

Imperial Thoughts: The US Congress and the Philippine questions, 1898-1934

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By

Norberto Barreto

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Abstract of the Dissertation

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Between the acquisition of the Philippines in 1898 and the approval of an independence bill in 1934, members of Congress extensively discussed the future of the Philippines as an American territory using the ideas and images created by American writers, journalists, scholars, missionaries, travelers, and colonial and military officers. However, members of Congress did not passively consume a body of knowledge about the Filipinos created by the American cultural mainstream. They also sought their own answers to the questions raised by American control of the Philippines. Through their travel accounts, books, interviews, articles, public speeches and lectures, a group of congressmen actively participated in American knowledge production about the Philippines. In doing so, these congressmen also expressed beliefs about the United

States' international role, and the challenges and anxieties that possessing colonies posed for the American republican system.

Congressional knowledge production about the Philippines circulated among the general public through publications, lectures, and speeches of some members of Congress. On the other hand, hearings and debates on the Philippines in Congress also gave congressmen an opportunity to produce knowledge, and reproduce the knowledge about the islands created by American cultural mainstream. Two opposing discourses on the Philippines were developed by congressmen: one supporting American control of the Philippines and depicting American colonialism as an enlightened enterprise; the other representing the Philippines as a racial, ideological and strategic menace, and imperial enterprises as a threat to Republicanism.

This dissertation analyzes the vast body of knowledge produced by congressmen, focusing on congressional records and challenging the traditional view that legislators' positions on the Philippines were related to the economic and political interests of the States they represented, and taking account of broader strategic, cultural, and ideological beliefs.

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Introduction

On October 18, 2003, United States President George W. Bush paid a short, but intense visit to the Philippines. During his highly-protected eight-hour visit—the Secret Service did not let him remain overnight in Manila—the President had a very busy agenda: he met with President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and praised her efforts in the fight against terrorism, and also had a chance to address a joint session of the Philippine Congress. The visit to the Philippines was the first stop of a six-nation Asian tour and a clear show of support for the re-election of President Arroyo, a strong US ally.

During his twenty-minute speech to the Philippine Congress, Bush gave a great example of American imperial amnesia. Bush told the Filipino legislators, “America is proud of its part in the great story of the Filipino people. Together our soldiers liberated the Philippines from colonial rule. Together we rescued the islands from invasion and occupation.”¹ More than a hundred years after the arrival of the first American troops to the Philippines, a president of the United States reinvented American-Filipino relations, erasing the colonial past. Bush’s address made no mention of the three-year Filipino-American war, of the nasty repression and torture of Filipino nationalism (the infamous “water cure”), the burning of Catholic churches, massacres of civilians, the desecration of cemeteries, the deportation of Filipino nationalist leaders or the thousands of Filipinos who died as a direct or indirect consequence of the United States’ “liberating” presence in their country. Delivered in the first months of what would become one of the greatest foreign policy blunders in the history of the United States—the invasion of Iraq—Bush’s short but important re-presentation of Filipino-American history carried great symbolic value. His address erased, forgot, rewrote American colonial history to hide the American imperial past and present.

By forgetting history, President Bush not only joined an old debate concerning the nature of the U.S. presence in the Philippines—that is part of a bigger discussion of the nature of American foreign policy—but also offered a shining example of the endurance

¹ Remarks by President Bush to the Philippines Congress, Philippine Congress, Manila, Philippines, October 8, 2003, <http://manila.usembassy.gov/wwwhr131.html>.

of American imperialistic rhetorical resources. Bush's words to the Philippine Congress echoed the arguments used a century before by imperialists like Albert J. Beveridge, Dean Worcester, Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root or Leonard Wood, to justify U.S. control of the Philippines. Like them, Mr. Bush identified American presence in the Philippines with liberation and freedom, rather than occupation and colonialism.

This dissertation will deal with both issues—the invisibility of U.S. imperialism, and the persistence of American imperialistic discourses—by analyzing congressional debates over the Philippines' future as an American colonial possession in the first three decades of the 20th century.

The American acquisition of the Philippines in 1898 provoked an intense debate over the meanings and consequences of U.S. colonial rule over the islands. The American people's ignorance regarding their far-away colony generated a need for information about the Philippines, which was filled by a group of American writers, journalists, travelers, missionaries, scholars, and colonial and military officers. For more than thirty years, these truth-makers explained, represented and described the Philippines and the Filipinos for the American cultural mainstream. In the process, they produced an impressive body of knowledge—images, ideas, and representations—that influenced the way American people understood or imagined their Asian colony.

Congress was not immune to American writers, journalists, travelers, missionaries, scholars, and colonial and military officers' influence. For more than thirty years, members of Congress extensively discussed the future of the Philippines as an American territory using ideas and images produced by American truth-makers. However, members of Congress were not just passive consumers of this knowledge about the Filipinos. In their search for answers to the questions generated by American control of the Philippines, some legislators themselves produced an interesting array of travel accounts, books, interviews, articles, and public speeches and lectures through which they influenced the way in which Americans imagined and understood the Philippines.

Congressional knowledge production about the Philippines was not limited to the publications and public lectures and speeches of some members of Congress. Congressional hearings, discussions, and especially debates, gave legislators an opportunity to produce knowledge about the islands, as well as to reproduce the

knowledge that had been created by the American cultural mainstream. These two dimensions—congressional production and reproduction of knowledge about the Philippines—will be this dissertation’s central axis, as it seeks to answer a series of questions: How did members of Congress interact with American cultural mainstream representation of the Philippine and the Filipinos? Which ideas and images did members of Congress use to discuss the Philippine questions? How did those ideas and images evolve during the first three decades of the 20th Century? What role did anti-imperialist ideas and arguments play in the development of congressional knowledge production about the Philippines?

It is necessary to make clear that congressional reproduction and production of knowledge about the Philippines was not the exclusive province of those who supported U.S. colonial policies in the islands. Members of Congress participated not only in the ideological and cultural consensus that underwrote those colonial policies, but also in dissenting ideological and discourses. Not only were the imperialists never able to monopolize knowledge production regarding the Philippines: I argue that two parallel discourses survived throughout more than thirty years, one justifying and the other questioning U.S. colonial control of the Philippines.

Congressional opponents of U.S. rule over the Philippines saw Filipino independence as the only solution to the dilemmas colonialism poses for any republican political system. These anti-imperialist congressmen built an image of the Philippines as a racial, ideological, political, and strategic threat to the United States. The control of the islands endangered not only American political institutions, but also national security. For them, Filipino independence was necessary to preserve American political institutions and guarantee American geopolitical safety, reaffirming isolationism as the nation’s foreign policy. Congress members opposed to the retention of the Philippines also presented Filipino independence as necessary in order to protect the United States from their Asian colony: for them, the islands, located thousands of miles away, constituted a strategic liability and were so vulnerable to external attack as to themselves constitute a danger to American security.

The Philippines' threat was not merely strategic, but also ideological and political. Congressional opponents of American colonialism in the archipelago argued that the American democratic and republican system was endangered by the act of ruling the Philippines like a colony. They feared that retention of the Philippines would transform the United States into a militaristic nation and destroy American political institutions, practices and traditions. They proposed Filipino independence as a necessary step to protect American democracy and republicanism from the risks associated with the United States' becoming an imperial power.

On the other hand, congressional supporters of American colonialism in the Philippines built a discourse based on the representation of the Philippines as a strategic asset. For them, American presence in the Filipino archipelago was a key element in the promotion and defense of American international interests.

These imperialist congressmen were true believers in American exceptionalism. For them, the United States was a unique country, undeniably superior to all others in racial, political and moral terms. Therefore, that they saw and represented American rule over the Philippines not only as an expression of the American exceptional nature, but also as its confirmation. These lawmakers represented American colonialism as an enlightened enterprise, a new kind of altruistic colonialism: the United States were civilizing and democratizing the Filipinos. Americans were not pursuing any economic benefit from the Philippines, but only their Asiatic subjects' wellbeing. American rule over the Philippines was not colonialism, but a selfless nation-making process that was helping the Filipinos to overcome their heterogeneity and become a nation. These congressmen actually considered U.S. colonialism a prerequisite for Filipino independence, arguing that only through America's unselfish guidance would the Filipinos be ready for independence. By this representation, they hid American imperialism safeguarding American innocence and moral superiority.

There is a strong relationship between the invisibility of U.S. imperialism and the Philippines. American foreign relations historiography has paid little or no attention to the American colonial "adventure" in the Philippines. More than forty years of U.S. colonial presence in the archipelago have been forgotten or downplayed. By so doing,

American traditional diplomatic historians have contributed to the development of what Filipino scholar Oscar Campomanes calls the “self-erasure of United States imperialism.”² The Philippines is one the strongest and saddest cases of American imperial amnesia. By ignoring American colonialism in the Philippines, historians have helped keep American imperialism invisible. By analyzing congressional discourses about the Philippines, this dissertation seeks to contribute not only to the understanding of American imperialism in its complexity, but also to overcoming the ways by which American imperialism “has been adjudged as insignificant to the history of the U.S. nation/empire building, therefore, deemed forgettable or negligible.”³

Traditional historical analyses have focused on economic and regional elements to explain Congressmen’s attitude towards the Philippines. Political and diplomatic historians have characterized Congressmen most as “provincial politicians who were concerned with securing support from the strongest interest in their constituency.”⁴ This dissertation will go beyond those approaches, analyzing the development of congressional discourses as part of a strategic, cultural and ideological interaction, not necessarily along economic and party lines. Although I do not deny that political orientation and regional origin influenced the positions adopted by members of Congress, I argue that these are not the only forces influencing their thoughts and behavior. I contend that even the strongest advocates of Filipino independence, based on economic reasons could not justify their position using strict economic terms. They thus had to resort to strategic, cultural, ideological and racial images and ideas. Going beyond traditional political and regional explanations of US Congressmen actions and words, will permit a focus on congressmen’s ideas about their country history, political system, and international role.

One of the main goals of this dissertation is to incorporate the U. S. Congress function in the debate about American imperialism. I argue that the United States

² Oscar Campomanes, “New Formations of Asian American of Asian American Studies and the Question of American Imperialism,” *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique*, 1997, 5:2, p. 538.

³ Oscar Campomanes, “The New Empire’s Forgetful and Forgotten Citizens: Unrepresentability and Unassimilability in Filipino American Postcolonialities,” *Critical Mass: a Journal of Asian American Culture Criticism*, 2:2, 1995, p. 153.

⁴ Julian Zelizer, “Introduction to Rountable,” *Social Sciences History*, 24:2, Summer, 2000, p. 309.

Congress has played a central role in the development of American imperialism, based on two main sources: the 'insular cases' and Congress' constitutional powers. In the 1901 'insular cases,' the United States Supreme Court examined the constitutional status of the possessions acquired by the United States in the war with Spain, and defined and limited congressional power over these possessions. According to the Court's decisions, the new possessions were American territories, but "non-incorporated" territories; therefore, Congress has the power to decide what constitutional provisions could be applied to their inhabitants. In effect, the Supreme Court ruled that American constitution did not entirely "follow the flag" into the new territories; therefore, American possessions were under the total control of Congress. The last word about the future of American insular possessions was not the President's, but Congress'.

Congress' constitutional powers also help explain congressional influence over the development of American imperial practices, discourses, and institutions. The Constitution of the United States gave Congress power over the federal budget and appropriations. That means that Congress analyzed and made decisions over the budget submitted by the Executive branch. From the deployment of a Marine battalion in Haiti to the construction of a federal government building in Manila or San Juan, Congress determined how government money was used. That power made Congress the major influence over the development of American imperial policies.

Besides the undeniable congressional legal, political and economic influence over American imperial practices, I contend that Congress has also exercised an important cultural and ideological influence over the development of American imperialism. The congressional discussion of the Philippines' future gives us a good example of Congress' cultural and ideological interaction with American imperial practices, especially imperial discourses. For more than thirty years (1898-1934) Congress discussed the future of the United States' most controversial possession. Too far from the traditional sphere of U.S. influence, too close to the Asian imperial competition, highly populated by a culturally, religiously, and linguistically diverse population, the Philippines were an ongoing topic of congressional discussion throughout the first three decades of the 20th Century. That discussion offers an excellent opportunity to analyze Congress' role in structuring U.S. imperialism, the discourses with that imperialism, and its continuing invisibility.

There are many persons and institutions to whom I owe the support and encouragement needed to complete this dissertation. This dissertation was possible thanks to the support of the Burghardt Turner Fellowship, the Philippine-American Educational Foundation (PAEF), and the Fulbright Program. Thanks to their economic assistance, I was able to do research at libraries and archives located in the United States, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Spain. It is necessary to make clear that their contribution has not been limited to their economic support, since they played a very important academic, cultural and social role in the development of this dissertation.

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CHAPTER 1
AMERICAN KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION ABOUT THE PHILIPPINES, 1898-
1924

“The people of these islands are many of them wild and distrustful children. They have no faith in us; they do not wish to obey our laws. If we are earnest in our wish to them good, and not harm, we must learn to know them better, so that we may understand their needs.” Mary H. B. Wade, *Our Little Philippine Cousin* (1902), p. vi.

In the early hours of May 1st 1898, a group of American warships slipped into Manila Bay in the Philippine Islands. The U.S. Navy’s Asia Squadron, under the command of Commodore George Dewey, was on a mission to “capture or destroy” the Spanish Asian Squadron.¹ A week before, American Congress had declared war on Spain, ending almost three years of diplomatic quarreling over the rebellion of the Cuban people that had begun anew in 1895. For the United States, this was to be a short and very successful war; for Spain, a national tragedy. However, one of this war’s ironies is that the conflict did not start in Cuba, but on the other side of the world, in Manila Bay.

At 5:22 A.M., the American squadron found the Spanish ships anchored close to the Spanish naval station at Cavite and an unequal naval battle began. After more than two hours of fighting, the American squadron faced ammunition supply problems and Commodore Dewey ordered a tactical withdrawal. When the ammunition problem was fixed, Dewey ordered breakfast served to his men, and after that unusual interlude, the American squadron completed the destruction of three hundred years of Spanish colonial rule in Asia.² One by one, all the Spanish warships were sunk; not a single American life was lost that morning. It was a great victory over a vastly inferior enemy.

Dewey’s victory amazed the American people and, in some ways, symbolized the beginning of the so-called American century.³ When the news of the victory in Manila

¹ From the message from Secretary of the Navy John Long sent to Dewey on April 26, 1898. Ivan Musicant, *Empire by Default: the Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century*. New York, A Marian Wood Book, 1998, pp. 201-202.

² Ibid, pp. 221-225.

³ John Offner, *An Unwanted War: the Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over Cuba, 1895-1898*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1992; Jules R. Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution. An Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990; Joseph A. Fry, "William McKinley and the Coming of the Spanish-American War: a Study in the Bermirching and Redemption of an Historical Image,"

Bay reached the White House on May 2, 1898, the first reaction from President William McKinley was to look for a map because he had no idea where the Philippines were located.⁴ The President was not alone; in 1898 few Americans could place the Philippines on a world map. McKinley's reaction can also be understood metaphorically: it signaled the beginning of an American search for answers about the Philippines that was to last more than thirty years. Even after the Philippines were occupied and officially pacified by the United States in 1902, the islands never stopped being a controversial topic. The political future of the Philippines as an American territory, as well as the strategic, economic, ideological, racial, and cultural meanings of American colonialism in the Philippines, were a matter of controversy in the United States long after McKinley learned the Philippines' location.

During the first thirty years of American colonialism in Philippines, the Filipinos and the Philippines were represented, classified, and analyzed for the American people through different forms: from lectures, speeches, books and articles published by colonial and military officers, travelers, missionaries, or journalists, to oratory club debates in colleges and high schools throughout the country. Authors like Dean C. Worcester, Katherine C. Mayo, James H. Blount, Nicholas Roosevelt, Daniel R. Williams, Thomas F. Millard, Harry B. Hawes and others filled American society's need for knowledge about the Philippines.

This search for knowledge led to what Filipino scholar Epifanio San Juan calls "a massive tradition of colonial discourse purporting to supply the veracious, objectively,

Diplomatic History, 3 (1979): 77-79; Louis Perez, Jr. *The War of 1898: The United States & Cuba in History & Historiography*, Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998; Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998; Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: an Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963; Ernest R. May, *From Imperialism to Isolationism, 1898-1919*. New York: The McMillan Company; 1964; Frank H. Golay, *Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1997.

⁴ Walter LaFeber. *The American Age United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad: 1750 to the present*. 2nd ed. New York, London: Norton; 1994, vol. 2, p. 202-203; James L. Roork et al. *The American Promise a History of the United States*. 2nd ed. Boston & New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000, p. 545.

‘scientific’ knowledge”⁵ in the form of ideas, images, and representations of these islands and their peoples.⁶

This knowledge was produced in response to the interest and questions that American colonialism in the Philippines raised in the United States.⁷ Too far from America’s ‘natural’ area of hegemony, too close to the dangerous Asian political and military problems, without any historical relation to the United States, and inhabited by millions of people with widely varying cultures and religions, the Philippines were the most controversial of all the American colonial possessions. This is why the meanings, real or imagined, of U.S. rule in the Philippines were a constant topic of debate for as long as the U.S. controlled the islands.

⁵ Epifanio San Juan, Jr. “One Hundred Years of Producing and Reproducing the “Filipino”,” *Amerasia Journal*. 24(2), 1998, p. 9.

⁶ Oscar Campomanes gives us a more complex description of this process. According to him, American production of knowledge about the Philippines created a “remarkably extensive ‘shadow-archive’ of images, ideas, and stereotypes about Filipinos and the Philippines which were elaborated in various U. S. cultural forms from the visual mass media (graphics and photography, an early pre-narrative U. S. cinema, protofilmic modes like chromolithography, stereotype and postcards) to the verbal pictures and ethnographical accounts encoded in print media forms like the Sunday supplements of major U. S. newspapers and journalistic reportage, back histories, and book length production ranging in scope from travelogues to constitutional-political polemics.” Oscar Campomanes. “The New Empire’s Forgetful and Forgotten Citizens: Unrepresentability and Unassimilability in Filipino-American Postcolonialities.” *Critical Mass: A Journal of Asian American Cultural Criticism* 2, no. 2 (1995): pp 177-178. Although I agree with Campomanes, my approach to American knowledge production will focus on the written word (travel accounts, books, articles, speeches, lectures, etc.) and congressional debates, hearings, and investigations.

⁷ It necessary to make clear that American knowledge production about the Philippines and other American colonial possessions has drawn the attention of both American and Filipino scholars. For example, Lanny Thompson, Oscar Campomanes, Epifanio San Juan, Faye C. Caronan, and Eduardo F. Ugarte have discussed American representations of the American colonial subjects in the first decades of the twentieth century. See Lanny Thompson Womack. ““Estudiarlos, juzgarlos, y gobernarlos:” conocimiento y poder en el archipiélago imperial estadounidense” in Consuela Arango et al. *La Nación Soñada: Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas ante el 98*. Aranjuez (Madrid): Doce Calles, 1996, pp 685-693. “Representation and Rule in the Imperial Archipelago Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines under the U. S. Dominion after 1898.” *Amerasia Studies Asia* 1, no. 1, 2002, pp. 2-39, and “The Imperial Republic: A Comparison of the Insular Territories under U. S. Dominion after 1898.” *Pacific Historical Review*, 71, no. 4 (2002), pp. 535-74; Eduardo F. Ugarte ““Qualifications Most Necessary to Rule’ The Amok in the Construction of Filipino and American Identities.” *Amerasia Studies Asia* 1, no. 1 (2002), pp. 41-73; Faye C. Caronan. “Colonial Consumption and Colonial Hierarchies in Representations of Philippine and Puerto Rican Tourism.” *Philippine Studies* 53, no. 1 (2005): pp. 32-58; San Juan, Op. cit, and Campomanes, Op. cit.

On the other hand, the debates over the Philippines were more concerned with the future of the United States than with the archipelago itself. American writers, journalists, scholars, and missionaries were primarily concerned with the meaning and consequences of U.S. Philippine policies for the American economy, culture, political institutions, and racial relations. The issue was much more how the retention of the Philippines could change the United States as a nation, than how American colonialism was changing Filipino society.

The public discussion of the Philippines was also a conversation about the future of American foreign policy. Behind the debate over the Philippines' political future were key elements of U.S. foreign policy: isolationism, Open Door Policy, the Monroe Doctrine, navalism/militarism, and concern over Japanese expansionism. For many, retention of the Philippines was a key element in a more assertive and active American foreign policy, especially in Asia. For others, retention of the Philippines was the main obstacle to a return to America's traditional isolationism. For many, retention of the Philippines came to symbolize an American foreign policy worthy of America's power. They saw independence for the Philippines as signaling a weakening of resolve that would damage America's international prestige and position. For others, Philippine independence was a necessary step to returning the nation to the tradition first defined by George Washington of non-entanglement overseas.

This chapter will examine the development of a body of knowledge about the Philippines during the first decades of the twentieth-century. It will argue that between 1900 and 1924, three major topics dominated the public debates about the Philippines: 1) the meaning of the Philippines for U.S. republican traditions and institutions; 2) the idea of an "enlightened" American colonialism; and 3) the strategic and geopolitical meaning of the Philippines. In other words, American discussion of the Philippines' future was a combination of political, racial, cultural, and strategic ideas and concerns about what ruling the Philippines meant for the United States. That discussion produced a body of knowledge that was used both to support and to criticize American colonialism in the Philippines. A more detailed analysis of these topics is necessary in order to understand congressional discussions of the Philippines, for they reveal not only how their colonial

masters understood the Filipinos as colonial subjects, but also how these colonial masters represented and imagined their own society.

THE TRUTH-MAKERS

Their legitimacy and influence

Before analyzing the development of the body of knowledge about the Philippines, it is necessary to ask how its creators were able to influence Americans' understanding of the Philippines. First, new mass communication media offered access to large segments of American society. According to Matthew Schneirov, between 1893 and 1914 the United States experience a revolution in mass communications. During this period, popular magazines aimed not only at a particular group of consumers, but also "to a large audience of adult men and women." According to Schneirov, these magazines' target audience was less the "highly educated middle-class" than the "growing population of new urban residents: people like shop girls, clerical workers, workers in sale, white collar workers, etc."⁸ In 1900, the total circulation of magazines in the United States was about 65 million, "or about three magazines for every four people."⁹ Schneirov argues that popular magazines were "the earliest expression of national mass culture" and "not regular forms of entertainment, a source of pleasure for national audience of readers, but a potent and powerful force in shaping the consciousness of millions of Americans."¹⁰ The writers examined in this chapter used popular magazines like *Munsey's*, *Scribner's*, *McClure's*, the *Forum*, the *American Monthly Review of Reviews*, *Harper's*, and the *Outlook* to represent American insular possessions to urban America.

⁸ Matthew Schneirov, *The Dream of a New Order. Popular Magazines in America, 1893-1914*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 4-6, 9-11, and 27.

⁹Ibid, pp. 53.

¹⁰ According to Schneirov, in 1900 *Munsey's* and *McClure's* had circulations of 590,000 and 369,000 magazines, respectively. This revolution in the communication was part of what Alan Trachtenberg called "the steady emergence of new modes of experience" in urban America during the Gilded Age. According to Trachtenberg, "Viewing and looking at representation, words, and images, city people found themselves addressed more often as passive spectators than as active participant consumers of images and sensations produced by others." Schneirov, pp. 265 and Alan Trachtenberg, *The Incorporation of America. Culture & Society in the Gilded Age*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982, pp. 123.

The continuous discussion of American policy in the Philippines also created an open market for information about the islands. Though some analysts of American colonialism in the Philippines have believed that the Philippines stopped being a major issue in the United States after 1902,¹¹ I found at least 75 articles and 40 books published in the United States between 1903 and 1934, dealing directly or indirectly with the Philippines.¹² Though perhaps the Philippines no longer occupied center stage in the public's awareness of policy debates, these sources show that the American cultural mainstream remained engaged with the Philippines until the question of the islands' political future was finally resolved in favor of independence. In addition, Filipinos themselves played a crucial role in maintaining their country's future as a topic of discussion in the United States. That the Filipino leadership accepted and cooperated with American colonial administrations did not mean that they stopped pressuring for freedom and political reforms.¹³ From pro-independence missions to Washington to lecture tours and radio addresses, Filipinos played a major role in keeping the Philippine question alive in the United States in the first three decades of the twentieth century.¹⁴

¹¹ The reason given is President Theodore Roosevelt's July, 1902 declaration that the Philippines were pacified, marking the official end of the war. Welch, *Op. cit.* pp. 76.

¹² See Appendix 1. This number does not represent an exhaustive survey of articles and books published in the United States between 1903 and 1934, but only the ones I came across during my research.

¹³ Regarding the Filipino elite's cooperation with the colonial government, see Michael Cullinane, "Implementing the New Order: the Structure and Supervision of Local Government. During the Taft Era," Norman G Owen. (editor) *Compadre Colonialism: Philippine-American Relations, 1899-1946*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Papers in Southeast Asian Studies no. 3, University of Michigan Press, 1971; Enrique de la Cruz. "Essays into American Empire in the Philippines." *Amerasia Journal* 24, no. 2 (1998): pp. ix-xv; and Reynaldo C. Ileto. *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979.

¹⁴ Regarding the activities of the Filipino nationalist movement in the United States, see Bernardita Reyes Churchill, *The Philippine Independence Missions to the United States, 1919-1934*. Manila: National Historical Institute, 1983; Theodore Friend. *Between Two Empires; the Ordeal of the Philippines, 1919-1946*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965; Gerald E Wheeler. "Manuel Quezon and Independence for the Philippines: Some Qualifications." *The U. P. Research Digest* 2 (1963); Bonifacio S. Salamanca. *The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901-1913*. US: Shoe String Press, Inc., 1968; Manuel L. Quezon. *The Good Fight*. New York: D. Appleton Century, 1946; and Michael P Onorato. "Quezon and Independence: a Reexamination." *Philippine Studies* 37 (1989): pp. 221-31.

Another issue is these American writers, journalists and scholars' self-proclaimed authority on the Philippines. Many of the creators of the Philippine Question became what San Juan identifies as "instant experts on the Philippines."¹⁵ According to San Juan, in their books Americans claimed authority to produce "truths" about the Philippines for popular consumption.¹⁶ These claims were based on travel to and around the Philippines, and/or scholarly studies of the archipelago's social, economic, cultural, and political conditions.¹⁷

¹⁵ San Juan, "One hundred years," p. 11. In 1906, James Leroy argued that "one of the evils of our Philippine experience has been that news and information and discussion have come like epidemics." Leroy criticized the burgeoning of experts on the Philippines, and identified what he thought were the basic requirements to become an expert on the Philippines: first, to have "gone thoroughly into the bibliography of the subject;" second, to have enough experience dealing with the Filipinos; and third, to speak at least Spanish. For him, a couple months' stay in the Philippines was an insufficient claim to authority as an analyst of the Philippines. Leroy was himself a self-proclaimed expert on the Philippines who wrote books about the islands (*Philippine life in town and country*. New York, London: G. P. Putnam's Sons; 1905 and *The Americans in the Philippines: a History of the Conquest and First Years of Occupation, With an Introductory Account of the Spanish Rule*. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co; 1914. 2 v.); James A Le Roy. *The Philippine and the Filipinos*. Boston: Ginn & Company; 1906, p. 288.

¹⁶According to San Juan, the texts created by these producers of American knowledge "authorized by a whole panoply of practices (economic, political, cultural and so on) hortatory and legitimizing, governing the relations between the United States as a colonial sovereign and the subjugated inhabitants of the territory labeled 'the Philippine Islands.'" Like the creators of discourse of Orientalism analyzed by Nicholas Thomas in his excellent study of colonial culture, the producers of the Philippine Question justified themselves through claims of authority. According to Thomas, "Through repetition and claims to authority, this tradition created a reality that it appeared merely to describe, and thus acquired 'material presence or weight.'" San Juan, p. 5-6; Nicholas Thomas. *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel, and Government*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 23.

¹⁷ Some self-proclaimed experts on the Philippines were Henry P Willis. *Our Philippine Problem*. New York: Arno Press & The New York Times; 1970 (1905); George A Miller. "Ten Years After; Have We Failed in the Philippines." *Overland Monthly*. 1908 Aug; 52:175-180; Theodore W Noyes. *Oriental America and its Problems*. Washington. D. C.: Press of Judd and Detweiler; 1903; Albert B Hart. *The Obvious Orient*. Appleton; 1911; David H Doherty. *Conditions in the Philippines. Paper on the Conditions in the Philippines, by David H. Doherty*, M. D. Chicago. Ill. February 27, 1904, 58th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Document No. 170. Washington D. C. Government Printing Office; 1904; Reid. "Philippine Observation" and James H Blount. "Philippine Independence -Why?" *North American Review*. 1907 Jun 21:366-; Homer C. Stuntz. *The Philippines and the Far East*. Cincinnati, New York: Jennings and Pye. Eaton and Mains, 1904.

Types of truth-makers

These self-proclaimed experts or “truth-makers” can be grouped in two categories: independent and official truth-makers. Independent truth-makers had no direct link with the colonial administration of the Philippines. They were journalists, businessmen, missionaries, and travelers who, after a few months or years of visiting or living in the Philippines shared their “expertise” on the islands through articles, books and lectures.¹⁸ For example, in the introduction to his book *Our Philippine Problem* (1905), Henry P. Willis claims authority by explaining his relationship to the Philippines. He describes beginning to pay “serious attention” to the Philippines in 1901 as an editor in New York City, and later Washington correspondent for the *New York Journal of Commerce* and the *Commercial Bulletin* (Springfield, Massachusetts) between 1902 and 1903. During this latter period, he explains, his knowledge of the Philippines increased by witnessing the congressional discussions about the Philippines. However, his main source of authority on the Philippines was his trip to the islands in 1904. During the couple of months he spent in the islands, Willis claims he made “as careful a study of insular conditions and of the working of our administration as circumstances permitted,” visiting not only the capital, but also traveling “some 2,700 miles outside Manila.”¹⁹ Acknowledging that “the ground covered in the Philippines was relatively small,” he argues that he received information “from the persons most directly responsible for or conversant with the conditions to which I have made reference.”²⁰ Willis’ sources

¹⁸ For example, in 1904, Homer C. Stuntz, a Methodist Minister, wrote a book about his experiences in the Philippines for the specific purpose of using his knowledge about the Philippines to influence American voters’ decisions about the archipelago’s future. According to him, “After eight years’ experience among similar social conditions in British India, and more than two years residence in the Philippines, it came to me as a duty to set down in order the things which American voters and American Christians ought to know for their guidance in helping shape the policies of our nation, and furnishing the support for our missionary societies in the work of God has appointed each to do among these people.” In other words, Stuntz saw himself as an expert not only in Filipino matters, but also in global colonial affairs who wished to share the truth about the islands with his American readers. Stuntz, *Op cit.*, p. 5. Emphasis mine.

¹⁹ Willis, *Our Philippine Problem*, p. iv.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. v.

included not only American military and civil officers, but also “many of the best-informed Filipinos, including some now residents outside the Philippines.”²¹

Thus armed with expertise, Willis returned to the United States and wrote a book analyzing and explaining the Filipino problem for his American readers. This pattern was followed by other writers like Thomas L Blayney,²² Gilbert Reid, who in stayed in the Philippines five months;²³ Albert Hart, who visited the islands during the winter of 1908;²⁴ Theodore W Noyes,²⁵ and David H Doherty, who stayed in the Philippines “three strenuous months.”²⁶ Like Willis, they returned from their insular adventures as self-proclaimed experts on the Philippines.

On the other hand, military and colonial officers like Dean C. Worcester, General Leonard Wood, Cameron W. Forbes, William H. Taft, Judge James H Blount, Colonel

²¹ Ibid.

²² According to a note from the editor of the *Review of Reviews*, Blayney, a professor at the William M. Rice Institute (Houston, Texas), traveled to the Philippines and had direct contact with the Filipino situation. According to this note, Blayney’s knowledge of the Philippines was enhanced by his “experience acquired by extended residence in Latin countries of Europe, and to his knowledge of oriental character gathered through an extensive acquaintanceship with Orientals in Morocco, India, China, and Japan.” Thus, this man was not only an expert on the Philippines, but an Orientalist as well. This article was introduced into the *Congressional Records (CR)* by Senator Miles Poindexter (R- Washington) in January 1916. As will be seen in this chapter, introducing articles, quotes, and comments into the *CR* was another way members of Congress participated in American knowledge production about the Philippines. Thomas Lindsey Blayney. “Our Administration of the Philippine Islands.” *Review of Reviews* (1916). (Introduced on the *Congressional Record* by Senator Miles Poindexter January 17, 1916. (*Congressional Record*, Senate, 64th Congress -1st Session, vol. 53, pp. 1155-1158.)

²³ According to Reid, the five months he spent in the Philippines put him a better position to analyze the Philippines than the “sightseers, globe-trotters and investigation commissions.” Reid, *Philippine Observation*, p. 238.

²⁴ Hart, *The Obvious Orient*.

²⁵ Noyes’ book is based on his “editorial correspondents and articles” published in the *Washington Evening Star*. He visited not only the Philippines, but also Java and Ceylon. Noyes, *Oriental America*, p. iv.

²⁶ Doherty was a physician from Chicago, member of the American Medical Association, the American Anthropological Association, and the Modern Language Association of America. He translated three books by the Austrian expert on the Philippines, Dr. Ferdinand Bluementripp. According to him, before traveling to the Philippines, he spent five years studying Filipino ethnology, history, and language. Doherty, *Conditions in the Philippines*.

William C. Rivers, and General Henry T. Allen also became truth-makers and played a major role in framing the Philippine Question.²⁷ These official truth-makers' authority came from their role in pacifying and governing the Philippines, as well as the experience and knowledge they gained during their time there²⁸, or what General Allen calls their degree of "**philipinitis**."²⁹ For example, in August 13, 1906, former Judge James Blount gave a speech to the Georgia General Assembly. A staunch supporter of Filipino independence, Blount's attack on the Republican Party's policy favoring retention of the Philippines is not surprising. What is interesting about Blount's speech is the Georgia General Assembly's resolution inviting Blount to address them. The resolution read,

Whereas, The Hon. James H. Blount, a distinguished son of Georgia, has recently returned from said islands, where he lived for many years, and during the term of his said residence was one of the codifiers of the laws of said islands, and was judge of one of his highest courts, and favors the Democratic position of independence and self-government for said islands, and has recently delivered two public speeches upon that subject in Georgia which, **for their learning, observation and wisdom, are of inestimable value to the people.**³⁰

This resolution recognizes Blount as an expert on the Philippines and identifies his expertise on the Philippines as a product of his work as a member of the islands' colonial administration, and his period of residence in the archipelago. The Assembly invites Blount to talk to them as a Georgian and fellow Democrat who could share his

²⁷ Dean C. Worcester was, without a doubt, the truth-maker *par excellence*, who will be discussed in depth later in this chapter.

²⁸ For example, in his lecture at the Lake Mohawk Conference in 1915, Colonel William C. Rivers, former chief of the Philippine Constabulary, presented his credentials as a truth-maker by saying he wanted to share his personal impressions "after ten year's service as an Army officer on duty with the Philippine Government." National Archives, RG, Sen 64A-F18, folder #2, William C Rivers, "The Moro as Factor in the Philippine Problem," 1915.

²⁹ During a speech at the Manufacturer's Club in New York City in 1908, Allen said it was natural that Club members expect his speech to deal with the Philippines, given his high grade of "philipinitis" after his six years' residence in the islands. Library of Congress (LC), Manuscript Division (MD), Papers of General Henry T. Allen, Box 9- Speech at the Manufacturer's Club, New York City, 1906, p. 1. Emphasis mine.

³⁰ LC, MC, Papers of Moorfield Storey, Box 7, James H. Blount, "Philippine Independence," August 13, 1906. Emphasis is our.

“learning, observation, and wisdom” with them. In other words, he was invited because he could speak authoritatively on the Philippines.³¹

Another good example of a colonial officer become truth-maker is Governor General Leonard Wood. In 1924, journalist Price Bell started an interview with Governor Wood emphasizing Wood’s expertise on the Filipino issues. For Price, Wood had no rival, **“Caucasian or non-Caucasian, in his knowledge of the archipelago and the people for which he has supreme immediate responsibility.”** According to Price, Wood’s knowledge was a product of years of **“first-hand study”** beginning in 1903 when he became Governor of the island of Mindanao.³² Price also emphasizes that Wood was Commander of the Filipino Division and member of a special commission that President Warren G. Harding named in 1921 to investigate the conditions of the Philippines.³³ For Price, nobody was in a better condition to analyze the Philippines than an officer like Wood who had occupied military and civilian important positions in the administration of the archipelago over the course of 20 years.

