & Calvo-Gonzalez, 2011, p. 28).

There were problems with the decentralization process itself. It took almost ten years for the central government to transfer all the required functions and resources together to the regional and local governments, so during that period they had resources but no legal framework to spend them, or *vice versa*, responsibilities with no resources to manage. In addition, the central government imposed a set of bureaucratic processes and technical requirements that increased the complexity of government spending and budget management, particularly in the case of new public investment projects. Even if local governments had good intentions such as increasing civic engagement, the activities and requirements could overwhelm the amateur government offices. Local constraints were key. Political barriers, poor alignment to local needs, and, mainly, limited local capacity to deal with the new duties and regulations reduced the regional and local governments’ efficiency. In the meanwhile, citizens’ demands towards their local governments increased. Moreover, decentralization represented an opportunity for local networks to capture the new resources. Gradually, some of these became strong crime networks with one foot in government and the other in illegal activities.

2.3 VIOLENCE TRENDS IN PERU

In 2015, Peru climbed from the position 110 to 92 in the Global Peace Index¹ (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015), arguably because of the decrease in the internal conflict with the remnants of the political guerrilla movement Shining Path. This is good news, but it also presents critical challenges for the future. The perception of crime, followed by the number of homicides and access to arms, are the indicators that push down the country's overall ranking in the index.² The report highlights an increasing "peace inequality". The most peaceful countries are strengthening their situation, while the most violent are deteriorating. Peru needs to jump into the peaceful half of the ranking to avoid being trapped in violence that could become even worse in the coming years. More importantly, "countries that have weak rule of law, high levels of intergroup grievances and high levels of inequality are more likely to experience deteriorations in peace as urbanization increases" (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015, p. 3).

Accordingly, a lack of safety and security is the main concern for 46% of Peruvians, while economic issues, such as poverty and employment, are cited only by 28% (Carrión, Zárate, & Zechmeister, 2014, p. 129). Inversely, in 2006 economic issues were the main concern for 71.4% and security only 10.2% (Carrión, Zárate, & Zechmeister, 2014, p. 130). This important change in relative perception does not seem highly correlated to the crime victimization rate, namely when a person experiences crime. In 2014, the crime victimization rate was 30.6%, only four more percentage points than 2006 (26.2%), and even less than 2010 (31.1%) (Carrión, Zárate, & Zechmeister, 2014, p. 131).³ Why has crime become the main concern for Peruvians in the last

¹ The Global Peace Index 2015 is prepared by the Institute of Economics and Peace. It is an effort to measure the situation of violence and peace in the world with a comprehensive view, as it has 23 quantitative and qualitative indicators classified into three themes: international and domestic conflicts, security and militarization. The data are collected and calculated by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The report defines peace as "the absence of violence and the absence of fear of violence".

² Another key indicator for Peru is the probability of violent demonstrations. I will not elaborate on this particular issue which is not related to urban violence but it is important to mention that social conflicts derived from extractive industries (oil, mining and logging) have triggered violent demonstrations in the country. Two other frequent expressions of violence in Peru are activities related to illegal mining and logging, and the linkages among coca growing, drug trafficking, and the residual presence of the political guerrilla movement Shining Path in the Amazonian Highlands. In a wider perspective, those activities also have some connections with crime.

³ The survey's question on crime victimization from 2010 is: "Have you been a victim of crime in the last 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, fraud, blackmail, extortion, threats, or some other type of crime in the last 12 months?" In 2006-2008, the question was: "Have you been a victim of crime in the last 12 months?" This change may explain the slight increase in 2010. (Carrión, Zárate, & Zechmeister, 2014, p. 130)

years? The Latinobarometro (2015) attributes it to the recent economic development: “To the extent that countries improve their economic situation, crime primarily captures the attention of citizens” (2015, p. 57). Nevertheless, this explanation is partial at best. Other reasons can explain the increase in crime perception in Peru, including media attention to important crime events and the number of homicide rates in certain cities.

2.4 MEDIA COVERAGE

Systematic extortions, hired assassinations, and drug-related violent attacks have attracted persistent media coverage in the last years. The most traditional newspaper of the country quoted the National Police Department stating that 288 people were killed by hired hitmen in the country between January and September 2014, accounting for 30% of the 972 homicides in that period (El Comercio, 2014). According to the news, some bands are recruiting and training children to kill, extort and provide services to drug traffickers. In 2013, the most read newspaper highlighted that more than 170 teenagers were arrested during the year in La Libertad (a northern department on the Peruvian Coast) and charged with assassinations, extortions, violent robberies, drug trafficking and illegal gun possession (El Trome, 2013). Moreover, media coverage has included attempted kidnappings and extortion in sensitive locations. In one instance, this involved a private school by leaving grenades in the doors and even murdering the principal. In addition, there is constant news on drug-related crimes and murders in El Callao, the most important port of the country. Overall, whereas these cases do not affect a large number of citizens, the media has devoted numerous pages and TV minutes to them in the last months, and the brutality of some of these episodes may be increasing the sense of fear.⁴

2.5 CRIME AND VIOLENCE ON THE NORTHERN COAST OF PERU

Peru’s national rate of homicides is one of the lowest in the region, but the figures are different and even dramatic at the local level. In 2014, Peru had 6.7 murders per 100,000 inhabitants,

⁴ The webpage of El Comercio, the most visited site in the country, created the tag “sicarios juveniles” (young hitmen) with 45 posts between September 2014 and October 2015. Furthermore, America TV has the most viewed news show in the country. The tag “extorsión” (extortion) in its website shows 286 videos since August 2012 to October 2014, four reports per month on average. El Trome sells almost 800,000 newspapers per day; the tag “Asesinatos en el Callao” (Murders in El Callao) has more than 50 posts in four months.

much less than the highest rates in Latin America in the previous year: Colombia (30.8), Guatemala (39.9), and Venezuela (53.7) (Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal, 2015). However, many Peruvian cities, primarily on the Northern Coast of the country, are witnessing an exponential increase in homicide rates in the last years. Trujillo, the most violent city in the country four years ago, maintains a high average (20.8), but it has been reached or surpassed by neighbouring cities (see Annex 1).

From 2011 to 2014, Tumbes increased from 4.7 to 37.1 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, Barranca from 5 to 25.1, and Chimbote from 12.5 to 18.2 (Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal, 2015). In Tumbes and Barranca, the ratio has increased more than five times in only three years, and even if they are not mentioned in the ranking of the 50 most violent cities in the world by homicide rates, they should appear (Pashico, 2015). Accordingly, the highest rates of crime victimization of the country are also located on the Northern Coast (see Annex 2).

2.6 TUMBES: A GROWING CITY

This MP analyzes the problem of violent crime in Tumbes, an emerging city on the Peruvian Northern Coast located in the department with the same name. From 2001 to 2012, the economic growth rate of the department was 6.3% (INEI, 2013). More growth has also accelerated urbanization. Although Tumbes already had 81% of its population in urban areas in 2001, according to estimates, the percentage is about 95% today (INEI, 2009) (see Annex 3). Tumbes is the smallest department in the country. For instance, the province of Tumbes has 164,404 inhabitants, less than half of the population of the largest provinces on the Northern Coast (INEI, 2013).

Urbanization is not only reflected in demographic changes, but also in economic transformations. Tumbes city, in particular, is almost on the border with Ecuador. The region has been the least active participant in the investment boom that has occurred on the Northern Coast the last ten years. The city has small business and industrial activity, and commerce is predominantly informal. It does not have many big national or international companies. For instance, private clinics and private education have not arrived yet to the region in the same way that they have in other Northern capitals (Peru Economico, 2012). Nevertheless, Tumbes is the region with the

fastest growth in the country in the last couple of years. Agriculture and tourism are driving its growth. A key sector of the economy is services due to the increase in tourism facilities and visitors to its beauty offshore in recent years. In agriculture, the main products are rice, banana and lemon (Valdiviezo, 2014).

3 INCREASE IN HOMICIDES DUE TO VIOLENT CRIME IN TUMBES

3.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT

In 2014, the city of Tumbes had the highest homicide rate in the country: 37.1 homicides per 100,000 people (Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal, 2015). As described in this section, most of these are “qualified homicides”⁵. In addition, the murders in Tumbes involve guns; they occur in public places such as the street or a restaurant; and they are increasingly targeting young men.⁶

3.2 TOWARDS A PROFILE OF MURDERS IN TUMBES

Two changes have occurred in the crime trends of Tumbes during the last four years.⁷ Firstly, there is a sharp increase in qualified murders from 2011 to 2014. In this short period, qualified homicides have gone from 64% to 89% of the total of murders (Annex 4). The rise of this kind of murder has been high and fast. In absolute numbers, qualified homicides increased seven times in three years—from 7 to 48 (Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal, 2015). This is the reason why Tumbes reached the highest homicide rate in the country in 2014. Hence, a fundamental challenge in this city is to stop that trend and prevent the spread of more violence.

Secondly, the proportion of murdered young people is becoming higher. In Tumbes, young people from 15 to 29 years old account for 43% of victims now, compared to 18% in 2011 (Annex

⁵ According to the Peruvian penal code, a “qualified homicide” occurs in the following circumstances: 1. Ferocity for profit or pleasure. 2. Facilitating or concealing another crime. 3. Cruelty or premeditation. 4. Involving fire, explosion, poison or any other means capable of endangering the life or health of others. 5. When the victim is a member of the National Police or the Army, a judge or public prosecutor.

⁶ Public information on crimes is more accessible and better compiled today through the reports published by the “Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal” since 2013. This platform links and compares information from police offices, courts, and national surveys. However, it is still difficult to identify the reasons for these crimes and the apparent increase in trend in hired assassinations, extortions, and kidnapping in Tumbes.

⁷ This data is from Tumbes/department. Whereas there is not much specific data on the city, districts or province, there is data available from the department. As Tumbes/city concentrates the major number of population of the department (more than 65%), departmental information provides a general idea of the violent crime in the city.

5). The other relevant group is people between 30 and 44 years old, which increased from 36% to 41%. Summing up these two groups, they account for 84% of murders in the city (Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal, 2015).

Additionally, more than 90% of homicides target men, and, some 70.4% of murders are in public places. More than half of them occurred on the street, followed by commercial places such as bars, restaurants or hotels, and they are using guns 85.2% of the time (Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal, 2015, p. 113). Summarizing, the profile of a murder in Tumbes is an assassination in a public space, primarily in the street. Murderers are using guns and target men between 15 and 44 years old, but most of them are younger than 29.