The writers, scholars, and civil and military officers mentioned in this section were important agents in the production and reproduction of knowledge about Filipinos.

³¹Blount also claimed authority over Filipino issues. In January 1907 he published an article in the *North American Review* titled “Philippine Independence- When? Attacking the Republican policy in the Philippines. According to him, that article captured public attention because “the writer, after nearly six years stay in the Islands (1899-1905) – the first two as an officer of the army that subjugated them, and remainder as a United States Judge- had finally returned home with the conviction that we ought not to continue to hold the Islands indefinitely, and gave some reasons, not academical, but derived from his personal observation, for the opinion.” James H. Blount. “Philippine Independence -Why?” *North American Review* (1907): 369-370.

³² LC, MD, Papers of Leonard Wood, Box 217, Philippines, Miscellaneous, Price Bell, “Wood declares U. S. should stay in the Philippines,” July 14, 1924. Emphasis mine.

³³ Ibid. For Price, General Wood embodied America’s civilizing mission in the Philippines. According to Price: “General Wood, gray, ruddy, sturdy, dignified, received me in the governor general’s private office, Malacañang palace, Manila. He sat in a wide, tall, dark hardwood chair, with bottom and back of cane, and talked rapidly in a low voice. His voice was so low that now and again I had difficulty in catching every word. For the most part the veteran soldier and administrator wore a look of seriousness, if not severity, but two or three times during the conversation his features relaxed, he smiled, and there was an extremely pleasant look in his blue eyes. **He has character. He has magnetism. He has brain. He is not only a military man; he is a thinker and a statesman.**” LC, MD, Wood, Box 217, Philippines, Miscellaneous, Price Bell, Conversation with Major General Leonard Wood Governor General of the Philippine Islands, July 12th, 1925. Emphasis mine.

Through their knowledge, experience, and self proclaimed expertise about the Philippines, they informed and formed Americans' knowledge about their Asian colony.

REPUBLICANISM

One of the main issues in the Philippine debates was the idea that U.S. colonial control of the Philippines islands was against American republican traditions and institutions. According to this idea's proponents,³⁴ republicanism and imperialism were incompatible because the latter would inevitably corrupt the former. Although they advocated Philippine independence, the anti-imperialists were concerned more with the future of American society than with the Filipinos' political rights. For them, U.S. military and colonial policies in the Philippines put American equality, freedom, and democracy at risk. The only solution was to grant those islands independence.³⁵ They saw the United States as a nation of citizens, not of subjects, and Filipinos as racially, politically, and culturally inassimilable. In addition, they thought that retention and conquest of the Philippines broke with America's anti-imperialistic tradition and set a dangerous precedent.³⁶ In view of the recent expansion of European rule throughout Asia

³⁴James L Blair. *Imperialism, Our New National Policy*. St. Louis: 1899; Harrison. *The Corner-Stone of Philippine Independence*; Thomas Matt Osborne. *Democracy and Imperialism by the Hon. Thomas Mott Osborne Delivered at the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Anti-Imperialist League*, Boston, November 30, 1908. Cambridge, Mass: Press of the Cambridge Chronicle, 1908? Richard F. Pettigrew. *Imperial Washington*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1922; Goldwin Smith. *Commonwealth or Empire*. Toronto: Wm. Tyrell & Co., 1902; William Graham Sumner. *The Predominant Issue*. Burlington, Vermont: F. A. Richardson, 1901; Willis, Op. cit.; William F Willoughby. *Territories and Dependencies of the United States. Their Government and Administration*. New York: The Century Co., 1905; Lieut. Francis A. Adams, U. S. V., NY, Philippine Question, LC, MD, Papers of William Croffutt, Box 16, Printed Pamphlets, 1899; *The American Birthright and the Philippine Pottage, From Sermon Preached on Thanksgiving Day, 1899, by Rev. Henry Van Dyke, D. D. LL, D., Rector of the Brick Church in New York City, Presbyterian, Anti-Imperialist Leaflet No. 18*, LC, MD, Papers of William Croffutt, Box 16, Printed Pamphlets, 1899; Moorfield Storey, *Anti-Imperialist Leaflet No. 16*, Extracts from the Speech of Moorfield Storey, Esq., at Faneuil Hall, Boston, June 15, 1898.

³⁵ In focusing on colonial subjects, the supporters of republicanism ignored their society's domestic inequalities: Chinese immigrants, Mexican-Americans, indigenous peoples, African-Americans, and women—with *Plessy v. Ferguson* recently decided and the women's suffrage movement well underway—were notably absent from their representations of America.

³⁶In 1905, Henry P Willis argued that "Unless great caution is exercised, therefore, there is every reason to fear that our dealings with the Philippine Question will only result in entangling us more and more completely with the islands. This may result in consequences permanently

and Africa, they concluded that the only way to keep colonies was through military power: militarism was, then, an inevitable consequence of imperialism. The resulting combination of military power and colonialism would not only corrupt American democracy, but also would end American isolationist policy and expose the United States to embroilment in foreign conflicts.³⁷

A good example of how republicanism was deployed against U.S. colonialism in the Philippines is Goldwin Smith's February 23, 1900 speech before the Anti-Imperialist League's Philadelphia Conference.³⁸ Smith, a Chicago lawyer and League member, emphasized how retention of the Philippines was a danger to the "spirit of American people" and "American character."³⁹ The United States could not be, he argued, at once

injurious, not merely to the Philippines, but to the United States" Willis, *Our Philippine Problem*, p. 28.

³⁷In 1899, Reverend Henry Van Dyke reminded his congregation that "Imperialism and democracy, militarism and self-government are contradictory terms. A government of the people, by the people, for the people is impregnable for defense, but impotent for conquest. [...] Hear the unintentional warning of an interested friend! Colonial expansion means strife; **the annexation of the Philippines means the annexation of a new danger to the world's peace.** The acceptance of imperialism means that we must prepare to beat our ploughshares into swords, and our pruning hooks into spears, and be ready to water distant lands and stain foreign seas with an ever increasing torrent of American blood." Judge James Blair also argued that by retaining the Philippines, the United States would throw "**down the gauntlet of international strife.**" For him, wars were an inevitable consequence of imperialism; therefore, the retention of the Philippines would involve the United States in very expensive wars whose worst consequence would be the "brutalization" of American society. Van Dyke, *The American Birthright*; Blair, "Imperialism our national policy," p. 20. Emphasis mine.

³⁸ Republicanism was one of the main arguments of the opponents of retaining the Philippines, especially the members of the Anti-imperialist League. The League was founded in Boston in 1898 by a group of opponents of U.S. foreign policy after the war with Spain. See Walter LaFeber. *The American Age United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750*. 2nd ed. New York: Norton; 1994, vol. 1, p. 224 and Robert L. Beisner. *Twelve against Empire. The Antimperialists, 1898-1900*. New York, Toronto, London, and Sydney: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968, pp. 98-100.

³⁹ Smith, *Republic or Empire*, pp. 7 and 20. According to Smith, "The change would soon extend to the spirit of the American people. The effect is already seen. Language on question between right and force at variance, not only with the Declaration of Independence, but also with anything that would have been heard fifty years ago, may now be read in the Imperialist press. It is true that there is throughout the world a tendency of sentiment in this direction; that evolution and the survival of the fittest have been everywhere propagating the gospel of force; while the gospel of human brotherhood, justice, and mercy, preached by Jesus and professed by Christian nations, has been losing influence even with Churches." For Smith, imperialism was a virus contaminating an American society he envisioned as a democratic Christian brotherhood.

an empire and a republic.⁴⁰ The American nation faced a dilemma: leave the Philippines and return to its historic republican tradition, or keep the islands and become an empire. If the United States decided to imitate the European monarchies and play what Smith called “the British game,”⁴¹ the nation’s exceptional essence would be destroyed. For Smith, imperialism equalled militarism, and militarism was against any principle of democratic and republican rule. Therefore, he concluded, there was no way to reconcile American retention of the Philippines with American democratic and republican institutions.

Twenty-two years after Smith addressed the Philadelphia Convention, former Congressman and Governor General of the Philippines Francis Burton Harrison wrote a book about his Philippine experiences, titled *The Corner-Stone of Philippine Independence* (1922).⁴² Harrison argued that only independence could reconcile the United States with its anti-imperial and republican tradition. For him, conquest and retention of the Philippines was “a venture in imperialism,” a historical accident, that could and should be remedied by granting independence to the Philippines. This would, furthermore, not only reconcile the United States to its tradition, but also improve

⁴⁰ “If you have an Empire you will, under one form or another, have an Emperor. You cannot help committing a measure of autocratic power to the head of the executive, thereby changing his character and the character of the constitution. [...] A standing army is the necessary appendage of Empire, and it brings with it not only the means of armed repression in case of conflict between the holders of power and the people, but the military spirit of absolutism and professional caste, which is congenial to oligarchic and adverse democratic sentiment; as Germany, dragooned by her military aristocracy, too well knows.” Ibid. p. 6

⁴¹ Great Britain and the British imperialism played a key role in Smith’s book. For him, if the United States followed British example, American democratic republicanism would be destroyed: “The American constitution is not suited for playing the British game. [...] It seems likely that the democratic character of the American Republic could be so completely eliminated from its diplomacy as to make it an apt yoke-fellow for a monarchical and aristocratic influence in Great Britain. The monarchical and aristocratic influence in Great Britain has been considerably strengthened, as it was sure to be, by Imperialism and militarism, which commend themselves to reactionists on that account” Smith, Op. cit. pp. 12-13.

⁴² Francis Burton Harrison was a lawyer “with a distinguished southern lineage.” His father was the private secretary of Jefferson Davis and his mother a novelist. He graduated from Yale in 1895 and from New York Law School in 1897, and served in the War with Spain. His congressional career began with his election to Congress (D-NY) in 1902, and lasted until President Wilson appointed him Governor of the Philippines in 1913 – a position he held until 1921. Golay, Op. cit. p. 173 and <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000268>.

American world-position.⁴³ According to Harrison, the problem lay not with the American people—because ordinary American citizens were anti-imperialistic by nature—but with the U.S. government’s misguided actions.⁴⁴ The acquisition of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, the protectorate over Cuba and Panama, and the military interventions in Siberia, Haiti, and Central America were mistakes that, according to Harrison, contradicted America’s self-proclaimed exceptionalism and anti-imperialism. In other words, the United States could not keep the Philippines and continue proclaiming its moral and political superiority over the rest of the world. For Harrison, Filipino independence was a necessary act of redemption that would cleans the nation’s tarnished honor. Despite Harrison’s sympathetic view Filipino independence, it is clear that his priority was to solve the contradictions American colonial retention of the Philippines entailed, and avoid the dangers of imperialism. According to him,

The definite retention of the Philippines will signify to the other countries that we have behind the screen hypocritical counsels and double-dealing policies. They will measure us in the corridor of European foreign affairs by their own standards. Then at least, we shall be obligated to gird up our loins and prepare for battles. The challenge to the other powers will be aggressive and unmistakable. Are we prepared to pay the price?⁴⁵

⁴³ Harrison, *The Corner-Stone of*, p.111. In his 1922 book, former Senator Richard F. Pettigrew (R-South Dakota) contended that what he called American ‘imperial policy’ started with the annexation of Hawaii and the retention of the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico. This imperial policy turned the United States out from its tradition, especially the Declaration of Independence. However, like Harrison, he believed that the greatest contradiction was annexing the Philippines. According to him, “We annexed the Philippines forcibly. That, according to the principles laid down in the Declaration of I, is criminal aggression. We departed from the foundation principles of this country; violated its most sacred obligations to the world, and pursued the same brutal, unjustified policy than Great Britain has pursued wherever her conquering armies have mowed down naked savages with machine guns.” Pettigrew, *Imperial Washington*, p. 333.

⁴⁴ Harrison, Op. cit.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 294.

AN ENLIGHTENED COLONIALISM

The portrayal of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines as a Christianizing, civilizing, and enlightening endeavor was one of the strongest and most enduring elements of American knowledge production about Filipinos.⁴⁶ For over thirty years, American journalists, colonial officers, travelers, businessmen, military officers, political analysts, writers, and members of Congress used the metaphor of an enlightened colonialism to explain and justify American colonial enterprise in the Philippines. For them, the relationship between the Filipinos and their American tutors was not colonial, but a special and friendly relationship. The United States was not exploiting the Philippines, but developing the islands for the Filipinos' benefit; not oppressing or tyrannizing them, but teaching them the secrets of democracy and self-government. According to the proponents of "enlightened colonialism," the American presence in the Philippines symbolized not colonialism, but freedom and progress.⁴⁷

This idea was developed by a group of writers who published articles and books about the Philippines during 1898 and 1899, justifying the United States government's acquisition of the archipelago by contrast to the Spanish colonial system it replaced. These writers did not invent Americans' anti-Spanish sentiment, the cruelty and inefficiency of Spanish imperialism, or the problems Americans found in the colonies

⁴⁶ According to Mary Louise Pratt, since the 18th century European imperialism solved its legitimization problems through what she calls "legitimizing ideologies." Among those ideologies, Pratt identifies "the civilizing mission, scientific racism, and technology-based paradigms of progress and development." In other words, by justifying American colonialism as an enlightening endeavor, Americans followed well-established imperial practice. Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes Travel Writing and Transculturation*. London and New York, Routledge, 1992, p. 74.

⁴⁷Curiously, one of the better descriptions of enlightened colonialism came from a staunch anti-imperialist, Moorfield Storey, who in 1904 wrote: that "The American people, a self-sacrificing and conscientious nation, having no object in view save the benefit of the Filipinos, should retain the absolute control of the Philippines indefinitely, and at least for several generations, meanwhile introducing education, railroads, sanitary improvement and other good things until the Filipinos are fit for independence, and then American people should decide whether they are fit for independence and also whether independence is good for them." Storey's irony identified the paternalism, arrogance and sense of superiority underlying the idea of enlightened imperialism. LC, MD, Papers of William Croffutt, Box 16, printed Pamphlets, Moorfield Storey, "The Philippine Policy of Secretary Taft," July 4, 1904.

they acquired from Spain in 1898.⁴⁸ But they did use Spanish imperialism as a foil against which to construct their vision of an enlightened U.S. imperialism. Spanish imperialism was a “system of conquest, and conquest alone,”⁴⁹ lacking any justification or legitimacy because it did not seek the progress and welfare of its colonies and colonial subjects. Enlightened imperialism, on the other hand, was legitimate because it was based not on exploitation of the colonized subjects, but on respect for their rights and promotion of their welfare and progress. These writers saw this kind of imperialism as the United States’ global vocation, because only a democratic and civilized republic like the United States could be an enlightened empire.⁵⁰ Since the United States was an exceptional country, its imperialism should and would be exceptional, and synonymous with progress. Unlike the advocates of republicanism, they saw no contradiction between American republican and democratic institutions and colonial control of the Philippines. For them, U.S. control over insular possessions was a consequence not of imperialistic aggression, but of America’s moral responsibilities. After the war with Spain, the United States had no choice but to face the moral obligation of rescuing the Filipinos from Spanish oppression, civilizing and teaching them self-government. For these writers, the United States, though traditionally a non-imperialistic nation had been forced by circumstances to become an empire in order to save and enlighten uncivilized peoples.⁵¹

⁴⁸ According to Gerald F. Linderman, the “Characteristics that drew American attention (though not necessarily praise) at mid-century -Spanish dignity, honor, military prowess- were subject to slow dilution, it seemed, as Spain disintegrated. That was nothing worthy, and much that was repugnant to Americans, in a conqueror grown indolent.” Linderman, *The Mirror of War American Society and the Spanish-American War*, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1974, pp. 120-121.

⁴⁹ Charles Kendall Adams, “Colonies and Other Dependencies,” *The Forum*, 27, 1898, pp. 36.

⁵⁰ According to E L Godkin, the United States should rule their insular possession “for their own benefit [...] not simply because we have been able to defeat Spain, but because we stand before her in the files of time, because our political manners are superior to hers, **because to sum it up, we are more ‘enlightened.’**” Godkin, “The Conditions,” p. 190. Emphasis mine.

⁵¹ Hugh H. Lusk, “The Problem of the Philippines,” *The North American Review*, September 1898; “America’s Duty to Her New Dependencies”, *The American Monthly Review of Reviews*, March 1898, pp. 335-336; Adams, “Colonies;” “The Responsibilities of Peace;” *The Outlook* (1898): pp. 957-59; Foreman, *The Philippines Islands*; Fisher, “Principles of Colonial;” H. G. Curtis, “The Status,” pp. 403-411; Hill, “The Value of,” pp. 414-419; Godkin, “The Conditions,” pp. 190-203; Whitmarsh, “Conditions in Manila;” Carroll, “The Territorial;” Ericsson, “A Visit to the;” Ward, “The Condition.”

As with the French civilizing rhetoric in West Africa (*mission civilisatrice*) Alice L. Conklin analyzed, American enlightened imperialism in the late 1890's "existed in dialectical tension with notions of universality." The writers analyzed in this chapter emphasized not only the differences, but also the commonalities between them and their colonial subjects. Although racially different from Americans, Filipinos "were nevertheless capable of improvement."⁵² Like French statesmen, supporters of enlightened colonialism "were constantly taking –or claiming to undertake, as the case may be- inclusionary and reforming measures on their behalf (the colonial subjects), that democracy and colonialism appeared compatible."⁵³ For Conklin, French civilizing rhetoric—and, I will argue, American enlightened imperialism as well—was not necessarily a cynical veneer overlaying imperialism's true nature. French and Americans both believed in the "moral legitimacy of overseas expansion."⁵⁴ Like the West Africans, Filipinos were seen as materially and morally inferior to Americans, but contact and help from the United States would help them become civilized.

Thus the construction of an enlightened imperialism made demonizing Spanish imperialism indispensable. These writers attacked Spanish imperialism as implacably as Commodore Dewey's guns: it was a cruel, barbaric, exhausted, and backward imperialism, diametrically opposed to what American imperialism would be.⁵⁵ The main goal of Spanish imperialism, according to these authors, was simply to exploit the

⁵² Alice L. Conklin, "Colonialism and Human Rights, a Contradiction in Terms?" *American Historical Review*, 103, April 1998, pp. 420-423.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ According to the *Outlook*, "For three centuries Spanish oppression has made the development of a free life in Cuba and Porto Rico impossible. Sampson and Schley, and Shafter and Miles have destroyed this impediment life. It is for others, in a like spirit of consecration, to carry into these islands the institutions which will promote life; to do this by establishing justice, encouraging industry, providing public education and freedom of religion, to do it by government, by commerce, and by philanthropy. **The success of war entails the responsibilities of peace.**" According to Lusk, "Should Spain now be restored what she unquestionably regards as her rights of sovereignty over the Philippines, her first step must be a renewal of the actions of her war in Cuba [...] to return the southern Philippines to Spain is to return them to the condition of **hopeless stagnation and barbarism** in which two centuries and half of nominal occupation and control by that country (Spain) have left them. "The Responsibilities," pp. 959 and Lusk, Op. cit. Emphasis mine.

colonial subjects. In contrast, American administration of the island would be wholly and exclusively for the benefit of the Filipinos.

For these proponents of enlightened colonialism, the United States should keep the islands to protect them, not only from external menace, but also from domestic unrest. They argued if the U.S. abandoned the Philippines, a period of tyranny, anarchy, and civil war would ensue, opening the door to intervention by a colonial power that would conquer and exploit the islands. Thus, the United States was responsible for defending the Filipinos not only from an external menace, but also from their own political immaturity and incapacity: the United States must protect the Filipinos from themselves.

Having thus established Filipinos' inability to rule and defend their own country, these writers argued that the United States was obligated to take control of the islands, to protect them and train their population in the secrets of self-government. According to Horace H. Fisher, the Americans were looking "to help wean the colony of dependency by protecting it from foreign encroachment and internal misrule during its apprenticeship in the art of self-government, and to give every reasonable assistance to make it self-supporting and self-governing and to attain the utmost practical measure of modern civilization and development."⁵⁶

The idea of an enlightened imperialism did not disappear after annexation of the Philippines in 1899, but continued to develop until the 1930's.⁵⁷ However, the heirs of its first proponents did not have to justify acquisition of the Philippines, since after 1899 it

⁵⁶ Fisher, *Principles of Colonial Government* (1899), pp. 22-23.

⁵⁷ See for example: Stuntz, *The Philippines*, 1904; Blayney. "Our Administration;" Briggs. *The Progressing Philippines*; Arthur J Brown. *The New Era in the Philippines*. New York, Chicago: F. H. Ravell Company, 1903; Chamberlain. *The Philippine Problem*; Crow. *American and the Philippines*, pp. 3-53; Elliott. *The Philippines to the End of the Commission*; Cardinal Gibbons. *Retention of the Philippines*; Harrison. *The Corner-Stone*; Otto H Kahn. *The Myth of American Imperialism*. New York: Committee of American Business Men, 1924; Charles E Magoon. *What Followed the Flag in the Philippines. An Address Delivered by Hon. Charles E Magoon Before The Patria Club of the City of New York at the Hotel Savoy, NYC, February 19, 1904.* 1904, pp. 2-5; Miller. "Ten Years After; pp 175" Noyes. *Oriental America*, pp. v 105-122; Cornélis D. Willcox. *Head-Hunters of Northern Luzon; With Appendix on the Independence of the Philippines*. Kansas City, Mo.: Franklin Hudson Co. 1912, p. 292; Reid, "Philippine Observation."

was a *fait accompli*.⁵⁸ Over the next thirty years, supporters of an enlightened colonialism would justify retention of the islands by praising “the paternal protection of the U.S.”⁵⁹

Enlightened Colonialism and Filipino independence

During the first decades of the twentieth century, supporters of American retention of the Philippines fought against what they identified as the primary threat to American civilizing mission in the Philippines: Filipino independence. One of their main arguments against Filipino independence was that only through American control of the islands could Filipinos be enlightened and civilized; therefore, the United States should not leave before its civilizing mission was accomplished. They argued that a premature American departure from the Philippines would not only be irresponsible, but also an unforgivable act of cowardice that would blemish American patriotism, honor, and international standing.⁶⁰ For example, in 1916 Thomas L. Blayney praised American

⁵⁸ The use of Spanish imperialism to justify American rule in the Philippines did not totally disappear. In 1904, Charles Magoon made a distinction between Spanish imperialism and American rule: “The flag of Spain, which ours displaced, blazons the colors of red and gold; these are the colors of the sunset. The flag of the Union, with its stripes of red and white, beneath a field of blue studded with silver stars, blazons the colors of the sunrise. Let us dedicate ourselves to the high purpose that the day follow the dawn it heralds in the Philippines shall be one that will add new honor to our nation and new glory to our Flag.” Magoon, *What Followed*, p. 6.

⁵⁹This phrase is from Reid, “Philippine Observation,” p. 295. An article written by George A. Miller in 1908, analyzing the first ten years of American rule in the Philippines, is good example of how colonialism’s supporters praised American rule in the Philippines. Arguing that this was a period of progress for the Philippines, Miller identified the United States’ major achievements in the Philippines: peace, justice, public health, education, freedom of religion, industrial development, domestic order and stability, a “progressive self-government,” the development of a middle-class, and the development of a work ethic. Miller, “Ten Years After,” p. 175.

⁶⁰According to the 1901 *Philippine Commission Report*, “The United States can not withdraw from the Philippines. We are there and duty binds us to remain. There is no escape from our responsibility to the Filipinos and to mankind, for the government of the archipelago and the amelioration of the condition of its habitants.” Governor General Leonard Wood also opposed Filipino independence. The United States should stay in the Philippines, he argued, to protect its human and economic investment in the islands. In addition, he saw the independence of the Philippines as a menace to world stability. For him, “If we withdraw now, all we have done would be undone, our investment of blood and treasure would be wasted, twenty-five years of idealistic labor would be thrown away, the Filipino people would be heartlessly betrayed and we should do a criminal disservice to the stability and the highest interest of the world.” Elihu Root saw not only American honor, but also American self-esteem at stake in the Philippines. According to him, “If we carry it through successfully it (American civilizing mission) will result in great credit to our country throughout the world; but we can not fail in it. Whether by our

work in the Philippines as the most “inspiring chapter in our national history.”⁶¹ For him, America’s unselfish labor in the Philippines embodied American exceptionalism and idealism. He argued that the American nation should not flee the islands to avoid the strategic dangers retention of the Philippines entailed. That kind of behavior would be unworthy and contrary to the American spirit. According to Blayney,

If we have not the courage of our forefathers, if the splendid work of American achievement, the self-sacrificing labors of countless men of our own race- the scientist, the educator, the administrator, and the soldier-are to be sacrificed to the empty shibboleth “independence,” is it not due our good name to leave the islands now? It is the firm belief of the writer that we owe it to ourselves, to the Filipinos, and to humanity to insist, so long as the American flag continues to fly over Manila and over the hundreds of schools, city halls, and courthouses of the archipelago, promising liberty and justice under its stars and stripes, not to a few political aspirants, but to all that just so long American, and not Filipino ideals of efficiency, administration, and justice should reign at Manila. [...] **The individual man is “free” today wherever the Stars and Stripes float to the breeze in the islands.** That he will not be “free” when the flag comes down is the firm conviction of all men of broad judgment and experience and experience in the Philippine.⁶²

Thus, for Blayney, defense of American honor required fulfillment of a perceived American mission in the Philippines. In addition, the United States should not betray the labor of “countless men of our race” who made major sacrifices to civilize and enlighten the Filipinos. Shirking these responsibilities would betray the American frontier tradition of expansion and adventure. For Blayney, the Philippines were the new Frontier whose

own misconduct or by weak abandonment of the duty we have undertaken, **without being greatly discredited throughout the world.** [...] More important still probably is the effect upon national self-respect and patriotism of doing such a piece of work well or making a discreditable failure in it.” Willcox acknowledged that the Philippines were a burden for the United States, but they were a burden that the Americans could not quit. *Philippines Commission Report*, p. 121: Bell, Op. cit.; and Elihu Root, “Prefatory Note,” in Elliott, Op. Cit. Emphasis mine.

⁶¹ Blayney, “Our Administration,” CR, S, 64th- 1st, S. 381, January 17, 1916, p. 1155-56.

⁶² Ibid. p. 1158. Emphasis mine.

risk and dangers the United States should not avoid; meeting its challenges would reaffirm the idealized American frontier values of masculinity, discipline and resolve.⁶³

Blayne's quote expressed the idea, widespread among the proponents of enlightened colonialism, that freedom came to the Philippines with the American invading forces in 1898. In this view, Filipinos were never free before 1898 and would never be as free as they were under the American flag. Therefore, independence was unnecessary because under American tutelage Filipinos were already free and happy. On the contrary, independence would destroy freedom in the Philippines and lead to tyranny, chaos, and external oppression. In other words, in order to enjoy "real freedom" Filipinos should renounce nationalism and remain under America's wise and benevolent colonialism. For some of the creators of American knowledge about the Philippines, American colonialism became synonymous with freedom for the Philippines.⁶⁴

Blayne was not alone. In 1912, Cornelius Willcox argued that independence was unnecessary because the average Filipino enjoyed "a freedom at least as great as that of the average American citizen, and is at complete liberty to pursue happiness in any way

⁶³ Rev. Arthur J. Brown also argued that the United States should not avoid its responsibilities in the Philippines. For him, the American nation had a divine mission to fulfill in the Philippines. An American withdrawal from the Philippines would be a childlike and cowardly act unworthy of "the greatest of the Christian nations." American retention of the Philippines was no accident, but part of a divine plan. God wanted the American nation to educate, civilize, and enlighten not only the Filipinos, but also other less fortunate races. According to him, "The wrongs of feeble and oppressed peoples are our affair, and we cannot pass by on the other side, pleasant though it would be if we could. It was Cain, the murderer, who said that he was not his brother's keeper. [...] There is a sentiment among the Christian people that an overruling Providence has in this matter called our nation to the great work of giving to those varied races good government, the reign of justice, education, and all the blessings which follow in the train of enlightened Christian civilization. It is this statement which inspires the mind of the President, and it is this sentiment, I believe, more than any other which will lead our people to sustain him in his arduous task." Brown thus internationalized American enlightened colonialism: for him, the United States was responsible not only for the Filipinos, but also for other "backward and less fortunate" races. Brown, *The New Era*, pp. 23 and 27. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁴ For Noyes, the Filipinos were very lucky the Americans did not abandon the islands, but forced them into what he identifies as the American "national kindergarten." In 1898, the Filipinos entered "at the foot of Uncle Sam's primary school in republicanism and self-government." According to him, the United States was developing a great political education in American territories (Alaska, New Mexico, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico) and the Philippines, the "republic's latest pupil," would be no exception. Noyes, *Oriental America*, pp. v and 110.

consistent with the law of the land and with the rights of others.”⁶⁵ Writing in 1914, Carl Crow contended that as American rule in the Philippines had developed, Filipinos were more free and happy under the U.S. flag than they could have been under the government of any Filipino republic.⁶⁶ For Theodore W. Noyes, American colonialism was a blessing for the Philippines because it stood for **“peace in the land, personal liberty and security to life property.”** Charles E. Magoon and Arthur J. Brown also thought that American colonialism was equal to freedom. According to Brown, ‘if freedom is meant honest enforcement of law, impartial administration of justice and the protection of all classes in life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, **then it must be said that the Americans have brought this fair Archipelago the only real freedom it has ever known.**” Magoon emphasizes that the American flag in the Philippines was a symbol of “liberty and progress, education and civilization, self-government and equality of right and privilege. It waves in the Philippines an emblem of the performance of a duty to ourselves, to civilization and to mankind.”⁶⁷

They all thought that independence was against Filipinos’ best interest because it would end America’s civilizing mission in the Philippines.

A new kind of colonialism

Supporters of enlightened colonialism also portrayed American rule in the Philippines as a revolution in the history of colonial administration: the limits and goals of colonialism were being redefined.⁶⁸ They reaffirmed American exceptionalism and

⁶⁵ Willcox, *Head-hunters*, p. 292.

⁶⁶ Crown, *America and the Philippines*, pp 3-53.

⁶⁷ Noyes, *Oriental America* (1903), p. 209; Brown, *The New Era* (1903), p. 28; Magoon, *What Followed* (1904), p. 16; Willcox, *Head-Hunters* (1912), p. 292; Crow, *America and the Philippines* (1914), 3-53. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁸Writing in 1916, Samuel L Parrish argued that the success of the American experiment in the Philippines would be crucial for the development of American world influence. According to him, the Philippine experiment was a sort of test case for the American people’s mission of spreading American values around the world. Therefore, the United States should not leave the islands until their civilizing mission there was completed. Samuel L Parrish. *Self-Government in the Tropics An Analysis of the Political Relations of the Temperate Toward the Tropic and Subtropic Zones, Especially As Affecting the Relations of the United States Toward Mexico and the Philippine*

traditional anti-imperialism denying that American occupation of the Philippines was an imperial enterprise,⁶⁹ holding up American enlightened colonialism as an alternative to traditional colonial exploitation of the world's less fortunate peoples.⁷⁰ For them, American occupation of the Philippines was a historical accident that forced Americans to face their moral and political responsibilities. One of the supporters of this idea, Charles Briggs, argued in 1916 that American occupation of the islands was an accident because in 1898 the United States was fighting for Cuban freedom. Briggs further

Islands, Senate Doc. 364. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1916. This document was presented to the Senate by Senator James Wolcott Wadsworth Jr. (R-NY).

⁶⁹ For Frederick C. Chamberlain, American policy in the Philippines was based on an altruism not found in other powers' colonial policies in Asia. According to him, "Unquestionably we have done more for the mass of Filipinos than any other nation ever did for a colony; and yet we have hardly made a beginning, so vast is the task. [...] No other nation believes in treating a colony as we have treated the Philippines." For Harrison, the retention of the Philippines did not make the United States an imperialist country because American control over the territory was transitory, tacitly recognizing that retention of the Philippines contradicted American self-representation as a non-imperialistic nation. Although William F Willoughby acknowledged the colonial relationship between the United States and the Philippines, he argued that American colonialism was special because, unlike European colonialism, it was not based on exploitation; American rule in the Philippines was just and altruistic. The Americans were giving the Filipinos education and "the largest measure of self-government that the conditions surrounding the acquisition and the character of its inhabitants safely warrant." Chamberlain, *The Philippine Problem*, pp. 191 and 205 Harrison, *Op. cit.*; and Willoughby, *Territories and Dependencies*, p. 8.

⁷⁰ David P. Barrows argued that American rule in the Philippines would set new standards "for the treatment of backward and dependent people" and influence the other world powers' colonial policies. Former Governor General Harrison argued that American policy in the Philippines was a heresy for France, Great Britain and Holland, but a "hope and inspiration for millions of patient brown and yellow men who find the new ideas of America a promise for the future." Barrows was an anthropologist who held important positions in the colonial administration of the Philippines during the Taft era: Superintendent of Schools for Manila, General Superintendent of Education for the Philippines, and chief of the Ethnological Survey for the Philippine Islands (also known as the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes). He also wrote a history of the Philippines, published in 1905. David P Barrows. "A Conservation Policy for the Philippines," Address before the Lake Mohonk Conference of the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples, October 20, 1910. LC, MD, Papers of Storey, Box 8, 1910, p. 650; Harrison, *The Corner-Stone*, p. 325; Michael Salman. *The Embarrassment of Slavery Controversies Over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippines*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, p. 117; and R. J. Sullivan. *Exemplar of Americanism: the Philippines Career of Dean C. Worcester*. Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, The University of Michigan, 1991, p. 142; and F. M. Russell, W. G. Donald, E. Neuhaus, "David Prescott Barrows, Political Science: Berkeley and Systemwide," http://sunsite.berkeley.edu:2020/dynaweb/teiproj/uchist/inmemoriam/inmemoriam1958/Generic_BookTextView/137.

claimed that U.S. colonialism was not only benign, but revolutionary: in the Philippines, the Americans had proved that “an oriental people” could be trained into republicanism, established a good educative system, and introduced “scientific solution of the baffling problems that the Spaniards never made progress with.”⁷¹ Eight years later, Otto H. Kahn argued that the United States was not an imperialistic nation because “America has made no unfair use of her power, that she has not employed her strength to subjugate and exploit other peoples, that she has pursued a foreign policy which aimed to keep in the path of justice, and that, if any lapses did occur in her international dealings, they were of the head, not the heart.” For Kahn, acquisition and retention of the Philippines did not contradict America’s anti-imperialist tradition because the islands’ acquisition had been an accident, and the United States had maintained a benevolent policy.⁷² Not a hint remained of the three bloody years of the Philippine insurrection (1899-1902), which had cost far more lives than the war with Spain.

A BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM

The idea of an American enlightened colonialism in the Philippines faced a vigorous opposition. Many writers and authors challenged their country’s alleged altruism in the Philippines. One of the main opponents of the idea of enlightened colonialism was the anti-imperialist leader Moorfield Storey.⁷³ Storey saw no

⁷¹Briggs, *The Progressing Philippines*, pp. 165-167. Brown argued that the United States had no choice but to occupy the Philippines because the Filipinos were incapable of self-government and returning the islands to Spain was impossible for humanitarian reasons. Brown also argued that an independent Philippines would cause a world war as the colonial powers fought for control of the islands. Therefore, there was no “selfish” motivation for U.S. actions in the Philippines: the islands were kept to avoid a world war, protect the Filipinos from the Spaniards, and teach them how to rule their own country. Brown, *The New Era*, pp. 22-23.

⁷² Kahn, *The Myth of American Imperialism*, p. 3.

⁷³ Moorfield Storey (1845-1929), a Harvard Law School graduate and founder of the Anti-Imperialist League, was a reformist who fought against corruption, racial segregation (he was member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People from 1910 until his death), and American expansionism. He was a staunch supporter of Filipino independence. See: <http://www.factmonster.com/ce6/people/A0846841.html>.

enlightened colonialism in the Philippines, but a “**benevolent despotism.**”⁷⁴ He asked, “Is it not monumental assumption for any man to suppose that he or his people can govern a foreign nation better than they can govern themselves?”⁷⁵ Clearly, he argued, the United States had no right to rule the Philippines and make decisions about what was best for Filipinos. In a 1904 pamphlet criticizing Secretary of War William H. Taft, Storey reminded his readers that,

For a hundred years, men of an alien race are to decide what the Filipinos need and how their wants can be supplied, and this experience they are to be trained for self-government. [...] Secretary Taft’s policy will not succeed, but if it does there will never be a Philippine Republic, and we shall be guilty of destroying an Eastern people as we have destroyed the natives of our own continent.⁷⁶

For Storey, American colonialism in the Philippines was simply the continuation of more than three hundred years of Spanish colonialism.⁷⁷ Like the Spaniards, the Americans justified their control of the Philippines with high and noble reasons. Interestingly, Storey made a direct connection between U.S. domestic and colonial subjects, recalling that the Filipinos were not the first beneficiaries of American “benevolence:” before them, Native Americans had also enjoyed the U.S. government’s paternal protection. Storey saw very clearly the continuity of American colonial practices. He worried that, like the Native Americans, the Filipinos could be destroyed by American altruism.

⁷⁴ LC, MD, Papers of Croffutt, Box 16, Printed Pamphlets, Storey, *The Philippine Policy of Secretary Taft*, July 4, 1904, p. 26. Emphasis is ours.

⁷⁵ For Storey, American colonialism was nothing new: “we must remember that from the dawn of history the oppressor has always insisted that oppression was good for the oppressed.” U.S. policy in the Philippines was hardly exceptional; the United States was behaving and justifying its behavior as every colonial power in history had done. *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 16-17.

⁷⁷ Writing in 1922, former Senator Richard W. Pettigrew also denied that U.S. rule in the Philippines was at all exceptional. He reminded his readers that since antiquity, every empire had justified its conquests with the promise of progress for the conquered people; for him, U.S. policy in the Philippines was not altruistic but greedy. Pettigrew, *Imperial Washington*, pp. 344-350.

Thomas Mott Osborne, another anti-imperialist, focused his criticism on the idea that the United States was civilizing the Filipinos. According to him, “We can warp, distort or destroy a tree, or we can assist in creating favorable conditions for its growth and development, *but we cannot make it grow*. The principle of life is in the tree- and in the free elements about it- in the sunshine and the air; we can only assist the processes of nature, we cannot substitute our own.”⁷⁸ For him, to pretend that Filipinos could be molded according to American will was a huge mistake, since “never yet in the world’s history has one nation been ultimately successful in forcing upon another its own civilization and ideals on order to prevent anarchy.”⁷⁹ Thus, given that the Filipinos could not be Americanized, independence was the only solution to the United States’ dilemmas in the islands.

In a letter to the editor of *The Transcript*, Lewis G. Janes used racial elements to reject the idea of enlightened colonialism.⁸⁰ Janes letter rejected the supposed success of the Anglo-Saxon in dealing with inferior races. According to him, “civilizing” encounters always had tragic consequences, like the vanishing native populations of New Zealand and Hawaii. According to him, “the strongest and ablest resist and are killed off. Those lacking in vitality, who supinely submit to the inevitable are the ones who survive. It was so with the Maoris, the Hawaiians, and the American Indians. It is the fate of all peoples on whom conditions of life are forced in advance of their functional development.”⁸¹ Janes stopped short of accusing the “Anglo-Saxon race” of genocide, but identified United States colonial adventure in the Philippines as a chapter of Anglo-Saxon expansionism. The American “civilizing mission” in the Philippines was not new, and could be as tragic to Filipinos as the civilizing mission was for other inferior races under Anglo-Saxon tutelage. Like Storey, Janes identified continuities in American colonial practices: for him, Americans were doing nothing in the Philippines that they had not

⁷⁸ Osborne, *Democracy and Imperialism*, pp. 6-7.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ LC, MD, Papers of William Croffutt, Box 16, Printed Pamphlets. Unfortunately, this letter is undated.

⁸¹ Ibid.

already done on the western frontier and in other insular possessions (Hawaii). Like the Native Americans and Hawaiians, Filipinos were victims of the Anglo-Saxons' best intentions.

STRATEGIC ELEMENTS OF THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION

The strategic meanings of the Philippines

The Philippines posed three basic questions for U.S. policy makers: Did the Philippines expose the United States to war with other world powers? Were the Philippines the 'weak-side' of American defense? Were the Philippines a strategic asset or a military liability? There was no single answer for those questions. For analysts like Rev. Arthur Brown, American possession of the Philippines was a fact, not a question to be debated. Therefore, the important question was how to take strategic advantage of the islands. Writing in 1903, Brown contended that the Philippines were a showcase of American power. American's decisive and brilliant actions in the Philippines had made the United States a world power to be respected, and Brown saw them as a strategic asset because they were the "gateways of Yokohama, Kobe, Nagasaki, Fusan, Chemulpo, Tsingtao, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore"⁸²

Other analysts denied that the U.S. rule over the Philippines made war with another power more likely. Writing in 1900, N. P. Chipman reminded his readers that the Netherlands had been in control of the Dutch East Indies for years without having any problem with any European power.⁸³ He According to him,

I can point to no page in the history of this century which records that Holland has been involved in any European war by reason of her possessions in the Far East. I do not recall at this moment that the powers have engaged in war with each other over any of their possessions in the Orient within the last half-century. I can see no European complications which our presence in the East Indies is at all likely to create. [...] We shall occupy the Philippines with

⁸² According to Brown, "That this object is being attained, in some measure at least, by our occupation of the Philippines is probably true. Asia and Europe already speak of the United States with new respect. Old world monarchies go out of their way to conciliate and cultivate the United States." Brown, *Op. Cit.*, p.283.

⁸³ Chipman, "Territorial Expansion," pp. 27-28.

the moral and physical force of this great country behind us; and such a force means peace.⁸⁴

Chipman thought it absurd to fear a war over the Philippines. His logic was simple: If little Holland's considerable Asian colonies had never been an issue, why should a large and powerful nation like the United States fear a conflict owing to its possession of the Philippines? In Chipman's strongly exceptionalist analysis, the American nation had not only the power to keep the Philippines, but also the moral superiority to make its control of the Filipino archipelago an instrument of peace.

On the other hand, observers like Theodore Roosevelt, James Abbott, and Governor General Harrison argued that the Philippines exposed and endangered American security. For them, retention of the Philippines would bring the United States into conflict with another power, probably Japan. Roosevelt's position is of particular interest, because he had staunchly advocated American retention of the Philippines. During his presidency, Filipino resistance had been defeated and a civil government organized. However, in a famous article published in January 1915, Roosevelt argued that "the Philippines from a military stand-point are a source of weakness to us."⁸⁵ According to him, Woodrow Wilson's Democratic administration had weakened the U.S. position in the islands by promising the Filipinos independence.⁸⁶ Once this promise was made, it became difficult "to hold them against any serious foreign foe."⁸⁷ For

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Roosevelt, "America on Guard," p. 126. Roosevelt's new attitude toward the Philippines was influenced by conflicts with Japan and domestic apathy, especially from Congress, toward defense of the Philippines. His position was very pragmatic: The American people were not prepared to assume the risks and costs behind the retention and defense of the Philippines, so the best thing to do was to assure their security through some international agreement and leave the islands as soon as possible. For the evolution of Roosevelt's attitude toward the Philippines see: Brands, *Op cit*, pp. 84 and 104-105 and Alfonso, *Op. cit.* pp. 74 and 107-108.

⁸⁶ The Jones Act, approved during Wilson's administration, stated in its preamble "that independence would be granted as soon as a stable government had been established." Karen Wells Borden. "Philippine Independence Legislation in the United States Congress, 1912-1934." M. A. Thesis, State University of California, 1969. p. 25.

⁸⁷ Brands, *Op. cit*; Alfonso, *Op. cit.*

Roosevelt, the solution was to grant the islands independence without any American commitment to the Republic of the Philippines' security.

For Abbot, retention of the Philippines was not a good deal for the United States. Economically, the islands were more a burden than an asset. Politically and militarily, the islands were a menace to American security. Abbot predicted that if any power attacked and conquered the Philippines, the American government would have no other choice than to retake the islands, whatever the economic or human price, because the American people would not tolerate a humiliating defeat in the Philippines. Defense of American honor and public opinion pressure would force the United States to make costly and unnecessary sacrifices for an unworthy possession. Like Roosevelt, Abbott thought the only choice for the American government was to grant the islands independence with no commitment to their defense.⁸⁸

Former Governor Harrison also saw Philippine independence as serving American security interests. In a 1922 book, he denied that retention of the Philippines was an asset for development of American trade with China, and characterized the islands as America's Achilles' heel in Asia. He argued that retention of the Philippines, in combination with the Open Door Policy and problems with Japanese migration to the United States, could easily lead to war with Japan. The United States would be at a geographic disadvantage in a war with Japan because "the Batanes Islands to the north of Luzon [the bigger island of the Philippine archipelago] are only thirty miles from Formosa, the nearest Japanese possession."⁸⁹ In other words, in case of an American-Japanese war, the Philippines would be Japan's natural target, the islands being closer to Japan than to the United States. For Harrison, retention of the Philippines had moved America's frontier thousands of miles to the west, and the best way to avoid potential

⁸⁸ In January 23, 1907, *The New York Times* reacted to an article by Judge Blount in the *North American Review*. According to the *Times*, the Philippines were not an asset, but an "international liability." Retention of the Philippines was not only very expensive, but also a provocation and a "vulnerability in our foreign relations." Along with other analysts, the *Times* favored Filipino independence, but without any American commitment to defending the Filipino republic. James F Abbott. *Japanese Expansion and American Policies*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916, pp. 100-103 and "The Philippines," *The New York Times*, January 23, 1907, p. 8.

⁸⁹ Harrison, *Op cit*, p. 311.

conflicts was to close that frontier by complying with the American promise of independence to the Filipinos.

The Monroe Doctrine and the Philippines

Another topic of strategic debate concerned the impact of retention of the Philippines on the Monroe Doctrine.⁹⁰ Authors like Goldwin Smith, Charles F. Dole, James Schouler, Moorfield Storey, and James Blount argued that retention of the Philippines was a threat to the Monroe Doctrine. They argued that the United States could not enforce the Monroe Doctrine, keeping non-American powers out of the Americas, while it maintained control over a colony in the middle of the Pacific. How could the American government pretend, for example, to keep the Japanese out of Mexico while the United States was occupying the Philippines?⁹¹ For them, retention of the Philippines was, therefore, incompatible with the “surest and safest political fundamental in our foreign dealings.”⁹² For them the solution was clear: In order to avoid the contradiction, the United States should abandon the Philippines.

⁹⁰ The Open Door Policy was also used to underline the strategic meaning of the Philippines for the United States. For example, in a speech at the Manufacturer’s Club of New York in 1906, General Henry T. Allen used the Open Door Policy to justify American occupation of the Philippines. In his speech, Allen stresses the strategic importance of the Philippines helping the United States to protect China’s political integrity. According to the General, the speedy U.S. military response to the Boxer rebellion in China exemplified the Philippines’ usefulness for U.S. policy in Asia. He concluded his speech emphasizing that “The holding of the Philippines made possible and effective our just demand for the open door and the integrity of the Chinese nation.” On the other hand, former Senator and anti-imperialist George S. Boutwell argued that the retention of the Philippines was a contradiction of the Open Door Policy. For him, the United States could not demand equal trade opportunities in Asia and at the same time keep exclusive control over the Filipino market. Boutwell concluded that Filipino independence was necessary to save American access to the Chinese market. Allen, *Op. cit.*, p. 4 and, George S. Boutwell. *The President's Policy; War and Conquest Abroad, Degradation of Labor at Home; Address by Hon. George S. Boutwell At Masonic Hall, Washington, D. C., January 11, 1900.* Chicago: American Anti-imperialist League, 1900, p. 9.

⁹¹ According to Dole, “What if Japan establishes a colony on our own continent? Having reached our own hands into Asiatic waters to seize territory against the will of its inhabitants, we are now asked to contemplate the possibility that Japan likewise might reach many thousands of miles after American territory.” Charles F Dole. *The Right and Wrong of the Doctrine Monroe.* Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1912, pp. 9-10.

⁹² LC, MD, Papers of Storey, Box 8, 1911, James Schouler, “The Philippines and the Monroe Doctrine,” Reprint from the *Independent*, New York City, June 29, 1911.

For Goldwin Smith, Philippine independence would not only save the Monroe Doctrine, but also increase America's standing and influence over Asiatic peoples. For him, American interests would be better served with the United States not on the side of the imperialist nations, but supporting the colonized peoples of Asia, especially the Chinese. However, that was impossible because control of the Philippines made the United States an Asian colonial power.⁹³

Judge Blount also used the defense of the Monroe Doctrine to justify independence for the Philippines. According to him, the United States "should stop running **a kindergarten for adults in Asia**, and get back to the Monroe Doctrine."⁹⁴ He argued that American manifest destiny was not in Asia, but in the Western Hemisphere. Retention of the Philippines was against America's mission of preserving republicanism and promoting peace "in our half of the earth." For Blount, Philippine independence would return the United States to its traditional and proper sphere of influence.

For all of them, the Philippines were not important enough to sacrifice what they saw as the foundation of American foreign policy.

The defense of the Philippines

Defense of the Philippines was another important issue related to the strategic meaning of the islands for the United States. American writers, journalists, and travelers were concerned with whether the U.S. could protect the Philippines from external attack,

⁹³ For Smith, "In the East the name of America must surely be better, and her influence over those races greater, if she stands aloof from European powers, to whose aggressive attitude this fearful uprising of Chinese is immediately due." Smith, *Commonwealth or Empire*, p. 14.

⁹⁴ Interestingly, Blount linked the construction of the Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine, and Filipino independence. For him, the inauguration of the Canal would open new commercial opportunities for the United States in South America, but the American nation would find there a strong anti-American feeling and strong pro-German attitude. To face the growing German menace in the Americas it was necessary create "a Pan-American *esprit de corps*, based on the instinct of self-defense." The sympathy and good feelings of South American countries were necessary, but jeopardized by U.S. control over a Catholic, Spanish-influenced nation. Thus, Philippine independence was necessary to improve American commercial opportunities in South America. It seems odd that after all Blount's years in the Philippines, he wrongly identified the Filipinos as a people with a Hispanic background: after three hundred years of Spanish colonialism, only a tiny minority could speak Spanish. James H. Blount. *The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912*. New York and London: G P Putnam's Sons, 1912, p 654. Emphasis is our.

and how much money it would cost to provide for the islands' defense. No consensus was reached, but an interesting array of concerns and theories were aired.

Several of the architects of American knowledge about the Philippines thought the islands were strategically, geographically, and economically indefensible.⁹⁵ For them, the United States could not stop an external invasion of the Philippines; therefore, the islands were a strategic liability. Others, like Charles B. Elliott agreed that the United States could not defend the Philippines from an external attack, but did not see them as a "a source of military weakness." According to him, no power would attack the Philippines because the archipelago was strategically insignificant, even in case of war.

Some American writers, journalists, and analysts were concerned about Filipino security, arguing that American retention of the Philippines exposed the islands to "the dangers of our international complications without affording them adequate protection."⁹⁶ According to them, not only could the United States not defend the islands, but U.S. rule actually exposed them to external attack. The Philippines were in danger only because they were a U.S. territory; therefore, Filipino independence was good not only for American self-defense, but would also spare the Filipinos the dangers of being American colonial subjects.

Others, like Rev. Brown, had a more pragmatic approach to this problem. He acknowledged the problems with the defense of the Philippines because of their location;⁹⁷ he also insisted that American military expenses in the Philippines were too high and that retention of the islands could expose the United States to war. However, he nonetheless believed that the United States had no choice but to defend the Philippines, because the nation could and should not was morally obligated to shoulder the economic

⁹⁵ Blount, *The American Occupation*, p. 439. Willis, *Op cit*, p. 439; National Archives, RG46, SEN63A-F21, Folder #2, John R. McDill, "The Philippines, America's Lost Opportunity," 1913; LC, MD, Papers of Storey, Box 9, 1910, "President Wilson's Philippine Policy," *The Boston Herald*, October 7, 1913.

⁹⁶ McDill, *Op. cit.*

⁹⁷For him, the islands were located "in such a distant place and exposed place where other nations maintain whole navies." Brown, *Op. cit*, p. 287.

costs and potential dangers of their Christianizing and civilizing mission.⁹⁸ In other words, what was really at stake in the Philippines was American honor.

A more regional analysis of the Philippines' strategic importance could be found in a Thomas Millard's book, *America and the Far Eastern Question* (1909). For him, defense of the Philippines was part of a bigger and more important issue: American economic and strategic interests in Asia, especially China.⁹⁹ He argued that the United States faced larger challenges in Asia than the defense of the Philippines.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, it was necessary to go beyond the debate over U.S. military spending in the islands, and focus on reorienting U.S. strategy in Asia.¹⁰¹ According to Millard, the Philippines were indefensible.¹⁰² The United States was not prepared to defend the islands in case of war because of geographic distance (the islands were too far from the United States and too close to Japan) and because of lack of congressional support for the construction of a naval base in the Philippines.¹⁰³ The only alternative was to sacrifice the Philippines and

⁹⁸ Brown supported the big and powerful Navy as necessary to defend the Philippines. *Ibid*, pp. 286-287.

⁹⁹ Millard reminded his readers that although the Philippines were important for the United States, they were neither the only issue, nor the most significant. Thomas F. F. Millard. *America and the Far Eastern Question an Examination of Modern Phases of the Far Eastern Question, Including the New Activities and Policy of Japan, the Situation of China, and the Relation of the United States of America to the Problems Involved*. New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1909, pp. 503-506.

¹⁰⁰For him, Philippine independence need not determine the size and power of the Army and the Navy, because American military and naval forces would not retire from Asia in case of independence. According to Millard, "Americans should, however, learn mentally to separate the question of the security of our position in the Pacific from the local issue of administration of the Philippines Islands. The United States, it is safe to predict, will in the future maintain a naval and military post in Asiatic waters whether the Philippines are retained or not." *Ibid*, pp. 480-481.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, pp. 530-531.

¹⁰² Even though Millard thought that Philippines were indefensible, he argued that the United States should be prepare to defend them. For him, a naval base in the Philippines was necessary to improve American naval position in Asia. According to Millard, "With a naval base and cheap coal, for which it does not have to depend upon foreign assistance not available in war, America's naval position in Asiatic waters will be such as to make our eastern possessions secure, and will give our navy an offensive potency in that part of the world which will make wishes of the nation respected there." *Ibid*, p. 529.

¹⁰³ Millard emphasizes the importance of a naval base in the Philippines: "I do not wish to appear in the role of alarmist, but the situation in the Far East is such that to procrastinate in this matter is little short of criminal neglect of the nation's interests. The day may come, and soon, when such

focus on the defense of Hawaii.¹⁰⁴ Operating from the Hawaiian archipelago, American naval forces could retake the Philippines.

Twelve years after Millard's book was published, retired Real Admiral Bradley A. Fiske analyzed the strategic meaning of the retention of the Philippines. In an article published in the *North American Review* in June 1921, Admiral Fiske contended that the real significance of the Philippines for the United States was strategic. Although the islands had some economic potential, what really was important was their location close "to the vast undeveloped territories of Eastern Asia."¹⁰⁵ Fiske was worried that despite the islands' economic and strategic value, "the Philippines could be taken by anyone who might desire to take them."¹⁰⁶ The Philippines were indefensible, according to Fiske, because the great distance between the islands and the United States increased the costs of defense of the archipelago. Congress was yet another obstacle to defending the

a base will worth ten Dreadnaughts to America; not necessarily in war, but as make-weight for peace. A chain of coaling stations stretching across the Pacific and linking America with a great fortress in the Far East may be likened to a strong arm extended with the fist at the western extremity, and presenting an obstacle which any enemy approaching America from that quarter must first overcome." Ibid, pp. 528-529.

¹⁰⁴ Millard emphasized the strategic value of Hawaii, especially in case of war with Japan. He argued that if Japan captured Hawaii, it would control the central Pacific Ocean making the defense of the Philippines impossible and menacing the American west coast. Therefore, a naval base in Hawaii was necessary to protect the islands. However, Millard minimized the risk of a Japanese attack against Hawaii because of the strategic and geographic problems such an attack would entail. The Philippines were in a different position. Because of Japan's strategic and geographic advantages, the Japanese naval and military forces would have little trouble conquering the Philippines. According to him, "The considerations thus briefly enumerated lead me to believe that if there should be a war between Japan and the United States within five years Japan will make no serious attempt to occupy Hawaii, but will confine her endeavors to an attack upon Philippines." For Millard, Hawaii was the western frontier, and a key element in the defense of the United States; therefore, the conquest of the Hawaiian Islands by an enemy power was to be avoided at any cost. On the other hand, the Philippines were too far to endanger America's Pacific coast. This strategic distinction between the two Asian possessions would play a major role during the congressional debates over Filipino independence in the 1910's, 1920's, and 1930's. Ibid. p. 519.

¹⁰⁵ Fiske also stresses that the islands' harbors "could be made to supplement the very few good harbors on the eastern coast of Asia, and give the United States a base of commercial operations, unequalled by that of any other country, save Japan." Bradley A Fiske. "The Defense of the Philippines." *North American Review* (1921), p. 46.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 722.

Philippines.¹⁰⁷ According to Fiske, Congress failed to appropriate “the very moderate amount it asked for, in order to take advantage of the possibilities of aeronautics,” the cheapest and safest way to protect the islands.¹⁰⁸ For this retired naval officer, the Philippines’ vulnerability was a temptation to any potential enemy of the United States.

It is a dangerous and foolish thing thus to leave any property wholly unprotected; and the most dangerous thing possible is to leave property unprotected from a sudden assault by any nation with which causes for friction exist. In such conditions (history tells us) some unlooked for contingency may at any time precipitate a state of popular excitement taking the form of overt action, if a chance for such overt action were in sight. Now, in case some suddenly arising situation should cause a popular outburst against us in Japan, the chance to seize the Philippines might prove too strong a temptation to be resisted.¹⁰⁹

According to Fiske, American retention of an indefensible possession in the middle of Asia was a foolish mistake that could be very dangerous for the American nation, because the islands undermined American national security. It is also clear that he saw in Japan a threat for the United States because of American control of the Philippines.

Fiske also addressed the issue of Filipino independence. Despite the American promise of independence, there was an undeniable truth: The Filipinos could not “possibly prove their capacity to protect themselves against any strong nation desiring to possess them, and that no island of their great area and richness in all kinds of natural resources, can safely be left unprotected in these days of annexation and colonization. Again, if the Islands were given to the Filipinos, would they retain them long? Is there any other equally large and valuable tract of land in the possession of any people, so helpless against attack as the Philippine Islands would be if our protection should

¹⁰⁷ It should be emphasized that both Millard and Fiske identified congressional attitudes toward the defenses of the Philippines as a main problem for American strategic position in the islands, recognizing the major role played by Congress in defining U.S. Philippine policy.

¹⁰⁸ According to Fiske, “A force of one hundred first-class airplanes, properly equipped and manned, if distributed at different points of Luzon (the northernmost island) could be able to concentrate at any threatened point on the coast before invading troops could start from the transport to shore.” *Ibid.* p. 723.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* p. 722.

withdrawn?”¹¹⁰ Fiske denied that the Filipinos had any military or political capability to defend their independence without American help. For him, Filipino independence was impossible because the islands would be exposed to the dangers of colonialism in Asia. In his version of enlightened colonialism, American control of the Philippines served as a protection against other colonialisms. In the process of this formulation, he soft-pedaled the colonial relationship between the United States and the Philippines.

After a detailed analysis, Fiske identified four options for the United States in the Philippines. The first option was a readiness to defend the islands using airplanes and submarines. The second option was to leave “them defenseless as they practically are now, with the virtual certainty that they will be taken by an enemy some day.”¹¹¹ The third option was independence, but without any commitment to the defense of the Republic of the Philippines. The fourth and last option was independence of the Philippines with American protection, but that would be a great mistake because the Americans would have responsibilities over the Philippines, but without any control over them. He concludes that the United States should not leave the Philippines, but be ready to defend the islands to avoid facing the human, economic, and strategic cost of retaking the islands.

These issues involving the defense of the Philippines would cause bitter discussions in the United States Congress in the 1910’s, 1920’s, and 1930’s.

Conclusion

The search for answers about the Philippines that McKinley initiated in 1898 did not end with the islands’ official pacification in 1902, but continued throughout the following three decades. The result of that search was the production of an impressive body of knowledge—ideas, images, representations, and stereotypes—about the Philippines and Filipinos, by a group of American writers, journalists, missionaries, and military and colonial officers. That body of knowledge was used at times to justify American colonialism in the Philippine Islands, at others to criticize it. In other words, the colonial and anti-colonial discourses developed in the United States about the

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p. 723.

¹¹¹ Ibid. p. 724.

Philippines in the first decades of the 20th century shared the same body of knowledge. Ideas and concerns such as republicanism, militarism-navalism, and enlightened colonialism became common ground for two contending representations of American colonialism in the Philippines.

Despite their differences, enemies and supporters of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines saw the United States as the greatest democratic republic in history. For some, the Philippines were not a menace to the survival of American republican and democratic traditions, but a showcase for the superiority of American political institutions. They argued that retention of the islands was part of America's historical mission of expansion of democracy, Christendom, and freedom, and a challenge that the country could not avoid without tarnishing its honor, self-respect, and international standing. Others worried about how American policies in the Philippines could change the nature of the American nation, endangering its republican traditions. For them, control of the Philippines took the American nation away from its anti-imperialist, isolationist, and anti-militarist tradition, and threatened survival of American democracy. For them, Filipino independence was defensive move that would free the United States from the political, ideological, and strategic dangers involved in American control over the Philippines. For both, what was really at stake in the Philippines was the future identity and security of the United States itself.

Chapter 2
CONTENDING REPRESENTATIONS OF FILIPINOS

"Taking into consideration their geographical location and the indisputable tendency for greater nations to absorb lesser ones, I cannot believe it will be possible for the Philippines permanently to exist as an independent political entity. **Left to themselves they inevitably will fall under the domination of some superior power,** and for the United States to abandon its position there will be to cast them, like a rich prize, to be struggled for by other nations; **a fate to which, in my opinion, the American people never will consign them.**" Thomas F. Millard. *America and the Far Eastern Question* (1909), pp. 486-487

"The great mass of Filipinos do not constitute 'a people' in the sense in which that word is understood in the United States. They are not comparable in any way with the American people or the English people. They cannot be reached as a whole, and they do not respond as a whole." Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present* (1914), vol. 2, p. 938.

While the previous chapter focused on the ideological and strategic issues involved in American knowledge production about the Philippines, this chapter will discuss American writers, scholars, travelers, missionaries, and civil and military colonial officers' representations of the Filipinos. Through their books, articles, and speeches, Americans analyzed, described and classified the Filipinos for their readers and spectators. In the process, as the new colonial rulers racialized and represented Filipinos as savages or children, they also transformed them into something comprehensible, understandable and imaginable. Filipinos were reduced to a set of ideas, images and stereotypes that served to "explain" them for the American public.

However, these ideas and images about the Filipinos served to question, as well as justify American colonialism in the Philippines. It could be argued that American writers, journalists, scholars, travelers, and colonial and military officers produced two conflicting portraits of the Filipinos. One, created by the supporters of American retention of the archipelago, represented Filipinos as culturally, racially and politically inferior, and in need of American guidance, protection, and supervision, and American occupation of the archipelago as an enlightening and civilizing enterprise. As they justified American colonialism, these writers racialized and categorized the Filipinos, questioned the existence of a Filipino nation, appropriated Filipino history, and dismissed Filipinos' political and military capabilities.

On the other hand, opponents of American control of the Philippines portrayed the Filipinos as a nation robbed of its independence and ready for freedom, and the American presence in the Philippines as a colonial enterprise. As they questioned American control of the archipelago, these writers asserted Filipinos' political capabilities, rejected the classification of the Filipinos in tribes, and reaffirmed Filipinos' role in their own history.

This chapter will focus on how these two visions collided in the first decades of the twentieth century.

THE PHILIPPINE WAR

When the American troops arrived in the Philippines in 1898, they found a nationalist revolution was underway. After a brief period of cooperation, American colonial ambitions collided with the Filipinos' nationalist aspirations, causing a bloody war.¹ For more than three years, U.S. soldiers fought an elusive and determined enemy until President Roosevelt officially declared the war over in 1902.

The Filipino-American War, one of the first national liberation wars of the 20th Century, posed a major problem for American supporters of retaining the Philippines. Opponents used the controversies surrounding the war, especially accusations of American atrocities, to criticize U.S. policy in the islands.² It is thus unsurprising that the Philippine war played a key role in American knowledge production about the islands. Supporters of the occupation of the Philippines used the war to rationalize and justify American intervention in the islands. In so doing, they elided the political and ideological background of the Filipino Revolution. For them, the Filipino rebels were not

¹Reynaldo C Ilet. *Knowing America's Colony: a Hundred Years from the Philippine War*. Hawa'i: Center for Philippine Studies, School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawa'i at Manoa, 1999; Brian M. Linn. *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000 and *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989; Glenn Anthony May. *Battle for Batangas a Philippine Province at War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991; Angel Velasco, and Luis Francia. *Vestiges of War the Philippine-American War and the Aftermath of an Imperial Dream, 1899-1999*. New York: New York University Press, 2000; Richard W. Welch. *Response to Imperialism. The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979.

² Norberto Barreto-Velázquez, "War Atrocities and Imperialism: the Filipino-American War, 1899-1902" unpublished paper, 1997.

freedom fighters, but bandits, even traitors, and denied the Filipinos were inspired or guided by any nationalistic feeling in their fight against their American benefactors. They further argued that the majority of the Filipino population did not support the war against the United States. For them, only a minority, the Tagalogs, were behind the war, not because they wanted to liberate the Philippines, but because of their political ambition and greed. American troops were represented not as an invading force, but as restorers of law and order, and protectors of the silent and peaceful majority of the islands' population: U.S. soldiers were fighting not to impose American colonialism, but to liberate the Filipinos from the bandits and murderers who wished to exploit them.³

On the other hand, critics of retention of the Philippines used the war to criticize American policy on the islands. They represented Filipino *insurrectos* not as bandits, but as a symbol of Filipino resistance to American oppression. For them, the *insurrectos* were not the bloodthirsty beasts that the American government claimed were torturing and murdering American prisoners of war, but patriots fighting to free their nation from a foreign invader. They not only acknowledged the nationalistic goals of the Filipino insurrection, but also questioned how a democratic and powerful republic like the United States could fight a colonial war against a weak and poor country like the Philippines. They reminded their readers of the American fight for freedom against Great Britain, and identified the *insurrectos* with 18th century American Minute Men. They concluded that in fighting and destroying the Filipino republic, the United States forgot its history and betrayed its political institutions.⁴

The origins of the Filipino-American War

The origin and causes of the Filipino-American War became a key element in the rationalization of American retention of the Philippines. As with the other issues discussed previously, there were two clearly distinct opposing positions. For supporters

³ Noyes, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 23 and 209; Magoon, *Op. cit.* pp. 2-5; and O. W. Coursey, *History and Geography of the Philippine Islands for General Reading and Use in Our Public Schools*. Mitchell, SD: Educator School Supply Co. 1903.

⁴ See for example, Willis, *Op. cit.* pp. 125-128.

of U.S. policy in the Philippines, Filipinos were the only ones responsible for the war⁵ the ungrateful and treacherous *insurrectos* attacked their liberators, the American soldiers, without any reason. In their blind ambition, Tagalog leaders incorrectly thought they could expel the Americans and misrule and exploit the islands for their own benefit. However, these leaders underestimated American courage and will. American soldiers were innocent of all accusations against them because American military action in the Philippines was an instrument of freedom and justice, a further expression of American exceptionalism.

On the other hand, opponents of U.S. Philippine policy depicted the war's origins in a diametrically opposite manner.⁶ For them, the American soldiers' behavior—especially their racism, arrogance, and violence—was the main cause of the war. Far from being innocent, American soldiers were not an instrument of freedom, but of oppression.⁷ They supported the Filipino leadership's allegations that U.S. officers had made promises of independence. Emilio Aguinaldo, the main Filipino nationalist leader, argued that he had made a deal with the U.S. in 1898. Aguinaldo claimed that American diplomats and naval officers—specifically Admiral George Dewey⁸--had promised him U.S. government support for the independence of the Philippines in exchange for his

⁵ Noyes, Op cit.; O. W. Coursey. *The Philippines and Filipinos; a Treatise on the History, the Civics, and the Mathematical, Physical and Political Geography of the Philippine Archipelago*. Mitchell, South Dakota: The Educator Supply Co. 1914, pp. 53-61.

⁶ Pettigrew, Op cit. 327-328; Willis, pp. 5, 16-19; Storey, *The Philippine Policy of Secretary Taft*, pp. 21-22; and Henry Welsh. *The Other Man's Country*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincot, 1900.

⁷ Willis focuses on the behavior of American soldiers emphasizing, "the war was relentlessly and ruthlessly pursued by our soldiery and the officers in command of them." According to him, the war was characterized by "the use of torture for the ascertainment of information as to the enemy's position, location of concealed arms, etc." Willis, Op cit. pp. 16-17.

⁸ According to Willis, E. S. Pratt, U.S. General Consul in Singapore, and Rousenville Wildman, U.S. Consul in Hong Kong, met with Aguinaldo in Hong Kong and "encouraged [him] to believe that the United States would aid the Filipinos in securing independence from Spain." Willis also discusses Admiral Dewey's role, arguing that the admiral invited Aguinaldo back to the Philippines from his exile in Hong Kong, and gave him weapons and ammunition. For Willis, although Dewey did not give Aguinaldo a pledge or diplomatic recognition, with his actions Dewey "tacitly recognized' the Filipino leader's plans and goals Willis, Op. cit. pp. 3-4 and 8. For a Filipino historiographical approach to these issues see: Ambeth Ocampo. *The Centennial Countdown*. Philippines: Anvil Publishing Company, 1998, pp. 6, 76, 107-109, 120-127, and 144-152.

military actions against Spain. With the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, the Filipinos had realized they had been deceived and betrayed by their erstwhile allies. Opponents of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines also argued that Filipinos were not the only ones betrayed. According to them, their government's actions in the Philippines betrayed American democratic and republican institutions and dishonored the nation.

Predictably, supporters of the retention of the Philippines dismissed Filipino allegations of an alliance as lies, and portrayed their American supporters as traitors. For them, there was no pledge from Dewey or any other American diplomat or naval or military officers. They asked how any "good" American could trust the word of a bandit like Aguinaldo over that of a national hero like Dewey.⁹

APPROPRIATION OF FILIPINO HISTORY

Many American supporters of retaining the Philippines elided Filipino history from their analysis.¹⁰ The Filipino-American war was one of the main elements of Filipino history that was forgotten or rewritten by Americans to more neatly fit their representation of American colonialism in the islands. Writing in 1903, for example, Theodore W. Noyes accused Filipinos revolutionaries of treason. According to him, when the Filipino-American war began in February 1899, the Philippines already belonged legally to the United States; therefore, the Filipino rebellion was act of treason because the Filipinos had no right to dispute American sovereignty in the islands.¹¹ In Noyes' logic, Filipino revolutionaries betrayed the United States by fighting for their freedom because American rights over the islands were prior to any Filipino claim for independence. Noyes neglected to mention not only that the Filipino fight for independence began well before 1898, but also that Filipinos had already written a constitution and organized a republican government—the first Christian republic in

⁹For example, the Philippine Commission Report rejected Aguinaldo's allegations. For the Commissioners, Admiral Dewey's rejection of the claims of the Filipino leaders was enough to confirm that Aguinaldo was lying. *PCR*, p. 121.

¹⁰ This practice is not new in American imperial experience. According to Rowe, the "method of narratively appropriating the native people's homes by manipulating their own stories and cultural practices is repeatedly enacted in the shabby history of U. S. colonialism at work in Manifest Destiny." Rowe, *Op. cit.* p. 43.

¹¹ Noyes, *Op. cit.* p. 122

Asia.¹² No Filipinos participated in the peace talks between Spain and the United States; there was not a single Filipino signature on the Treaty of Paris.

Supporters of American policy in the Philippines also appropriated the historical figure of the Filipino national hero, Jose Rizal.¹³ Rizal, a poet, novelist, physician, and Filipino patriot born in 1861 and executed by the Spanish colonial government in 1896, was the son of a rich landowner and sugar producer of Chinese-Filipino ancestry. He studied medicine and liberal arts in Madrid where he became the leader of the small Filipino student community. In 1886, he published his first and most famous novel, *Noli Me Tangere*, criticizing the behavior of the Spanish Catholic orders in the Philippines. Returning to the Philippines in 1892, he founded a reform movement, but was deported to the island of Mindanao. Four years later he was arrested, tried for sedition, and executed.