It is important to explore the crime motives, but the current data is insufficient. According to the national data, the main reason of murders in Tumbes is “revenge” (41%). However, the same percentage of murders (41%) are “not specified” (Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal, 2015). This leaves excessive room for speculation. Also, it is confusing what “revenge” means. This broad category may comprise different motives such as personal revenge or a grudge match between rival gangs. In the case of gang rivalry, it would overlap with the category of “organized crime”. Moreover, it is not possible to know whether the killer was a hired assassin nor whether murders due to kidnapping and extortion are also included in this category. Furthermore, murders with causes that are “not specified” obviously ensure a large margin of error when exploring motive. Another problem in the published typology is the decision of putting together “common crime” and “organized crime” as one single category since 2014, even though they were two different categories previously (see Annex 6).

Consequently, better statistical information on the causes of crime with no overlap between categories, consistent definition and interpretations, and more research to determine the “not specified” causes would provide a better understanding of violence dynamics and criminal trends. Meanwhile, Tumbes seems to have more than 100 murders committed by hitmen between 2011 and 2014, but the high peaks started in 2012 (La Republica, 2014).

3.2.1 Murders in Tumbes since 2012: Settling Arguments and Hired Killers

In absolute numbers, Tumbes registered seven qualified homicides in 2011, 43 in 2012, 39 in 2013, and 48 in 2014. Evidently, the biggest change occurred in 2012. News stories from the Internet and newspapers published in 2012 were analyzed to determine some common patterns in the homicides. Not surprisingly, they are consistent with the profile of murders previously mentioned—they occur in public spaces, use firearms and target young men—but there are some other characteristics that shed light on the reason why the murders are happening.

Many of the murders registered in Tumbes in recent years were perpetrated by hitmen. The newspapers reported on seven out of the 43 murders that occurred in Tumbes in 2012. These seven victims were males younger than 45 years old. Three of the victims were killed inside a bar, two in the street (one of them in front of his house), one in his taxi, and another one was found dead. Moreover, six of them suffered an ambush by hitmen riding motorcycles. In at least four cases there were more than three hitmen involved, and five of the victims received two or more gunshots, sometimes five or even seven. According to the witnesses, most of the perpetrators were young, almost teenagers.

These data account for the brutality, premeditation and audacity of at least 20% of the qualified murders in Tumbes in 2012. The masterminds of the murders had to recruit the hitmen, which also unveils a market of hired murders. As the experience of other Northern cities in Peru has shown, this modality of murders is usually linked to extortion and settling arguments between gangs.

4 EXPLAINING VIOLENT CRIME IN TUMBES

Tumbes has persistently grown in the last decade. There are new economic activities and investments that have created an emerging middle class by reducing poverty. However, homicides rates have increased quickly and different types of crime are threatening the peace. Why has Tumbes been increasingly exposed to crime, violence and murder despite its growth and urbanization?

An article on the World Economic Forum’s website asks: “Why isn’t economic growth reducing Latin America’s homicide rates?” (Muggah, 2015). The answer is consistent with the findings of the Global Peace Index: urbanization may lead to violence if there are grievances, inequalities, and weak institutions. Complementarily, the article mentions “aspirational crime”, namely membership and belonging, in addition to organized crime and drug trafficking. This analysis utilizes a similar framework to describe the conditions and triggers that contributed to violence in Tumbes. These elements provide a theoretical framework for the analysis, but also imply that most Latin American cities that witness an increase in violence have common patterns. Hence, a relevant challenge is to identify specific characteristics and drivers in Tumbes to understand the violence in this city.

4.1 DEEP CONDITIONS⁸

4.1.1 Unequal Growth and Persistent Inequality

Inequality is more important than poverty when measuring conditions underlying violence. Tumbes has significant levels of poverty and inequality, but it is not the poorest and most unequal region in the country. In 2012, Tumbes was ranked 175 out of more than 1800 Peruvian districts in terms of human development; its index is 0.530, which improved since 2003 when it was 0.386 (PNUD Peru, 2013). Consequently, Tumbes is in the highest 10% of Peruvian districts according to the Human Development Index that combines education, health and income. Accordingly, in 2012, the monthly income per capita was S/.730.5 (about US\$292) in Tumbes, above the national average of S/.696.9 (about US\$279).

Nevertheless, poverty incidence in Tumbes is still high at 20.1% (MIDIS, 2015). In addition, services are limited for many citizens in the region where this city is located. Thus, Tumbes has about 55% access to water and sanitation, electricity, and telephone service together (MIDIS, 2015). The inequality gap is highlighted when assessing the multidimensional poverty desegregated by poverty clusters within the districts (INEI, 2013). In Tumbes, most of the city has

⁸ I am using “deep conditions” because the analysis is not claiming causality. Instead, it focuses on the economic, social and political environment in the region that led to a sort of “perfect storm” for violent crime.

between 14.4% and 22.5% poverty incidence, while there are some areas with almost no poverty (see Annex 7).

Tumbes reflects the low educational level of the country, but also the opportunity gaps between urban and rural areas. Despite the relatively high average growth rate of the last 10 years, only 58.9% of the population above 18 years old finished secondary school in Tumbes city in 2012. Furthermore, the percentage of primary school teachers of first and second grade who have engaged in specialized training in Peru is 10.4% in urban areas and 4.6% in rural (Ministerio de Educacion, 2014). However, in Tumbes only 2.1% of teachers in urban areas and none of them in rural ones received specialized training. Moreover, the percentage of classrooms in good conditions in Tumbes is shameful: 4.4% in urban areas and 2.3% in rural ones. Not surprisingly, primary school education outcomes are low. Tumbes is below the national average in the “satisfactory” level of the reading and math assessment for second grade children with 38.9% and 17.4%, respectively (Ministerio de Educacion, 2014). The results in urban areas are much better than the rural ones, as a clear example of opportunity gaps for children and youth.

These figures express the sharp contrast of income and quality of life that Peru is experiencing in spite of its economic growth. Some prosperous residential zones in the capital cities, like Tumbes, coexist with dramatic pockets of poverty. This situation is consistent with the Global Peace Index findings that violence is more likely to emerge in a context of fast urbanization plus persistent inequality. This hypothesis appears to be valid across Latin American countries where poverty on its own is not the main cause of violence (Fajnzylber, Lederman, & Loayza, 2000).

4.1.2 Precarious Jobs

Unemployment is not the main problem in Tumbes because it only stands at 5.3% of the workforce. The main economic problems related to the incidence of violence are the precarious and usually difficult employment conditions and limited economic opportunities for youth. Informal employment is defined as employees working in the informal sector, with no social security and benefits provided by law funded by the employer, and/or unpaid family workers whether in the formal or informal sector (INEI 2014, 96). In Tumbes 78% of the population is working in the informal sector. In other words, eight out of ten workers do not have contracts,

do not receive benefits such as vacation and insurance, and/or work for tips or even free. Many of them are working in precarious conditions: for example, those who are working as domestic servants for middle or high income families. Tumbes has a buoyant service sector, but many jobs are either informal, part-time or unpaid. In this city, 35% of the labour force is comprised of young people (OSEL, 2013), but 30% of young people do not study nor work, while 27% are underemployed.

There is a sharp difference between the young and privileged people who access jobs in the public sector and those who are family workers with no payment. The best paid jobs for youth in Tumbes are in the government, but this sector absorbs only 8% of young workers. Additionally, more than 40% of the young people work in the private sector, while 21% are independent workers. Finally, to illustrate the informality and lack of decent work, more than two thirds of young, paid workers do not have a contract. From those who are working in the more formal private and public sectors, only 68% have health insurance in Tumbes (OSEL, 2013). Informal employment and lack of youth opportunities must be seen as one sign of the deep social and economic inequalities that the country faces. Young people do not engage in violence because they do not have money; instead, they perceive and experience injustice: “Young people take up the gun not because they are poor, but because they are angry” (Mercy Corps, 2015).

4.1.3 Rule of Law: Distrust in Institutions and Perception of Corruption

The two institutions in charge of safeguarding rule of law in any country are the police and the judiciary. In Peru, they do not have legitimacy. More than 40% of citizens nationwide distrust the judiciary (see Annex 8). In addition, one out of three Peruvians do not trust police, and this percentage is similar in Tumbes (34.1%). Not surprisingly, 87% of Peruvians in the main cities of the Northern Coast, such as Tumbes, say that their fellow citizens do not respect the law (ProEtica, 2012). The percentage is so high that there is no doubt that quality of institutions is a crucial challenge. Evidently, lack of law enforcement is an opportunity for crime. The situation is even more severe because a number of current and former police officers are directly engaged with criminal networks at different levels. This data is also consistent with the Global Peace Index regarding the relevance of rule of law and trust in institutions as key elements to deter the increase of violence in contexts of urbanization. In fact, rule of law “was found to be the most

significant variable in explaining safety and security in countries with higher levels of urbanization” (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015, pág. 30).

The lack of effectiveness of the law enforcement is evident. In the first semester of 2015, the police registered 26 homicides in the region of Tumbes, but only one was resolved (Dia Peru, 2015). People do not trust in police and judiciary not only because they are slow or not well trained, but also because they think they are corrupt. Four out of ten Peruvians in urban cities think that it is possible to bribe a policeman. These figures are even higher for judges (69%), employees of regional governments (66%), and municipalities (68%) (ProEtica, 2012). Interestingly, young people from 18 to 24 years old show the same or even a slightly higher proportion of distrust. Moreover, Tumbes is in the top ten cities that are considered as corrupt by their own citizens. In Tumbes, 84% of those surveyed perceived it as a corrupt or very corrupt city. Interestingly, ten years ago most of the citizens from Tumbes already thought they were living in a corrupt city. Therefore, corruption within institutions was a constant but violence has recently increased. In this context, what triggered crime and violence in Tumbes in recent years?

4.2 TRIGGERS

Tumbes shares common patterns with the rest of the largest Peruvian cities and with many violent cities in Latin America: urbanization and modernization, increasing growth and income per capita, profound inequalities and grievances, lack of rule of law, and corruption. All of these characteristics are fertile ground for crime and violence. Nonetheless, it is necessary to identify some situations that have triggered violence and crime in Tumbes. Specifically, they are flagrant and persistent cases of corruption in the local and regional governments, traffic routes and high prices for drugs due to its particular location, spread of crime across the Northern Coast as an effect of fighting against crime in the neighbouring city of Trujillo, and complementary “crime markets” as a result of the new economic situation.

4.2.1 Corruption Scandals in Municipal and Regional Governments

The years with an increase of homicides in Tumbes match with the period of two corrupt authorities: the governor of the region and the mayor of the city. The governor of Tumbes 2011-2015, Gerardo Viñas, was imprisoned on 1993 because he was part of the Shining Path insurgency

since the eighties; he was accused of murdering a police officer, and participating in the “popular schools” of Shining Path. He was condemned to 10 years, but left prison after eight due to a pardon. When he was elected governor ten years later, immediately he hired many former members of Shining Path as managers and directors of the regional government, and requested a presidential pardon for the imprisoned leader of Shining Path, Abimael Guzman. He has been accused of 25 cases of corruption, including hiring ghost workers and selling more than S/.20 million (US\$8 million) of public lands for only S/. 2,500 (US\$1,000) (Peru21, 2014). The Anti-Corruption Attorney Office’s in Tumbes released information in 292 cases of corruption in the region. According to them, the previous authorities misused S/.66million (US\$26.4 million), so that more than 800 government officials are being prosecuted (RPP, 2015). Moreover, some journalists have claimed that they received threats and were frightened by the governor’s representatives and bodyguards (El Comercio, 2014). Today, Gerardo Viñas is a fugitive, and three of his former government bodyguards were killed since he disappeared. That is not all. The former mayor of the province of Tumbes 2011-2014 was also accused of corruption and she is a fugitive too.

In sum, two former authorities are fugitives of the law, charged with corruption in Tumbes, in addition to tens of government officials prosecuted. They were in office between 2011 and 2015, the same period of the increase in violence.⁹ Nevertheless, it is important to understand that corruption networks do not work like traditional mafias, cartels and clientele; instead, they are malleable networks of people who join and leave according to the situation, stakeholders’ interests, and particular common objectives (Mujica, 2009). Networks do not depend on a head and they constantly adapt to the market and government conditions. For the common citizen, corrupt behaviour becomes necessary and even accepted to obtain benefits from the government. As a result, a sense of impunity spreads all over society. Although the heads might

⁹ This is not the only case on the Northern Coast of Peru. For instance, Chimbote, in the department of Ancash, has three previous authorities accused of serious cases of corruption. The two last mayors of the province of Santa—who are at the same time mayors of the district of Chimbote—have been condemned to prison. The former one is in jail with a sentence of 15 years, and the recently elected one is a fugitive with a seven year sentence (he started in office in January 2015). However, the gravest case was embodied by the former governor of Ancash Cesar Alvarez. He was in office from 2007 until 2014, when he resigned to be investigated, and then imprisoned. Cesar Alvarez, alias “La Bestia” (the Beast) worked in complicity with crime networks in Ancash and Chimbote, by which went to jail with 20 other accomplices, including the former mayor of Salta.

be in jail, the probability of capture and punishment of the wider components of the network is low and diffuse. They are embedded all across the society.

4.2.2 Routes and Prices of Drug

One of the main forces that moves crime is profits. Thus, both the routes and the prices of illegal drugs, mainly cocaine, affect the dynamic of crime and violence in continents, countries and cities. Thus, an increase in consumption in Europe and South America, along with the slight reduction in the big US market, has expanded cocaine's supply, routes and destinations (Garzón Vergara, 2015). As a result, the domestic routes are in constant change, looking for efficiency improvements and avoiding (or engaging with) local institutions as needed. Ports and borders are traditional sources of violence because of the transit of commodities, and Tumbes is not an exception. Exports through ports require knowledge about logistics and local networks to facilitate the transportation of larger quantities of the drug, so the second most frequent way to export cocaine is across territorial borders. Given the difficult transit in the Andean and Amazonian borders between Ecuador and Peru, Tumbes has become a convenient route to export drugs to Ecuador (from there, to Colombia to be transported to the US or Europe).

Secondly, the local price of cocaine attracts local criminal networks. Cocaine is more expensive on the border, and its price gradually decreases in ports, transit cities and production zones. In Tumbes, one kilogram of cocaine costs between US\$1,600 and US\$2,000, but once it crosses the border it can cost US\$3,000. Tumbes has the second highest prices of cocaine in the country (see Annex 9). For instance, one of the most important drug clans in the country, "Los Panchos", transports tons of cocaine from Ucayali, Huánuco and Ayacucho to Lima, and then to Ecuador by passing through Tumbes (Pereira, 2012). However, these organizations are not the transnational cartels of the 1980s and 1990s.¹⁰ They are mutating to local, fragmented and diversified crime networks that constantly move looking for new markets.

¹⁰ Maybe the last transnational drugs kingpin is Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman who is the leader of the Sinaloa Cartel. However, instead of a pyramidal organization responding to him all across the region, the Sinaloa Cartel is a decentralized network with different hubs governed by local organizations and traffickers. Because of this reason the Sinaloa Cartel is called "the Federation".

4.2.3 The “Cockroach Effect” and Crime Diversification

Cockroaches are social insects. When one of them finds a new piece of food, they mobilize together to harness it, until fumigation arrives and they spread into different places across the house where there is no poison and there are other sources of food. A similar phenomenon occurs with criminal networks. Since 2012, bribery and extortion reports have increased in another city of the Northern Coast, Trujillo, by 50%. There are more than 30,000 units of public transportation threatened with being burned or with killing the drivers if they do not pay a fixed cash amount every single day. As a consequence, crime networks revenues are more than US\$5 million in Trujillo only from bus and taxi extortions. Back in 2007, Trujillo was the only city in the country reporting this kind of systematic extortion towards commerce and business (Oficina Nacional de Diálogo y Sostenibilidad, 2014). It attracted the attention of the media and police, but this plague gradually spread towards Tumbes, Piura, Lambayeque, Chiclayo and Barranca, and continued in Trujillo too. All of them are on the Northern Coast, and many of them have become the most violent cities in the country in the last three years. This is the “cockroach effect”, namely the “displacement of criminal networks from one city/state/region to another within a given country or from one country to another in search of safer havens and more pliable state authorities” (Bagley, 2012, p. 11).

In a context of economic growth, increase in consumption, middle class expansion, and new local businesses represent new markets for criminal networks (Garzón Vergara, 2015). Some of them are part of cocaine’s transport, micro-commercialization, and/or export. However, these activities are shared with other crimes with similar (or even more) profitable revenues, as well as less risky ones, such as extortion, kidnapping, illegal goods (e.g., stolen cars, cell phones and computers), services (e.g., prostitution and hitmen), illegal extraction of natural resources like mining and logging, and so on. Analogous to Trujillo, the media in Tumbes increasingly report a culture of extortion and hired assassinations, in addition to smuggling and robberies, which did not have similar intensity in past years.

5 CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

5.1 PUBLIC HEALTH

Crime and violence have severe effects in society. They cause loss of life and, because of that, they are a threat to human rights. They affect people's health, not only in the short run but also in the long term by increasing the number of people with anxiety disorders and disabilities, for example. Victims are likely to suffer from trauma and physical and mental disorders. Given the diverse range of possible consequences on people's well-being, violence is considered a public health issue.

5.2 ECONOMY

Crime and violence have a direct impact on the economy for many reasons. In the case of households, it is evident for robberies, but violence also causes deaths or disabilities that result in a decrease in household income. In middle income countries like Peru, in a city like Tumbes in particular, this could represent a significant decline in the quality of life; in absolute terms, some vulnerable households are likely to fall (or return) below the poverty line. Moreover, crime and violence represent an important cost for the government and a decrease in revenues. They lead to more investment in security such as police, weapons, munitions or equipment, as well as public health costs derived from violence. Thirdly, insecurity scares investment away. Extortion discourages people from reinvesting and intimidates companies, so they internalize violence costs and even indirectly fund crime by paying the criminal's demands. There are many other possible impacts on the economy. According to the Global Peace Index, the estimated cost of violence in Peru was almost US\$24 billion in 2014 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015), almost 12% of that year's GDP.

5.3 POLITICAL CLIMATE

Criminal violence is also a threat for democracy. People concerned about insecurity might adopt authoritarian tendencies and preferences, as citizens lose faith in the regime's ability to provide adequate public security. Therefore, there could be less support to democratic alternatives to guarantee safety (Carrión, Zárate, & Zechmeister, 2014). Militarization of street security is one of

the most controversial methods, even without proof of effectiveness; in fact, it is very likely to do more harm (Gagne, 2015). The former president of Peru Alan Garcia had proposed to send military forces to the streets as part of his program for the 2016 elections. Furthermore, another dangerous consequence is the decision of citizens to take justice into their own hands. Thus, an infamous Facebook page called “Chapa tu Choro y Déjalo Parálítico” (“Catch your Thief and Leave him Crippled”) has encouraged Peruvian citizens to capture and lynch common delinquents in their neighbourhoods, and then to publish the picture on social networks. This is one of the maximum expressions of distrust in institutions and absence of the rule of law.

5.4 SOCIAL ISSUES

Finally, crime and violence harm the country’s social fabric by increasing interpersonal distrust and fear, and, in turn, grievances intensify and create tensions between groups. Additionally, distrust reproduces many of the existing deep conditions, such as corruption and weak rule of law. In short, violence leads to more violence.

6 POLICY QUESTION

What are the policies that the government of Tumbes needs to adopt in order to decrease the high rates of violence, build resilience and foster sustainable peace?

6.1 CLIENT

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

For the IDB, citizen security in Latin America and the Caribbean is a development priority. In other words, given the strong ties linking citizen security and the development of Latin America and the Caribbean, the IDB supports efforts to tackle crime and violence. The IDB offers tailor-made answers to insecurity across the region. Accordingly, its programs focus on prevention and strengthening institutions. The main thematic priorities of the IDB in citizen security are:

- Social prevention: Mitigating risk factors that trigger criminal behavior with a focus on vulnerable groups such as youth, women, indigenous populations and Afro-descendants.

- Police: Advocating for a more effective community-based policing using data management technology.
- Rehabilitation, reinsertion and criminal justice: Improving the criminal justice system to increase access to justice and encourage rehabilitation and reinsertion into society.
- Governance: Connecting institutions dealing with citizen security.

Accordingly, the Citizen Security Initiative launched in 2012 supports countries in the region by addressing three challenges to effective policymaking: 1) the capacity to generate, compile and analyze data to make informed decisions; 2) institutional strengthening, and development and evaluation of innovative solutions to generate applied knowledge; 3) and platforms of regional dialogue and cooperation to share lessons to manage and assess public policies.

More specifically, the IDB frames its work in citizen security through the establishment of specific “Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety” (OPG-CCPS). The OPG-CCPS identifies three priority target areas or components: public policy planning, violence prevention, and select activities relating to control, criminal justice, and rehabilitation. In the operations to prevent violence, the IDB must address the specific circumstances of each country by adapting the comparatively most promising practices while, at the same time, promoting a regional platform of cooperation suited to the broader features of the violence phenomenon. The IDB offers an integrated package to address the violence phenomenon from an interagency and multisector perspective, with appropriate levels of institutional strengthening and territorial focus, and harnessing inputs from a wide range of disciplines, such as public health, education, urban infrastructure, new information technologies, violence prevention activities, and others (Inter-American Development Bank, 2009).

6.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE POLICY REFORM

- Reduce the number of homicides and stop the violence escalation
- Address the deterioration of deep conditions and triggers of crime
- Promote peaceful coexistence and participative solutions

7 POLICY SOLUTIONS

This section describes a series of approaches distributed within three broader fields (Development, Peacebuilding and Security). Their differences and complementarities are analyzed as a framework to establish policy recommendations for Tumbes. In order to conceptually delimit and assemble the three fields, a set of existing policy approaches to reduce crime and violence is embedded within each field's boundaries. Clearly, there are inevitable overlaps between some of them, as well as contradictions that will be described.