According to Carl Crow, the U.S. government made Rizal a Filipino national hero.¹⁴ Crow acknowledged that Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the Filipino insurrection, was the closest to a national hero, but his opposition to the American government made him unacceptable to the Americans; therefore, it was necessary to create an acceptable national hero for the Philippines, and the best candidate was the pacifist Rizal. According to Crow, Rizal was acceptable for the Americans because despite his opposition to Spanish colonialism in the Philippines, he was not a radical revolutionary or military leader, but a poet. Crow contends that through the construction of monuments,

¹² Welch, Op. cit. , p. 14.

¹³H. W. Brands. *Bound to Empire the United States and the Philippines*. New York: Oxford University Press; 1992, Op. cit. , pp. 39-44; Miller, Op. cit. , pp. 32-34; Frank H Golay. *Face of Empire United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press with cooperation with University of Wisconsin-Madison, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1997, p. 21; and <http://www.univie.ac.at/Voelkerkunde /apsis/ aufi/jorizal.htm>.

¹⁴ Carl Crow. *American and the Philippines*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1914. San Juan argues that the appropriation of the historical figure of Jose Rizal was one of American colonialism's legitimation strategies. According to him, the U.S. colonial government constructed an image of a Rizal as pro-Western hero. Rizal was presented as "the representation of the enlightened, autonomous, self-respecting Filipino." Rizal's revolutionary background was ignored in making him an "instrument of colonial legitimation." The Rizal constructed by American became an exemplar of the moderate, law-abiding citizen: an ideal colonial subject. This process of appropriation and deformation of Rizal was part of a larger process of colonial legitimation. According to San Juan, "U. S. consensus-building undermined the nationalist opposition by assimilating parts of its world vision and using them to legitimize imperial ascendancy." San Juan, op. cit. p. 29.

the naming of a Filipino province and several streets after Rizal, the publication of his poetry, the creation of a holiday in his name, and the release of a postal stamp honoring him, Americans created Rizal as the Filipino national hero.¹⁵ Construction of Rizal as a hero, what Crow calls the “Rizal diversion,” freed the Americans to continue their civilizing mission in the Philippines.¹⁶ Crow did not acknowledge that Rizal was already a national hero when the first American troops embarked for the Philippines: his execution by the Spanish government in 1896 was one of the main triggers of the Filipino rebellion against Spanish colonialism.¹⁷ Crow further overlooked the fact that the laws naming a province and streets, the creation of a holiday in Rizal’s name, and the appropriation of funding for the construction of monuments, were all approved by the Filipino Assembly; thus, the U.S. colonial government could not claim sole responsibility for Rizal’s official exaltation.¹⁸

The Filipinos’ role in defeating Spain was another part of Filipino history overlooked by the supporters of American rule. They argued not only that the Filipinos were militarily irrelevant to the war’s outcome, but that the Filipino insurrection against Spain lacked any political significance. According to them, Filipino rebels helped the Americans lay siege to Manila not because they were seeking their country’s independence, but to plunder the city.¹⁹ Again, by portraying Filipinos as outlaws and bandits, supporters of U.S. colonialism emptied their actions of all political content.

¹⁵ According to Crow, “As soon as this **artificial fame** had been created for him [Rizal], Filipino orators began conjuring with his name just as American orators use the names of Washington, Lincoln, and Jefferson and the minor state heroes. It would be impossible to stop the Rizal cult.” Crow, *op. cit.* pp. 53-57. Emphasis mine.

¹⁶ Crow acknowledges that this hero-making process could be “preposterous” to his American readers because they were accustomed to see “our heroes as the natural product of our own country.” Seemingly, for Crow the Filipinos had no natural heroes, but only those the Americans created for them. *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Reynaldo C. Ileto has shown in his great book *Pasyon and Revolution*, that Rizal’s martyrdom played a major role in the way the Filipino peasants saw their struggle against Spain. Reynaldo C. Ileto. *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979, pp. 132-133 and 312-313.

¹⁸ For a Filipino analysis of Rizal’s construction as a national hero, see Ocampo, *op. cit.* , pp. 274-276.

¹⁹ Coursey, *op. cit.* 61.

Only by casting the Filipino struggle for freedom as apolitical, criminal actions could they argue that U.S. policy in the Philippines was suppressing not a national liberation movement, but a group of bandits.

RACIALIZATION OF THE FILIPINOS

Proponents of U.S. rule in the Philippines also sought to deny the existence of a Filipino nation, and classification and racialization of Filipinos were major elements of this denial.²⁰ Retention of the Philippines was justified in racial terms:²¹ Filipinos were represented as human beings whose behavior and capability were determined by the color of their skin.²² As members of the inferior Malay, or brown, race, Filipinos were incapable of self-government, democracy, and republicanism.²³ Therefore, the racially

²⁰ The term racialization term comes from John C. Rowe's analysis of the representation of Native Americans in American literature. According to him, writers like Edgar Allan Poe identified Native Americans as a race, a human group not sharing not only ethnic features, but also a common way of thinking and living that was determined by those ethnic features. According to Rowe, Poe saw no differences between Native Americans. All of them were savages, lazy, irresponsible, indolent, and doomed. Like Native Americans, the Filipinos were identified as members of a race, the Malay race, with defined physical features that determined their way of life and thinking; like the Native Americans, the Filipinos were also classified in tribes. Rowe, Op. cit. 56.

²¹ American imperialism was not alone using race as a justification for colonialism. In his book *Colonial Desire*, Robert J. C. Young emphasizes how 19th Century European imperialism used race to justify the conquest of Asia and Africa. According to him, in the 1880's "the cultural ideology of race became so dominant that racial superiority, and its attendant virtue of civilization, took over from economic gain or Christian missionary work as the presiding justifying idea of the empire." One of the main characteristics of the European imperialism was "the equation of white race with civilization (and, as we has seen, of civilization as cause of whiteness)." Robert Young. *Colonial Desire" Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race*. London, New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 93-95.

²²According to Elliott, "We must admit that race is a fact which can not be obliterated by sentiment, a change of government, or even of religion. What scientists call unit characters, such as skull shape, stature, eye and hair color, and nose form, are transmitted from generation to generation, in accordance with fixed mathematical laws." Elliott, *The Philippines to the end of the Commission Government*, Preface.

²³The Philippine Commission Report divided the Philippine population into three races: the Negritos, the Indonesians, and the Malaysians. However, according to the report the bulk of the inhabitants of the islands were of the Malay race, "although the race is not found pure in any of the islands." According to Wade, the Philippines were populated by "many tribes, all belonging to the same brown race." Wade, Op cit. p. v and *PRC*, p. 12.

superior Americans were morally obligated to rule the islands in their name and for their own good.²⁴

However, Filipinos were not exclusively racialized by supporters of U.S. colonialism; race was also invoked to oppose retention of the Philippines. For some writers, U.S. policy in the Philippines was doomed because Filipinos were members of an inassimilable race. Writing in 1904, Paul S. Reinsch argued that Filipinos could not be Americanized because they belonged to “an alien race.”²⁵ For him, Filipino independence was racially inevitable; therefore, Americans should seek to understand Filipino cultural, social, and economic characteristics so as to prepare them for freedom.²⁶ Thomas Elliott also argued that Filipinos were inassimilable because of their racial features. According to him, American policy in the Philippines should focus on making “good and efficient Filipinos out of all the inhabitants of the islands. It is not necessary to try to make Yankees out of them.”²⁷ These authors agreed that because Filipinos could not be Americanized, the only solution to the Philippine problem was independence. For Reinsch and Elliott, regardless of American achievements, America’s mission in the Philippines was limited by the Filipinos’ racial nature.

²⁴According to Rafael, “The effect of racializing both the social structure and cultural history of the Philippines is to position the population in a derivative relationship to the outside. It is as if the country was naturally destined for conquest just as the United States was manifestly destined to colonize it.” Vicente L. Rafael. *White Love and Other Essays in Filipino History*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000, p. 36.

²⁵ Osborne and Boutwell also criticized American retention of the Philippines in racial terms. Reinsch. *Colonial Autonomy*, p. 15, Osborne, *Op. cit.* pp. 4-5, and Boutwell, *Op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

²⁶According to Reinsch, “We shall never succeed in making Americans of the Filipinos; but we may hope by careful, considerate, natural policy to assist in raising them to a higher plane, though it must remain their life, and will never be ours.” *Ibid.* p. 24.

²⁷According to Elliott, American policy in the Philippines should “create conditions under which all the people of the islands should have an opportunity to develop the best that was in them.” Elliott, *Op. cit.* Preface.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE FILIPINOS

Classification of the Filipinos in tribes was critical to American knowledge production about the Philippines.²⁸ The idea of tribes helped the framers of the Philippine Question represent Filipinos in terms familiar to their American readers and listeners.²⁹ For example, in a 1902 book for children, Mary Wade argued that “people of one tribe may be found on one of these islands; those of a different tribe are living on another; or one tribe may live in a valley and its neighbors in the hills; and so on to the number of eighty tribes. Each tribe has its own customs and ways. And yet we shall call these various peoples of the brown race our cousins; for not only are they our kindred by the ties which unite all the races of men in this world; they have been adopted into the family of our own nation, the United States of America.”³⁰

Filipino tribes were classified according to their “level of culture” into “civilized” and “wild” or non-civilized tribes. The Christian majority was identified as the “civilized tribes,” while a minority, composed of different groups, from the so-called headhunters to the Moros (“Moors”), were classified as “non-civilized tribes.”³¹ The *Philippine*

²⁸ For the use of classification in imperialistic rhetoric, see David Spurr. *The Rhetoric of Empire Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993, pp. 60-75.

²⁹ Drinnon emphasizes the symbolic and ideological meaning of identifying and classifying the Filipinos as tribes. Reminding his readers of the weight of the idea of *tribe* in late-19th century American history, he argues that in early-20th century American discourse, the word implied savagery, lack of self-control, and need to be civilized: “The association was simple and politically handy: Filipinos were ‘savages’ incapable of self-direction, dependent in dire need of the ‘civilizing ministrations and permanent political tutelage of their white masters.’” For Paul A. Kramer, the idea of the Filipino “tribes” was very important in pacifying the Philippines: the term provided what the Philippine Commission and the supporters of American rule needed: somebody to civilize. Drinnon, *Op. cit.*, pp. 344-345 and Paul A Kramer. “The Pragmatic Empire: U. S. Anthropology and Colonial Politics in the Occupied Philippines, 1898-1916.” Ph D, Princeton University, 1998, 129.

³⁰ Crow also classified the Filipinos in tribes, but argued that all Filipinos had a common racial background. Wade, *Op. cit.* pp. v-vi and Crow, *Op. cit.* p. 17.

³¹ When Spanish sailors came to the Philippines, they found in the southern island a strong group of Muslims they called *Moros*, after the 8th Century Muslim conquerors of Spain.

*Commission Report (PCR)*³², divided the Filipino population into tribes “which often differ very greatly in language, manners, customs, and laws, as well as in degree of civilization.” Although some Filipino tribes were “savages,” the majority of the population was civilized and Christian.³³ According to the *PCR*, Filipino “wild tribes” were in general, pacific and “harmless,” even though some of them still practiced headhunting, polygamy, slavery, human sacrifice, and cannibalism.³⁴ However, the *PCR* concluded that the majority of the inhabitants of the Philippines “possessed a considerable degree of civilization.”³⁵

The relationship among these tribes was another issue of discussion. According to supporters of U.S. Philippine policy, the Philippines could not become a nation because the Filipino tribes were culturally, religiously, and politically irreconcilable: they would never develop the necessary cohesion for nationhood, not only because they were different, but also because they were irreconcilable enemies.³⁶ The best example of the

³² In January 1899, President McKinley appointed a civil commission to investigate the conditions of the Philippines and make policy recommendations. The First Philippine Commission, also known as the Schurman Commission, was composed of Jacob G. Schurman (Chairman of the Commission and President of Cornell University), Charles Denby (former American Minister to China), Rear Admiral George Dewey, Major General Elwell S. Otis, Dean Worcester (a professor at the University of Michigan) and John R. MacArthur (Secretary). After a year of hearings and analysis of the conditions of the Philippines, the Philippine Commission released a report heavily influenced by its main source of information: the Filipino elite. Kramer, *Op. cit.*, pp. 81-83; Golay, p. 48; and Brands, p. 51.

³³ United States Philippines Commission. *Report of the Philippines Commission to the President*. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1900, p. 12.

³⁴ A 1911 article in *Living Age* also emphasized Filipino tribes’ “wild” practices, especially headhunting and cannibalism. “American in the Philippines,” *Living Age*, p. 304.

³⁵ Writing in 1903, Reverend Arthur J. Brown disagreed with the *PCR*. Brown argued that only a handful of the Filipino population was, according to “Anglo-Saxon standards,” civilized. He stressed cultural and religious differences among the Filipinos. According to him, “A much larger number are half civilized, presenting a curious mixture of Spanish manners and Malay savagery, while a vast multitude are really heathen with a thin veneer of Arabian Mohammedanism or medieval-Spanish Romanism, and sometimes without even that.” *PCR*, p. 16; Brown, *op. cit.* p. 52.

³⁶ According to Willcox, the Filipino tribes were “bitterly hostile to one another, and so low in the scale of political development unlike our own Indian, they have never risen to any conception of even tribal government or organization.” In a clear link to America’s imperial past, Willcox compared the Filipino “tribes” with their American counterparts, the Native American tribes. Writing in 1914, Crow also thought that the Filipino tribes were irreconcilable. However, he

mutual irreconcilability of Filipino tribes was the Moro Question. Opponents of Filipino independence reminded their readers that the Philippine archipelago's southern islands (Mindanao and Sulu) were populated by Muslims, whom the Spanish never completely subjugated. Some American knowledge-producers represented the Moros as a warlike, fanatical race who would never live in peace with their northern Christian neighbors. Thus, the Moro Question presented Christian-Muslim religious conflict as an obstacle to the creation of a Filipino nation and, therefore, a powerful argument against Philippine independence.

THE FILIPINO NATION

Supporters and opponents of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines contested the nature of the Filipino nation. Some American knowledge producers argued that when American troops arrived in the Philippines they did not find a Filipino nation, but a group of tribes with vastly different cultures, languages, and religions.³⁷ This proved one of the strongest, most enduring, and useful representations of Filipinos created during American colonial rule, serving to rationalize and justify retention of the islands as a nation-making mission. According to this idea's proponents, in 1898 the Americans encountered not an "organized people in the sense of the law of nations," but a group of tribes characterized by the "savagery, ignorance, experience only of despotic oppression."³⁸ The republic Aguinaldo organized in 1899 was not a national government because it represented only a very ambitious minority of all the Philippines' tribes and groups. Thus, Aguinaldo's

traced Filipino cultural, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity to the failure of the Spanish civilizing mission. According to him, "Spanish rule did little or nothing to break down the tribal differences, and it is probably not unjust to say that these differences were encouraged, for with the tribes mutually hostile the maintenance of Spain's sovereignty was much easier." That would not be true of the U.S. colonial enterprise in the Philippines. Willcox, op. cit. pp. 287-288; Crow, op. cit., p. 17.

³⁷ Willcox, op. cit. p. 286; Crow, Op cit. pp. 258-288; Mary Hazelton Blanchard Wade. *Our Little Philippine Cousin (The Little Cousins Series)*. Boston: The Page Company, 1902, pp. v-vi; Elliot, Op cit.; Philippine Commission Report, pp. 11-12; Noyes, Op. cit. p. 196; Doherty, op. cit. p. 7; "America in the Philippines, the problem Reviewed," *Living Age*, 268, 1911, p. 304.

³⁸ Noyes, Op cit. p. 196.

republic was not a legitimate Filipino government, and the United States saved the Filipino majority from Aguinaldo's tyranny.³⁹

For many supporters of U.S. control of the Philippines, the problem with Filipino independence was clear: how could an independent government be organized in the archipelago without cultural, linguistic, and religious homogeneity among the islands?⁴⁰ They argued that Filipino independence was impossible until the nation-making process the Americans initiated in the Philippines was completed.⁴¹ Supporters of this idea appropriated the right to determine when Filipinos could become a nation and, therefore, aspire to be free from American tutelage. Thus, U.S. enlightened colonialism would not only bring the Filipinos material progress, freedom, and political training, but forge their separate tribes into a nation: U.S. rule was the only path to Filipino freedom and nationhood, and American colonial officials were their guides.

On the other hand, opponents of U.S. colonialism called denial of Filipino nationhood a lie to justify retention of the Philippines. They understood that this was a very effective argument against a free Philippines, and attacked the classification of Filipinos into tribes, emphasizing that there *was* a Filipino nation, ready to be free.⁴²

³⁹ According to Noyes, Aguinaldo's republic was the despotic rule of a Filipino tribe. When the Americans came to the Philippines "There was no republic there to be crushed, no aspirations for liberty to be baffled, no independent nation to be overthrow." The Americans liberated the Filipinos not only from Spanish despotism, but also from the abuses of "Filipino brigands whose domination has been based on the terrorism of systematic murder by banded assassins." For Noyes, the Treaty of Paris meant "a change of government unquestionably beneficial," for the Filipinos. *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ According to Willcox, "When, therefore, it is proposed to grant independence to the Philippine Islands, let it be recollected that this grant is to be made not to a single homogeneous people, of one speech, of one religion, of one state of civilization, of one degree of social and political development, but to an aggregation of peoples, of different speech, of different religions, of widely varying states of social and political development, of little or no communication with one another- to an aggregation, in short, whose elements, before 1898, had but one bond, the involuntary bond of inherited subjection to Spanish authority, and all of which today are distinguished by the characteristic trait of the Oriental, absence of the quality of sympathy." Willcox, *Op cit.* pp. 288-289. Emphasis mine.

⁴¹ Crow had an idea of how that mission was working. According to him, the Americans were helping bring Filipino tribes closer together by building roads, controlling headhunting and substituting it with baseball. Crow, *Op. cit.* p. 266.

⁴² Writing in 1900, Pierce argued that the Filipinos were as homogeneous as the Swedish or the Norwegians. 22 years later, Charles Russell analyzed what he identified as one of the opponents

David H. Doherty articulated of the strongest defenses of Filipino nationhood. He classified Filipinos into three groups: civilized (the Christian Filipinos), semi-civilized (the Moros), and the “mountains, or uncivilized.”⁴³ According to Doherty, all three groups were of Malay background, but the first, the civilized Filipinos, “has been so altered and improved by Christian civilization and by race intermixture that it is no longer scientific to class it as Malayan.” Using the 1900 American census, Doherty insisted that the non-civilized were unimportant, comprising only 650,000 persons against the 7,000,000 civilized Filipinos. According to him,

The errors about these people have arisen **from confounding them with the semi civilized Moros and the savage mountain tribes**, to whom they have no other relationship than that of contiguity. The names Tagalog, Bikol, Bisayan, Ilocano, Pamapangan, Pangassinan, and Cagayan are the names of provinces or provincial dialects of Filipinos, not the names of distinct tribes or peoples. I protested to Doctor Barrows, head of the bureau of non-Christian tribes, against his use of the word ‘tribes’ in writing of the Filipinos, and when he admitted that the world is not correct and said that he did not know a proper word to use, I said: **‘Don’t be afraid of facts. Call them a people.’** All these Filipinos of group are alike in physique, manners, and dress; and in speech the differences is not anywhere greater than between German and high German or between certain Italians or Spanish dialects. Furthermore, they all recognize one another as of one people, Filipinos; and such few dislikes or antipathies as exist (for example, between the people of the town of Macabebe and their fellow Tagalogs) are only local or personal feuds such as may be found among our Kentucky or Tennessee mountaineers.⁴⁴

of Filipino independence’s major arguments, that “the Filipinos are unfitted for independence because they are not sufficiently homogeneous for national unity.” According to Russell, this was false because the Filipinos had shown their capacity “for united purpose and actions.” Willis focused on the Philippines linguistic heterogeneity, arguing that linguistic differences within the Philippines were no greater “than those which exist as between districts in Germany.” Pierce, “The ‘single tribe’ Fiction” Reprinted from the *Springfield Republican*, 1900, pp. 14-15 and Russell, *The Outlook for the Philippines*, p 353 and Willis, Op. cit. pp. 446-447.

⁴³ Doherty, Op. cit. , p. 7.

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 11. Emphasis mine.

Doherty not only rejected the use of the word “tribe,” but emphasized Christian Filipinos’ homogeneity.⁴⁵ According to him, the so-called Filipino tribes were only names of provinces. Doherty saw Christianity as the common bond between all civilized Filipinos that made them a nation. There was no Bisayan, Tagalog, or Ilocano tribe, but a homogeneous Filipino people ready for freedom; therefore, there was no reason to continue denying the islands independence. The weakness in Doherty’s analysis was that he ignored the Filipino non-Christian minority. Seemingly, for him, only Christian inhabitants of the archipelago could be defined or identified as Filipinos; he minimized their importance of the others, especially Muslims, who did not fit his representation of Filipinos as a homogeneous nation.⁴⁶

FILIPINO CAPABILITIES

Filipino’s capacity to rule and defend their country was a central element in every American discussion of the future of the islands. American speakers, journalists, and analysts were not sure whether the Filipinos could rule themselves *and* protect their freedom. This was a crucial issue for Filipino nationalists and their American allies, and as well as supporters of American rule in the Philippines. If the Filipinos were ready for self-government and able to defend their freedom, there was no excuse for American “sentimental colonialism.”⁴⁷ Conversely, if the Filipinos were not ready for self-government, independence could hardly be justified. This debate proved to be one of the most enduring elements in congressional and public discussion of the Philippines’ future.

Filipinos’ defensive capability

The defensive capability of Filipinos was an important issue in these discussions. For supporters of American colonialism, Filipinos could not survive as a free nation

⁴⁵Doherty rejected the classification of the Filipinos into tribes. According to him, “We must not let preconceived notions or a false nomenclature of tribes, etc., bias our judgment, for any intelligent man who goes over the ground must see that the ethnological and political conditions is what I have found it to be and have stated above.” Ibid. p. 12

⁴⁶ According to Doherty, “The census reveals the vast predominance of the Filipinos, even after the losses of the war and of cholera, **and the relative unimportance of the Moros and the mountain tribes.**” Ibid. p. 11. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁷ This phrase is from Rafael, Op Cit. p. 23.

without American protection. For them, only the American flag kept the Philippines safe from the (other) imperialist nations. For example, writing in 1909, Thomas F. F. Millard argued that independence was not an option for the Philippines because Filipinos could not keep their freedom. According to him,

Taking into consideration their geographical location and the indisputable tendency for greater nations to absorb lesser ones, I cannot believe it will be possible for the Philippines permanently to exist as an independent political entity. **Left to themselves they inevitably will fall under the domination of some superior power**, and for the United States to abandon its position there will be to cast them, like a rich prize, to be struggled for by other nations; **a fate to which, in my opinion, the American people never will consign them.**⁴⁸

In Millard's analysis, American colonialism was a protection against imperialism.⁴⁹ He implicitly supported the idea of an American enlightened colonialism in the islands: the United States was not a colonial power, but a benevolent tutor and protector of the Filipino people. Moreover, not only were Filipinos unprepared to defend themselves, but their independence could be a problem for the United States. Millard was among those who thought that, even after independence, the American people would not tolerate the conquest of the islands by an imperialistic power. Therefore, independence would be a grave mistake because the U.S. would remain responsible for the islands, but without any control over their affairs or the behavior of their population.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Millard, *Op. cit.* pp. 486-487. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁹ The Philippine Commission also argued that the Filipinos could not survive without American protection. According to the PCR, "The Philippine Islands, even the most patriotic declare, can not at the present time stand alone. They need the tutelage and protection of the United States. But they need it in order that in due time they may, in their opinion, become self-governing and independent." PCR, p. 83.

⁵⁰ The range and meaning of Filipino independence was a big issue of discussion. For many, independence was the only solution to American ideological, political, and strategic dilemmas in the Philippines. They saw Filipino independence as the end of American entanglement in the islands and the region. However, for others, the Filipino independence would not end American responsibilities over the islands, but would leave the United States in a worst position to protect the islands. This is going to be a big issue during the congressional discussion of the Philippines.

Filipinos political capability

Supporters and opponents of U.S. rule also contested the Filipinos' political capability. Supporters of Filipino independence focused portrayed them as a peaceful and civilized nation ready for self-government; the islands were ready for freedom, and American tutelage was unnecessary. On February 27, 1904, for example, Senator George F. Hoar (Rep-Mass), a devoted anti-imperialist, introduced into the *Congressional Records* a paper written by David H. Doherty. This paper, written after Doherty's "three strenuous months of travel and study in the Philippine Islands," argued that before Doherty went to the Philippines he was warned about the nature of the Filipinos. Although—unfortunately—Doherty did not identify who told him that Filipinos were liars, thieves, "loafers," cowards, ungrateful, stupid, without any initiative, and lazy,⁵¹ he rejected this description of the Filipino people: "I would in social contact or personal friendship prefer the Filipino to a Chinaman, or Japanese, or even to some occidental people. I was particularly impressed by the sense of justice possessed by even the humblest people. The Filipino occupies a stage where not race generalization but personal attributes must be the basis for judging him."⁵² Politically, Doherty thought the bulk of Filipinos rejected annexation to the United States and supported independence. As for their political capabilities, Doherty thought Filipinos were ready to establish "an unstable third-rate republic on the level of certain South American republics, but after a limited period of American tutelage they will be able to form a government which will satisfy all their aspirations, bring happiness and prosperity to their people, be a credit to their teachers, and be a harbinger of freedom to the oriental world."⁵³ Thus, although Doherty believed the Filipinos were not yet ready to be free, he had no doubt they would qualify for independence after a brief American tutelage.

Writing in 1905, Henry P. Willis rejected the arguments of supporters of American colonialism regarding Filipinos' political capacity. For him, Filipinos had

⁵¹ Doherty's sources also told him that the Filipinos were a clean, domestic, hospitable, and religious people. Doherty, *Op. cit.* p. 13.

⁵² *Ibid.* pp. 12-13.

⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 12.

proven their readiness to become a free nation. However, what is interesting in Willis' position is his "pragmatic" approach. According to him:

It should be understood that no effort to thrust upon the Filipinos the ideas and institutions which have been developed by Western nations after a long period of constitutional struggle ought to anticipate success. The natives of the Philippines are foreign to the inhabitants of the United States in all their ways of thought, action, and prejudice. What we have consistently done thus far has been to try to force upon them methods and institutions with they had no natural aptitude. **We have been trying to make a Filipino over into an American. As well expect to turn a palm tree into an elm!**⁵⁴

For Willis, Filipinos' political capability could not be judged by American standards.⁵⁵ He identified the limits of American enlightened colonialism in the Philippines: the Filipinos could not be Americanized because they did not have the "natural aptitude" for American institutions. In other words, the incorporation of the Filipinos into the United States as citizens of a democratic republic was not possible because they lacked the natural (perhaps racial?) disposition to become Americans.⁵⁶ Therefore, Filipino

⁵⁴ Willis, Op. cit. p 444. Emphasis mine.

⁵⁵ William Croffutt also thought that Filipino capacity should not be judged by American standards. Criticizing Secretary of War William H Taft in 1904, Croffutt argued, "Secretary Taft seems to confuse self-government with American self-government. The Declaration of Independence was exactly what its name implies, a declaration of national independence, not a declaration in favor of any form of government. It asserted the right of every people to by govern by itself. It did not undertake to say how. No people in the world are governed exactly as we are, and our institutions would not suit other men." Croffutt, Op. cit. p. 16.

⁵⁶ For example, Edwin Burritt (Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Anti-Imperialist League) wrote in an unfortunately undated pamphlet: "That the islanders are not qualified for American citizenship is everywhere acknowledged. **Indeed, their alleged unfitness for self-government is the excuse for making them subjects of a self-governing people.** Because, 'they are not a self-government race' we may incorporate them into our body politics without representation. In order to hold lands and peoples that are alleged to be unfit for freedom, we have already created one of the costliest of naval and military establishments. That we, like England may have colonies, we have returned to militarism with its grievous burdens and sordid ideals. That we may join with the 'predatory nations' in the partition of the world, those who temporarily exercise our authority are striking at the vitals of free-government. **The conceded unfitness of the islander for American citizenship would seem to indicate that we should let them go. On the contrary, it is made the conclusive reason for their incorporation into our body politic without rights.**" in Library of Congress (LC), Manuscript Division (MD), Papers of William Croffutt, Box 16, Printed Pamphlets, n. d. Emphasis mines.

independence was not only possible, but necessary because the political elements of the Philippine question yielded no other solution.⁵⁷

Some American writers, analysts, and journalists denied Filipino capability on racial grounds.⁵⁸ For example, in a paper introduced into the *Congressional Record* by Senator James W. Wadsworth (Rep-NY) in 1916, Samuel Parrish argued that weather conditions were “of pressing importance to this country [the United States] at the present time in connection with its attitude toward those parts of the Tropics which are forcing themselves upon our attention.”⁵⁹ Parrish, evidently a geographic determinist, divided the Earth into three climatic zones: the “Temperate,” the “Subtropic,” and the “Tropic,” and focused on the potential and limitations of the tropics. According to him, although this zone was economically important, white men could not settle there, and self-government was impossible there. According to Parrish,

In an examination of governmental conditions, which from time immemorial have existed in the Tropics, I can find no instance of an orderly self-government, with representative institutions, evolved from the people themselves. Nor, on the other hand, have the efforts made by England in recent times to introduce responsible self-government in her tropic dependencies given any encouragement that the issue of such experiments will prove successful. The mental, moral, and economic factors are all at variance with the conditions required for an orderly self-governing community. Of the millions of men who now occupy, and of the untold millions, who since recorded time, have been the indigenous inhabitants of the Tropics, I think it may safely be said that no one commanding figure, judged by the world standards, has

⁵⁷ For many Americans, the Philippines could not become an American state because their population could not be Americanized. However, in one of the major paradoxes of American colonialism in the Philippines, they also thought that the Filipinos were not sufficiently Americanized to be free. Degrees of Filipino Americanization served not only to deny incorporation, but also to justify retention. In other words, the Filipinos were trapped between their “incapability” to become American citizens and their “incapacity” to rule and defend their country.

⁵⁸ Brown, *Op Cit.* p. 52; Parrish, *Op. cit.* pp. 3-6; Blayney, *Op. cit.* pp. 1156-1157; Root, *Op. cit.* ; and Katherine Mayo. *The Isles of Fear the Truth about the Philippines*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1924, p. 64.

⁵⁹ Parrish, *Op. cit.* p. 3.

ever emerged from the mass to challenge the admiration of the world as a benefactor of mankind.⁶⁰

For Parrish, the political future of the Philippines was determined by their location in the tropics. He argued that Filipinos could not develop self-government because they were a tropical people and therefore lacked what he identified as the four basic elements of self-rule: an “intelligent public opinion”, “willingness” to obey the will of the majority, the recognition of the dignity of manual labor, and an “incorruptible judiciary to impartially administer the law in the interest of the weak no less than in that of the strong.”⁶¹ The development of those conditions was, for Parris, an indispensable requirement for Filipino independence.

Cornélis Willcox also believed the Filipinos were not ready for self-government. According to him, self-government “depends for its existence and maintenance on the possession of certain qualities, and still more, perhaps, on the passion of those qualities by a majority of the people who practice or are to practice self-government, on an educated and inherited interest of the citizen in the question affecting his welfare in so far as this conditioned by government.”⁶² Therefore, Filipinos were not ready for independence because of their lack of political and linguistic cohesion, their small educated population, and the absence of a middle class that after independence could prevent the islands’ being tyrannized by the Filipino elite.⁶³

Former Secretary of War Elihu Root also joined in the discussion of Filipinos’ political capabilities. Writing in 1917, Root argued that they were unready for independence, incapable of self-government, unable to defend their freedom without American protection, and that American “benevolent assimilation” was not yet

⁶⁰ According to Parrish, Muhammad was the only exception, because Buddha and Confucius were born outside the Tropic zone. *Ibid.* pp. 5-6.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 6.

⁶² Willcox, *Op. cit.* p. 294.

⁶³ *Ibid.* pp. 295-297. Willcox’s comments reflect the way he imagined the United States. What he identified as lacking in Filipinos was what, for him, defined the American society: a homogeneous nation with a common language, a strong middle class, and an educated population of citizens able to exercise their rights and responsibilities.

complete.⁶⁴ Interestingly, he linked the problem of the Filipinos' political capacity to the "Negro problem." According to him,

The American people have had some serious lessons to teach them (the Filipinos) the truth that self-government is an art to be acquired and that is a terrible evil for a people to have imposed to them a form of government which it is beyond their capacity to carry on. We gave the ballot to the Blacks of the South at the close of the Civil War upon the theory that if they had an opportunity to vote they would be self-governing; and we made a ghastly failure of the experiment and inflicted great injury upon Blacks themselves because our theory was wrong. [...] The best service that we can render to the peoples whom we wish to benefit is to help them to acquire the art of self-government. This is the theory upon we are proceeding in the Philippines, but **the application of such a theory requires knowledge** and genuine interest and sympathy, and these qualifications ought to the people of the Philippine Island.⁶⁵

Root argued that Americans should learn from the history of the "Negro Problem" in the South in order to avoid similar mistakes in the Philippines. Interestingly, Root identified a direct link between American domestic and colonial subjects: For him, American colonial policy toward Filipinos should be informed by the history of U.S. policies toward American Negroes. Like African Americans after the end of the Civil War, Filipinos were seen as unready to assume the responsibilities of citizenship and self-government. American paternal protection should not be withdrawn from the Philippines, and the Filipinos' political and defensive capacities should not be over-estimated. Only wise white men could decide when African Americans, Filipinos, Puerto Ricans or Native Americans were ready for responsibilities "beyond their capacity to carry on."⁶⁶

⁶⁴ According to Root, these questions could not be answered "without knowledge:" the American search for knowledge about the Philippines begun by McKinley continued. Root, Op. Cit.

⁶⁵ Ibid. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁶ Ibid. Albert Hart compared the situation of the Philippines with the southern states because in the South, there was also "a dependent race which has to take its law and government from another race." For Hart, Filipinos posed a thornier problem than African Americans because they had their own languages, laws, religions, and civilization. Contrary to the Filipino, the American Negro had "less sense of any destiny in which the white man is not part; the last thing he wants is independence." Hart, Op. cit. pp. 279-280.

In 1924, twenty-six years after Dewey's victory, Katherine Mayo⁶⁷ wrote a suggestively-titled book, *The Isles of Fear: the Truth about the Philippines*,⁶⁸ in which she identified what she understood were the three basic elements of American problems in the Philippines: strategic, commercial, and human concerns.⁶⁹ According to Mayo, discussion of the Philippines' strategic importance pitted those who argued that the islands were the only port available for the Navy in that region, and those who thought the Philippines were "a strategic weakness in our line of defense."⁷⁰ The commercial concerns about the Philippines centered on the economic potential of the islands and the interests of the American investors in the Philippines. For Mayo, Filipino capability was very limited: "...whatever has been done for the advancement of the Filipino people in the last quarter century has been done by Americans and Filipinos under American guidance."⁷¹ Conversely, she asserted, "whatever has been done to their harm, loss, and oppression has been done by the Filipino himself, unguided."⁷² Thus, the American tutors were responsible for everything good that happened to their "pupils," but their "trainees" were responsible for every evil that befell them. Mayo represented American colonialism as the sum of all goodness, and Filipinos as children unable even to walk without their tutors' assistance.

Race was also part of the discussion of Filipinos' political capabilities. In 1913, Frederick C. Chamberlain argued that Filipinos could not develop self-government

⁶⁷ Katherine Mayo, an American journalist and writer born in 1867, traveled extensively thanks to the support of M. Moyca Newell, a rich heiress. *The Isles of Fear* was the product of a trip to the Philippines in 1923. She also traveled to India and wrote a book supporting British colonialism (*Mother India*, 1927); she died in 1940. See American National Biography (<http://www.anb.org>) and <http://www.allbiographies.com/biography-KatherineMayo-54474.html>.

⁶⁸ The words "fear" and "truth" in the book's title carried considerable symbolic weight. The word "fear" reflected the old debate about the domestic, as well as strategic, implications of U.S. control of the Philippines; the word "truth" evoked the continuous American search for answers about the Philippines, and the truth-making process it produced, as it identified Mayo as a truth-maker.

⁶⁹ Mayo, Op. cit. p. 8.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 64.