The selection of policy approaches is consistent with the framework proposed by Caroline Moser and Patty Mcilwaine (2006) to tackle different forms of violence in Latin America: Public Health, Conflict Transformation, Human Rights, Social Cohesion, Criminal Justice, Citizen Security and Environment Design. One more approach (Economic Opportunities) has been added to enrich the framework, so the final make up looks as shown in the Graph 1:

GRAPH 1: FIELDS AND APPROACHES TO DEAL WITH VIOLENCE



Sources: Moser, 2004; Moser & Mcilwaine, 2006, Inter-American Development Bank, 2012.

The nexus between *security* and *development* has become a relevant topic for both scholars and practitioners in order to tackle the complexity of vulnerable scenarios (Spear & Williams, 2012), to reduce the gap between short and long run solutions, and to stop the emergence of spirals of violence. Moreover, there is an increasing deterioration of many Latin American urban areas into “fragile cities”, where public spaces become the main target of violent crime and become “ungoverned, unpatrolled and impenetrable built-up areas” (Jutersonke & Krause, 2013, p. 5). This new scenario brings the necessity of merging the approaches and, consequently, breaking the barriers amongst fields.

As *peacebuilding* has grown as a field since the last decades of the twentieth century by addressing interstate and intrastate conflicts, mainly with political purposes, in order to reduce violence, safeguard lives and human dignity, the emergence of urban violence is a relatively new challenge for the field. Therefore, the peacebuilding community is still attempting to find its role in the city, to match its methodologies with the dynamic of urban non-state actors such as crime networks and gangs, and to build bridges with the communities of practice involved in security and development: “Peacebuilding in the city requires a different approach, one that seeks to harness the symbiotic relationship between the public sphere and the urban government, and the more informal process of conflict mitigation.” (Jutersonke & Krause, 2013, p. 7). Despite the frequent segregation and even clashes among fields of study, with different paradigms and priorities, a dialogue among development, peacebuilding and security is more than necessary to rise to the occasion.

7.1 DEVELOPMENT

7.1.1 Public Health

The objective of public health interventions is prevention through reduction of individual risk factors. This is achieved by addressing primarily youth through social protection, education, cultural activities, and behavioral change (Moser, 2004). The public health approach takes into account the social and physical environment to change individual behavior. Accordingly, both policymakers and communities recognize the relevance of addressing risk and protective factors to prevent violence, such as the use of drugs and alcohol and gun possession. The approach

includes working in the community, family and other social dimensions, as well as with specific groups with major risk based on gender, age or ethnicity. Public health pays attention to some types of violence such as child maltreatment, intimate partner violence, sexual violence, youth violence, elder abuse, and self-directed violence (like suicide). Relevant interventions should tackle several forms of violence given that these are interrelated.

The key premise, based on empirical evidence, is that violence can be prevented in the same way as diseases and injuries (World Health Organization, 2010). Accordingly, public health specialists recommend several interventions focused on vulnerable groups, predominantly children and women. Thus, programs to increase healthy and safe relationships between parents and children have emerging evidence that they reduce youth violence, as well as developing life skills in children and adolescents through preschool and, especially, social development programs. Furthermore, reducing alcohol availability is also an effective solution whether by regulating sales, raising prices (or taxes), rehabilitation, or improving drinking environments. Finally, one important intervention with security implications and evidence from public health research is to lessen access to weapons, guns and knives by restricting licensing and purchase, along with enforcing bans.

While the interventions above have an important impact on youth violence, a special concern for Latin America and Peru, other complementary interventions for different types of violence are changing cultural and social norms with social marketing strategies, and promoting gender equality in the school, through teaching life skills and providing financial opportunities. Finally, programs to identify victims with the aim of providing them care and support have some influence in reducing domestic partner violence.

7.1.2 Economic Opportunities

Consistent with the evidence that inequality is a driver of violence rather than poverty, there is no clear evidence that youth employment alone can reduce violent behaviors. Some successful employment programs have failed to reduce violence, in some cases because crime still pays better than peaceful jobs. In other cases, it is because there are other reasons for engaging in violent crime such as status, belonging and rage. However, programs that instill life skills such as

social, emotional and planning-related abilities and behaviors (e.g., self-control, responsibility, perseverance) may have better results to reduce violence as evidenced by some programs that are using cognitive behavioral therapy in the US and Africa (Blattman & Ralston, 2015).

While human capital investment through skills training may be important, programs that provide capital to future entrepreneurs and self-employers seem to have more impact, especially if complemented with training and mentoring (Blattman & Ralston, 2015). Finally, the better targeted the program, the more likelihood of success, particularly by reaching those with the least opportunities and the most vulnerable because they have the highest risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of violence.

An important finding is that youth employment programs are important because the communities involved perceive that unemployment is the key driver of violence¹¹. As people's perception is a relevant factor to consider in reducing violence, it is also relevant to generate policy responses that take this into account (The World Bank, 2011).¹² Finally, qualitative evidence shows that community members relate alcoholism and unemployment, which, as a vicious circle, are mutually enforcing (The World Bank, 2011).

7.2 PEACEBUILDING

7.2.1 Conflict Transformation

The purpose of this approach is resolution of conflict through dialogue, negotiation and other nonviolent, sustainable methodologies (Moser, 2004). Historically, this approach has been used for political violence. However, non-political violent groups, such as criminal organizations that have to deal with the law, are generally excluded from negotiation and peacebuilding processes. Nevertheless, this approach has been applied in Central America and the Caribbean by negotiating truce and ceasefire with gangs. Recent examples are the negotiation and truces with gangs in El Salvador, Honduras and Jamaica:

¹¹ According to the World Bank (2011), this is a constant pattern in different communities in South Africa, Kenya, Brazil and East Timor.

¹² This very interesting analysis of the World Bank leaves an open question: Could unemployment be not a cause but a symptom of a violent environment? Might it be the reason why people relate unemployment with violence, but, at the same time, confuse it with causation?

A gang truce is a nonviolent resolution to a larger conflict between groups that has an impact on general levels of violence and other forms of criminality within a community... Gang truces often involve dialogue and negotiations between multiple parties that seek to recalibrate the norms of conflict within and between groups for the purpose of reducing or eliminating violence and other crime. (Katz & Amayo, February 2015, p. 4)

However, the negotiation approach in El Salvador seems to have worsened the problem. The gangs have increased their political power and have used the truce as a strategy to gain time for rearming and making deals with drug cartels (Farah, 2016). Even though El Salvador reduced homicides rates during the truce, murders increased after a while. There is also evidence of more disappearances in parallel, and the gangs using the murder rates to blackmail the government. Unfortunately, the negotiations and truces in Honduras and Jamaica do not show the expected violence reduction in terms of murders (Katz & Amayo, February 2015).

A benefit-cost analysis of negotiating with gangs and other criminal organizations should not only include the short-term consequences, but also the long-run impact of the truce. Thus, as murders are likely to decrease in the short-run, the gangs gain legitimacy in the long one, both with the government—as an equal interlocutor—and with the community. Consequently, a truce must be a last measure when the government’s capacity for social control and tackling extreme violence is weak, presenting clear signs of fragility and vulnerability in the territory. Finally, the negotiation process needs to ensure clear behaviors, deliverables and results in the short-run from all the engaged parties. Accordingly, the government has to be prepared to respond to morally uncomfortable and legally controversial demands from the criminal organizations.

7.2.2 Human Rights

The human rights approach comprises efforts to advocate for and legally enforce human rights based on documented abuses of the government (Moser, 2004). Advocating for human rights has been a continuous theme in Latin America given the long history of dictatorships and government repression of opposition groups. However, it also applies to a general reduction of crime and urban violence as long as it aims to protect citizens’ rights to be free from the threat or victimization of violence (Moser & Mcilwaine, 2006).

Basically, those in charge of citizen protection are the states and the international community. Therefore, while governments are increasingly using military alternatives to tackle crime and urban violence, human rights violations become a potential threat. Experiences in Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Brazil and other Latin American countries have resulted in more violent responses, arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings in the name of security (David Gagne, 2015). Thus, the human rights approach within the peacebuilding field clearly opposes violent methods to deter and control crime that threat citizens' rights, human dignity and lives. Inversely, it advocates for peaceful solutions through bottom-up participation with campaigns and lobbying, including urging the government to respect and enforce human rights while deploying security alternatives.

7.2.3 Social Cohesion

This approach aims at rebuilding social capital, trust and cohesion within both formal and informal institutions such as family, community and the judiciary. Community based solutions to reintegrate youth, gangs and "maras"¹³ are some examples of this approach (Moser, 2004). Sound local organizations can be expressions of trust and unity within communities. However, while strengthening the social fabric is a noble goal by itself, it does not necessarily imply that social capital and cohesion will always be positive. For example, an organized neighborhood could watch the area in coordination with the police, but it could also take the law into its own hands and form lynch mobs.

Therefore, some theorists have complemented the concepts of social capital and social cohesion with collective efficiency (The World Bank, 2011). Whereas social capital and social cohesion stand for the capacity to relate, associate and cooperate among citizens, *collective efficiency* adds "trust in an overreaching framework of rules for behavior", or, in other words, "shared expectations to action" (The World Bank, 2011, p. 13). Hence, increasing the trust, organization

¹³ Whereas "maras" have transnational origins and migratory patterns, "pandilla" is home-grown youth groups or gangs. However, the pandillas in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras have been gradually replaced or absorbed by the maras. There exist only two reported mara groups: the Dieciocho (18) and the Salvatrucha (MS), which are bloody rivals. They emerged directly from the 18th Street gang in Los Angeles in the 1960s, but in the late 1990s and beginning of 2000s their members were deported from the US and reproduced their structures and behaviors in Central America, where they founded local "clikas", or chapters, explicitly affiliated with either the Mara 18 or the Salvatrucha. (Jütersonke, Muggah, & Rodgers, 2009)

and cooperation among citizens is important, but it is equally important to have common expectations and values regarding neighbors and institutions in order to prevent and reduce violence. In order to build these capacities, there needs to be healing after a violent experience, both collectively and individually to build trust. Unlike most of the other approaches, this is an entirely bottom-up method, so trust is an outcome of participatory processes that build on the community needs, strengths and weaknesses (Moser & Mcilwaine, 2006).