⁷² Ibid.

because of their racial limitations. According to him, America's Filipino experiment would never succeed because the mental patterns of inhabitants of the archipelago would never change. The main problem the Americans faced was the fact that Filipinos were member of an Oriental race, and this determined their culture and behavior. Chamberlain saw miscegenation as a possible solution to Filipino racial inferiority because it was a historical fact that a "Filipino with a father of Chinese, Japanese, Spanish, French, British, or American blood is usually a great improvement in ability upon his mother's people. The vigor of the foreigners is usually so much greater than that of the natives that an intermixture usually means a long advance in brain and character power. A similar result we must acknowledge to follow the union of the Negro and the American."⁷³ Thus, Filipinos could not develop self-government because they could not be Americanized, and they could not be Americanized because they were not white.

On the other hand, in 1922, Russell rejected the idea that Filipinos were racially incapable of self-government—what he called the "ethnological argument"⁷⁴—nor was Filipino capability for self-government determined by geographical factors. For him, aptitude for self-government was not an American monopoly. As Russell reminded his readers,

That democracy has so far gained no great foothold in Asia means only that the dawn in Asia has come more slowly. [...] Nowhere has a nation passed from autocracy to democracy without fevers and crises. [...] In point of fact, no one people invented self-government, can be deemed to have any form of patent upon it, nor have been racial reasons conspicuously successful in its development or application. The people that have carried democracy the farthest in this world are the Swiss, who re made up of three so-called races.⁷⁵

⁷³ Chamberlain, *Op. cit.* p. 234. Crow also saw miscegenation as an instrument to improve the "Malay race," because the mixed-race Filipinos were the richest and most advanced class in the islands. Interestingly, Crow thought miscegenation could be useful because of the Filipinos immorality: "The morality of the Philippines is the morality of the banana belt, and every visit of a foreigner, from the early Chinese to the present American army, has left an increased number of half caste children." Crow, *Op. cit.* p. 22.

⁷⁴ The fact that in 1922, almost twenty-five years after Dewey victory, Russell found it necessary to argue against racial arguments about Filipino political capabilities bears witness to the endurance of race as one of the more important elements of the Philippine question.

⁷⁵ Russell, *Op. cit.* pp. 351-352.

Russell concluded that the best way to learn the techniques of self-government was not reading books, but practicing self-government. Americans had no choice but to recognize that Filipinos were ready for freedom, and fulfill their promises of independence.

As with the other issues discussed previously, there was not a single vision about Filipinos political capabilities, but two distinct sets of images deployed in support of conflicting objectives. Both representations of the Filipinos for American public consumption coexisted throughout the first three decades of U.S. colonial rule.

FILIPINO INDEPENDENCE

Conspiracy Theory

The degree of support for independence among Filipinos was another principal element of the knowledge production process analyzed in this chapter. Supporters of American colonialism asked several important questions: Who supported Filipino independence, and why? Was Filipino popular support for independence widespread? Did the common Filipino understand the meaning and risks of independence? Who would benefit most from independence? As they answered these questions for their American public in their articles, books, and lectures, they questioned the Filipino independence movement's legitimacy and appropriated the right to judge the honesty, truthfulness, and authenticity of Filipinos' political aspirations.

In their analysis of the Filipino independence movement, Americans came to several 'conclusions.' For them, Filipino independence was not supported by the majority of Filipino population, but only by a minority group, the Tagalogs.⁷⁶ For example,

⁷⁶ Barrows, *A Conservation Policy*, p. 65. The Philippine Commission concludes that only a minority of the Filipinos supported independence. According to *PCR*, the Filipinos who testified before the Commission were against independence because they thought that common Filipinos were ignorant, lacking political experience, culturally divided, and therefore incapable of independence. The security of the islands was another concern among the Commission witnesses. According to the *PCR*, they thought that Filipinos could not defend their freedom, and that the islands could be easily conquered by a foreign power. Although Elliott acknowledged that independence would be favored in a plebiscite on the archipelago's political future, he argued that "we have in the Philippines a prevailing sentiment in favor of immediate independence, but it is not universal and it varies greatly in intensity and seriousness." *PCR*, p.

writing in 1912, Cornélis D. Willcox acknowledged support for independence among Filipinos, but contended that it was mostly limited to Tagalogs. According to him, the Tagalogs were characterized by “a certain restlessness of disposition, by a considerable degree of vanity.”⁷⁷ In addition, they were poor workers, in comparison to other Filipinos, and “measurably inferior in point of trustworthiness.” Though more educated than the Visayans, they were also more volatile, insincere, and “more mixed in blood than other tribes.”⁷⁸ Willcox concluded that “it is not without significance that it was the same Tagalog who organized the chief insurrection against the domination of Spain.”⁷⁹ In other words, supporters of Filipino independence were not among the better citizens of the archipelago, but were the unreliable, worthless, vain, disloyal, lazy, violent, and unpredictable sector of the Filipino population.

Supporters of American retention of the Philippines also argued that independence would not only benefit a minority of Filipinos. Like the Filipino rebellion against Spain, they represented the post-1898 Filipino independence movement as the product of selfish Tagalog leaders. They developed a conspiracy theory to explain the popularity of Filipino independence. According to them, there was a pro-independence conspiracy of the political and cultural elite, especially the Tagalog elite,⁸⁰ who would be able to exploit and dominate the island’s population without American protection. The Filipino elite was represented as group of evil agitators and villains, with a hidden agenda that not only manipulated their people, but also the good faith of the American people and leadership to fulfill their greediness and ambition.⁸¹ The creators of the elite conspiracy theory

83; Elliott, *The Philippines to the End*, p. 448; and Gibbons, *Retention of the Philippines*, pp. 1-2; Willcox, *Head-hunters*, p. 289.

⁷⁷ Willcox, *Op. cit.* p. 289.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* p. 290.

⁷⁹ Interestingly, Willcox argued that the Filipino independence movement was urban-oriented and centered around Manila. *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Willcox emphasized that although most Filipino independence advocates were Tagalog politicians, there were also Visayans like Sergio Osmeña. This made him question whether the politicians or the people would be the beneficiaries of Filipino independence. *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Manuel L. Quezon, one of the main Filipino political leaders, was harshly criticized by many American writers and commentators. For example, in his 1916 article for *The Review of Reviews*,

portrayed Filipinos as an ignorant people, easily influenced, by the elite. According to Cardinal James Gibbons,⁸²

Up to the present moment, the Filipinos have no conception of the honor and responsibility which it is now proposed to thrust upon them. I hold it to be unreasonable in the extreme to impose both upon men who have not even been consulted as to their wishes **and have no adequate conception of the duties and responsibilities involved in giving them their independence.** [...] But even could it be demonstrated that a large number of Filipinos desired that independence, in my judgment the inhabitants of those islands, as a whole, are utterly unprepared to shoulder the responsibility which independence will place upon them. Some authorities give the number of those capable of reading and writing as not more than 5 per cent. Nor have more than 3 per cent an adequate idea of the duties required of those charged with self-government.⁸³

Writing in 1913, Parrish divided Filipino society into four groups: “a handful of idealists” who quoted French writers on “the abstract principles of liberty;” the silent majority composed of different races and speaking different languages “**whose only idea of government now is, and always has been, obedience to those who have been set to rule over them by some higher power;**” a partially-educated minority who could be easily influenced “**and without any very definite principles to guide their political conduct;**” and “a small group of educated men who have both the intelligence and the

Thomas L. Blayney argued that it was “very unfortunate that Señor Quezon should have succeeded in establishing himself in the opinion of Washington as a typical representative of his race.” According to Blayney, Quezon was very knowledgeable about “America and American ways” and cleverly played “upon our feelings and prejudices, and to make himself interesting and attractive in society.” Blayney charged that Quezon was using this knowledge to manipulate American feelings. For Blayney, Quezon was taking advantage of American idealism and good intentions, and Congress should be very cautious dealing with him and his pro-independence actions. In other words, Blayney was concerned about a colonial subject’s use of knowledge to question the U.S. colonial project. Writing in 1923, Charles Hodges also criticized Quezon’s political greed. Blayney, Op. cit. p. 1156 and LC, MD, Box 230, Speeches, Charles Hodges. “Political Deflation in the Philippines.” *The Independent* 111, no. 3848 (1923).

⁸² Cardinal James Gibbon was born in Baltimore in 1834, the son of Irish immigrants who arrived in the United States in 1829. He became Cardinal in 1887. Although he opposed the war with Spain, Gibbon later supported American colonialism not only in the Philippines, but also in other former Spanish colonies. He died in 1921. See American National Biography (www.anb.org).

⁸³ Gibbons, Op. cit. p. 2. Emphasis mine.

will to make their influence for good powerfully felt among their countrymen.” The last groups were the main supporters of American rule.⁸⁴ Parrish was not alone in his class-based approach to the problem of Filipino independence. For Elliot, pro-independence feelings were weakest among the common people of the archipelago, because they had no idea what independence was. He argued that only politicians and agitators supported independence.⁸⁵ According to Blayney, educated Filipinos were against independence because they were afraid that without American protection the islands would become victims of internal fighting and instability.⁸⁶

Although Willcox rejected the conspiracy theory, he agreed that independence would open the door for an oligarchic Tagalog government,⁸⁷ because

The capital, Manila, is Tagalog, the adjacent provinces are Tagalog, the wealthy class of the islands on the whole is Tagalog, and **there is no middle class anywhere**. The mere fact that the capital is situated in the Tagalog province would perhaps alone determine the issue, apart from the fact that the Tagalog are the dominant element of the native population. **Before granting independence, therefore, we should be reasonably sure that we are not in reality placing supreme control in the hands of a few.**⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Parrish, Op. cit. pp. 8-9. Emphasis mine.

⁸⁵ Elliott, Op. cit. p. 448.

⁸⁶ Blayney, Op. cit. p. 1157.

⁸⁷ According to Filipino Scholar Enrique de la Cruz, the development of a Filipino oligarchy was a consequence not of independence, but of American colonialism. For him, one of the legacies of U.S. rule in the Philippines was the transformation of the of *Ilustrados* class into an oligarchy “that since has dominated Philippine politics.” The *Ilustrados* were the Filipino cultural and economic elite in the last decades of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines. De la Cruz argues that their transformation into an oligarchy was made possible by a law approved by the Philippine Commission in 1901 extending suffrage only to male Filipinos “who were at least twenty-three years old, who could read, speak, and write English or Spanish, and who owned property value at P. 500.00 or who paid annual taxes worth P. 300.00.” Because of this law, only the high and middle Filipino classes could vote in Filipino elections. De la Cruz concluded that “To this day, Philippine politics continues to be dominated by an oligarchy that was ushered into power through American sponsored elections.” Enrique de la Cruz, “Essays into American Empire in the Philippines.” *Amerasia Journal* 24, no. 2 (1998): p. xi.

⁸⁸ Willcox, Op cit. p. 291. Emphasis mine.

The creators of the Filipino elite conspiracy theory argued that, after independence, the absence of a Filipino middle class and the ignorance and poverty of the bulk of the islands' population would leave the elite free to rule the country unchecked, and indifferent to the interests of the majority of the people.⁸⁹ In other words, misguided Filipinos supported independence because of their ignorance and vulnerability, and not because they really understood the meaning and consequences of independence. If they knew what was behind independence, they would realize American colonialism was the best protection for their freedom and welfare: only American colonialism could protect Filipinos from one another.⁹⁰

The Moro Question

American writers, lecturers, colonial officers, military officers, and journalists' classification of Filipinos into tribes—Christian and non-Christian, civilized and uncivilized—helped advocates of retention of the Philippines deny the existence of a Filipino nation by underscoring the heterogeneity of the islands' population. In addition, classifying the Filipinos according to their religions, socio-political organizations, and

⁸⁹ For example, writing in 1913, Chamberlain argued that the only beneficiaries of Filipino independence would be Filipino cultural elite, the so-called *gente ilustrada* who were the main supporters of independence because they wanted to be able to exploit the 90% of the Filipino population who wanted the protection of American sovereignty, keeping them poor and ignorant. He was convinced there was a conspiracy, because only 10% of the Filipino population supported independence. Chamberlain, *The Philippine Problem*, pp. 217-219.

⁹⁰ Governor Wood also used the conspiracy theory to justify American retention of the Philippines. In a cablegram sent to the Secretary of War in 1924, which was published in *The Official Gazette*, Wood criticized the Filipinos' pro-independence campaign in the United States: according to him, Congress and the American public were "misinformed and deceived by misleading propaganda and information which has been circulated by the Independence Mission's Press Bureau and others." For Wood, it was necessary the American people and United State Congress needed to pay attention to those Americans who had lived in the islands and, therefore, knew their real conditions. Wood argued that if Americans had the right information about the Philippines, they would understand the nature of American mission in the islands and their attitude toward Filipino independence would change. According to him, "We must not be swept off our feet by the purely local and artificial agitation produced by a small group fanning the very natural desire of the people for independence, but absolutely failing to enlighten them as to existing conditions or the costs and responsibilities which independence involves." LC, MD, Wood, Box 217, Philippines Miscellaneous, Folder 8, "Cablegram Sent by Governor-General Wood to the Secretary of War," March 14, 1924, *Official Gazette*, May 13, 1924, XXII: 58, p. 1205-1206.

cultural “levels” helped justify American colonialism as an enlightened, benevolent project. Non-Christian Filipinos, specifically the Muslim Moros of the southern islands of the archipelago, were also important in representing American colonialism as a guarantor of peace, order, and stability in the Philippines. The so-called Moro Question was a very important element of the Philippine Question.⁹¹

American knowledge producers described the Moros as a warlike race characterized by religious fanaticism and a natural ferociousness and bellicosity.⁹² The Moros’ alleged natural animosity toward Christian Filipinos, as well as their supposedly friendly “special” relationship with their American benefactors, were two additional elements of the Moro issue.⁹³ According to the authors, military and colonial officers, and journalists analyzed in this chapter, the Moros would never tolerate a Filipino government dominated by the islands’ Christian majority. They alleged that the Moros saw a Christian Filipino republic as a clear danger to their way of life, their freedom, and especially their religion.⁹⁴ Consequently, according to these writers, for Filipino Muslims American control over the islands was their only protection against their Christian neighbors. Moros saw the American flag over the archipelago as a shield against the Christians, thanks to the alleged special relationship that developed between them and the American colonial and military officers.

⁹¹ During his lecture at the 1915 Lake Mohawk Conference, Colonel William Rivers, former Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, recognized that in the Philippines the U.S. faced what he called “the Moro Problem.” However, Rivers argued that the Moro problem was inseparable from the larger Philippine Question. Rivers, “The Moro as a factor in the Philippines Problem.”

⁹² Accusations of polygamy, slavery, and piracy also featured in representations of the Moros.

⁹³ Noyes, *Op. cit.*, pp. 38-39 and Crow, *Op. cit.*, pp. 256-257.

⁹⁴ Interestingly but unsurprisingly, Cardinal Gibbons saw the Moros as a menace to the islands’ Christian population. For him, Filipino independence would lead to a period of internal conflict because of Moros’ bellicosity. According to him, “Evidence of the bloodthirstiness of the Moros comes to us with depressing frequency. Their attacks upon the United States troops and upon their law-abiding fellow countrymen continue from time to time, and only recently an American officer and several scouts were ruthlessly massacred by these men. How helpless would be the peace-loving Filipinos against the Moros uprising were the worthy protecting hand of the United States withdrawn.” In other words, Gibbons saw American colonialism in the Philippines as the only way to protect the Filipinos from themselves. Gibbons, *Op. cit.* pp. 2-3.

For analysts of the Moro problem, Filipino independence would lead inevitably to a period of instability—perhaps civil war—because the Moros would not tolerate rule of the Tagalog.⁹⁵ This political instability would, in turn, pave the way for foreign, perhaps Japanese, intervention that would end Filipino independence and reinstate colonial control over the archipelago. However, this new period of foreign control would not be characterized, like the American, by enlightenment, but by exploitation and repression. In other words, Filipino independence would destroy the Americans' civilizing work in the Philippines, especially in the Moro southern region.⁹⁶ Therefore, independence should be out of the question: Americans should stay in the Philippines to protect Filipinos from themselves.

DEAN C. WORCESTER

No analysis of American representations of the Philippines would be complete without special attention to the best known and most important of all truth-makers, Dean C. Worcester.⁹⁷ During his more than twenty-five years of direct relationship with the Philippines, Worcester held key positions in the Philippines' colonial administration, and his books, articles, and lectures had a strong and lasting influence over Americans' understanding of the islands.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ In 1914, Crow argued that Filipino independence would open a period of internal conflict and, therefore, the U.S. Army should maintain surveillance and control over the Moro region, even after Filipino independence. Crow, *Op. cit.* pp. 256-257.

⁹⁶ Writing in 1912, Willcox argued that Filipino independence would lay waste to years of American pacifying and civilizing work in Mindanao. According to him, "so far as this part of the Archipelago is concerned, a grant of independence means the re-establishment of slavery, the recrudescence of piracy, the reincarnation of barbarism." Willcox, *Head-hunters*, p. 299.

⁹⁷ According to his biographer Rodney J. Sullivan, Dean C. Worcester was the most authoritative and influential American expert on the Philippines in the first decades of the 20th century. Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism*, pp. 183-184.

⁹⁸ According to Filipino historian Lydia N. Yu-Jose, as part of its growing interest on the Philippines, the Japanese government translated two chapters of Worcester's book, which speaks to Worcester's influence not only in the United States, internationally. Lydia N. Yu-Jose, *Japan Views the Philippines, 1900-1944*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992, p. 24.

Dean Worcester was born in 1866 in Vermont, to a family with a strong missionary background.⁹⁹ In 1884, Worcester traveled west to the University of Michigan at Ann Harbor, where he fell under the influence of Dr. Joseph B. Steere, Director of the Department of Zoology. Professor Steere, a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School, embarked in the 1870's on a world tour that took him to the Amazon Basin, the Peruvian Andes, China, Formosa, the Philippines, and the Moluccas islands. The purpose of his zoological expeditions was to gather material for the University of Michigan museum. Upon Steere's return to the United States in 1876, he joined the University of Michigan's Department of Zoology,¹⁰⁰ and in 1886, he organized an expedition to the Philippines that would change Worcester's life. The young student was so interested in joining Steere that he insured himself for \$1500 and borrowed \$1200 on the policy to pay for his expenses to the Philippines. In 1887, Steere left for the Philippines, accompanied by two students (Worcester and Frank Bourns) and a Filipino who had accompanied him to the United States in 1876 named Mateo Francisco. After a year in the Philippines, the Steere expedition returned to the United States,¹⁰¹ but Worcester's growing interest in the Philippines led him to organize a second expedition to the islands with Bourns. According to historian Peter W. Stanley, the Worcester-Bourns expedition (1890-1893) took them to the most remote areas of the archipelago and "established Worcester—and Bourns had he cared to exploit it—as a unique American authority on the Philippines."¹⁰² After returning to the United States, Worcester

⁹⁹ His three paternal uncles were missionaries; one of them, Reverend Samuel A. Worcester, a missionary from the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions, was jailed in the 1830's for his defense of the Cherokees. Sullivan, Op. cit. p. 9, and Carla Sinopoli, "Dean Worcester and the Philippines," in Carla Sinopoli and Lars Fogelin (editors and compilers), *Imperial Imagining: the Dean C. Worcester Photographic Collection of the Philippines, 1890-1913*. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Museum of Anthropology, 1998, Cd Rom.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p 10. According to Sullivan, during his expedition to the Philippines, Steere visited many of the archipelago islands and found new species of birds. He also gathered ethnological information about the inhabitants of the Philippines.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. pp. 13-25.

¹⁰² Peter W. Stanley, "'The Voice of Worcester is the Voice of God,' How One American Found Fulfillment in the Philippines," in Peter W Stanley. (editor) *Reappraising an Empire. New Perspectives on Philippine-American History*. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: The President and Fellows of Harvard College, Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 121.

published some articles about his scientific findings in the Philippines and joined the University of Michigan faculty.

The war with Spain opened a new period in Worcester's life, because he was one of the few Americans with significant knowledge about the Philippines. In the late 1890's, he took advantage of the problems between Spain and United States, beginning a series of public lectures and publishing articles about the Philippines.¹⁰³ The growing tensions between Spain and the United States increased the demand for Worcester's articles and public presentations. Worcester's biographer Rodney J. Sullivan emphasizes that between April and October 1898, six new articles by Worcester were published and the "public exposure he garnered as major newspapers reprinted and further circulated the material."¹⁰⁴ Taking advantage of his temporary success, Worcester decided to publish a book based on the letters he sent to his family during his second visit to the Philippines. After a "competitive struggle" between Century Co. and McMillan, the book was published by McMillan in October 1898 under the title of *The Philippine Islands and their Peoples*. The book's immediate success led to three consecutive monthly reprintings, in November and December 1898, and in January 1899.¹⁰⁵

Under the auspices of James Burill, President of the University of Michigan, Worcester met with President McKinley in December 1898. According to Stanley, Worcester impressed the President so much that he thought to name Worcester his personal representative in the Philippines. However, McKinley changed his mind and

¹⁰³ Ibid. According to Sullivan, Worcester first public lecture about the Philippines was at the Unity Club of Ann Arbor on November 1897. In October 1897, Worcester published his first article of this period, titled "Spanish Rule in the Philippines" in *The Cosmopolitan*. Sullivan, Op. cit. pp. 31-32.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 32. Worcester unquestionably played a major role in this crucial early period of the creation of American knowledge about the Philippines. Sullivan states that in his articles published between 1898 and 1899, Worcester developed an "influential version of history which legitimized both the acquisition and administration of the Philippines by the United States." Ibid. p. 184

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. According to Sullivan, Worcester got \$500 for the book, "almost one third of Worcester's annual salary," and 15% in royalties. The book's success led Worcester to postpone his plans for study in Europe and go on the lecture circuit, a decision that would tie him to the Philippines for the rest of his life.

named the young professor member of the First Philippine Commission, also known as the Schurman Commission.¹⁰⁶ Because of his ambition, knowledge, and contacts in the Philippines, Worcester played a dominant role in the Schurman Commission's work, especially in compiling the commission's famous report.¹⁰⁷ One measure of Worcester's influence is the fact that he was the only member of the Schurman Commission whom McKinley named by to the Second Philippine Commission, the Taft Commission.¹⁰⁸

When the Taft Commission organized a civil government in the Philippines, Worcester was named Secretary of Interior. During his thirteen years as colonial officer, Worcester was the "dominant personality" of the Philippine Commission. During those years, he dealt with issues related to Philippine agriculture, health, science, forests, land, and, especially, non-Christian Filipinos.¹⁰⁹ However, Woodrow Wilson's election to the White House in 1912 ended Republican control of Filipino affairs, and Worcester's career as a colonial administrator. Forced to look for a new job. In 1913, Worcester signed an agreement with the American-Philippine Company, a company organized to promote American investment in the islands. He also returned to the United States and spearheaded a public campaign against Filipino independence. Using an impressive

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, pp. 35-39 and Stanley Op. cit. p. 95. The Schurman Commission was created to investigate and make recommendations about conditions in the Philippines. For Sullivan, with his appointment to the Schurman Commission "Worcester now officially filled the public role of American expert on the Philippines." Sullivan, Op. cit. For the composition of the Schurman commission see Supra p. 32.

¹⁰⁷ Sinopoli, Op. cit. According to Kramer, Worcester's presence on the Commission reinforced the report's credibility, because he was identified as the major American scientific authority on Filipino affairs. In Kramer's words, "Worcester's word as scientist displaced ephemeral words of others, especially those of anti-imperialists." Kramer also quotes *Harper's Weekly's* assessment of Worcester's credentials: "The testimony of such a man [Worcester] is worth a worldful of sentimental and academic literate and mere political talk." Kramer, "The Pragmatic Empire," p. 84.

¹⁰⁸ The Taft Commission was named by McKinley on March 16, 1900 and was composed of William H. Taft (Chairman), Professor Bernard Moses (University of California), Luke E. Wright (a lawyer from Tennessee), Henry Clay (a lawyer from Vermont), and Worcester. According to Sullivan, the Taft Commission was created to replace the islands' military government with a civilian colonial administration. Sullivan, Op. cit. , p. 95.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 98. According to Lewis Gleeck, Worcester was "the most influential man in the Philippines from 1901-1912." *American Institutions in the Philippines, 1898-1941*. Manila, 1976, p. 90. Quoted by Sullivan, Op. cit. p. 99.

collection of pictures taken during his many years in the Philippines, Worcester embarked on a very successful national lecture tour.¹¹⁰ His second book about the Philippines, *The Philippines: Past and Present*, was published in 1914.¹¹¹

In 1915, Worcester returned to the Philippines as manager of a coconut oil factory. This return was not without controversy; Worcester's opposition to Filipino independence and racist attitudes had won him the animosity of many Filipinos. He died in 1924, a rich man repudiated by the Filipinos he claimed to be civilizing.¹¹²

The present analysis of Worcester's contribution to the Philippine Question will focus on his two books about the Philippines, for practical reasons: In his more than thirty years' involvement with the Philippines, Worcester wrote numerous articles, reports, and books, and gave many interviews and lectures:¹¹³ too large a corpus for this study. Moreover, Worcester is of interest here not because of his colonial career, but his contribution to American knowledge production about the Philippines. Without a doubt, his two books, especially the second, contributed powerfully to the American public's perception of the Philippines.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ According to Sullivan, "The bulk and variety of the material he [Worcester] placed before the American public is truly remarkable: in addition to the two-volume book there were numerous photographs, newspapers interviews and articles, films, illustrated public lectures, an official report, and copious evidence given to a Senate Committee. **The dominant image was of Worcester himself, commanding, authoritative, wronged, and bent on vindication.**" Sullivan, Op. cit. p. 178. Emphasis mine.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p. 165 and Sinopoli, Op, cit.

¹¹² Sinopoli, Op. cit. According to Kramer, Worcester "had become the most patent Filipino symbol of American imperialism." Kramer, Op. cit. p. 292.

¹¹³ His biographer, Rodney J. Sullivan, identifies at least 44 works by Worcester. Sullivan, Op. cit. pp. 358-361.

¹¹⁴ Sullivan quotes Isaac Lucero, a Filipino studying librarianship in the United States in the 1920's complaining about the popularity of Worcester's book. In 1923, Lucero visited 200 bookstores in the United States and found that the book was the main source of information about the Philippines available in the country. According to Sullivan, "He [Lucero] alleged that the book was biased against the Filipinos but admitted that **if it were to be discarded there would be no adequate substitute to meet the demand for information about the Philippines.**" Sullivan, Op. cit. 178. Emphasis mine.

The Philippines and their Peoples

Worcester's first book, *The Philippines and their Peoples*, was published in 1898, just as the U.S. victory over Spain created a huge demand for information about America's new insular possessions, especially the Philippines.¹¹⁵ The book was the culmination of Worcester's campaign in favor of U.S. retention of the Philippines. Between 1898 and 1899, Worcester played a major role in the public debate about the future of the Philippines.¹¹⁶ Through his lectures and articles, he advocated U.S. retention of the Philippines, arguing that Americans had no other choice: the Filipinos were unprepared for self-government and Filipino independence would open the door for

¹¹⁵ Kramer emphasizes that Worcester's first book filled the United States' Philippine information gap in the wake of Dewey's victory, quoting an editorial from *The Outlook* arguing that Worcester's book filled "the general hunger for reliable and recent information" about the Philippines. After examining reviews of Worcester's book published in journals and magazines like *The Outlook*, *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, *Political Science Quarterly*, and *The Nation*, Sullivan concludes that Worcester's book "accomplished the wide dissemination in America of an old imperial image of the Filipino quickened by the imprimatur of academic science." According to the review in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, "It is very evident that the Philippines are fitted only for a paternal government which must be administered by vigor and justice. If they ever become capable of self-government, especially those who are not inhabitants of Luzon, it will only be after a long tutelage. Professor Worcester's record of personal observation indicates very clearly that the Philippines need three things above all others: Honest government, sanitary regulations, and education." Kramer, Op. cit. pp. 63-64 and Sullivan, Op. cit. pp. 35-34.

¹¹⁶ For example, in December 1899 Worcester lectured 1500 people at the National Geographic Society in Washington about the Filipino tribes. However, Worcester's talks were significant less for the number of people who attended his lectures, than for the way he constructed himself as a truth-maker. For example, his November 1899 address at Chicago's Central Music Hall was based on his direct knowledge of the Philippines that enabled him to correctly understand the Filipinos. According to Sullivan, "Worcester presented himself to his Chicago audience as a pragmatic who eschewed emotion. He claimed to have both 'a knowledge of the facts involved' and 'the disposition and ability to interpret those facts correctly,' **stressing the point that this knowledge was derived from personal identification. [...] His knowledge of Filipino 'feelings and aspirations' was, he emphasized, based on 'daily conversations with them.** He poured scorn on participants in the debate who had not been to the Philippines or relied on newspapers for their information. **What is striking about this line of argument is that Worcester posed as an honest spokesman for the great majority of Filipinos, omitting any reference to the advocates of independence and indigenous government.**" Worcester's Chicago lecture was "enthusiastically received by an audience considerably larger than that attracted by [Carl] Schurz." *The San Francisco Chronicle* and *Harper's Weekly* published Worcester's address. Sullivan, Op. cit. pp. 84-85 and 88. Emphasis mine.

European intervention. Returning the islands to the Spaniards was out of the question, so there was no other option than U.S. control of the archipelago.¹¹⁷

Unsurprisingly, *The Philippines and their Peoples* focused on describing and representing the Philippines and the Filipino people, as well as emphasizing the archipelago economic potential. Perhaps less surprisingly, strategic concerns did not play a major role in this book. Worcester's main intention was clear: to justify retention of the Philippine islands as an American possession. He focused primarily on four topics: economic possibilities, Spanish imperialism, classifying the Philippine population, and Filipino political capabilities.

Worcester's claim to Philippine expertise is of particular interest. One of the more interesting aspects of his book is what Mary Louis Pratt calls the *anti-conquest*, or "the strategies of representation whereby European bourgeois subjects seek to secure their innocence in the same moment as they assert European hegemony." For Pratt, the main character of the anti-conquest is what she calls the "seeing-man" whose "imperial eyes passively look out and possess."¹¹⁸ In his 1898 book, Worcester played the role of a seeing-man, arguing that his observations and descriptions of the Philippines were from the neutral and objective position of a man of science, without personal or national interests.¹¹⁹ Worcester thus claimed that the picture of the Spaniards and native Filipinos he produced for his readers was not the product of his biases or prejudices as a white American man, but of his objective observations.¹²⁰ Worcester claimed this alleged

¹¹⁷ Ibid. pp. 46-47.

¹¹⁸ Pratt, Op. cit. pp. 7.

¹¹⁹ Although this book drew from Worcester's experience during his trip to the Philippines in the early 1890's, it was written in 1898, and was part of Worcester's campaign in favor of American retention of the islands: hardly the neutral-scientific point of view Worcester claimed.

¹²⁰ Sullivan asserts that "Despite the opening phrase of its subtitle, 'a record of personal and experience...,' *The Philippine Islands and their People* signaled the transmission of a largely traditional image of the Filipino to an American audience anxious to know more about its new possessions. The literature encapsulated an image of the Filipino as childlike, indolent, intellectually inferior, and morally retarded. In short, the Filipino who entered in American mind—both popular and academic—was a logical subject for government by what Europeans and Americans regarded as their own more advanced societies." Sullivan, Op. cit. p. 54.

scientific distance between himself as observer and the people he observed, to legitimate his observations and conclusions about the Philippines.¹²¹

In his 1898 book, Worcester paid special attention to the Spaniards and their colonial endeavor in the Philippines, especially, in relation to the islands' economic potential.¹²² For him, the main cause of the archipelago's underdevelopment was not lack of natural resources, but Spanish colonial policy. He contended that the Philippines could only progress if "the islands come under the control **of some progressive nation.**"¹²³ For him, Spanish colonial government in the Philippines was characterized by bureaucracy, corruption, personal influences, arrogance, and caprice. Colonial administration of the colony was organized for personal economic benefit of Spanish officers, not the welfare of Filipinos. Through a corrupted and unfair tax system, the Spanish government exploited Filipinos and obstructed the islands' development and progress. The system was an unfair burden; Filipinos paid taxes to a corrupt government that cared little about their future or progress.¹²⁴ Worcester concluded that Spanish colonialism was not working for the Philippines' progress, because "from the beginning until now, the archipelago has served the horde of hungry Spanish officials as a plundering ground."¹²⁵

Worcester also described the Filipinos with strong paternalistic and racist overtones. One of his main concerns was to make clear to the American people that not all Filipinos were savage and barbaric. Although Filipinos were an inferior people, they could be enlightened. According to Worcester, the Filipino population was composed of

¹²¹ Despite the alleged scientific nature of his second expedition to the Philippines, Worcester acknowledged that one of the expedition members, Dr. Bourns, served as intelligence officer on the staff of the U S Army's commander in chief in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War. Dean Worcester. *The Philippines Islands and their People*. London, Macmillan and Co. Ltd. 1898, p. x.

¹²² In addition to his comments about the Philippines' economic possibilities, Worcester also included an appendix with information about the archipelago's climate, human resources, mineral resources, agriculture, etc. Ibid, pp. 503-520.

¹²³ Ibid. pp. 75. Emphasis mine.

¹²⁴ Ibid. pp. 235-236.

¹²⁵ Ibid. pp. 470.

more than 80 tribes and divided in four racial groups: “Negritos,” “Mohammedan Malays” (Moros), “pagan Malays,” and “civilized Malays.” In Worcester’s racial hierarchy, “closeness” to the white race was a synonym for civilization. Accordingly, the least black of the Filipino racial groups were the only groups that could be civilized. Negritos (black dwarfs) were not only accorded the lowest position in Worcester’s racial hierarchy, but also condemned to extinction. For him, Negritos were not only repugnant, Black and ugly, but also “incapable of civilization; but this fact is of little importance, as they are rapidly disappearing, and seem destined to speedy extinction.” Only Malays could be civilized, because they were not black like the Negritos, but Orientals, and therefore closer to the white men.¹²⁶

In his classification of the Filipino population, Worcester also focused on the non-Christian Filipinos. For him, the Moros were to be handled with a combination of softness and hardness. For that, it was necessary to let them practice their religion, while giving them “absolute justice with **relentless firmness.**”¹²⁷ Filipino Pagans were entirely different from the rest of the population. While some were “harmless and docile,” others were hostile to white men, who could overcome that hostility through “fair treatment.”¹²⁸

Spanish colonialism played a very important role in Worcester’s analysis of the civilized Malays. For him, Spanish colonialism was responsible not only for Filipinos’ level of civilization, but also for their political and intellectual limitations. Worcester

¹²⁶ Ibid. pp. 473. Worcester summarizes his racial categorization of the Negritos: “They are a wretched, sickly race, of almost dwarfish stature. Their skin is black, their hair is curly, and their features are coarse and repulsive. [...] Mentally they stand at the bottom of the scale, and experience seems to have proved them incapable of civilization.”

¹²⁷ Ibid. 474. Emphasis mine.

¹²⁸ Worcester offered one example of how to deal with the ‘wild’ Filipinos. During his travel to Mindoro Island, Worcester came in contact with a pagan tribe, the Magyan. According to him, despite their reputation as “dreaded head-hunters and cannibals,” they were “**harmless as children.**” At the end, the Magyans were for Worcester a source of “**endless amusement.**” He explains why: “We gave the man a hand-mirror. He did not recognize his own reflection, **but acted precisely as I have seen the Philippine monkeys do under similar circumstances.** He first looked into the mirror, and then looked behind it, in order to get better view of the strange individual who peered back at him. After two or three failures to locate the other fellow by this method, he snatched the mirror suddenly from before his eyes, so that the stranger might not have opportunity to hide. Finally, holding the glass close to his face, he reached behind it, and tried to lay hold of the mysterious man who seemed to be so near. When this expedient failed, he threw the mirror down in disgust.” Ibid. pp. 377. Emphasis mine.

argued that Filipinos were civilized because they had been, more or less, Christianized by the Spanish missionaries. However, Spain's oppressive colonial rule gave them no chance to improve. Civilized Filipinos were like children to Worcester; they needed a wise and tolerant father who could guide them through the "mysteries" of progress, as Spain had proved incapable of doing. Worcester saw civilized Filipinos as materially, morally and racially inferior to white American men: they could be educated, but as victims of Spanish colonialism, "some of them are doubtless stupid."¹²⁹ He argued that because of their lack of originality, the Filipinos had not made any scientific, literary or artistic contribution. In addition, Filipino's moral dissoluteness could be explained, according to Worcester, by the fact that they lacked "a sense of moral guilt, and cannot understand being punished for what is not, in his mind, an offense."¹³⁰

Robert Young emphasizes how 19th-century European imperialism used race to justify the conquest of Asia and Africa. According to him, one of the main characteristics of European imperialism was "the equation of white race with civilization (and, as we have seen, of civilization as cause of whiteness)."¹³¹ Worcester's racial ideology exemplifies Young's argument: Worcester thought civilization was determined by race. Thus, unsurprisingly, he argued Filipinos were not really a civilized people because they were not white men, but Orientals. In Worcester's representation of the Philippines, any intelligent Filipino should have white blood in his veins. This is why Worcester was amazed by the intelligence of a member of Sultan Harun's cabinet. According to Worcester, "on our visit to Harun we had met his Minister of Justice, **a very intelligent man, who looked as if he has white blood in his veins.**"¹³²

¹²⁹ Ibid. p. 476.