CASE STUDY 1: CALI

Public Health and Social Cohesion to Reduce Violence in Cali

Source: World Bank, 2011

Rodrigo Guerrero is a Colombian physician who graduated as a M.Sc. and Ph.D. in Epidemiology from Harvard University. In 1992, he was elected Mayor of Cali, Colombia, and developed DESEPAZ, a program with an epidemiological approach to the prevention of urban violence. From 1994 to 1997, homicides decreased 30% in Cali (from 124 to 80 homicides per 100,000 people). The public health perspective also included a wide range of interventions that merged with other complementary approaches such as social cohesion and citizen security:

Public Health:

- Epidemiology of violence (data collection): Representatives of different sectors analyzed various data sources to reach a consensus on the main characteristics and drivers of crime.
- Restriction on Alcohol Sales (controlling risk factors): The “semi-dry law” enforced the bars and nightclubs to close at 1am on weekdays and 2am on weekends, as a response to 60% of homicides that occurred during the late night and 26% of victims intoxicated by alcohol.
- Restriction on Carrying Firearms (controlling risk factors): Firearms caused 80% of crimes, so the city banned carrying guns, and permits were invalid on weekends and holidays.
- Family Judiciary and Family Programs (reducing family violence): Precincts and school programs with teachers, lawyers, social workers, psychologists, and others.

Social Cohesion

- Mass Media Campaign: Private sector supported educational TV commercials launched in primetime to promote peaceful coexistence, tolerance and responsible behaviors.
- “Children Friends of Peace”: To create awareness about the restriction of carrying firearms, children were invited to exchange their toy weapons for free access to recreation facilities.
- Youth Houses: 17 houses to bring young people together to meet, dance, play sports, and participate in cultural events.

Other approaches complemented these activities. For instance, improving the police's human resources and facilities to defend rights and tackle corruption, city security councils, including the Mayor to coordinate law enforcement actions, and community security councils and community government councils that brought together the government and citizens. In addition, the city implemented technological networks among the law enforcement agencies, employment programs with training and credit, and better public services in primary education, housing and healthcare.

In sum, Cali's strategy comprised almost all of the fields and approaches described in this Master Project. Since a rigorous monitoring and evaluation process did not accompany the diversity of initiatives, it is not possible to identify the individual impact of each of them. Furthermore, this strategy was not sustained by the next city administrations. However, it is one more positive example of integrated actions engaging civil society and involving strong coordination among government agencies.

7.3 SECURITY

7.3.1 Criminal Justice

Violence deterrence and control is the main objective of this approach by arresting, convicting and punishing violent crime and other kinds of violence. Police, judiciary and penitentiaries are the key institutions associated with criminal justice. Thus, this approach is still the primary reference for policymakers and local communities--even if people in Latin American cities recognize its moral and technical limitations, for instance:

...often popular among politicians seeking short-term solutions to the symptoms of violence... [and where] constituted by male-dominated elites they tend to exclude access to groups on the basis of gender, age, or ethnicity. (Moser & Mcilwaine, 2006, p. 102).

Consequently, while the Latin American history of criminal justice is linked to the "mano dura" ("firm hand" or "iron fist", in English), an emerging concept of "mano amiga" ("friendly hand") considers that it is important to collaborate with the local community, to address risk factors, and to provide opportunities to the citizens, which expands this approach beyond its traditional boundaries and overlaps with complementary ones such as public health, citizen security and social cohesion. In other words, whereas "mano dura" implies that the government applies top-down, repressive strategies to reduce violent crime, sometimes including a set of violations of

human rights and citizens' integrity, "mano amiga" comprises different initiatives that have in common a more comprehensive and flexible role of the institutions in charge of enforcing the law. Central America, for example, moved from one strategy to the other in the last decade in order to control gangs' proliferation and crimes.

In general, the countries did not find solutions with the "mano dura". In some cases, actually, it had negative results by radicalizing crimes and expanding violence across the country and civilian population. The "mano amiga", however, is not a panacea (Jütersonke, Muggah, & Rodgers, 2009). There are no clear results regarding the effectiveness of reducing violence with the wide range of alternatives to "mano dura", such as small arms control and weapon collection, public health interventions to address risks and symptoms, awareness raising, and so on. Again, this discussion highlights both the difficult to identify silver bullets to reduce violence in the region, and the blurred limits between fields and approaches.

Despite these previous considerations, there are some strategies to analyze in detail. First, "hot spot" policing assumes that violent crimes mostly occur in specific locations and times during the day, so the focus of the law enforcement and police operations should be within this spectrum based on data collection on patterns of homicides and victimization. There is evidence of violence reduction using the "hot spot" strategy without displacing crime to other locations and, in some cases, creating an effect of positive "diffusion" amongst the nearby areas (Wilman & Makisaka, 2010).

Finally, it is important to mention that private security is a growing industry due to the lack of capacity of the governments to provide safety and security conditions to their citizens in the cities, and considering the mistrust in the police and the judiciary. As a result, with the dissemination of companies providing security, the Latin American governments, both at the national and local levels, find a new challenge in regulating this new market, under the risks of opening room for human rights abuses and the spread of firearms within the population (Wilman & Makisaka, 2010). Private security responds according to socioeconomic gaps and inequality, from private guards, sophisticated artifacts and street barriers in the neighborhoods with higher income, to informal vigilante groups and gangs selling security to local businesses ("chalecos" in

the Peruvian slang) in less affluent areas. Private security, in the very last part of the chain, comprises individual solutions such as buying weapons for personal use and hiring third parties to provide security.

7.3.2 Citizen Security

The purpose of this approach is to prevent and reduce violence by engaging citizens. Usually, these are cross-sectoral initiatives to prevent and/or reduce violence. These measures address both economic and social violence with programs at the national and municipal levels (Moser, 2004). Citizen safety and security was a widespread approach in Latin America and the Caribbean beginning in the 1990s, at a time when most of the countries were consolidating their recent democracies.

Accordingly, the international and multilateral organizations working on the blurry space between security and development have gradually adopted this approach, giving emphasis not only to the physical protection of people and goods, but also to citizen safety and participation (Inter-American Development Bank, 2012). In fact, the citizen security approach is a very comprehensive one to the extent that it adopts lessons and methodologies from almost all the other approaches. In this sense, it includes institutional strengthening, juvenile anti-violence programs, and social awareness and rehabilitation activities (Moser & Mcilwaine, , 2006). Citizen security can also incorporate peacebuilding approaches with activities to foster social cohesion and peaceful coexistence. All of these combined methods require coordination and collaboration among stakeholders and fields at the various government levels.

Citizen Security also has connections with the peacebuilding field if taking into consideration, for instance, the renowned experience of Bogotá, Colombia, that instilled a new “civic culture”, transforming one of the most violent cities in the world in the 1990s. According to the Mayor Antanas Mockus who led the process, "civic culture" can be understood as “strengthening and harmonizing law, morality and culture” to increase compliance with rules of behaviour, the ability of some citizens to encourage others to peacefully enforce the law, and consultation and peaceful settlement of disputes amongst citizens (Mockus, 1999, pág. 29). Citizen security, in

addition, is able to involve more comprehensive policies related to governance and development, such as effectively providing basic public services to local communities.

7.3.3 Environment Design

Also called CPTED (Crime Prevention through Environment Design), it focuses on the *settings of crime*, the urban design and environmental conditions. Thus, this is a municipal approach to address both social and economic violence by reorganizing the urban infrastructure in order to provide more effective safety and security (Moser, 2004). The urban environment affects social dynamics and, hence, it has a relationship with urban violence.

This relationship occurs when the environment has inadequate infrastructure without safe, public spaces, and has features such as narrow alleyways, lack of street lighting, and limited services to meet basic needs that are likely to exacerbate citizens' frustrations (The World Bank, 2011). According to the local communities, some specific locations that attract drugs, gangs and crime are (unused) sports courts, (empty) parks, or (isolated) riverbanks. Importantly, there exist gender distinctions between the possible risks; for instance, remote places like riverbanks and big parks are particularly dangerous for women due to rape threats. "Since many dangerous areas identified were intended to be recreational areas, this has implications for policy makers" (Moser & Mcilwaine, 2006, p. 106).

Local infrastructure and facilities mostly correspond to municipal local responsibilities, not only on the street but also in coordination with school, hospitals, transport systems, parks and recreation, and other public services. Along these lines, CPTED addresses physical conditions that can affect violent behaviors, but it does not tackle the deeper social causes of violent crime. In a wider sense, improving the environment matches with well-planned urban development (Wilman & Makisaka, 2010).

CASE STUDY 2: CIUDAD JUAREZ

From Repressive Criminal Justice to Comprehensive Citizen Security in Ciudad Juarez


Source: International Crisis Group (2015) and Pouncy, (2014)

Mexico witnessed in 2007 the highest period of growth in homicide rates. In Ciudad Juarez the 14.1 homicides per 100,000 people in 2007 climbed to 265.4 in 2010. The key violent actors were

the major drug trade organizations (DTO), the regional mafias, and the local street gangs. The government's strategy of fighting with military means to capture the leaders fuelled a bloody competition among DTOs, which, in turn, yielded a power vacuum on the top of the organizations. Meanwhile, the judiciary and police did not have the capacity to deter and control the spiral of killings and kidnappings.

Ciudad Juarez was the most violent city of Mexico in 2010. The ineffectiveness of the repressive criminal justice approach and the bloody crisis prompted the reaction of civil society, the municipality and the federal government. The result was a US\$270 million program called "Todos Somos Juarez" (We all are Juarez). The federal government targeted the most violent organizations, while investing to strengthen the institutional capacity of judicial and law enforcement agencies, and increased the commitment, coordination and intelligence of the three government levels. Moreover, business, professional groups, non-profit organisations and scholars came together to make the government more accountable through the creation of La Mesa de Seguridad y Justicia (La Mesa). The civil society engaged in the design, implementation and evaluation of security policies, and delivered social programs to prevent participation of young people in crime. Roughly 160 programs were implemented to enhance security, education, health, and economic opportunities. After seven years, the cycle of violence deescalated.

Today, Ciudad Juarez has 45 homicides per 100,000 people. The program deterred youth from massively engaging in DTOs and regional mafias. Moreover, civic engagement and public-private coordination at La Mesa increased the credibility of law enforcement institutions. Nevertheless, the decrease of homicide rates is only partially a result of the government's actions. It is also a consequence of the emergence of winners in the battles between DTOs—also called "narcopeace". A rigorous evaluation of the programs is still necessary and some challenges are still present. The effort suffered delays and disputes due to lack of transparency and questions regarding political use of the resources. Furthermore, basic security for the media and civil society is a lasting risk for civic engagement. Finally, structural problems persist, such as deep inequality and grievances, and the government has not fully defeated the DTOs and regional mafias, leaving the window open for a possible reescalation of the cycle of violence.



8 ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

8.1 KEY STAKEHOLDERS TO ADDRESS SAFETY AND SECURITY IN TUMBES

8.1.1 Ministry of Interior

This Ministry defines, manages and assesses the national policy on public security. The Ministry of Interior is mainly in charge of leading the police, which has a national mandate in Peru. It also manages domestic intelligence, and regulates security firms, firearms and explosives. The number of police officers in the country has increased in the last 5 years from roughly 100,000 to roughly 120,000 (Costa & Romero, 2011). Consequently, Peru has today one police officer per 259 citizens. Furthermore, the country has 1,459 police stations, located in 1031 districts, but 820 districts still do not have police stations (INEI, 2014).

The department of Tumbes has 18 police stations. Seven of those have adequate permanent public structures (i.e., with water and electricity). All of them have computers and communications equipment, but only ten have Internet access. Moreover, in 2014, the department had 345 police officers, which stands for 1.4% of the 36,000 police officers who work

at police stations in the country (INEI, 2014). In relative terms, there are only 147 police officers per 100,000 people all across the Tumbes region (Universidad Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, 2015). Finally, as explained before, at least 34% of the Tumbes' citizens do not trust the national police, which expresses the lack of legitimacy in addition to weak capacity that this institution has to address the issue.

8.1.2 Regional Government

The regional government of Tumbes is one of the agencies that seem to be more active currently in tackling. For instance, it is restarting a project for the implementation of a Georeferenced Information System on violence, drugs and crime in the region. According to the regional government, they have already identified almost 50 critical points of crime, both in the city of Tumbes and across the region. Furthermore, the regional government will implement a pilot program in the Pampa Grande, one of the most dangerous areas of Tumbes, engaging the municipality of the district, the chief of the police in the area, and civil society. The project will also include campaigns to raise awareness and prevention programs (Diario Correo, 2016).

During the administration of the former governor Gerardo Viñas, who is a fugitive of the law today, project started, including one for the implementation of neighborhood alarms, but, once again, the idea was on paper, but it was never executed. In fact, all the public safety projects led by the former governor are part of his judiciary case for misappropriation and corruption.

8.1.3 Municipality of Tumbes

The Municipality of Tumbes has a double mandate for the province and the district of Tumbes. In terms of citizen security, its purpose—in concordance with the Peruvian Constitution— is to promote, support and regulate the participation of the neighborhood in local development, and provide citizen security and safety services with the cooperation of the Police. For that reason, the Municipality of Tumbes has a Management Office on Citizen Security.

The Municipality of Tumbes also regulates the "serenazgo", an unarmed corps of municipal police that patrol the city. Serenazgos became a mainstream municipal policy across the country at the end of the 1990s. The serenazgo's mandate is to collaborate with the police in fighting against crime in the district from a deterrence and preventive perspective. The Municipality of Tumbes

has managed a fluctuating number of serenazgos in the last five years, from 40 to 100 depending on the year—in 2016, for example, it reported 71. In the last couple of years, the province has responded to violent crime by increasing exponentially the budget for serenazgos: from S/.287,110 (US\$89,722) in 2012 for patrolling and policing to S/.2'224,060 (US\$695,018) today (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2016). However, weak selection processes (sometimes linked to clientelism), lack of training and capacity, and flawed coordination with the police and neighbours prevent the high investment from having better outcomes. In addition to the serenazgos, the Municipality of Tumbes has a "municipal police" with nine officers in charge of enforcing municipal policies and institutional security.

Furthermore, Citizen Security Committees at the regional, provincial and district level are the agencies responsible for formulating plans, programs, projects and citizen security policies, as well as implementing them in their jurisdictions. They should include the police chiefs, provincial and district mayors, and representatives of neighborhood councils or rural roundtables. In Tumbes, although the Citizen Security Committee of the district has a Plan on Citizen Security 2016, the plan does not have indicators, approaches or strategies to address the problem beyond a set of general objectives and a few activities. In fact, the plan is mostly a summary of outputs delivered during the previous year and a list of contact information for public servants who work on the issue. Nevertheless, the intentions of having a plan and the development of crime and risk maps of the city are important steps forward (Municipalidad Provincial de Tumbes, 2016).

8.1.4 Youth

Young people represents 26.6% of the population of Tumbes (SENAJU, 2015). The poverty incidence of youth on the region has decreased from 17.9% in 2010 to 13.8% in 2014 (SENAJU, 2015). As described above regarding the deep conditions of violence in Tumbes, at least two thirds of young people between 15 and 29 years old do not study or work, or are underemployed. For those who have a job, average salaries are very close to the minimum wage (S/.750 or US\$300 per month). Many others do not have decent jobs or an adequate income. Consequently, the younger population is easy prey for crime, which provides better payment, in addition to identity and status, usually called “aspirational crime”.

There are some initiatives from the government to work with and for the youth of Tumbes. Some active youth organizations were recently working with the Municipality of Tumbes. For instance, during the recent national elections in April 2016 the Municipality of Tumbes supported the efforts of the association “Reconstruction Youth” of Tumbes along with various other youth groups to organize a panel with candidates for Congress called “Youth for an Informed Vote.” Furthermore, the Office of Public Safety of the regional government recently implemented a plan of “reintegration into society” for youth that offered scholarships in technical institutes to increase employability (Diario Correo, 2016). There are at least ten active youth organization in Tumbes, working on many different topics, from environment to sexual rights, in addition to sports and promotion of civic engagement (INNPARES, 2011)

By analyzing the statements and descriptions of the previous events, the views of the authorities about youth can be seen (Diario Correo, 2016). According to them, violence reduction only requires youth professional training and job opportunities. This approach is limited. As explained in different sections of this document, employment is important for youth development, but economic opportunities alone cannot solve or even prevent violent crime. The authorities also recognize the need for better education, healthy living and more spaces for sports and recreation. However, there are critical constraints on the resources and the approaches to build these spaces. More specifically, to have a football court in a neighbourhood does not guarantee better use of free time. In fact, without a comprehensive strategy, resources can be spent without achieving meaningful results.

8.1.5 Business Owners

In the last years, businesspeople are one of the main targets of robbery, extortions and, as a result, sometimes murder. Many of them decide to send their families out of the city due to the constant threats (El Comercio, 2014). Frequently, these threats are linked to a periodical “tax”—which can be diary, weekly or monthly—in exchange of “security”, or to a one time, fixed amount that can reach more than US\$15,000. It is not necessary to have a fortune to be a victim of extortion. Victims can be medical doctors, agriculture brokers or taxi drivers, but some sectors, such as construction, are more vulnerable. Furthermore, extortion does not only intimidates the owners of local companies, but also their families.

Since Tumbes is a growing city, local business associations are developing fast. However, the most important firms are not necessarily located within the city, but outside the metropolitan area, mainly in the cases of tourism that is next to the shore or agriculture which is in more rural areas. Therefore, a strategy for Tumbes would preferably need to bring together a number of small and medium local businesses in the urban area, most of them devoted to commerce, services or construction.

8.1.6 Criminals and Gangs

Since 2011, new gangs named “Los Walas”, “el Sordo Vite”, “Los Antón”, “Los Pollos” y “Cara de Bebé” jumped on to the stage in Tumbes (El Comercio, 2014). Their main activities are extortion and car robberies, but they combine these crimes with border-related ones such as drug trafficking, smuggling and human trafficking. In some other cases, these bands of criminals worked together until having some disagreements, such as with the division of earnings. One example is the rivalry between “Los Walas” and “Los Pollos” that left behind at least five murders in 2013 (Diario Correo, 2014).

Some of these gangs come from other cities of the Northern Coast. One of those cases is the delinquent group called “Los Plataneros” that started in Trujillo and travels across the region to organize assaults on buses, trucks and other vehicles; robberies of financial and exchange currency agencies; extortions and/or kidnapping businessmen, authorities or, in general, any person who demonstrate wealth (Diario Correo, 2013). Interestingly, part of the strategy of these criminal networks is to expand their activities throughout the Northern Coast just before holidays, as a clear example of the flexibility and dynamism of their organizational structure.

8.1.7 Civil Society and General Public

Tumbes embraces a few efforts from civil society to address relevant issues such as reproductive health, corruption, and sexual and intra-family violence. These activities are mainly led by local NGOs or NGOs from Lima with temporary activities in the city. For example, the NGO Calandria, from Lima, organized a few years ago a fair called “Promoting Families Free of Violence” that took place in the square of the city of Tumbes. The purpose was to “create awareness in men and women of the importance of preventing violence against women, as well as exercising their sexual and reproductive rights” (Calandria, 2010). To do this, the organization delivered stands

with information, in addition to recreational activities such as videos, games, music and dance with content related to the topic. With a similar strategy, the Anticorruption Network of Tumbes, led by the NGO Proetica— the national chapter of Transparency International—also organized activities in the square under the slogan "without corruption, less poverty and more development in Tumbes."

These initiatives are embedded into larger projects that are part of institutional networks and working sessions currently happening in the city, and many of them have the support of the Municipality. However, the efforts have produced few results so far. Moreover, despite these initiatives' attempts to engage citizens in their activities, the organizations behind the activities do not formally represent citizens' voices. Citizens themselves are, of course, eager to see a reduction in violent crime in Tumbes, but are not well organized. In addition, the civil society of Tumbes is discouraged to participate because it does not have technical support and resources from the Municipality. Neither civil society nor neighborhood groups are currently included in the Citizen Security Committee organized by the Municipality. As shown in the documents of the public hearings and working sessions of the group, only representatives of the local authorities are currently part of the process (Municipalidad Provincial de Tumbes, 2016).

8.1.8 International Organizations and Development Agencies

Given the explosion of urban violence in Latin America, international organizations and development agencies are strengthening their focus on fragility, resilience, safety and security of cities. Currently, however, there are only a few international efforts in Peru about this issue, mainly in Trujillo. It is important to follow its results and lessons of these projects, so that it is possible to replicate and adapt them to other similar realities like Tumbes.

The IADB is supporting the INEI (National Institute of Statistics and Informatics) to improve the statistics on crime and public safety. The goal is to have reliable information that complies with criteria such as comprehensiveness, homogenization, standardization and coverage. Complementarily, the project aims to design and implement an adequate system to collect information in a timely manner (Inter-American Development Bank, 2014). The IADB also leads the Emerging and Sustainable Cities Initiative, which selected Trujillo to implement the first pilot

in 2012. The IADB has worked with the Municipality of Trujillo, in coordination with the Regional Government, municipalities of eleven districts, civil society, academia, and the private sector to prioritize five topics: climate change, solid waste, water and sanitation, citizen security, and results-based management. The plan on citizen security includes the creation an Observatory of Citizen Security, improvement of interinstitutional coordination, strengthening of security plans, and projects to promote jobs for young people (Beltran, 2013). The initiative has also supported training programs in Bogotá to strengthen the capacity of the Committee of Public Safety. After five years, the initiative has reached 71 cities in the region, but only three have been implemented in Peru. Tumbes is not one of them (Inter-American Development Bank, 2016).