¹³⁰ Ibid. pp. 475-478. According to Worcester, the civilized Filipinos were hospitable and with a great family tradition. Children were respectful of their parents and women enjoy a freedom "hardly equaled in any other European country, and they seldom abuse it." Ibid. p. 479.

¹³¹ Robert Young. *Colonial Desire Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race*. London, New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 93-95.

¹³² Ibid., pp. 198. Emphasis mine. Sultan Harun was the political leader of the Moros recognized by the Spanish government.

The average Filipino was “irresponsible in financial affairs” and indolent, but not “hopelessly indolent” because the main cause of his laziness was the archipelago’s climate.¹³³ Despite all the “amiable qualities” of civilized Filipinos, Worcester concluded that they were not ready for self-government. According to him,

Their universal lack of education is in itself a difficulty that cannot be speedily overcome, and there is much truth in the statement of a priest who said of them [the civilized Filipinos] that ‘in many ways they are big children who must be treated like little ones.’¹³⁴

Therefore, colonial possession of the Philippines was not a moral problem, but a moral responsibility that the United States should not avoid.

One index of Worcester’s ideas about the possibility of civilizing Filipinos is his description of one of the members his two Philippine expeditions: Mateo Francisco, “a full blooded Philippinēs native whom Dr. Steere had brought home with him in 1874, and who had continued to live in this country.”¹³⁵ Mateo Francisco lived in the United States for thirteen years before he returned to the Philippines in 1887. Worcester explains that during this period, Mateo Francisco was Americanized and, therefore, became a civilized man: “sober,” “disciplined,” “quiet,” “industrious”, and “honest” citizen; a “living demonstration of the capability for improvement possessed by the average native.” Worcester’s descriptions of “our boy” as “a companion, not a servant”, suggest a belief that, just as Mateo Francisco had been redeemed by his contact with American

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 57, 75, 134-135, 272-273, 284 and 475-478, and 482. To Worcester, Filipinos were also gamblers, superstitious, and ignorant.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 482. It is necessary underline that Worcester’s emphasis on Filipinos’ redemption was not incidental, but central to his justification of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines. If, despite their alleged racial inferiority, the Filipinos were not culturally and socially redeemable, how could American colonial rule be justified as an enlightened effort? For Worcester, the Filipinos could improve, but only with the help and guidance of their American redeemers.

¹³⁵ Dr. J. B. Steere was an American naturalist who visited the Philippines between 1870 and 1874. *Ibid.* pp. vii.

civilization, all Filipinos would be enlightened through contact with a unique nation like the United States.

The Philippines: Past and Present

Worcester's second book, *The Philippines: Past and Present*, was published in 1914 in a very different context from that of his first. After nearly sixteen years of American colonial rule in the Philippines, Worcester saw the future of the Philippines as an American territory endangered by new circumstances beyond his control: Woodrow Wilson's victory in the 1912 presidential election,¹³⁶ the Filipinization program,¹³⁷ the publication of Judge James H. Blount's book about the Philippines,¹³⁸ and the pro-independence bills introduced in the House of Representatives by William Jones (D-VA).¹³⁹ Over a thousand pages long, *The Philippine: Past and Present* was a two-

¹³⁶ The Democrat Party's long-standing commitment to Philippine independence and Wilson victory raised questions, in the Philippines and the United States, concerning how Wilson would deal with the Philippines. For Filipino nationalists, Wilson's victory heralded the end of American colonialism. For supporters of American retention of the Philippines, like Worcester, it was a menace not only to their influence and personal and economic interests, but also to what they saw as America's mission in the Philippines. For the meaning of 1912 presidential election, see Brands, *Op. cit.* pp. 104-107 and Golay, *Op. cit.* pp. 162-165.

¹³⁷ Wilson's victory marked the end of the so-called Taft Era, and the beginning of a new period U.S.-Filipino relations. Filipinization of the civil service was one the most important changes brought by the new president's Filipino policy. Under the leadership of the General Governor Francis B. Harrison, the Wilson administration handed "over domestic self-government to the Filipinos." The Americans retained control over the security of the islands, but left the administration of the colony on Filipino hands, replacing American colonial officers with Filipinos. Brands, *Op. cit.* pp. 104-110.

¹³⁸ In 1912, James H Blount, a veteran of the Filipino-American War and former U S District Judge in the Philippines (1901-1905), published a book titled *American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912*. In his book, Blount attacked official representations of American colonialism in the Philippines, and supported Filipino independence as the only way to purify the United States of its colonial sins and thereby reconcile America with its mission and destiny. Worcester explained why he had to react to Blount's book: "**Judge Blount has indulged so freely in obvious hyperbole, and has made so very evident the bitter personal animosities which inspire many of his statements, that it has been a genuine acquaintance that his book has been taken seriously.**" James H. Blount. *The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912*. New York and London: G P Putnam's Sons, 1912 and Worcester, *Op. cit.* p. 14. Emphasis mine.

¹³⁹ In 1911, Jones introduced the first of his Filipino bills. This bill gradually increased Philippine self-government and set Filipino Independence Day for July 4, 1921. On April 26, 1911, the Democratic majority of the House Committee on Insular Affairs recommended the first Jones Bill. It was historical moment, because it was the first time that a congressional committee supported

volume apologia for the U.S. colonial enterprise in the Philippines, and a direct attack on Filipino independence.¹⁴⁰

One of the most interesting characteristics of *The Philippines: Past and Present* is its lack of a strategic analysis of American retention of the Philippines. Worcester paid no attention to the Philippines' strategic importance for the United States. Discussion of the Japanese threat, the "Yellow Peril," and American strategic interests in the Pacific were wholly absent from Worcester's book. Why did Worcester omit strategic concerns from his 1914 book? Was he really uninterested in the strategic implications of retention of the Philippines, or was he avoiding a topic that he knew could be unfavorable and dangerous to his defense of American colonialism in the Philippines? In other words, did he realize that the Philippines were a liability for the United States' global security position, and thus intentionally avoid the topic? Worcester was aware of the strategic

Philippine independence. The bill passed the House, but "Republican regulars in the [Senate] Committee on the Philippines denied the Senate an opportunity to act on the bill." Jones introduced his second bill in August 1914. The second Jones Bill also increased Filipino self-government, but omitted any direct promise of independence. Instead, the bill's preamble affirmed that it was "the purpose of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine islands and recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established." This commitment would be open to controversial and conflicting interpretations by Filipinos and Americans. Golay, *Op. cit.* pp. 147 and 184-186. Emphasis mine. For an analysis of the debate over Filipino independence in the United States in the 1910's, see John A. Beadles. "The Debate in the United States Concerning Philippine Independence, 1912-1916." *Philippine Studies* 16, no. 3 (1968): pp. 421-441.

¹⁴⁰ Worcester asserted that his 1914 book was unmotivated by personal interests: "It is my purpose to **tell the plain, hard truth** regardless of the effect of such conduct upon my future career." He wanted to share his knowledge in order to enlighten Americans about the Philippines, telling the truth and only the truth about those islands. This was necessary "if the present possibility of Philippine independence is seriously considered." In other words, the *truth-maker par excellence* saw his intervention as necessary to save not only America's colonial legacy in the Philippines, but to save the Filipinos themselves from independence. Only those who knew the truth, like Worcester, were qualified to judge America's work in the Philippines and to understand what was good for the islands. His use of adjectives like "plain" and "hard" reflect Worcester's claim that his Filipino knowledge was direct and scientific, and therefore the truth. Worcester's knowledge about the Philippines came not from his read in a comfortable library, from fieldwork in the Philippine jungles. He did not *invent* the truth about the Philippines, he *knew* it. Worcester, *Op. cit.* pp. 14-15. Emphasis mine.

risks the Americans were facing in the Philippines, but he saw those risks worthy because of the moral and potential economic rewards behind retention of the Philippines.¹⁴¹

Furthermore, Worcester's main concern was not to protect the Philippines from external threats, but from internal menace: he believed the gravest danger the Filipino people faced was not a foreign power, but independence. Worcester argued that the United States should and could not leave the Philippines, because the American flag was the only guarantee to order, peace, and protection for the common Filipino. Filipino independence would be unavoidably followed by a period of domestic instability, conflict, and violence. Filipinos had to be protected from other Filipinos (the poor from the rich, Christians from Moros, Moros from Christians, and Heathens from everyone else), and also from ignorance, superstition, and illness. Worcester opposed independence because he believed it would harm Filipinos' welfare.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Though it was not one of his main concerns, Worcester had clear ideas about the Philippines' strategic value. For example, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on the Philippines in December 1914, Worcester focused on strategic elements, arguing that any American withdrawal from the Philippines in order to avoid problems with Japan would be a selfish movement that could blemish America's international position, especially if, as he predicted, the Philippines entered a period of domestic instability and violence after the American retreat. Worcester acknowledged that Japan might invade the Philippines, but argued that Corregidor could resist a siege for a year. According to Worcester, "It would be much better for ourselves to be keeping a fleet of Japan in far eastern waters, in the event of trouble, **than to have the Japanese fleet molesting us on our Pacific coast or in our other island possessions in the Pacific**; and it seems to me that if our foreign trade is to be developed—and it certainly must be developed if tariff barriers are to be thrown down and foreigners are to ship into this country goods in the manufacture of which we can not compete, which will necessarily mean the seeking of new markets for goods in the manufacture of which we can compete, if the balance of trade is not to go against us—**under those conditions we certainly must have a Navy adequate to protect our trade.** [...] With a proper base in the Philippines, repair yards, and supply depot, I do not believe that Japan or any other country which could not drive us off the seas could maintain an armed force on land there and continue a military occupation." It seems clear that Worcester saw American retention of the Philippines not as threat but as guarantee for American security because American control of the Philippines forced Japan's fleet to stay close to her home waters and far from American continental territory or Hawaii. Worcester also favored the construction of a naval base in the Philippines and saw the retention of the islands as essential to American economic interests in the Asia. U S Congress, Senate, 63rd Congress, 3rd Session, Committee on the Philippines, *Government of the Philippines, Hearings, H. R. 18459*. Washington, GPO, 1914, p. 337. Emphasis mine.

¹⁴² It seems clear that in Worcester's mind, the Filipinos were incapable of anything good without American paternal supervision.

Slavery played a very important role in Worcester's campaign against Filipino independence. In 1913, Worcester wrote one of his last reports as a member of the Philippine government titled *Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands*.¹⁴³ In his report, Worcester argued that, after more than ten years of American sovereignty, slavery was still a common practice in the Philippines. This severe accusation caused great controversy in both the Philippines and the United States.¹⁴⁴ For Filipino nationalists, Worcester's report posed a great danger because of its impact on American discussion of Filipino independence.¹⁴⁵ According to Michael Salman, Worcester's report weakened Filipino elites' representations of their country as a nation ready for independence.¹⁴⁶

In *The Philippines Past and Present*, Worcester repeated his *Slavery and Peonage* accusations to attack Filipino independence, devoting an entire chapter to the subject. He argued that, slavery was still a problem in the Philippines because of the Filipino Assembly's irresponsible refusal to deal with the issue. Only the U.S.-controlled Philippine Commission did something to destroy slavery, but only in the non-Christian

¹⁴³Worcester's report was prepared using all the resources available to the colonial government: confidential reports from the Philippine Constabulary, reports from provincial governors, judicial documents, census data, and others. Dean C. Worcester. *Slavery and peonage in the Philippine Islands*. Manila, 1913. For an excellent analysis of slavery in the Philippines under American rule, see Michael Salman, *The Embarrassment of Slavery: Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippines*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.

¹⁴⁴ According to Sullivan, Worcester's report "achieved the desired publicity in the United States. Scores of prominent headlines blazed the shocking news, typified by a New Orleans newspaper's declaration that "Slave Girls Can be Purchased in Uncle Sam's Isles. [...] Worcester's assertions were not only immediately accepted in the United States; they would also prove remarkably durable despite Filipino nationalists' vigorous attempts to expose their misconceptions. They appeared in standard works on the Philippines in 1928 and 1930. As late as 1950 Bruno Lasker's influential study *Human Bondage in Southeast Asia*, drew heavily and relatively uncritically on Worcester's material." Sullivan, Op. cit. p. 171.

¹⁴⁵ According to Sullivan, "The nationalist newspaper *La Vanguardia*, in an editorial headed 'Cast The Antidote Where The Poison Fell,' lamented the 'scandalously large headlines' they had generated and the consequent setback for the independence movement. It labeled Worcester 'the greatest enemy we have' and singled out for particular mention his cunning, ferocity, and hatred." Ibid. P. 172.

¹⁴⁶ In an attempt to fight back, the Filipino assembly prepared a report answering Worcester's denunciations. This report, titled *Informe sobre la esclavitud* (Report about the slavery), had a very weak impact in the United States because it was written in Spanish and because "it lacked the institutional powers of colonialism, science, and whiteness that authorized Worcester's voice." Salman, Op. cit. p. 246. Emphasis mine.

territories under its direct control.¹⁴⁷ Worcester held this as proof that the Philippines were not ready for independence because its leaders were indifferent to the welfare of the Filipino population.¹⁴⁸

Worcester's also focused on the Filipino Assembly in criticizing what he regarded as American overestimates of Filipino political capabilities. For him, given the legislation passed by the Filipino Assembly, and the character of its members, that representative body should never have been created. Filipino political leaders had not shown enough political capability to justify even the Filipinization of the colonial government, let alone independence. Therefore, the United States had no choice but to retain control of the islands.¹⁴⁹

The future of non-Christian Filipinos in a Filipino republic was another concern for Worcester and another line of attack on Filipino independence. For him, no peaceful coexistence among different Filipino religious and cultural groups was possible without American paternal protection, and independence would unavoidably mean political instability and civil war, because the Moros would never tolerate a Filipino Christian republic. Christian Filipino elites would mercilessly persecute Heathens, and would be

¹⁴⁷ According to Worcester, the Filipinos not only ignored slavery, but attacked and condemned those who, like him, decried the problem. His genuine concern for the Filipinos' welfare had brought him insults and scorn from the real enemies of Filipinos' well being. In Worcester's words, "While no member of the assembly had ever made any official statement on the subject, the Filipino press had on various occasions denounced me as a liar or an ignoramus, and an enemy of 'the Filipino people,' for saying that slavery existed." Worcester, *The Philippines: Past and Present*, vol.2 p. 704.

¹⁴⁸ According to Worcester, the Filipino Assembly's attitude toward slavery made him doubt whether the Filipinos "have arrived at stage of civilization comparable with that of the more advanced nations of the world, and are capable of establishing and maintaining a just and humane government." Thus, the slavery issue indexed uncivilized attitudes, leading him to question Filipinos' cultural level. Ibid. vol. 2 p. 679.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. vol. 2, pp. 768-791. Worcester also argued that independence was impossible because too few Filipinos were capable of exercising their civic responsibilities to support a government based on the peoples' consent. In his words, "It is hardly to be wondered at that **an Oriental people** which had never had a free press or liberty of speech should have mistaken liberty, when it finally came, for **license**, and have gone to extremes which conclusively demonstrated their initial unfitness properly to utilize their new privileges." Thus, for Worcester, the Philippines were not a society of competent and responsible citizens, but an Oriental society characterized by 'license,' lawlessness, 'extremes,' and self-indulgence. The Philippines could not become a free country because there were no self-controlled, disciplined, white people. Ibid. vol. 2, pp. 952, 956-957. Emphasis mine.

unable to control or prevent the Moros' hostility.¹⁵⁰ It was America's moral and political responsibility, despite Filipinos' aspirations, to keep control over the archipelago in order to guarantee peace and order. Worcester also argued that in case the United States made the great mistake of granting Filipino independence, American military forces should keep control over Moro territory, especially, Mindanao Island. According to Worcester, Christian Filipinos had no right nor ability to control the Moros, whose bellicosity could only be kept in check by American sovereignty. Independence would start a religious war, in which the Christians could not possibly prevail given their military weakness and cultural inferiority.¹⁵¹

Filipino "wild" tribes had a special role in Worcester's colonial career.¹⁵² In the first decades of the twentieth century, he constructed an image of himself as not only the main American authority on non-Christian Filipinos, but also their main protector and friend.¹⁵³ Therefore, it is unsurprising that these groups were an important referent for

¹⁵⁰ According to Worcester, the non-Christian Filipinos only had one thing in common, their "unwillingness to accept the Christian faith and their hatred of the several Filipino peoples who profess it." He also reminded his readers that the Moros could not be easily controlled because of "their strong adherence to the Mohammedan faith and their inclination to propagate it by the sword." Ibid. vol. 2, pp. 661-662.

¹⁵¹ Worcester represented the Christian Filipinos as a weak stock that needed American protection to keep the warlike Moros from invading and conquering them. In Worcester's words, "In short, the lion and the lamb lay down together, with the lamb inside as usual." This representation of the Moro-Christian relations would be very strong during the congressional debates on the Philippine Question. Ibid. vol. 1, pp. 224-229.

¹⁵² In the first chapter of *The Philippines: Past and Present*, Worcester used the Filipinos 'wild-tribes' to justify his long colonial career. According to him, "My interest in the work for the non-Christian tribes and my fear that while my successor was gaining knowledge concerning it which can be had only through experience, matters might go to the bad." In other words, Worcester argued that he stayed in the Philippines for more than ten years because of his concern for what he called "the non-Christian tribes." He apparently saw himself as indispensable to one of the basic justifications of American colonialism in the Philippines: the process of civilizing the so-called wild tribes. The defense of non-Christian Filipinos figured prominently in the discourse of colonial officers like Worcester. For them, the non-Christians' future welfare was a crucial consideration in the solution of the Philippine Question, making it a perfect justification for American colonialism. Ibid. vol. 1, p. 13.

¹⁵³ In his 1991 biography Sullivan remarks the endurance and influence of Worcester's image as the savior of the wild Filipinos, contending that "There is no cause of doubt of Worcester's 'love for the naked savage,' his enthusiasm for the scientific study of tribes people, and his concern for their welfare. He found in his 'wild people' a primitive nobility, and, in stark contrast to lowland and Muslim Filipinos, an amenability to American rule. When he traveled from Manila to the

Worcester's justification of American colonialism in *The Philippines: Past and Present*. According to him, the Philippines' non-Christian population should be a main concern in discussing the islands' political future, because their welfare and security were an American responsibility.¹⁵⁴ Worcester contended that Christian Filipinos had never been concerned for the welfare of their uncivilized neighbors. On the contrary, Worcester alleged that Christian Filipinos have been exploiting and enslaving their Heathen countrymen for centuries without regret. For him, only the U.S. colonial officers had worked for the wellbeing of non-Christian Filipinos, against the Christians' passive and obstructionist attitude.¹⁵⁵ Worcester concluded that Filipino independence would be tantamount to a U.S. betrayal of America's non-Christian friends and pupils.¹⁵⁶ He used the alleged American special relation with non-Christian Filipinos to identify American

Mountain Province, he exchanged hostility and derision for adulation and respect. Ridiculed as the 'King of Benguet' in the Assembly and the Filipino press, he was able to introduce himself to tribes people as 'the ruler of all non-Christians.' In his love for a 'savage' frozen in time and culture, unconscious of nationality and statehood, he could not accept, and sought to prevent, what was inevitable: the integration of tribal peoples into the Philippine nation-state." Sullivan downplays the paternalism, racism, and colonialism behind Worcester's 'special relation' with the Filipino non-Christian inhabitants of the archipelago. Sullivan, Op. cit. p. 162. For Worcester's representation of non-Christian Filipinos, see Dean C. "Worcester. Head-Hunters of Northern Luzon." *National Geographic* 23, no. 9 (1912): pp. 833-930. Emphasis mine.

¹⁵⁴ According to Worcester, "One of the most important factors in winning and retaining the good will of the non-Christian peoples has been the extension to them of protection from the impositions of their Filipino neighbors. [...] The wild men are constantly deprived of their crops or their lands; cheated in the sale of their products and their purchases; arrested and fined on trumped-up charges; compelled to work for others without compensation; charged by private individuals for the privilege of using government forests or taking up public lands; and badgered and imposed upon in a thousand and one other ways. **If the Filipinos were put in control, would there rise up among them unselfish men who would check the rapacity of their fellows, and extend to the helpless peoples the protection they now enjoy?**" Worcester, *The Philippines: Past and Present*, vol. 2, pp. 668-670. Emphasis mine.

¹⁵⁵ According to Worcester, the Christian Filipinos had never "originated one single important measure for the benefit of their non-Christian neighbors, and their attitude toward the measures which have been originated by Americans has always been one of active or passive opposition." On the contrary, the Americans gained the respect and loyalty of the non-Christian through "a firm but kindly policy." Ibid. vol. 2, pp. 661-662.

¹⁵⁶ According to Worcester, "We have encouraged the primitive Philippine peoples to stand up for their rights. We have promised them our protection and help if they would do it, and thus far we have kept our promise. To break it now, and turn them over the tender mercies of the Filipinos, who have never ceased to make threats as to what they will do when they get the chance, would in my opinion be a crime against civilization." Ibid. vol. 2, p. 671.

colonialism in the Philippines with the islands' weakest, the most vulnerable, and least civilized inhabitants. For him, these were the main beneficiaries of American enlightened colonialism and, consequently, they would be the main losers if the United States left the island.¹⁵⁷ Again, American colonialism was represented as an instrument of justice, progress, and protection of the weak.¹⁵⁸

The idea of an enlightened colonialism was also an important element of Worcester's book. For him, American sovereignty brought not only peace, order, and progress to the Philippines, but also improved public health and hygiene, communications, the justice system, and administrative efficiency.¹⁵⁹ Although Worcester praised American work in the Philippines, he was primarily worried about its future. He strongly argued that before even considering Philippine independence, some essential questions had to be answered: Was American civilizing and enlightenment work in the Philippines over? Were the Filipinos ready for freedom? For him, the answer to both was clearly negative, and a premature American withdrawal from the Philippines would be a huge mistake, a treacherous and cowardly act that would tarnish America's honor.¹⁶⁰ According to him,

¹⁵⁷ According to Worcester, "Several of the wild tribes have progressed much more rapidly during the brief period since the American occupation than have any of the Filipino peoples, and if given adequate protection and friendly assistance they will continue progress. Their splendid physiques and high intelligence, no less than their truthfulness, honesty and morality, certainly make them well worth saving. [...] Were American control to be withdrawn before the civilization of the wild tribes had been effected, **their future would be dark indeed**. Under continued American control they can be won over to civilized ways, and will in the end become mentally and morally, as they now are physically, **superior to the lowlanders** [Christians]." Ibid. vol. 2, p. 671. Emphasis mine.

¹⁵⁸ Worcester representation of the 'wild' Filipinos was often echoed in debates over the Philippine Question. For example, in 1916 Thomas L. Blayney argued that Filipino "wild tribes" had a "genuine appreciation for whatever they realize as being done to help them." Blayney argued that 'informed persons' agreed that non-Christian Filipinos should stay under American supervision because Christian Filipinos have shown no interest in the Heathens' welfare. What is striking in Blayney's analysis is his identification of Worcester: according to Blayney, "they [the non-Christian Filipinos] are considered to have a future full of promise under the **capable and sympathetic hands** of men like **Dean C. Worcester**." Blayney, "Our Administration of the Philippine islands," p. 1155. Emphasis mine.

¹⁵⁹ Worcester Op. cit. vol. 2, pp. 921-932.

¹⁶⁰ According to Worcester, "Both of our great parties are committed to the policy of granting independence when the Filipinos are ready for it. Are they now? If so, the promise should be

“Serious consideration must be given to another group of facts in considering the fitness of the Filipinos for independence. It is undeniably true that they have progressed much further in civilization than any other groups of Malayan peoples. **It is just as indubitable that their development has not been a natural evolution, but has resulted from steady pressure brought to bear during three and a half centuries by Spain, and during the last decade and a half by the United States.** What would happen were this pressure removed? One may judge, within limits, from what happened where its has been removed. Take, for instance, Cagayancillo, which is an isolated town on a small island southwest of Panay. Here the Spanish friar was the sole representative of governmental authority in bygone days. Cagayancillo was then a thriving town, with a strong stone fort for defense against the Moros, a beautiful, large church with splendid wood carving ornamenting its interior, and a stone schoolhouse, also excellent for their day. I first visited the place shortly after Palawan was made a province under civil rule. No priest had been there for three years. The town and its inhabitants reeked with filth. The wits of the two or three exceptionally intelligent men of the place were befogged with opium. The church and *convento* were falling into ruin. The fort had already gone to the bad. The *presidencia* was a wreck, and so was the schoolhouse. There were no teachers for the children. **There were rapidly lapsing into barbarism.** [...] I am firmly convinced that the Filipinos are where they are today only because they have been pushed into line, and that if outside pressure were relaxed they would steadily and rapidly deteriorate.”¹⁶¹

For Worcester the Filipinos could only progress under the United States’ protective oversight. The main force driving Filipino progress was the civilizing pressure of colonialism, especially in its American version. Without that pressure, Filipinos would fall victim to their own apathy, violence, and disorder, and would soon destroy the fruits of America’s civilizing labor. Independence was against the Filipinos’ best interests, but some Filipinos were unable to understand this and the American authorities should

kept. If not, we should be guilty of an unjust and cowardly act if we withdraw our protection and control.” Ibid. vol. 2, p. 933.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. vol. 2, p. 958. The first person (‘I’) in Worcester’s argument deployed considerable rhetorical power. He was writing about things he (‘I’) saw; his knowledge was the product of direct and scientific observation.

remind them of what was best for them. In Worcester's logic, independence equaled barbarism.

As we already saw, the history of Filipino-American relations was a very controversial topic. In *The Philippines: Past and Present*, Worcester denied the existence of a Filipino nation, the 1898 Filipino Republic, Filipino agency in defeating Spain, American responsibility for the outbreak of the Filipino-American war, any popular support for independence: in short, everything that might blur his depiction of U.S. rule in the Philippines as an instrument of progress, peace, and order.

Denial of a Filipino nationhood was a recurrent feature of Worcester's discourse.¹⁶² According to him, the Filipinos were not a homogeneous people, but a nebulous group of tribes with different cultural, linguistic, and racial characteristics. Filipino heterogeneity was a problem that had to be corrected before independence. According to Worcester, Filipinos were not a people in the way the British or the American were a people; therefore, independence should be out of the picture for at least two generations because Filipinos needed time and American help and supervision to *become* a nation.¹⁶³ Worcester was very clear: only after the American nation-building experiment in the Philippines was completed could the Philippines become a sovereign country.¹⁶⁴

His analysis of the war with Spain gave Worcester a chance to deny Filipino nationalists' and American anti-imperialists' charges of U.S. double-crossing. Worcester focused on two issues: the alleged promise of independence made to Aguinaldo, and Filipino soldiers' role in the capture of Manila. The first issue was crucial because if, as Aguinaldo argued, U.S. naval and diplomatic officers had promised him independence in

¹⁶² In his excellent analysis of imperial rhetorical resources, David Spurr focuses on the use of negation by European imperialists. Spurr, *Op. cit.* pp. 92-93, 98, and 104.

¹⁶³ According to Worcester, "the great mass of Filipinos do not constitute 'a people' in the sense in which that word is understood in the United States. They are not comparable in any way with the American people or the English people. They cannot be reached as a whole, and they do not respond as a whole." *Ibid.* vol. 2, p. 938.

¹⁶⁴ According to Worcester, "Philippine independence is not a present possibility, nor will it be possible for at least two generations. Indeed, if by the end of a century we have welded into a *people* the descendants of the composite and complex group of human beings who today inhabit the islands; we shall have no cause to feel ashamed of our success." *Ibid.* vol. 2, p. 960. Emphasis mine.

exchange for his support against the Spaniards, then the charges that the annexation of the Philippines was an act of treason were true. Using primary sources, especially Captain John R. Taylor's *The Philippine Insurrection*¹⁶⁵ and Admiral Dewey's congressional testimony,¹⁶⁶ Worcester denied that there was any pact or agreement between any American officers, especially Admiral Dewey, and Aguinaldo. According to Worcester, this was a lie used by Aguinaldo to justify his treacherous and unjustified rebellion against the United States.¹⁶⁷

Worcester also denied that Filipinos played any important role in the defeat of Spain and the capture of Manila.¹⁶⁸ For him, the victory over Spain was solely the result of American naval and military action. The thousands of Filipino rebels who surrounded Manila and kept the Spanish trapped behind the city walls are absent from Worcester's version of the war. Worcester also questioned the usefulness and efficacy of Filipino troops, and dismissed the political content of the Filipino-American war. For him, the Filipino rebels were not freedom fighters, but undisciplined bandits who only wanted to plunder Manila.¹⁶⁹ He portrayed the American Army not as a conquering army, but a

¹⁶⁵ Taylor, an Army intelligence officer, compiled documents captured from the Filipino Army during the Filipino-American war. They were published in 1906 and strongly influenced U.S. historians' analyses of this war. According to Filipino historian Ambeth Ocampo, Taylor's five-volume compilation is the "tip of the proverbial iceberg" of the collection of documents in the National Library of the Philippines. See Taylor, John R., *United States, and Bureau of Insular Affairs. The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States*. 1906?: 5 v. and Ocampo, Op cit. p. 194.

¹⁶⁶ Worcester quoted Dewey's denial of any agreement with Aguinaldo. According to Dewey, he took Aguinaldo back to Manila because of pressure from the American consul in Hong Kong. Worcester, Op. cit, p. 81.

¹⁶⁷ According to Worcester, "Aguinaldo himself carefully refrained at the outset from saying, in any document which Americans could read, that independence had been promised, and advanced this claim only when the growing of his land forces had given them confidence. He repeated it, with increasing emphasis, as his army increased in size, ultimately openly threatening war if his pretensions were not recognized. In doing this, he was carrying out a carefully prearranged plan." Ibid. vol. 1, pp. 65-66.

¹⁶⁸ He quotes Dewey: "We could have taken the city [Manila] at any moment we had the troops to occupy it." Ibid. vol. 1, p. 81.

¹⁶⁹ According to Worcester, "They [the Filipinos] demanded for themselves 'Malacañan palace and other buildings and a share in 'the war booty.' They promptly looted the parts of the city which they occupied and ultimately retired from their positions within the city limits on the evening of their last day of grace after being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so

liberating force. The U.S. Army gained control of Manila and kept the Filipino Army out as a way to protect the city and its inhabitants from the Filipino soldiers' violence and greed. In short, the Filipino-American conflict was not war, but a police action.

Worcester also contended that the help Americans received from the Filipinos was part of Aguinaldo's plan to deceive the United States. Relying on Taylor, he criticized what he called Filipinos' duplicity and their 'treacherous policy.'¹⁷⁰ According to Worcester, the Filipinos had plans to revolt against their American benefactors in case independence was not recognized by the United States. Therefore, they were not truly allies of the American Army, but were using American power to accomplish something they could not do by themselves: expel Spain from the archipelago.¹⁷¹ Curiously, Worcester represented Filipino independence aspirations as Filipino betrayal of America ignoring their pre-1898 struggle for independence. He also ignored the fact that Filipinos never hid their pro-independence agenda. On June 14, 1898, the Filipinos proclaimed their independence and even invited Admiral Dewey to the official ceremony. Americans also knew that in January 1899 Filipinos had written a constitution and were organizing a republican government.

The republic organized by Filipinos in 1898 was an obstacle for supporters of American colonialism in the Philippines, especially because Filipino nationalists and American anti-imperialists both accused the U. S. Army of having destroyed the first Christian republic in Asia. Worcester paid close attention to this issue.¹⁷² According to

they would be driven out." Malacañan was the official residence of the Spanish governor of the Philippines. Ibid. vol. 1, p. 86.

¹⁷⁰ For Rowe, the image of a "treacherous race" is an important part of what he identifies as America's 'imperial heritage.' American continental expansion produced a set of images, justifications, and stereotypes that made up what Rowe calls a 'repertoire of methods of domination.' According to Rowe, writers like Edgar Allan Poe used this racial stereotype to justify American continental expansionism. They represented Native Americans as a lazy, but **and treacherous** race. Worcester, like other American writers, journalists, scholars, travelers, and colonial officers, incorporated elements from this 'imperial heritage' in their representations of the Philippines and the Filipinos. Rowe, Op.cit. p. 56.

¹⁷¹ Worcester , Op. cit. p 97.

¹⁷² Worcester discussed the issue of the Filipino republic in three chapters of *The Philippine: Past and Present*: Chapters 5, 6, and 8.

him, there was no Filipino republic because the Aguinaldo government was not based on consent by Filipinos. The alleged Filipino republic was actually a Tagalog military oligarchy “imposed on the people by armed men and maintained especially during its latter days, by terrorism and very free use of murder as a governmental agency.”¹⁷³ To prove his argument Worcester reminded his readers that Aguinaldo declared himself a dictator. The United States did not destroy a legitimate Filipino republican government, but a tyranny.¹⁷⁴ He also argued that Filipino rebels did not know what a true republic was. A centralized military dictatorship had been organized with no real support from the Filipinos who never saw themselves as citizens of a republic, only as subjects.¹⁷⁵ The alleged Filipino republic was not product of a democratic process, but the creation of a minority of the Filipino population, the Tagalogs, who forced it on the rest of the population.¹⁷⁶ The United States did not destroy a republic, but rescue the majority of the population from the exploitation and oppression of an aggressive and violent minority.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ Ibid. vol. 2, p. 921-922.

¹⁷⁴ According to Worcester, “As the United States is a republic it was natural that the directing group of the insurgent leaders should decide upon a republican form of government. That form would appeal to the people of the United States; the first ‘Christian Asiatic Republic’ was a description, which would inevitably awaken sympathy in that mother of republics. The idea was a wise and subtle one; but Aguinaldo’s republic was merely **an elaborate stage-setting arranged for the contemplation of the people of the United States.**” Ibid. vol. 1, pp. 245-246. Emphasis mine.

¹⁷⁵ “Indeed, there is much to show that if Aguinaldo and his followers had succeeded in their plans, even the name ‘republic’ would not have been long continued as the title of his government.” Ibid. vol. 1, p. 249.

¹⁷⁶ Worcester argued that: “A determined and well-organized minority had succeeded in imposing its will upon an unorganized, heterogeneous, and leaderless majority. [...]” While the government of Aguinaldo was called a republic, **it was in fact a Tagalog military oligarchy in which the great mass of the people had no share.** Their duty was only to give soldiers for the army and labourers for the fields, and to obey without question the orders they received from the military heads of their provinces. There is no cause for vain regrets. We did not destroy a republic in the Philippines. There never was anything there to destroy which even remotely resembled a republic.” Ibid. vol. 1, p. 252. Emphasis mine.

¹⁷⁷ As part of his denial of the Filipino republic, Worcester criticized the report prepared by two American soldiers in 1898, Paymaster W. E. Wilcox and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent. These officers traveled through the territory under the control of the Filipino republic between October 8 and November 20, 1898, and reported that they found “the authority of Aguinaldo’s government

One of the principal vulnerabilities of the arguments in favor of American retention of the Philippines was the origin and causes of Filipino-American war. For opponents of American colonialism, the war resulted from U.S. intervention in Filipino affairs. Worcester countered this argument with the claim that the war was a consequence of Filipino treachery and ambition. Against Blount's assertion that the U.S. army had started the war, Worcester argued that Filipinos deliberately provoked the war with a treacherous, unprovoked, and unjustified attack on American troops who had resisted all Filipino provocations. The Filipinos confused American troops' discipline with cowardice, in believing that they could easily win.¹⁷⁸

Worcester also analyzed accusations that American soldiers committed atrocities.¹⁷⁹ He agreed that in some instances Filipinos rebels were treated 'with severity, and even cruelty, by officers and soldiers of the army of the United States, but it is nevertheless undoubtedly true that never before have the officers and men of any civilized nation conducted so humanely a war carried on under the conditions similar to

universally acknowledged, the country in a state of perfect tranquility and public order, with profound peace and freedom from brigandage and the like." Unsurprisingly, Worcester could not accept the Wilcox-Sargent Report as an accurate source of information because it contradicted his dismissal of the Filipino republic. According to him, the report was not reliable: the Filipinos allowed Willcox and Sargent to travel, knowing that these two officers would write a favorable report. Worcester did not explain how the Filipinos knew this. He further argued that the Filipinos staged the scene for Wilcox and Sargent, cleaning streets and painting buildings "to show every one, and specially the travelers through the territory of the Insurgents, that they were 'not opposed to a good such as a refined and civilized people should have.'" Worcester also contends that since Wilcox and Sargent did not speak the Filipino local dialects, therefore, they were unable "to learn the sinister facts as to what had been and was occurring in the territory which they visited." In other words, Sargent and Wilcox lacked knowledge to understand the Filipinos; they were not truth-makers. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 152-156.