Finally, one of the few examples of a comprehensive project on the Northern Coast is one led by the United Nations with a cost of almost US\$5 million. The three years project (2014-2017) “Strengthening Human Security and Community Resilience by Fostering Peaceful Co-Existence in Peru” aims to develop a model for reducing crime and safeguarding human security in three of the most vulnerable and dangerous communities of Trujillo, with an emphasis on empowering these communities (United Nations, 2015). The project attempts to tackle crime rates, and reduce gender-based violence and youth involvement in criminality. The initiative brings together different UN and government agencies, such as the Ministries of Justice, Education and Health, National Police, the regional government, and the Municipality of Trujillo, as well as local NGOs. The human security approach of this project has many similarities with the analysis described across this document.

8.2 CRITERIA FOR THE ANALYSIS

Five criteria have been used to analyze the different approaches discussed in Chapter 7. They are impact, cost, equity, political feasibility and local capacity. Each one of them receives a score between 1 and 5. As impact, equity, political feasibility and local capacity increase the final score, the score of costs is subtracted. Moreover, impact carries a double weight.

8.2.1 Impact

The more an initiative is able to reduce violence, the better score it receives. Since the main problem in Tumbes is the increase in the homicide rate, the main focus will be on proven success

in diminishing murders. Thus, 1 represents a negative impact, namely the likeliness of more violence, and 5 represents a high probability of reducing violence, while 3 represents no impact or a relatively small impact, mostly dependent on the specific conditions, characteristics and emphasis of the interventions. In sum, the question to answer when ranking impact is: Does this approach have demonstrated effects to reduce violence and crime in terms of homicide rates?

This is a tricky measure for several reasons. First, many of the policies implemented in Latin America and elsewhere have applied different strategies at the same time, so it is difficult to identify which one is more effective. Second, many initiatives are not clearly divided among the different approaches and the borders between them are fuzzy. Third, monitoring and evaluation has been an infrequent practice in the field, particularly in the experiences with some success. Therefore, conclusions of academic studies and the analysis provided by different case studies are used to determine the scores.

Furthermore, impact has a double weight in the analysis because all the other criteria are irrelevant without obtaining results on reducing violence; hence, impact is a determinant for all the others and it cannot receive the same weight. For instance, an initiative can promote equity or have important political and social support, but if it does not have a real impact in reducing crime and violence in the city, or in transforming conditions and behaviors that yield violence, then equity and political feasibility are not important.

8.2.2 Cost

The question driving this criterion is: does this approach requires a large amount of financial, logistical and human resources during its implementation? Consequently, 1 is a relatively costless program because it does not require new infrastructure, new materials and other expenses, and new human resources. Inversely, 5 includes a large amount of new investments in these categories. In addition to direct costs, this also considers the possible costs and externalities that any given approach will transmit to other agencies and stakeholders.

8.2.3 Equity

Equity is a difficult criterion to objectively analyze. Complementing impact, equity adds a normative criterion beyond effectiveness. Benefiting only one group at the expense of another,

excluding one particular group in the solution, or increasing the gaps between groups are fundamental criteria to include in the equation. In fact, the less equitable the policy, the higher the probability of escalating violence and conflicts.

As a matter of fact, equity is important both for the outcomes and the process of reducing violence. This includes having a police and judiciary that respect the procedures for all of the population equally, implementing actions attempting to heal the wounds derived from social fragmentation, or addressing some vulnerable groups like women and indigenous people with an affirmative action viewpoint. Consequently, the key question here is: Does this approach amplify or reduce the gap between groups? Here, 1 means that it would increase the gaps and differences between groups, and 5 would decrease it, while 3 is a neutral position in terms of harming or benefitting one specific group at the expenses other.

8.2.4 Political Feasibility

Political feasibility is mainly based on stakeholder analysis. A strong opposition to the approach accounts for 1 and a strong support accounts for 5, with 3 a neutral support. Given the authoritarian history of the country, the lack of legitimacy of the agencies responsible to enforce the law, and the need for participation to reduce violence among other relevant variables, political support from the political leaders, civil society and the general population is an important factor to determine the overall feasibility of the policy. Therefore, the key question driving this criterion is: Do the key stakeholders (i.e., political authorities, business, civil society and citizens) present a strong opposition or support for this approach?

8.2.5 Local Capacity

One of the key issues to address regarding the different approaches is the lack of capacity in some of them. Therefore, it is relevant for the intervention to analyze both the existing capacities and the shortages for each approach. The question to determine the score for this criterion is: Does the city of Tumbes have existing human, organizational and institutional capacities to implement this approach? The answer scores 1 when the city does not have any kind of local capacity, and 5 when it is already technically equipped to implement the approach, while 3 suggests that it has some existing capacity to develop or some initiatives to harness and build on. These answers are also based on the stakeholder analysis.

Lack of capacity could account for new investments and, in turn, costs. However, the criterion of local capacity in this analysis underscores the existing human, organizational and institutional aspects that make the approaches able to happen without any additional investment. In other words, it accounts for the capacity to immediately adopt any given initiative or program. The timeframe is more relevant here than the cost.

Chart 1: Matrix of Policy Approaches

	Criteria					TOTAL
	(+) Impact (1-5) x2	(-) Cost (1-5)	(+) Equity (1-5)	(+) Political Feasibility (1-5)	(+) Local Capacity (1-5)	
	Does this approach have demonstrated effects to reduce violence and crime in terms of homicide rates?	Does this approach requires an important amount of economic, logistical and human resources during its implementation?	Does this approach alone is able to reduce the gap between groups?	Is there a strong support for this approach?	Does the city of Tumbes have existing human, organizational and institutional capacity to implement this approach in the very short run?	
Public Health	5(x2)=10	-3	3	3	3	16
Economic Opportunities	3(x2)=6	-4	3	5	3	13
Conflict Transformation	3(x2)=6	-2	3	1	1	9
Human Rights	4(x2)=8	-1	4	2	3	13
Social Cohesion	3(x2)=6	-2	4	3	2	13
Criminal Justice	4(x2)=8	-4	3	5	4	16
Citizen Security	5(x2)=10	-3	3	4	3	17
Environment Design	4(x2)=8	-4	3	5	4	16

8.3 INTEGRATING DEVELOPMENT, PEACEBUILDING AND SECURITY TO TACKLE VIOLENT CRIME

Chart 1 shows the results of the analysis. The citizen security approach is the favoured outcome, closely followed by criminal justice, public health and environmental design. This is consistent with the recent research and policy formulations. Latin America has increasingly recognized the relevance of complementary approaches in the reform of the police and judiciary systems: “Policymakers have shifted toward more integrated approaches that acknowledge not only the multiple forms of violence but also the identity and agency of different social actors” (Moser, 2004; p. 4). Thus, an analysis of the fields, approaches and case studies shed some light on the many challenges and trends to complement traditional security practices.

Even though, in theory, the definition of each approach attempts to differentiate it from the others, in practice the fields and approaches are diffuse. In addition, the most successful Latin American interventions in recent years have included a mix of approaches. Many times, this mix has been labelled as citizen security, even if the list of actions comprises a much wider and diverse set of approaches. Citizen security is a comprehensive and integrated approach, so it can “absorb” the development and peacebuilding viewpoints in the policymaking process to reduce violent crimes.

9 CITIZEN SECURITY STRATEGY TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, REDUCE HOMICIDES AND ADDRESS FRAGILITY IN TUMBES


Citizen security is an approach that is versatile enough to include many of the better practices from other approaches. In fact, a comprehensive policy recommendation on citizen security should explicitly embrace the other approaches in order to shape the positive orientation of the intervention.

9.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

Citizen security is the most convenient approach because governments, donors and some firms mostly understand it. Due to its political and conceptual history, Citizen Security is made to measure for Latin America. It already has legitimacy among stakeholders. Nevertheless, the broad nature of the Citizen Security concept also requires defining principles and limits for the

intervention, as well as priorities in the short and long run. With this, it is possible to avoid this approach becoming a hodgepodge of safety and security policies. As diagrammed in Graph 3, the following recommendations describe the basic criteria to implement a comprehensive approach to tackle violent crime and prevent further escalation in Tumbes.

GRAPH 2: A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK TO TACKLE VIOLENT CRIME AND PREVENT FURTHER ESCALATION



9.1.1 Recommendation 1. Use Four Stages: Planning, Stabilization, Transition, Consolidation
 Reducing violence and fostering peaceful coexistence is a complex endeavor, so it requires focus and prioritization, even more in a city without many resources like the case of Tumbes. Furthermore, Tumbes is dangerous, so taking some actions to stop people killing each other is urgent, while other complementary initiatives to sustain violence reduction are also necessary. Therefore, a more efficient, comprehensive and responsible approach is to divide the process in four different stages where every step builds on the achievements of the previous ones (Betancourt, 2016).¹⁴ The implementation plan in the next section shows in detail every stage, its objectives and the measures to implement in each of them.

Each stage has a different purpose. The first stage is to plan collectively, namely determining goals, activities, responsibilities and timeframe while engaging the different stakeholders in the solutions and sharing a common vision of peaceful coexistence. Planning to reduce violence

¹⁴ Interestingly, these stages match with the conflict transformation framework: peacekeeping/protection → peacemaking/transition → peacebuilding/development.

requires an explicit political commitment. Accordingly, the Citizen Security Committee of the province of Tumbes needs to be active, according to the “Law of Municipalities”, and bring together leaders of the police, civil society, and private sector, as well as neighborhood representatives.

After having all the main stakeholders at the table and sharing a common purpose, the next step is to stop violence and homicides, and decrease the sense of fear and insecurity by focusing on the hot spots and key threats, as well as addressing risk behaviors. Thirdly, similar to contexts of political violence, Tumbes has to focus its efforts on reducing some factors that could contribute to violence reescalation, such as the way that the police and serenazgo address local conflicts and human rights, as well as the large bulk of youth at risk in the area. In other words, in this stage the city starts to tackle its inherent fragility. Last but not least, Tumbes needs to consolidate a peaceful future and address the deep roots of violence. It is just during this stage when the government can begin to face structural problems without worrying too much about violence escalation. The following recommendations will develop some of these stages in depth, including the specific policies and initiatives to implement them. These are summarized in section 9.2.

9.1.2 Recommendation 2. Engage Citizens, Build Social Cohesion, and Promote Human Rights

A citizen security strategy for Tumbes—and any city—should include two pillars: on the one hand, civic engagement and social cohesion, and on the other, human rights. These principles need to be embedded in every single action of research, law enforcement and development. Almost every case study of successful reduction of urban violence in Latin America includes participation of the different stakeholders, from small to large businesses, NGOs, activists and grassroots organizations, in addition to different government levels in direct dialogue with the citizens.