¹⁷⁸ Worcester argued that "The growing confidence of the Insurgents in their ability to whip the cowardly Americans, **rather than any fixed determination on their part to push a struggle for independence to the bitter end**, led to their attack." Worcester did not discuss why the Filipinos might want to "whip" the Americans; perhaps he would say that as Orientals, they were a cruel and violent stock. *Ibid.* vol. 1, p. 151.

¹⁷⁹ The anti-imperialists attacked the Army's behavior from the beginning of the insurrection. However, it was the American press that made the soldiers' behavior a national issue. Between 1899 and 1902, newspapers like *The New York Times*, *Boston Journal*, *The New York Evening Post*, *Boston Evening Transcript*, *San Francisco Call*, *The Arena*, *The New York Sun*, *Public Opinion*, *Boston Herald*, *The Springfield Republican*, and others, published news and letters about American soldiers' atrocities in the Philippines, and initiating public discussion and a congressional investigation of the topic. Barreto-Velazquez, "War Atrocities and Imperialism," p. 2.

those that prevailed in the Philippines.”¹⁸⁰ In contrast, the behavior of Filipino rebels was characterized by cruelty and open violence, not only toward the Spanish and American prisoners of war, but also toward Filipino people.¹⁸¹ These were not freedom fighters, but savages, murderers, and outlaws. For Worcester, the alleged Filipino republic was based on terror and murder, characteristics that did not disappear, but were still very much alive among Filipino nationalists. Worcester wondered how the United States could support Filipino independence if that would mean a return to the terror and violence the common Filipinos suffered during Aguinaldo’s republic.

CONCLUSION

Americans’ search for answers for the questions raised by the Philippines made the nature of Filipinos a contested topic. In order to make them intelligible to the American public, American knowledge producers classified, racialized, described and portrayed the Filipinos, generating a set of images, stereotypes, and ideas for American consumption.

However, American writers, journalists, scholars, travelers, and colonial and military officers did not produce a homogeneous portrait of the Filipinos, but rather two conflicting images of the Filipinos that reflected Americans’ conflicted relationship with their Asian colony. One of those portraits was used to justify American colonialism, the other to challenge it. These two representations of the Filipinos provided very different answers to the same questions. Those answers reflected their creators’ attitudes, not only toward U.S. control of the Philippines, but also to its meaning, real or imagined, for America’s political institutions, strategic and defensive position, and foreign relations.

For the supporters of American colonialism in the Philippines, the Filipinos were children, incapable of self-government, who needed American supervision and protection: an inferior, immature, and vulnerable stock easily manipulated by Filipino economic and political elites. In this portrait, American colonialism was became a nation-making enterprise, a protecting shield for the weakest Filipinos, and an enlightening experience for all the islands’ inhabitants.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. vol. 2, p. 922.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. vol. 1, 170-224 and vol. 2, pp. 730-767

On the other hand, opponents of American colonialism in the Philippines produced an optimistic and positive representation of the Filipinos: for them, the Filipinos were a nation seeking an opportunity to govern their own destiny without American intervention. This sympathetic portrait presented American Asiatic colonial subjects as a politically competent people, and U.S. Philippines policies not as a liberating force, but as a colonial enterprise in contradiction to America's democratic and republican principles.

Chapter 3
THE INTERSECTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE NAVAL QUESTION,
1900-1910

“If any other nation in the world could seize and hold a single island in the Philippine Archipelago against the United States, it would require us to bring our fleet and our men and soldiers and transport them 7,000 miles to meet the enemy there, when there is not a nation of Europe that could land a single regiment upon the soil of the United States.”

(Senator Fred W. Carmack (D-Tennessee), March 3, 1904)

“We have the Philippines over there in the other hemisphere, which we must protect. We are charged with them. I care whether gentlemen upon the other side may have been opposed to that policy or not, but the American people have set their approval upon it, and it is not necessary for us to go back and consider the question whether it was wise that we should hold the Philippines or not. We are there; they are ours, ours to protect.”

(Representative George E. Foss (R-Illinois) February 22, 1904)

The United States Congress was one of the primary sites of production and reproduction of knowledge about the Philippines. Congress’ power over the Philippines resulted in an unending congressional discussion of Philippine issues. From the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in 1898 until the passage of the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act officially ‘ended’ American colonialism in the Philippines, United States Congress played the main role in the definition of American policy regarding the islands.

Congressional power over the Philippines was based on two main sources: the ‘insular cases’ and Congress’ constitutional powers. In 1901, in the famous ‘insular cases,’ the United States Supreme Court examined the constitutional status of the possessions acquired by the United States in the war with Spain, and defined and limited congressional power over these possessions. According to the Court’s decisions, the new possessions were American territories, but “non-incorporated” territories; therefore, Congress has the power to decide what constitutional provisions could be applied to their inhabitants. In other words, the Supreme Court ruled that American constitution did not “follow the flag” into the new territories. According to historian Walter LaFeber, in 1901 the United State Supreme Court recognized that the “territory’s people were at Congress’ mercy.”¹

¹ Walter LaFeber. *The American Age. U. S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad*. New York & London W. W. Norton & Company, 1994, vol. 1, p. 211. The Insular Cases are also discussed in Christina

Congress' constitutional powers also help explain why the Philippines were an ongoing congressional issue. The Constitution of the United States gave Congress power over the federal budget and appropriations. That means that Congress analyzes and makes decisions over the budget submitted by the Executive branch. From the construction of a battleship to the construction of a federal government building in Manila, Congress had power over how government money was used in the Philippines. That power left the door open for legislators to discuss the Philippines not only during deliberations over the archipelago's political future, but also when appropriating money for defense, education, transportation, etc.²

Congressional attitudes toward the Philippines did not develop in a vacuum. Americans' ideas, images, and stereotypes of the Philippines and of Filipinos heavily influenced how Congress understood and dealt with the Philippines. It should also be made clear that congressional attitudes toward the Philippines developed in a dynamic relation with American society and culture. In other words, Congress did not have a passive relationship to a body of knowledge about the Filipinos created by the American cultural mainstream. On the contrary, an important group of congressmen took part in the formation of American ideas about the Philippines and the Filipino people.

Duffy Burnett and Burke Marshall (Editors). *Foreign in a Domestic Sense Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press; 2001.

² It is necessary to emphasize that the Philippines were also an ongoing congressional issue because the islands were the more controversial of the Spanish colonies acquired by the United States in 1898. The United States did not have long-standing historical and economic relation with the Philippines, as it did with Puerto Rico. The islands were not only located thousands of miles away from American geographical and historical area of hegemony, but also were inhabited by a large and culturally, religiously, and linguistically diverse population scattered throughout thousands of islands. For example, in the South, in the Sulu Islands and Mindanao, the Americans found thousands of Muslims. In the north and center of Luzon, they found millions of Christians. While the Americans were welcomed by Puerto Ricans, Filipinos resisted American colonialism in a bloody war. In addition, the Americans faced serious strategic complications in the Philippines because the islands were important to a wider imperialist competition for the domination of Asia. In other words, American control over the Philippines did not fit in the traditional idea of American expansionism and was for many Americans a contradiction and a stain on America's prestige. In the words of Filipino historian Oscar Campomanes, the Philippines were "the unacknowledged locus of twentieth-century U. S. imperial-national anxieties and quandaries." Oscar Campomanes. "The New Empire's Forgetful and Forgotten Citizens: Unrepresentability and Unassimilability in Filipino-American Postcolonialities." *Critical Mass: A Journal of Asian American Cultural Criticism* 2, no. 2 (1995): p. 178.

Congressmen like Richard P. Hobson, Albert J. Beveridge, Richard W. Austin, William A. Jones, and Harry B. Hawes participated in the “procedure of truth-making”³ that defined the Filipino-American relations for more than thirty years. Through their travel accounts, books, interviews, lectures, articles, and public speeches, they also became “instant experts on the Philippines,” willing to explain Filipino reality to the American people.⁴

Congressional hearings, discussions and debates about the islands also gave members of Congress an opportunity to produce and reproduce knowledge about the Philippines created by American cultural mainstream. In other words, the Philippines arose as a topic of debate during the discussion of many different congressional bills, giving members of Congress an opportunity not only to use the ‘knowledge’ about the Philippines created by Worcester and many other truth-makers, but also to produce their own set of ideas and images about America’s controversial Asian colony.

In addition, congressional attitudes toward the Philippines were not only influenced by political or regional concerns. In addition to their geographical, ideological or political orientations, members of Congress used rhetorical resources created by the American cultural mainstream.⁵ In other words, southerners or westerners, Democrats or Republicans, progressives or conservatives, members of Congress were also influenced by cultural, racial, political and strategic sets of ideas created by American writers, journalists, scholars, travelers, missionaries, and colonial and military officers. They used those ideas to support or decry American colonialism, and, mainly, to set forth their own ideas of the United States’ nature and future.

However, members of Congress were in a very different position from the creators of American knowledge about the Philippines: they had the power not only to

³ This phrase is from San Juan, “One Hundred Years,” p. 11.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ We will argue, following Robert D. Johnson’s excellent analysis of a group of anti-imperialist members of Congress called ‘the peace progressive,’ that when Representatives and Senators discussed the future of the Philippines they “engaged primarily a cultural and ideological critique of American foreign relations.” Robert David Johnson. *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations*. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 9.

influence, but also to determine the future of Filipino people. Therefore, understanding how Congress interacted with that knowledge is crucial to understanding the development of American Filipino policies.⁶

This chapter will focus on the intersection between the congressional debate over the United States Navy's role in American foreign policy, and the congressional discussion of the Philippines in the first decade of the twentieth century. In other words, this chapter will focus on how congressional discussion of the future of the Navy reflected the ideological, racial, cultural, and political elements of the Filipino problem.

THE NAVAL QUESTION AND THE PHILIPPINES

In the first years of the twentieth century, the Congress intensely discussed the number, size, weight, armament, and geographical distribution of the U.S. Navy's battleships. Among the many forces and topics that were covered in these discussions--pacifism, anti-militarism, isolationism, budget conservatism, and regional politics⁷--the Philippines' future emerges as a major issue.⁸ This should come as no surprise: it could be argued that from the beginning to the end of American occupation of these islands there was a strong link between the Navy's role and the U.S. colonial adventure in the archipelago.

⁶According to Julian Zelizer, American historians have not paid enough attention to United States Congress. Zelizer argues that social, political, progressive, and leftist American historians minimized Congress' influence and importance, emphasizing presidential power or reducing members of Congress to "provincial politicians who were concerned exclusively with securing support from the strongest interest in their constituency." For Zelizer, this was a serious mistake because "the persistent influence of Congress contradicted the teleology of their (American historians) story." We will argue that 'persistent influence of Congress' is still stronger in the case of American colonial possessions. Julian Zelizer. "Introduction to Roundtable." *Social Sciences History* 24, no. 2 (2000), p. 308-309.

⁷The development of the Navy is analyzed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press; 1990; George T. Davis, *A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Navy Policy*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940; and Paul E. Pedisich, "Congress Provides a Navy: The Emergence of a Modern Navy as a Force in Congressional Politics, 1882-1916," Ph. D., Stony Brook: State University of New York, 1998.

⁸Between 1900 and 1908, naval and the Philippine questions intersected in three major congressional discussions: the annual debate over the Naval Appropriation Bill, the debates over the construction of a naval base in the Philippines, and the April 1908 debate over the construction of four battleships.

Retention of the Philippines was used by members of Congress not only to justify, but also to criticize the plans for a big Navy.⁹ Congressional supporters of a big Navy argued that a strong and powerful Navy was necessary not only for the defense the Philippines, but also to protect all that was at stake in those islands (American honor, international prestige, and economic interests). For them, American sovereignty in the Philippines was not under discussion; the islands were an American territory that should be defended. They argued that because of the strategic realities, especially the huge distance between the Philippines and American continental territory, the islands could only be protected with a powerful navy. For them, the link between a big Navy and the retention of the Philippines was direct and clear: the United States had no other choice but to increase its naval power so as to be able to defend the Philippines.

On the other hand, opponents of a big Navy also used the retention of the Philippines to justify their position. Agreeing that the United States needed a big Navy in order to be able to defend the Philippines, their solution to this problem was equally clear: the United States should leave those islands, not only to avoid becoming a militaristic and undemocratic nation, but also to avoid the military and political risks associated with American control of the archipelago. The link between the Philippine and naval questions was clear: supporters of a big Navy opposed Filipino independence and opponents of a big Navy supported independence before leaving the Philippines.

Many representatives and senators also saw the discussion of the naval problem as a good opportunity to focus on American occupation of the Philippines. Although the so-called Filipino insurrection officially ended in 1902, the retention of the Philippines continued to be an issue for the United States throughout the first decades of the twentieth century.¹⁰ As Chapters 1 and 2 discussed, this discussion took different forms: from lectures, speeches, books and articles published by travelers, missionaries, or journalists, to oratory club debates in colleges and high schools throughout the country. The United States Congress was one of the main places where this discussion took place.

For many members of Congress, the Philippine question was related not only to the political future of the islands, but also to the future of American institutions and

⁹ Our research starts after the Philippines were annexed in 1899.

¹⁰ See Chapters 1 and 2.

political traditions. For them, the Philippine problem was much bigger than the question of the Philippines' political future (independence, annexation, or retention). Their discussion of the Philippines involved not only the defense of the islands, but also citizenship, the American political system, racial relations and hierarchies, America's security, honor and international role, etc. In other words, for many members of Congress, both questions were related not only to regional politics or budgetary considerations, but also to their ideas of Americanness.

REPUBLICANISM AND THE NAVAL QUESTION

“Republicanism” was one of the main issues discussed by Congress during debates over naval questions.¹¹ Republicanism could be defined as one of the main ideological elements used in the construction of an American national identity through differentiation from Europe, especially Great Britain. This differentiation was based on a comparison between European monarchies and the American republican political system. Almost all members of Congress in the first decades of the twentieth century shared these ideas, imagining and representing the United States as the greatest republic in history, the freest and most equal and democratic society on earth. It was widely held that no other country in history had ever developed a non-monarchical political system, with a strict separation of church and state, without nobility, without standing armies, and based on a democratic political participation of its citizens. According to this belief, no other country was capable of reproducing or copying American republican institutions and traditions because they were a product of American historical, political, cultural, racial, and economic uniqueness.

Although almost all members of Congress agreed on this superiority of American republicanism, there was a major debate about how retention of the insular possessions could change or affect American republicanism. For many members of Congress, the possession of colonies was not only a contradiction to a republican society, but a danger: colonialism was compatible with monarchical forms of government, not with a republic like the United States. Thus, the retention of insular possessions could endanger the

¹¹ As we saw in Chapter 1, “republicanism” was an important element in the production of an American knowledge about the Philippines. See Chapter 1, pp. 11-15.

survival of democracy in the United States. However, for other members of Congress, the acquisition of insular possessions was a great opportunity to fulfill America's mission of spreading American republican institutions beyond American borders. For them, there was no contradiction between colonialism and republicanism, because American colonialism was and could only be an enlightened colonialism.¹²

Republicanism was similarly important during Congressional discussions of America's naval future. Some members of Congress were concerned about the impact of militarism on American political institutions. For them, the construction of a large and powerful navy would endanger American democracy. They saw no need for a big navy because, they argued, the United States had nothing to fear, being protected by two huge oceans. On the other hand, other members of Congress saw no menace in the construction of a powerful American navy. For them, a powerful fleet was needed for the defense of American interests and possessions.

These two concerns intersected during the debate over the construction of a naval base in the Philippines. Between 1900 and 1908, the United States government extensively discussed the role the Philippine islands would play in American policy in Asia. One of the main elements of that discussion was a plan for the construction of a naval base. This naval base would have a twofold strategic importance for the U.S. in the Pacific, serving as the core of American naval operations in the area and protecting the Philippines from attack.¹³ Almost all American political and military leaders agreed that this base was necessary for the defense of the American interests in Asia. However, the Army and the Navy had different ideas about where in the Philippines it should be located. For the Army, Cavite in Manila Bay was the best location for the naval base, while the Navy favored Olongapo in Subig Bay. In 1908, after seven years of debate and discussion, Manila Bay was chosen as the location of the American naval base in the

¹² As cited in Norberto Barreto-Velazquez, "Advancing Civilization: Race, Nation, and Imperialism in the Later 19th Century America," unpublished paper, 1998; Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France, 1895-1930*, Stanford: Stanford University Press; 1997 and Alice Conklin, "Colonialism and Human Rights, a Contradiction in Terms? The case of France and West Africa" *American Historical Review*, 103; 3, April 1998, pp. 420-423.

¹³As cited in Norberto Barreto-Velazquez, "U. S. Congress and the Philippines' Defense: the Naval Base Debate, 1898-1908," unpublished paper, 1999; William R. Braisted, "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1908," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLI (1), 1954 and *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958.

Philippines. However, the Navy never developed a great naval base in Manila, choosing Pearl Harbor that same year as the home port of the Pacific fleet. Unlike Subig Bay and Manila, Congress readily supported the establishment of a naval base in Hawaii.¹⁴

But it was Congressional attitudes, not the Army-Navy debate, that determined the future of the Philippine naval base. Congress, especially the House of Representatives, did not seriously support the Theodore Roosevelt administration's plans for a naval base in the Philippines, even when the opinion in favor of Subig Bay was almost unanimous. This is why Congress did not make the necessary appropriations for the development of Subig before the Army-Navy debate became an issue. Between 1901 (56th Congress) and 1907 (60th Congress), the federal government, through the Navy, did ask for funds for the development of Subig Bay as a naval base, and Congress systematically ignored or paid little attention to this request.¹⁵ In other words, Congress' attitude was the main force behind the decisions made by Roosevelt and the naval and military leadership about the American naval base in the Philippines.

The debate over the Philippine naval base gave some members of Congress an opportunity to criticize American policy in the Philippines. For Representative James L. Slayden (D-Texas), the construction of a naval base in the Philippines was an ill-advised movement for a very clear reason: the islands were indefensible. According to Slayden, "there were military experts who do not believe that the islands can be put in a state of defense for any sum of money which will not be prohibitive."¹⁶ Slayden raised a basic economic and strategic problem: why invest millions in the construction of a base that could not guarantee the security of the Philippines? However, Slayden was not opposed to the fortification of the Philippines for economic reasons and strategic considerations alone. His opposition was also ideologically oriented; Slayden, like other opponents of U.S. retention of the Philippines, saw the retention of the islands as contradictory to American institutions and traditions. For him, the American intervention in the

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Between 1901 and 1909, the Roosevelt administration asked Congress \$5,201,395 for the construction of a naval base in Subig, but Congress only appropriated \$1,384, 395. Barreto-Velázquez, "U. S. Congress," p. 14.

¹⁶ *Congressional Records* (CR), House (H), 59th- 2nd, vol. 41:3, February 12, 1907, p. 2776.

Philippines was “**strange and un-American,**” and therefore, it was a policy that should be abandoned as soon as possible.¹⁷

Congressman Robert Baker (D-New York) offers another good example of how the discussion of naval issues could be used to attack the American retention of the Philippines. During the February, 1905, House debate over the assignment of \$100,000 for the development of a naval base in Olongapo, Baker introduced an amendment eliminating the \$100,000 for the development of that base. Baker’s made his reasons very clear:

I maintain that the people of the United States have no business in the Philippines; we never had any business in the Philippines; we have no business there today. **It is not our business whether the Filipinos are capable of self-government or not.** It is not for us to say whether there is misgovernment or good government in the Philippines. **We have no right- no moral right- to go outside of the boundaries of the United States and force our will upon any people, no matter whether their government measures up to our standard or not.** [...] We have no moral right to interfere in the slightest degree with the people of the Philippine Islands. Therefore, this appropriation is, first, a waste of the funds of the people of the United States, and, second, **it is to be used in a most immoral manner.**¹⁸

For Baker, American control of the Philippines was not only immoral, but also unnecessary. Baker saw no economic, strategic, cultural, or humanitarian justification for American occupation of the archipelago. American control over the Philippines was unnatural because the islands were too far from the natural boundaries of the United States;¹⁹ it was also immoral because the United States had no right to judge the political capability of the Filipinos. Baker believed that American standards of freedom and self-government gave the United States no moral power to determine any people’s right to be free. For him, that was not only wrong, but also was very unfair, because American standards of freedom and government could not be easily imitated. He rejected one of the

¹⁷ Ibid. Emphasis mine.

¹⁸ CR, H, 58th-3rd, 39:4, February 17, 1905, pp. 114-117. Emphasis mine.

¹⁹ Other members of Congress developed this geographical rejection of the Philippines arguing that the islands were out from the territory protected by the Monroe Doctrine.

supporters of U.S. retention of the islands' main arguments, that the United States should keep control over the Philippines in order to teach the Filipinos the secrets of self-government. For Baker, political education of the Filipinos was not a responsibility of the United States.²⁰

As we have seen, members of Congress used the debate over the future of a naval base in the Philippines to criticize American control of the archipelago as a menace to America's republican political traditions.

THE PHILIPPINES AND AMERICAN SECURITY

Republicanism was not the only topic discussed when the naval and Philippine questions intersected in Congress. Members of Congress also discussed other very important issues during the congressional debates of naval issues in the first decade of the twentieth-century. One of these issues was the development of international rivalries in the Far East and their possible consequences for the United States. At the beginning of the Twentieth century Russian, French, Japanese, German, and British economic and strategic interests collided in the Far East, especially concerning China. China's political, economic, and military weakness opened the door to imperialistic competition over control of China's market and natural resources. In other words, the diplomatic fight over China was also a struggle for supremacy in Asia.

The European powers' behavior in Asia was not the only issue that worried the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. The rise of Japan as a new world power also complicated the Asian scenario for the United States, especially after 1902 when Japan achieved one of its main diplomatic successes, signing an alliance with Great Britain "that shook the international terrain."²¹ That treaty recognized Japan's "special interests in Korea" and "provided that any of other powers attacked one of the signatories, the other would come to its aid."²² This great diplomatic victory helped Japan to establish a favorable strategic setting for a war with Russia. Russia was one of the powers that participated in the international military operation against the Boxer

²⁰ Baker's amendment was not approved.

²¹ LaFeber, *The Clash*, p. 76.

²² *Ibid.*

Rebellion in China.²³ Relations between Japan and Russia started to deteriorate when the Russian government took advantage of the operation against the Boxers to occupy Manchuria. Among the Japanese people, there was a “near-unanimous consensus that Japanese national security demanded Japanese control over the Korean peninsula, and this could not be safeguarded as long as Manchuria remained under Russian power.”²⁴ For Japan, it was necessary to prevent Russia from using Manchuria as a base to divide China—and therefore, menace Korean independence—even at the risk of war with the Russian Empire. With surprising victories at Port Arthur and Mukden, and a stunning naval victory at the Battle of the Sea of Japan in May 1905, Japan shocked the world defeating the Russian Empire.

In this context of Japanese expansion and victories and European imperialistic competition over China, it is unsurprising that the international significance of U.S. retention of the Philippines became an issue when Congress discussed the future of the Navy. The main question to be answered was if the retention of the islands would draw the United States into war with any of the world powers. Was American national security endangered by the retention of the Philippines?²⁵

For some members of Congress, there was no danger for the United States because the American nation had no enemies and nobody would dare attack the Philippines. During the discussion of the 1904 Naval Appropriation Bill (NAB), Representatives George E. Foss (R-New York) and Theodore E. Burton (R-Ohio) discussed the meaning of the retention of the Philippines and the size of the Navy:

Mr. Foss: I would like to ask the gentlemen whether or not he thinks that we ought to have a fleet in the Orient large enough, strong enough to protect the Philippines?

²³In 1900, a radical anti-foreign Chinese society known as the Boxers attacked foreigners and their properties in a nationalistic reaction to foreign governments’ increasing power over China. They besieged foreign compounds in Chinese cities, forcing the foreign powers, including the United States, to send troops to protect their citizens. Walter LaFeber, *The American Age. U. S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad*. Volume 2, New York and London, W. W. Norton and Company, second edition, 1994, p. 222.

²⁴ Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement*, p. 73.

²⁵ This question would be asked during almost all congressional discussions about the Philippine question in the first three decades of the twenty-century and the members of Congress were never able to agree in a single common answer.

Mr. Burton: Why, I presume I should say yes. What is the reason, though, that we need any more battleships to protect threatening to attack the Philippines? Who is raising any cry against us? Who is threatening to attack the Philippines at all?²⁶

Although Representative Burton established a direct link between the number of American battleships and the retention of the Philippines by acknowledging that a bigger navy was needed to defend the islands, he also argued that the islands were facing no danger or menace because they were an American territory. For him, the American flag was better protection for the islands than a big Navy. He did not acknowledge that the acquisition and retention of the Philippines not only changed America's international position, but also exposed American security. Nothing had changed, because the United States had no enemies and thus had nothing to fear. Other members of Congress shared Burton's optimistic attitude.

In the Senate, Senator Chauncey M. Depew (R-New York) rejected Senator Fred W. Carmack's (D-Tennessee) arguments against the retention of the Philippines. According to Depew, the world powers were "the only nations that could be expected to take part in a controversy of that sort" (an attack against the Philippines), but they were incapable of transporting the number of soldiers that would be necessary for a successful invasion of the archipelago. The long distance from their main bases and the presence of the Navy would stop any possible attack over the Philippines. Carmack's reply is very interesting because he reminded Depew that Great Britain had colonies in the area, from which the British could launch such an attack.²⁷

As a matter of fact, Mr. President, the Philippines, with their immense coast line, would be peculiarly subject to attack. I believe to defend the Philippine islands in case of a foreign war would require a navy as large as or larger than would be required to defend the coast of the United States. It would be necessary also to fortify all the various islands of the archipelago, so that we should have to spend millions dollars ever year, even in time of peace, preparing for a possible condition of war with a view to this immense trade in the Orient of which the Senator from New York (Depew) so feelingly. [...] **So that the danger of us getting into a foreign war is greatly increased by our of holding the Philippines, and our defensive strength is immensely weakened by our possession of the**

²⁶ CR, House, 58th-2nd, 38:3, February 22, 1904, p. 2231.

²⁷ CR, Senate, 58th-2nd, 38:3, March 3, 1904, p. 2734.

Philippine Islands. We are in a greater danger of getting into a war and we would be a great deal weaker after we got into a war by reason of holding the Philippines.²⁸

Carmack clearly saw the Philippines as a liability for American national security. He not only identified a direct link between a big Navy and the defense of the Philippines, but also emphasized the economic cost of that defense. To protect the Philippines, it would be necessary to spend not only millions of dollars on a big navy, but more still on the construction of fortifications. In addition, the acquisition and retention of the Philippines located the United States close to the instability and dangerousness of Asia. For Carmack, keeping the Philippines actually weakened and endangered the United States.

What is interesting is the absence of Japan from Depew's and Carmack's analysis. Depew's definition of "world powers" was clearly Eurocentric, and that is why he forgot Japan. Because he could only see European powers as threats to Filipino security, the islands were safe because of geographical considerations. Although Carmack's approach is less limited than Depew's, he focused only on British power as a menace for the Philippines, neglecting the proximity and growing naval and military power of Japan. The invisibility of Japan in Carmack's and Depew's analysis could be understood as a consequence of their underestimation of the Japanese power. To understand the senators' attitude, it should be remembered that their debate took place before the 1905 Russo-Japanese war. Japan's victory over the Russian Empire, especially its great naval victory at Tsushima, drastically shocked Western countries.²⁹

However, not all members of Congress underestimated Japan's menace to the Philippines. For example, during the discussion of the 1904 NAB, Senator Hernando de Soto Money (D-Mississippi) presented Japan as one of the main dangers that the United States faced in the Philippines. For Money, the Japanese were "an enemy that no nation

²⁸ CR, S, 58th, 2nd, 38:3 March 3, 1904, p. 2733. Emphasis is mine.

²⁹ Not all members of Congress were impressed by the Japanese victories in 1904 and 1905. For example, during the 1908 four-battleship debate, Representative John Sharp Williams (D-Mississippi) dismissed any chance of war with Japan stemming from Japanese ambition over the Philippines. According to him, "nobody has anything that we want and we have nothing that anybody else wants." For Williams, the retention of the Philippines was not a menace for the United States because no power envied American control of the islands. The Philippines were so worthless that United States had nothing to fear. CR, House, 60th-1st. 42. April 15, 1908, p. 4782.

can afford to despise.”³⁰ The Americans could not stop Japan if it wanted to conquer the Philippines, because the Japanese were a warrior race that would not stop before fulfilling its ambitions for Asian domination. According to Money, Japanese conquest of the Philippines was only a matter of time.

Japan stands exactly in the attitude toward Manchuria and Korea that she stands in relation to the Philippine archipelago. There will be no trouble about her getting those islands if she wants them.³¹

Some members of Congress used the representation of Japan as a warrior race to justify opposing American retention of the Philippines.³² They thought that the United States should leave the archipelago to avoid a war with Japan. For example, Representative Thomas S. Butler (R-Pennsylvania) “hoped there would be some honorable way to get rid of the Philippines.”³³ Senator Money also emphasized Japan as a military menace not only to the Philippines, but also to the United States.

“Our splendid geographical isolation”

The intersection between the naval and the Philippine questions opened the door for a congressional discussion of the meaning of America’s geographic isolation. Like the Monroe Doctrine, the American Mission idea, and the Open Door Policy, isolationism was one the “beliefs and traditions” that had influenced American foreign policy.³⁴ According to historian Robert L. Beisner, in the nineteenth century, isolation “was more than physical fact; it was a national goal.” For the American people, isolation was “a prophylactic to prevent contamination of the American Experiment by decadent European mores and institutions,” by avoiding European disputes and conducting

³⁰ CR, Senate, 58th-2nd, 38:6, Appendix, p. 93.

³¹ Like Carmack, Money thought that the Philippines were a liability for American security. For him, any war against the United States would start with an attack on the Philippines, and the fall of the Philippines would be followed by an attack against the American west coast. The absence of Hawaii in Money’s analysis is striking. *Ibid.*

³² The racialization of the Japanese people by members of Congress will be address during the analysis of the alleged “Yellow Peril” in chapters 4 and 5.

³³ *The New York Times*, February 16, 1905, page 5, column 4.

³⁴ Beisner, *From the Old Diplomacy*, p. 9.

American affairs “independently of European chancelleries as a prudent way to pursue selfish national interests.”³⁵ However, isolation did not mean that the American government was isolated from the rest of the world. On the contrary, the United States not only kept diplomatic and commercial relations with other countries, but also cooperated with other nations and “asserted itself in the Western Hemisphere, especially in Central America and the Caribbean.”³⁶

The discussion of naval issues led to congressional examination of the very meaning of isolation after the war with Spain. During this debate, some fundamental questions arose: How useful could isolation be as a defensive strategy for the United States in the early years of the twentieth century? To what extent did the United States’ emergence as an Asian colonial power change American isolationism?

The Philippines played an important role in those debates. Members of Congress debated how retention of the Philippines altered America’s strategic position, making changes necessary in congressional appropriations, as well as strategic planning. During those debates, legislators considered whether retention of the Philippines endangered United States. They also debated the Navy’s role in relation not only to the Philippines, but to the overall U.S. international position. In other words, was a big navy necessary not only to protect the new colonies, but also to keep the nation safe?

Predictably, members of Congress had different answers to these questions. For some, retention of the Philippines meant the end of American isolation.³⁷ For them, the United States could no longer rely on its geographical isolation because in 1898 the American frontier moved thousands of miles westward to encompass the Philippines. They argued that it was no longer necessary to cross the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans to attack the United States, because all the Japanese, Germans, or British had to do was to attack any of the U.S.’s insular possessions. Their geographic and strategic definition of the United States changed drastically: the nation was no longer a continental country, but

³⁵ Ibid. p. 10-11.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ George E. Foss (R-Illinois), Samuel L. Powers (R-Mass), Fred W. Carmack (D-Tennessee), Nicholas Longworth (R-Ohio), Richard W. Parker (R-New Jersey).

a world power with international interests to be protected. They argued that a big navy and naval bases were necessary to protect those interests.

During the 1904 discussion of the NAB, Congressman George E. Foss (R-Illinois), Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, used the defense of the Philippines as an excuse for augmenting naval American power. According to him, with the retention of the Philippines the United States stopped being an “isolated country.” Foss argued that no matter how the Filipino question might be resolved in the future, one thing was unavoidable: the United States would always be responsible for the Philippines security.³⁸

We have the Philippines over there in the other hemisphere, which we must protect. We are charged with them. I care whether gentlemen upon the other side may have been opposed to that policy or not, but the American people have set their approval upon it, and it is not necessary for us to go back and consider the question whether it was wise that we should hold the Philippines or not. **We are there; they are ours, ours to protect.**³⁹

Foss’ approach was very pragmatic. For him, retention of the Philippines was a fact Congress had to face. He saw no quick solution to the Philippine question; therefore, the United States should be ready to defend the islands. Protecting the Philippines was, for Foss, an inherited responsibility that the United States could not avoid.⁴⁰

For Representative Nicholas Longworth (R-Ohio), isolationism was no longer a feasible defense policy for the United States. Like Foss, he argued that America’s traditional isolationism ended with the retention of the insular possessions in Asia and the Caribbean. Besides, Longworth argued that the United States’ international role at the beginning of the twentieth century “have forced us, whether we want it or not, into the

³⁸ This was one of the thorniest aspects of the Philippine problem: when or how would American responsibility over the islands end? For over thirty years this question was discussed not only in Congress, but also in conferences, books, articles, cartoons, and radio speeches.

³⁹ CR, H, 58th-2nd, 38, Part 3, February 19, 1904, p. 2066. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁰ Congressman Samuel L. Powers (R- Mass) also thought that the United States was not an ‘isolated country’ anymore because of the retention of Puerto Rico, and because the American flag was also floating “thousands of miles to the westward, near the scene of the great conflict that is going on today.” For him, a strong Navy would not only protect American insular possessions, but also could be a useful instrument for the expansion and protection of American interests, especially foreign commerce. *Ibid*, February 22, 1904, p. 2226.

front rank as a world power, and I, for one, am proud of it.”⁴¹ Longworth also thought that the Philippines defense was a responsibility that the United States could not avoid. For him, no matter how far away the Philippines might be, the American people would not tolerate the islands being seized by another world power. Thus, it was better to be ready to protect them.

It must be emphasized that not all those who argued that American isolationism was over were members of the Republican Party. For example, Senator Fred W. Carmack, a Democrat from Tennessee, agreed with Powers and Foss that the retention of the Philippines ended with American isolation. Unlike Foss and Longworth, however, Carmack saw the Philippines as a danger to the United States. According to him:

If any other nation in the world could seize and hold a single island in the Philippine Archipelago against the United States, it would require us to bring our fleet and our men and soldiers and transport them 7,000 miles to meet the enemy there, when there is not a nation of Europe that could land a single regiment upon the soil of the United States.⁴²

It seems clear that for Carmack, the Philippines were a major weakness in the United States’ defense; thus, he saw ending U.S. control over the Philippines as necessary in order to eliminate this weakness.

Not all members of Congress agreed that isolationism was over. For many members of Congress, isolationism remained the best policy for the United States.⁴³ According to them, the war with Spain did not change American geographical conditions; therefore, the United States could still count on the Pacific and Atlantic oceans as natural defenses against any potential enemy. They further believed U.S. security was not threatened, because nobody wanted to attack the United States. For them, there were no external menaces to justify a big navy or a big army. These true believers in American exceptionalism saw America’s uniqueness as a shield that would

⁴¹ CR, H, 60th-1st, April 15, 1908, p. 4802.

⁴² CR, S, 58th-2nd, 38:3, March 3, 1904, p. 2733.