A few years ago, the city of Trujillo attempted to tackle violence through violent measures. The local police created a killing squad that later was accused of more than twenty extrajudicial murders of delinquents and criminals (Uceda, 2009). Despite the support of many citizens for the approach, this violent measure did not solve the problem, killed a number of people with the justification that they were criminals and, eventually, left a set of human rights accusations for the judiciary. Tumbes cannot repeat that story of state violence and repression, so it is important

to raise the human rights approach from the beginning of the operations: namely total respect for the life and rights of all citizens, particularly prosecuted people, as well as strict compliance with judicial procedures.

9.1.3 Recommendation 3. Improve Crime Data Collection and Analysis at a Local Level

Tumbes has already designed a few crime maps. With them, it is possible to identify vulnerable areas where violent crime mostly happens. However, there are some improvements to do in order to tackle the local threats more effectively. Primarily, it is important to harmonize the concepts behind both local and national data—and to harmonize local data with national data as necessary. For instance, what kind of crimes does “revenge” involve? Is revenge passion-driven, settling a score, or extortion? What is the meaning of “unspecified” crimes that account for more than 40% of the murders in the city? Is there a category specifically for organized crime? Why is organized crime now merged with other concepts in the data? What are the specific geographic limits of the data (e.g., the province, the district or any other demarcation of the city of Tumbes)?

Complementarily, prosecutors, police, hospital and national statistical institute representatives need to participate and coordinate within the Citizen Security Committees in Tumbes. A proven strategy is to collapse the most important safety and security tasks into one single building. As a result, data collection and analysis is more likely to become teamwork, which would also improve coordination among officers and institutions. An important opportunity is to replicate the Observatory of Citizen Security promoted by the IADB in Trujillo based on the lessons learned during the process.

Secondly, since there is a lack of resources and capacity in the region for sophisticated data collection and analysis, participatory research and validation of the data with citizens are necessary. Discussing crime maps and prioritization of problems with them would increase the decision makers’ understanding of crime, needs and territory. Moreover, participatory research is also a tool to engage people and entire neighborhoods. Nevertheless, this engaging process must ensure citizens’ safety and security, as the delinquent groups will see it as a potential threat for their activities.

9.1.4 Recommendation 4. Focus on Reducing Homicides in the Very Short Run

Even if murders are not a threat for most of the population, homicides are an important source of insecurity and fear. They also have many negative effects on families, businesses, institutions, and the social fabric. Murders derived from criminal networks that are not resolved increase the sense of impunity; consequently, violence easily escalates. As mentioned above, homicides in Tumbes are mostly happening in public spaces, target young men, and perpetrators use firearms.

Therefore, during the stabilization stage, reducing homicides is the core priority to tackle violent crime, and it requires, in turn, tackling robbery and extortion in the first place given the connection between those and many of the murders. Since strengthening police capacity and the judiciary system is a long-term process that requires, among other things, political decisions at the national level, the recommendation is to create a small, local task force to address and monitor these issues. This special force would comprise a selected group of a few police officers, prosecutors, and members of the serenazgo, in addition to social workers and psychologists who can help in the process with both perpetrators and victims, paying special attention to vulnerable populations such as young people and women. The task forces can receive special training, security, incentives and facilities to develop their work in the best possible way.

Complementarily, since there is a strong linkage between alcohol use and homicide rates, the municipality—in coordination with the Ministry of Health—needs to implement measures to reduce alcohol use through banning sales and consumption in particular hours. Furthermore, the regional government must increase control of guns and drugs trafficking in the bus terminals and at the border with Ecuador. Finally, focusing on homicides implies focusing on specific groups and spaces. This task force would start working on the areas identified as critical on the crime map, either because a large number of murders are happening there, or because the gangs members meet or reside in those places. The key goal is to recover the streets in those neighborhoods by taking the most dangerous criminals out of there.

9.1.5 Recommendation 5. Do not Neglect Other Types of Violence and Vulnerable Populations

This policy paper has not focused on other types of crime—such as theft—and other types of violence—such as domestic violence. However, these elements are a priority to make any effort on reducing violent crime sustainable. Especially the latter is a key investment to transit from a

violent to a peaceful city because the difference between different types of violence is not clear and distinct. Perpetrators of violent crimes frequently are perpetrators of domestic violence. Further, violence within the family has strong effects on the children's futures. Violent behavior of youth is frequently shaped by the cruelty they saw at home and by the scars that this violence left on their bodies and souls. In fact, the way women are treated is the best predictor of a state's peacefulness—not only terms of direct violence, but also their opportunities and freedom (Hudson, 2012).

Hence, the Municipality in coordination with the Ombudsman's office in Tumbes and the Ministry of Women has to prioritize protecting families and victims of domestic violence, and discuss gender issues. One important alternative is also to have special personnel in the police stations where policewomen and social workers can receive the victims, instead of men who currently have a different sensibility about the issue. Although police stations are formally beyond the scope of the municipalities, the mayor can complete some agreements with the chief of the police in the region in order to provide the facilities to make "women friendly police stations".

Finally, the other relevant group is young people. There is plenty evidence that shows that many of them need jobs, but this is not the reason why they engage in gangs and crime. Vulnerable young people need to dream, to develop life skills, and to feel the world less unfair. In addition, they need meaningful alternatives and safe environments to deploy their time and creativity. Therefore, activities related to sports, art, science and adventures are able to channel their energy towards positive outcomes.

Because of these reasons, the Open Schools programs is an exciting alternative for Tumbes in coordination with the Ministry of Education. This program literally opens the schools in non-school hours for social programs and activities devoted to children, teenagers and youth. These programs provide a better use of the free time for young people, as well as specific opportunities to improve life skills along with some technical training on tools for a job. Schools become spaces to connect the community, so civic engagement and participation of civil society become a keystone.

9.1.6 Recommendation 6. Address Structural Issues in the Long Run


In the long-run, violence prevention requires addressing the conditions that are fertile ground for crime, primarily inequality of economic opportunities, health, education and other basic public services such as electricity, water and sanitation, and safe public spaces. Whereas public services for all, including in the most remote areas, are already relevant to tackle structural violence, they may also help to prevent it.

In terms of education, early childhood development from zero to eight years old, by supporting the brain's development and basic soft skills, has effects not only for violence but, in general, to form better citizens. Secondly, as suggested before, it is not enough to provide jobs to reduce violence. Economic opportunities also imply access to better jobs, a decent salary, health insurance, vacations, a good work environment and other benefits. Unfortunately, the quality of jobs in Tumbes, as in many other parts in the country, reproduces socioeconomic gaps, including discrimination. Therefore, the municipality should commit to reducing informality by supporting the Ministry of Labor to supervise labor conditions and enforce medium and large firms to comply with minimum legal requirements.

Finally, urban planning is relevant. There are some specific measures using Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) that are able to deter violence in some places. Some of these increase visibility of all the corners of the street or public places, whether by using better illumination or by designing the space differently. Tumbes can start to use this strategy in the most dangerous streets, next to the river, and in empty areas in the margins of the city.

The above recommendations are summarized in the next section: "An Implementation Plan for Tumbes".

9.2 AN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR TUMBES



Adapted for Tumbes from Betancourt (2016)

10 CONCLUSIONS

A few final thoughts need emphasis. First, there is an increasing need of expertise in monitoring and evaluation of crime and crime prevention efforts in order to recognize the main drivers of violence reduction and peaceful societies. Although epidemiology as part of the public health approach is a very helpful tool to identify origins and patterns of violence, a more accurate quantitative and qualitative analysis of the relationship between interventions and violence reduction is necessary.

Another challenge is the limited number and capacity of human resources available for approaches other than criminal justice, namely for public health, conflict transformation, and social cohesion (Inter-American Development Bank, 2012). Most police officers and judiciary workers are not trained to address crime and violence beyond the criminal justice understanding of the issue. Widening the perspective requires also a shift in paradigms.

Moreover, the Latin American context and heritage require that these approaches address some specific governance issues. Some of them are chronic distrust and lack of confidence in the state's capacity to ensure security, the risk that parallel forms of state and social governance can produce perverse extra-judicial justice, and the growing privatization of security due to the weak response of the authorities, which is likely to reproduce more inequality and discrimination. In other words, the relationship between the government and communities, linked to safety and security, are key issues to address when applying any given approach. Consequently, all the mentioned approaches need institutional and governance reforms to achieve their objectives. Improving the operational aspect of the interventions is not enough.

There is a constant tension between short-term and long-term measures although they are definitely not exclusive. Short-term measures to reduce violence must include the effective role of judicial and police agencies, and long-term measures should address structural social and economic gaps. In any case, sustainability requires political commitment and citizen engagement. In this sense, as implicitly mentioned before, some important factors for violence reduction are:


...commitment of political leaders interested in prioritising public security; sufficient resources for designing and implementing novel policies; an evidence-based approach to policy evaluation; police forces acquiescent to civilian administrations; and a civil society able to support and internalise changes that reforms entail... (Hoelscher & Nussio, 2015, p. 14)

There is not a successful case of violence reduction in Latin American urban areas without political leadership and, conversely, as urban violence has sharply increased when political leaders are involved directly or indirectly in urban crimes. Complementarily, the engagement of civil society, neighbourhoods and citizens, in general, is a keystone of any success.

One final note on the general process is the recognition of the uncertainty of the duration on every step. Along with leadership and participation, violence reduction takes times because violence is “sticky”: the more violence endures, the more difficult it is to stop it. Consequently, every step crates the conditions for the next one, but also flexibility and perseverance are critically important. Only by travelling slowly down this path step by step will the burden of violence in Tumbes and other Latin American cities be lifted.


11 ANNEXES

11.1 ANNEX 1: MOST VIOLENT CITIES IN THE PERUVIAN NORTHERN COAST (CHART)




Source: The author with data from Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal (2015) and Pashico (2015)

11.2 ANNEX 2: CRIME AND VIOLENCE ON THE PERUVIAN NORTHERN COAST (MAP)




Source: Carrión, Zárate, & Zechmeister, 2014; and Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal, 2015. Modified.

11.3 ANNEX 3: INCREASE IN URBAN POPULATION IN TUMBES




Source: The autor with data from Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal (2015)

11.4 ANNEX 4: PERCENTAGE OF QUALIFIED MURDERS IN TUMBES




Source: The autor with data from Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal (2015)

11.5 ANNEX 5: MOST TARGETED VICTIMS BY AGE GROUPS IN TUMBES




Source: The autor with data from Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal (2015)

11.6 ANNEX 6: MOST FREQUENT REASONS OF MURDER IN TUMBES




Source: The autor with data from Consejo Nacional de Política Criminal (2015)

11.7 Annex 7: Poverty Map in the City of Tumbes




Source: INEI (2013)

11.8 Annex 8: DISTRUST IN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS BY DEPARTMENT (% of people stating that do not trust government agencies)



Source: CONASEC (2015)

11.9 Annex 9: Cocaine Routes and Prices Across the Country



Source: Mella, 2012. Modified.

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