⁴³ John S. Williams (D-Missouri), David A. de Armond (D-Missouri), Lemuel L. Padgett (D-Tennessee), James R. Tawmeyer (R-Minnesota), Samuel L. Piles (D-Washington), Thomas H. Carter (R-Montana), Moses E. Clapp (R-Minnesota), and Richard Barthold (R-Missouri).

keep the nation safe. For some of them, American patriotism was the country's first line of defense. American security should be based on American political institutions, not numbers of battleships. They did not consider the insular possessions important enough to change America's traditional foreign policy.

For example, during the 1904 NAB discussion, Representative John S. Williams (D-Mississippi) analyzed Britain's performance during the Boer war to argue that isolationism was still the best defense for the United States. According to Williams, the Boer war showed how difficult transportation of troops could be, even for the world's leading naval power. Therefore, the United States had nothing to fear because thanks to America's geographic isolation, any attack on the country would involve transportation of troops across two large oceans, something that even the British found challenging.

It will be very hard indeed for any nation in this world, transporting her troops in ships a regiment at a time, to land upon America's coast a number of men that could not be starved to death in very short order, or bodily surrounded and overcome by the National Guard and militia of the neighborhood, if ever our regular forces could not be gotten up.⁴⁴

The insular possessions were absent from William's analysis. For him, the United States was a continental country with no responsibilities beyond its natural borders. The war with Spain, the retention of the Philippines and Puerto Rico, the annexation of Hawaii, and even the construction of the Panama Canal meant nothing to him.

Representative David A. de Armond (D-Missouri) also used the 1904 NAB discussion to defend isolationism as America's best defense. According to Armond, the patriotism of the American citizens was the real source of American power. In addition, if the United States kept its tradition of focusing on "our own business" there was nothing to fear. Armond also thought that the United States was such a powerful nation that any country "would attack us with any hope of success, and that no combination of hostile nations which could be made against us, even in the dream of the wildest enthusiast."⁴⁵ According to Armond,

⁴⁴ CR, H, 58th-2nd, February 22, 1904, p. 2229.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, February 25, 1904, pp. 2378-2379.

The Atlantic defends us upon the one side; the Pacific defends us upon the other; the Gulf is a defense upon still another; and greater than all these, the love of liberty, devotion to country, the inherent and developed genius of the American people, the genius of our institutions, the character of our Government, the aims and objects that we have in view, the high destiny that is before us- all those admonish us to tread in the pathway of republican, democratic, patriotic independent America and not to drop back into the trodden ways, the blood-stained and the crime-darkened ways of the nations of the Old World.⁴⁶

The insular possessions played no role in Armond's view of American security, because his idea of America did not include islands thousands of miles away from the North American continent.⁴⁷ For him, the United States was an exceptional country populated by superior people with a higher destiny to fulfill. It had democratic and republican institutions to protect its people from European contamination. A big navy was not necessary because the country was isolated and protected by the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. In other words, Armond's idea of American security depended more on American political, moral, and intellectual superiority than on the construction of battleships or naval and coaling stations.

Representative Lemuel P. Padgett (D-Tennessee) likewise opposed a big navy because he saw no danger to American security. During the congressional discussion, he asked: Which country wanted to challenge American power? Who wanted to challenge American superiority? Who wanted to face American exceptionalism? Who wanted to challenge American manhood? According to Padgett, nobody wanted to face the United States in a war; therefore, the country was safe.

One hundred and twenty-five years we have existed. We began as a Government in a wilderness and through that one hundred twenty-five years we have marched on the upward line of progress and developed a civilization, and today our ninety millions of people, with their civilization, their production, and their resources, are a nation of power. We have lived these one hundred twenty-five years; we have escaped all the pitfalls and the snares and the dangers. In our infancy, we were not ensnared. In our

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 2379.

⁴⁷ Armond's omission of the insular possessions might stem from the difficulty of arguing American superiority over Europe while acknowledging the United States as a colonial power.

boyhood, we were not engulfed. In our young manhood we are not beaten; but now they come and raise the cry that because we have gotten to be a great and a strong and mighty and powerful nation, the greatest and the grandest and the noblest and the most powerful in all world's history and civilization, therefore we are in danger. I do not subscribe to it and I do not believe it. [...] Now we are confronted with the direct proposition that we must depart from the traditions; we must forget the history of the past; we must embark upon a new policy and a new program, and we must go into a wild and an extravagant naval program that would dazzle the nations of the earth, and would levy tribute to exhaustion upon the resources and the labor and production of American citizenship. I stand here to protest against it.”⁴⁸

Like Armond, Padgett believed that superior American civilization, government and “manhood” would “stand as guarantee and the assurance” of American security. For him, it was not American security that was at stake, but America’s future as a democratic and republican country. A big navy was un-republican, therefore un-American and unnecessary.

In 1908, Senator Samuel H. Piles (D-Washington) supported the appropriation for the construction of four battleships although he believed the United States did not need “standing armies.” He said that unlike the European countries, the United States did not need to face the menace of “contiguous adjacent states.”⁴⁹ Senator Thomas H. Carter (R-Montana) also thought that the United States had nothing to fear from an external attack and he quoted Lincoln to emphasize his position: “All the combined armies of the world can not take a drink of water of the Ohio river unless we want to let them.”⁵⁰

Although there were differences of opinion among these senators and representatives, Padgett, Armond, Williams, Piles, and Carter’s analyses also had something in common: they ignored the U.S. insular possessions. The Philippines, Puerto

⁴⁸ CR, H, 60th-1st, April 10, 1908, p. 4578.

⁴⁹ CR, Senate (S), 60th-1st, 42, April 24, 1908, p. 5164. Senator Moses E. Clapp (R-Minnesota) concurred with Piles that American geographical isolation was enough to guarantee American security. According to him, “I say it is absolutely absurd to suggest that any unknown condition prevails in our relations to the world that requires not four battleships today for what might be, but which requires exactly four battleships three years from now.” *Ibid.* p. 5274.

⁵⁰ For Carter, the United States was the “vanguard of the Aryan race.” *Ibid.* April 27, 1908, p. 5269.

Rico, and Hawaii did not fit their definition and representation of the United States as a white, Christian, civilized, peaceful, manly, and exceptional nation. That is why, for these members of Congress, the American empire was invisible; the islands were shadows to be ignored and forgotten. This helped them avoid acknowledging the imperial face of a nation they imagined as exceptional. Like African Americans, Native Americans and Asian Americans, American colonial subjects in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines were erased, hidden, ignored. Their elision permitted the reproduction of a discourse based on American exceptionalism that helped keep American imperialism invisible.⁵¹

However, it should be stressed that not all members of Congress ignored the strategic meaning of U.S. insular possessions, especially the Philippines. For some of them, the U.S. conquest and retention of those islands changed America's position in Asia, making a big navy a necessity.⁵² They speculated that the loss of the Philippines could expose Hawaii, and the loss of Hawaii could expose the American west coast to foreign attack. Therefore, not only was the defense of the insular possessions at stake, but American national security as well. Some of them also understood that the Philippines could play an important role for any U.S. military operation in Asia and in the expansion of U.S. interests in China. For them, those islands could be used as bases of operations for the American Navy and Army. Senator Chauncey M Depew (R-NY) acknowledged, in 1904, that in case of war, the Philippines "would be the most valuable possession the United States has to defend, and the most valuable possession we have for the purpose of attack."⁵³ For him, the Philippines were also the most valuable American possession because

⁵¹ About American imperialism's invisibility see: Amy Kaplan, "'Left Alone with America': the Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture." in Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, *Cultures of United States Imperialism*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993, pp. 3-21.

⁵² Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass) had a different approach to the strategic meaning of the Philippines. For him, national security concerns made a powerful Navy necessary, with or without the retention of the Philippines. He thought that in either case, the United States should keep a fleet as well as naval stations in the Pacific to guard American interests in Asia. CR, S, 58th-2nd, March 4, 1904, p. 2734.

⁵³ CR, S, 58th, 1st, March 3, 1904, p. 2732.

They are the place which all the Europeans nations regard as the port from which the United States is to be able to reach and protect trade with the Orient.”⁵⁴

Other members of Congress recognized the strategic value of the Philippines, but that did not stop them from criticizing the retention of the islands. According to Representative Hernando de Soto Money (D-Mississippi), the Republican Party favored the retention of the Philippines because the islands could be used as base to guarantee a piece of the Chinese market for the United States. For him, the retention of the Philippines was not a good deal for the United States: ‘Why, the very fact that this navy is increased, I will say, to such enormous figures proves that the occupation of the Philippines is no account to this country. It does not add to her wealth nor to any else, but it does project us into the storm center of future wars of the world.’⁵⁵ For Money, the United States government had to get rid of the islands in order to avoid a war. In addition, Filipino independence would allow the American government to “diminish the Navy there (Asia) to a very small proportion.”⁵⁶ However, what is most striking about Money’s ideas is the contrast between his assessments of the strategic importance of the Philippines and Hawaii. He thought that any investment in Hawaii’s security and defense was “a wise proposition” because it was also an investment in national security, particularly for protecting the West coast. According to Money,

With that properly fortified, coaled, and garrisoned there (Hawaii), there will be no danger for any attack on our Pacific possessions.”⁵⁷

As we had seen, the strategic and geopolitical meanings of the Philippines were a highly contested topic among members of Congress. There was no consensus about the impact of the Philippines on American security and the long-held policy of isolationism.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ CR, S, 60th-1st, 42, April 21, 1908, p. 5014.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

AMERICAN “HONOR” AND THE PHILIPPINES

The intersection of the Philippine and the naval questions in Congress also opened involved another fundamental issue: American national honor. For some members of Congress, American honor was at danger at the Philippines because the American people would not tolerate any attack over the islands.⁵⁸ If seized by any power, the defense of American honor would require the re-conquest of the islands at any cost; therefore, the United States had to be ready to defend the islands in the only way they could be defended: with a powerful navy. It was, then, a congressional responsibility to support the American Navy in order to protect not only the Philippines, but also American honor. These congressmen were unwilling to consider Philippine independence, because the U.S. was to leave the islands only when the United States government wanted to do it—not because any foreign country forced them to leave the islands. Therefore, the American nation should be ready to defend the archipelago.

As with other issues analyzed before, there was no congressional consensus about the Philippines’ meaning for American honor. Some members of Congress, concerned about the risk of war over the Philippines, argued for a tactical withdrawal from the archipelago in order to avoid not only military, but also the ideological and political hazards associated with the Philippines. Other members of Congress denied that the Philippines were a menace to American honor.

The American flag played a very important role in this discussion as a symbol of American honor. For many congressmen, the American flag was the key symbol of American sovereignty and mission in the Philippines. For them, the American flag should only be hauled down when that mission was over.⁵⁹ The best way to keep the American flag floating over the Philippines was by maintaining a strong Navy. According to Representative William E Humphrey (R-Washington)

⁵⁸ Frank T. Brandegee (R-Connecticut), William E Humphrey (R-Washington), William Richardson (D-Alabama), George K. Favrot (D-Louisiana), and John W. Gaines (D-Tennessee).

⁵⁹ During 1904 NAB discussion, Representative Henry A. Cooper (Wisconsin-Rep) used “the raising of American flag in the Philippines” to justify a big Navy. CR, H, 58th-2nd, 38:3, February 20, 1904, p. 2157.

The American people will never consent to play the coward's part. We will do our duty, we must and we will prepare to protect the flag wherever it floats.⁶⁰

Although Humphrey acknowledged that the retention of the Philippines was “a constant menace to the peace of the nation,” he also thought that “National peace, national safety, national pride, and national honor demand that we take immediate steps to protect them (the Philippines) from themselves and from the rest of the world.”⁶¹ Even though American honor and national security were at stake at the Philippines, the United States could not flee from the Philippines as a “cowardly” nation, therefore, the United States had no choice but to be ready to protect them; the only way to do that was “by a great navy.” For him,

The only certainty of peace on the Pacific is to be prepared for war that no nation will dare unjustly to attack us. **The honor, the peace, and the safety** of this nation imperatively demanded that a mighty battleship squadron be kept upon the Pacific as well as upon the Atlantic.”⁶²

This quote offers a good example of the link between a powerful Navy and the retention of the Philippines. Humphrey made no distinction between the defense of American honor and the defense of the Philippines. For him, both required a strong Navy.

For Humphrey, American naval power was not a sign of militarism, but an instrument of peace because no nation had anything to fear from the United States military power. A non-militaristic and non-imperialistic nation like the United States could not be seen as a menace by other powers. On the contrary, because the United States was the only world power without hidden intentions, it could exercise a democratizing and pacifying influence over the world. That is why, for him, any investment in the defense of the Philippines was not only an investment in the defense of American honor, but also in the promotion of peace in the Pacific. In other words, Humphrey saw the American Navy as an extension and an instrument of American exceptionalism. According to him,

⁶⁰ CR, H, 60th, 1st, 42, April 15, 1908, p 4791.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid. p. 4792. Emphasis mine.

We must depend entirely upon the Navy in any contest upon the Pacific Ocean. Our Army, even if we had one, would be useless. **The only warrant of peace upon the Pacific in the future is a great navy.**⁶³

Representative William Richardson (D-Alabama) also thought that American national honor was at stake in the Philippines, and that the only way to keep it safe was to protect the islands through a powerful navy. According to him,

To protect and defend the Philippine Island from the grasp of foreign power, whether Japan, or any other power, is a part of our national honor and pride. We can not escape it if we would. Our flag is there and we will maintain it.⁶⁴

Other members of Congress like Representative George K. Favrot (D-Louisiana) had a more pragmatic approach to this question. For Favrot, although by the acquisition and retention of the Philippines the American government had “unwisely” acquired obligations, the United States could not now avoid them. According to him,

We have acquired territory far distant from our shores, and no matter what disposition we may finally make of those islands, as long as we hold them we must protect them. We may at some time in the future give the people of those islands their independence. We may sell those islands, but as long as they are ours we cannot without humiliation and national disgrace permit them to be taken from us. And even if we give these people their independence, we must guarantee that independence and must protect them in it. And I beg leave to remind the gentlemen who oppose a larger increase in our Navy that these far-distant possessions can not be defended, can not be protected by simply repelling invasion from our own coasts.⁶⁵

For Favrot, American honor was at stake in the Philippines and the United States had no other choice than to be ready to fight for the islands if necessary. Favrot also emphasized the relation between naval power and Filipino security. Only through a strong naval power would the United States be capable of fulfilling its responsibilities to the Filipinos. However, those responsibilities would not end with Philippine independence because the

⁶³ Ibid. p. 4790. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 4788.

⁶⁵ Ibid, April 10, 1903, p 4581.

United States would remain responsible for the archipelago's security even after independence. It should be emphasized that for Favrot, the retention of the Philippines was what made a powerful navy necessary.

Representative John W. Gaines, a Democrat from Tennessee, also marked a direct relationship between American honor, the defense of the Philippines, American republicanism, and the power and size of the U.S. Navy. Gaines, however, used the defense of American honor to oppose U.S. control of the Philippines. He identified strategic, ideological, and political dilemmas involved in the retention and defense of the Philippines. For him, a big Navy was necessary only because the retention of the Philippines exposed American honor, and the islands could only be defended through a strong naval force. However, a big Navy was equal to militarism and was therefore a menace to American democracy and republican institutions. Gaines also identified the retention of the Philippines as an imperialistic adventure that was taking the United States away from its traditional anti-imperialistic roots. Thus, retention of the Philippines was not only exposing the United States to involvement in wars, but also corrupting American institutions. According to Gaines,

We all want to and will 'maintain the honor of our country.' No doubt about that all times; but the vital question is shall we start and uphold a 'foreign policy in every port and harbor throughout the world,' to do which **we must turn our back on the policy of the father**, keep a standing Army in the United States and the Philippine Islands, and build and maintain a Navy big enough to whip Europe in **case of war in the Philippine Island, which may occur at any time.**⁶⁶

It seems clear that Humphrey was an isolationist who saw the Philippines as an undesirable liability. American withdrawal from the Philippines was, therefore, necessary for self-defense.

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Massachusetts) also agreed that the problems of Filipino security would not end with the independence of the Philippines. For him, Filipino independence would increase American responsibilities because the government of the islands would take loans from foreign banks. The Filipino government's inability to fulfill its financial responsibilities would lead to foreign governments intervening on

⁶⁶ CR, H, 57th, 1st, 35:6, May 15, 1902, p. 5526. Emphasis mine.

behalf of their financial interests. In other words, Lodge was worried about the Latin Americanization of the Filipino republic. The United States would have to intervene in the Philippines as it had in Haiti or the Dominican Republic, to prevent countries like Germany or Japan from taking advantage of Filipino financial problems to occupy the archipelago. According to Lodge,

Then, under our pledge to it to maintain its independence intact, we should have to either pay its debts or go to war to defend it.⁶⁷

However, not all members of Congress saw a necessary connection among the defense of the Philippines, American honor, and a big navy. Representative Richard Barthold (R-Missouri) rejected the use of the Philippines to justify a big Navy. For him, the Philippines did not represent a risk to the United States honor because “not one of the great powers would accept the islands even as present.” For him, it was an unacceptable that in order to keep the Philippines, the United States should become a “warlord” and become involved in a European arms race.⁶⁸ Representative Theodore E. Burton (R-Ohio) also rejected the relationship among American honor, Filipino defense, and a big Navy. For him, American economic power was a shield against war because countries like Japan, Great Britain, and Germany depended on U.S. imports. They would not dare attack the United States; therefore, who was left to attack the Philippines? For him, the United States “should take the lead in the paths which lead to peace; that we should take advantage of our magnificent isolationism, of the confidence that other nations place in us.”⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Ibid, April 21, 1908, p. 5016.

⁶⁸ Ibid. April 10, 1908, p. 4587.

⁶⁹ Ibid. April 11, 1908, p. 4611.

CONCLUSION

There was a strong link between the naval and the Philippine questions in the first decade of the twentieth-century: the discussion of either of them led to the discussion of the other. Members of Congress used both questions as excuses for the discussion of their ideas of Americanness and their concern with the future of American political institutions and traditions. Their debate mirrored what Matthew F. Jacobson describes as a main characteristic of American political culture at the beginning of the twentieth-century: “a paradoxical combination of supreme confidence in United States superiority and righteousness, with an anxiety driven by fierce parochialism.”⁷⁰ In other words, congressional debates on the Philippine and the naval questions reflected a conflict between the ideas of “American mission” and “proper Americanism.”⁷¹ Some members of Congress had no problem acknowledging that after the war with Spain, the United States had new international responsibilities and challenges. For them, the nation could and should abandon isolationism, build a powerful Navy and naval bases, and keep and protect its insular possessions, especially the Philippines, as bases to promote American economic interests. The United States would then be in a position to fulfill its mission of expanding and spreading its democratic, civilized, and enlightened influence around the world. American political institutions, especially American republicanism, would not be endangered by a stronger American international stand. The United States was immune to militarism and imperialism because of the exceptionality of American political institutions and traditions, culture, racial composition, and history.

⁷⁰ Matthew Frye Jacobson. *Barbarian Virtues. The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917*. New York: Hill and Wang, 2000, p. 4. Serge Ricard also identifies this conflict between the ideas of exceptionalism and universalism. For him, nineteenth-century U.S. expansion was justified through the idea of “American uniqueness” of the Founding Fathers, and a strong sense of messianism. American uniqueness was based on an “irreducible contradiction that would forever vitiate American foreign policy: the basic incompatibility of the exceptionalist claim with political messianism, of singularity with universalism.” In order that the United States keep its ‘primeval purity,’ the nation should remain isolated. However, American missionary sense demanded “intervention on behalf of freedom, to promote it or defend it in other parts of the continent or the world.” On the other hand, although American values were universal, “its application required qualities possessed by Americans alone.” Serge Ricard, “The Exceptionalism Syndrome,” in David K. Adams, and Cornelius A. van Mennen ed. *Reflections on American Exceptionalism*. Staffordshire, England: Ryburn Publishing, Keele University Press, 1994, p 73.

⁷¹ These two phrases are also Jacobson’s. Ibid.

For other members of Congress, on the other hand, the future of American democracy and republicanism was at stake. For them, a big Navy was equal to militarism, and the retention of the insular possessions, especially the Philippines, equaled imperialism. For them, the United States had to renounce imperialism, avoid militarism, and strengthen isolationism in order to survive as a democratic and republican country.

Chapter 4

**SAVING AMERICA FROM THE PHILIPPINE THREAT: AN ANTI-FILIPINO
CONGRESSIONAL DISCOURSE, 1912-1924**

"The great God of Nature and of the eternal fitness of things is showing us [...] that the Philippines is not a white man's country." (Representative, James T. Heflin (D-Alabama), May 1, 1916)

"I do not argue with the gentleman that an armed conflict between the Far East and Far West is inevitable. But if such a conflict shall ever come to provoking cause will be that the far-away Philippines constitute **our most, if not our only vulnerable point**, rather than any question of mere trade rivalry." William A. Jones (D-Virginia), October 2, 1914)

In March 1912, Representative William A. Jones (D-Virginia)¹ introduced the first of a series of bills he would author, granting independence to the Philippines.² The first Jones Bill was recommended favorably by the House Committee on Insular Affairs (HCIA), but the House took no action on it. Despite this failure, the first Jones Bill opened a period of intense congressional discussion of Philippine independence that peaked in 1916 when the third Jones Bill was passed, reorganizing the government of the islands. After 1916, discussion of the Philippines subsided until Representative Louis W. Fairfield (R-IN) introduced a bill for Filipino self-government in 1924.³ The Fairfield Bill proposed the creation of a U.S.-supervised Filipino republic to be known as a "Commonwealth." It was reported by the HCIA, but the House took no action on this bill.

¹ Representative William Atkinson Jones was born in Virginia in 1849, studied law at the University of Virginia at Charlottesville, and represented Virginia in Congress from 1891 until his death in 1918. As Chair of the House Committee on Insular Affairs (HCIA), Jones became a champion of Filipino independence. For a brief biography of Jones, see www.bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=J000259.

² The first Jones Bill proposed granting independence to the Philippines in 1921. The second, introduced in July 1914, set no specific date for Filipino independence, but included a preamble stating, "that independence would be granted as soon as a stable government had been established." This second Jones Bill was approved by the House, but the Senate took no action on it. The third Jones Bill was introduced in January 1916 and passed, after an intense debate, on August 29, 1916. Karen Wells Borden. "Philippine Independence Legislation in the United States Congress, 1912-1934." M. A. Thesis, State University of California, 1969, p. 25 and Antonio Molina, *Historia de las Filipinas*. Madrid, Ediciones Cultura Hispánica del Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, Madrid, 1984, tomo II, pp. 532-534.

³ *Ibid*, p. 73. According to Borden, the Fairfield Bill sought to help American entrepreneurs by creating "more stable conditions in the Islands by means of establishing a commonwealth," ending the political uncertainties that were hindering American investments in the archipelago. *Ibid*, p. 58.

After that, congressional discussion of Philippines independence entered another lull that would be broken by the consequences of the Great Depression.⁴

The intensity of congressional debates over the Philippines in the 1910's make this period crucial for understanding the development of congressional ideas and representations of the Philippines. During this period, as members of Congress debated the Philippines' meaning for the United States, they also set forth their notions of Americanness, citizenship, republicanism, and America's international role. This chapter will identify the arguments used by congressional opponents of U.S. retention of the Philippines between 1912 and 1924, focusing on how congressmen interacted with the body of knowledge about the Philippines created by American writers, missionaries, journalist, travelers, and civil and military colonial officers analyzed in Chapters 1 and 2. Two basic questions are of particular interest: Which ideas from "the remarkably extensive 'shadow-archive' of images, ideas, and stereotypes about Filipinos and the Philippines which were elaborated in various U. S. cultural forms⁵" did members of Congress use during these debates? What did members themselves contribute to the discussion of the Philippines?

Although legislators' lectures, speeches, and publications will be examined, analysis will center on congressional debates over Philippine independence bills between 1912 and 1924, arguing that congressional discussion of Philippine issues, especially Filipino independence, was another mode of knowledge production. In other words, members of Congress reproduced and produced knowledge about the Philippines as they discussed the Philippines in congressional committee meetings and—especially—on the floor of the House and Senate. Following David Spurr, I argue that *Congressional Records* is "non-fiction writing" of great value for the analysis of congressional colonial and anti-colonial discourses.⁶

⁴ Ibid.

⁵Oscar Campomanes. "The New Empire's Forgetful and Forgotten Citizens: Unrepresentability and Unassimilability in Filipino-American Postcolonialities." *Critical Mass: A Journal of Asian American Cultural Criticism* 2, no. 2 (1995): pp 177-178. See also chapter 1, note 6.

⁶David Spurr emphasizes the importance of "non-fiction writing, and literary journalism in particular," in the analysis of colonial discourses. David Spurr. *The Rhetoric of Empire Colonial*

CONGRESSIONAL DISCOURSES

Congressional discussion of the Philippines in the first two decades of the 20th century produced two opposing discourses.⁷ The first, anti-imperial discourse represented the Philippines as a racial, political and a strategic danger for the United States. According to congressional opponents of retention of the Philippines, U.S. colonial rule of the islands endangered the American political system: like a virus, it was contaminating American political institutions and traditions. They also saw U.S. control of the Philippines as a national security threat, exposing the nation to unnecessary dangers and risks. The anti-imperialists supported Filipino independence as a way to free the United States of political and military risks behind retention of the Philippines.

On the other hand, congressional supporters of U.S. colonial rule produced an opposing, imperialist discourse, which represented the Philippines as a strategic, economic, and political asset. For them, retention of the archipelago was crucial to a more assertive American foreign policy, and the Philippines were a perfect base from which to project U.S. power and influence and protect American interests throughout Asia; retention of the Philippines would also help the United States fulfill its destiny. They very pragmatically acknowledged the political and military risks retention of the Philippines entailed, as the price the United States should pay for behaving like a world power. This discourse will be the topic of the next chapter, while this chapter will focus on congressional anti-imperialist discourses concerning the Philippines.

Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993, pp. 2-3 and 10-11.

⁷ According to Nicholas Thomas, "colonialism's culture should not be seen as a singular enduring discourse, but rather as a series of projects that incorporate representations, narratives and practical efforts. Although competing colonizing visions at particular times often shared a good deal, as the racist discourse of one epoch superficially resembled those of others, these projects are best understood as strategic reformulations and revaluations of prior discourses, determined by their historical, political and cultural contexts, rather than by allegedly eternal properties of self-other relations, or by any other generalized discursive logic." Nicholas Thomas. *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel, and Government.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 171.

REPUBLICANISM

The idea that retention of the Philippines Islands was against American republican traditions and institutions was developed by writers, journalists, scholars, and travelers analyzed in Chapter 1.⁸ Through their publications, addresses and speeches, they described colonialism as republicanism's historic enemy. For them, retention of the Philippines under the American flag was a direct menace to American democratic and republican institutions. Quite a few U.S. legislators embraced this idea during debates over the future of the Philippines. For them, republicanism and colonialism were incompatible:⁹ Colonies might be consistent with monarchies and empires, but not with democratic and republican governments;¹⁰ therefore, by retaining control over the Philippines the United States was behaving more like a monarchy than a republic.¹¹ This was a dangerous contradiction, whose logical solution was Filipino independence. Like the truth-makers analyzed in Chapter 1, members of Congress were more concerned with the United States' political future than the Filipinos' welfare. For them, Filipino independence was a matter of ideological and political self-defense.

⁸ James L. Blair, Francis B. Harrison, Richard F. Pettigrew, Goldwin Smith, William Graham Sumner, William F. Willoughby, Lieut. Francis A. Adams, Rev. Henry Van Dyke, and Moorfield Storey. See Chapter 1, pp. 11-15.

⁹ Marcus A. Smith (D-AZ), CR, S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, p. 1076; Jacob T. Baker (D-NJ), CR, H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 1, 1914, p. 16040; Cyrus, CR, H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 16, 1914) George F. Burgess (D-TX), CR, H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 2, 1914, p. 16087; Henry A. Cooper (R-WI), Philippine Independence, H, CIA, H. J. Res. 131, H. R. 3924, H. J. Res. 127, H. R. 2817, 1924); Charles A. Towne (D-MN), 1901; William E. Mason (R-IL), 1899; George F. Hoar (R-MA), 1898; Berry, 1899; Thomas W. Hardwick (D-GA), S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 19, 1916; William E. (D-WV), CR, S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, # 76; Marcus A. Smith (D-AZ), CR, S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, #74; William P. Borland (D-MO), H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 1, 1914, p. 16034; William F. Shafroth (D-CO), CR, S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 7, 1916, p. 653, handwritten). Cyrus Cline (D-IN), CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, Extension of Remarks, October 16, 1914, p. 1226; Francis G. Newlands (D-NV). *The Public Papers of Francis G. Newlands Edited and Placed in Historical Setting by Arthur B. Darling*. Boston & New York, 2 vols. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1932, p. 245 (December, 1905).

¹⁰ Clement C. Dickinson (D-MO), CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 1, 1914, p. 16026.

¹¹ According to Senator Knute Nelson (R- MN), "We [the United States] have no subjects in this country. **That term is foreign to American institutions and foreign to American law.**" Nelson, CR, S, 64th-1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, p. 1075. Emphasis mine.

British imperialism was an important referent for proponents of this argument.¹² Members of Congress identified colonialism with the British as opposed to the American, political system. For them, Great Britain, the archetypical imperialist power, was the opposite of the democratic, republican, and egalitarian United States. For those members of Congress, by keeping control of the Philippines the United States was behaving like Great Britain and this was intolerable. They reminded their colleagues that colonialism went against the grain of American political institutions and American history: the United States had once been a group of British colonies, and emerged as a free nation only after a bloody war against British imperial rule. By occupying the Philippines the United States behaved like Great Britain, and betrayed its own historical origin.¹³

This argument hinges upon how these congressmen imagined and represented the United States. The image of the United States as a republican utopia was prevalent among members of Congress analyzed in this chapter; they saw the United States as the greatest republic in history, an ideal society based on freedom and democracy, a nation whose government was based on the people's consent. For them, the United States was an exceptional country: linguistically and culturally homogenous, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, middle class, with no nobility. Filipino independence was necessary to protect this image of America's "exceptional" society from which African Americans, Native Americans, Mexican Americans, women, labor problems, corruption, social conflicts, and poverty were noticeably absent. Millions of non-Anglo-Saxon, non-Protestant, and non English-speaking immigrants who had arrived in the United States in the last decades of the 19th and the first decades of the 20th century were also excluded.¹⁴

¹² For example see: Henry A. Cooper (R-WI), CR, H, 63rd-2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 2, 1914, p. 16094. This theme was stronger among Congressional than non-congressional truth-makers.

¹³ Replying to Representative James R. Mann (R-IL) during the debate of the first Jones Bill, Congressman Augustus O. Stanley (D-KY) argued that "It is natural, it is logical, that the gentleman (Mann) read editorial after editorial commending Britain's colonial policy saying, in effect, that is the policy of the Republican Party to emulate **the ugliest and cruelest attribute of a monarchy from which we ourselves wrenched our liberty by the sacrifices of life and treasure.**" Stanley, H, 63rd-2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 3, 1914, p. 16133

¹⁴ For example, in 1900 Representative Charles A. Towne (D-MN) argued that "The republic is **homogeneous**; the empire is heterogeneous. The republic is a **unit**; the empire is an aggregation. The republic is composed of **citizens**; the empire rests on **subjects**. The republic thrills with one conscious and common life; the empire is a clash of unmutual aspirations. The republic means

Risking American freedom

As Eric Foner has emphasized, “no idea is more fundamental to Americans’ sense of themselves as individuals as a nation than freedom.”¹⁵ It is thus unsurprising that the Philippines’ implications for American freedom were a major congressional issue. Some members of Congress contended that retention of the Philippines endangered this, America’s most valuable treasure. For them, imperialism and freedom were incompatible: a democratic and republican government such as the United States could not hold colonies without endangering its freedom.¹⁶ Like the past republics of Venice, Rome, and Athens, the United States could not survive the consequences of imperialism.

For congressional opponents of U.S. control of the Philippines, colonialism was compatible with a government of subjects, but not of citizens. Just as before emancipation, the United States could not survive “half-slave and half-free,” nor could it now survive as half-citizen and half-subject.¹⁷ They concluded that American colonial control of the Philippines contradicted everything the United States had historically stood for.¹⁸ Filipino independence was the only way to return the United States to its republican tradition, reconciling the nation with its history and destiny by ending the

peace; the empire stands for war. The republic is a **nation**; the empire is a compulsory league of unequals.” Charles A Towne. *Philippine Independence. Speech of Hon. Charles A. Towne, of Minnesota, in the Senate of the United States, Monday January 28, 1901.* Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1901, p. 33. Emphasis mine.

¹⁵ Eric Foner. *The Story of American Freedom.* New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998, p. xiii.

¹⁶ In 1900, Senator Charles A. Towne (D-MN) argued that colonialism was “the sure precursor of the downfall of free government in every age of the world.” He argued that colonialism would lead to “dangerous growth of the executive power.” Towne, *Op. cit.* pp 31-33.

¹⁷ For Charles F. Curry (R-CA), “governing people as subjects and holding land as colonial possession is contrary to the genius of free institutions.” For Senator. Thomas (D-CO), “There can be, in a free republic, no subjects without doing violence to our institutions.” (Charles F. Curry (R-CA), CR, H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 14, 1914, 16620, and Charles S. Thomas (D-CO), CR, S, 64-1, 53, S.381, January 24, 1916, p. 1449

¹⁸For Senator Chilton, “we can not be truly a free people as long as we hold another people in subjection.” CR, S, 64th-1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 19, 1916, p. 1078.

dangerous and accidental Filipino colonial adventure.¹⁹ In Senator William F. Shafroth's (D-Colorado) words, Filipino independence would protect the United States "from the rocks of Imperialism."²⁰

The Philippines and America's destiny

Some legislators also argued that retention of the Philippines was against American destiny and mission.²¹ For them, the United States was charged with a divine mission: democratization of the world, a more important responsibility than civilizing or protecting the Philippines.²² On the contrary, retention of the Philippines was a distraction that prevented the United States from fulfilling God's will, and Filipino independence was necessary in order to bring the United States back to its sacred mission.²³ They also saw preservation of American republicanism as another element of

¹⁹ Thomas H. Ball (D-TX), *The Evolution of Imperialism, Remarks of Honorable Thomas H. Ball of Texas*, January 16 and 19, 1900; Clement L. Brumbaugh (D-OH), H, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916, p. 7186; William P. Borland (D-MO), H, 63rd -2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 1, 1914, p. 16034; James K. Vardaman (D-MS), S, 64-1, 53, S: 381, January 26, 1916, p. 1501.

²⁰ LC, MD, Papers of Storey, Box 11, 1916, William F. Shafroth (D-CO), "Independence for the Philippines," *The Filipino People*, 3;9, Jan. 1916, p. 9 (originally published in *The New York Evening Post*, Dec. 4, 1915).

²¹ John L. McLaurin (D- SC), *Speech of Senator John L. McLaurin*, Senate, January 13, 1899, pp, 8/13; Cyrus Cline (D-IN), CR, H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 16, 1914, 16620, handwritten; Charles M. Stedman (D-NC).

²²According to Representative Cline, "It has never been and never will be the purpose of this Republic to subjugate alien races on the other side of the globe." Stedman argued that: "If the Republic could not live **half slave and half free**, tell me how it will fulfill the high destiny for which it was intended by Providence with millions of men 10,000 miles away held in bondage against their will, with no voice in the Government which controls them. [...] The greatness of the American Republic does not rest upon the accumulation of colonial possessions." According to Representative Finly H. Gray (D-IN), "The mission of this Government is not conquest and subjugation. It is to preserve the principles of self-government at home and promote popular rule abroad. That is our mission, and it is a **great and glorious mission**." Cline, Op cit., Stedman Op. cit., Finly H. Gray, (D-IN) CR, H, 63rd -2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 14, 1914, p. 16615. Emphasis mine.

²³ Representative John L. McLaurin (D-SC) argued that: "The hand of God may have been in the war with Spain, **but I do not feel that it is in obedience to the Divine will that we are pursuing a career of conquest in the Philippines**. Conquest has never been the handmaid of our civilization or the Christian religion; their triumphs rest upon a foundation of peace. The sword established the religion of Mohammed, but it will never spread and maintain the religion of Jesus

America's mission: the United States was a guiding light for less fortunate peoples of the world who found, in American democracy, inspiration for their fight against tyranny. Hence, it was the American people's duty to keep these peoples' hopes of a better world alive by protecting American republicanism. Thus, they transformed American republicanism into an aspiration of all humankind that had to be protected. How could the United States be a role model of democracy and freedom, and at the same time a colonial power? They offered a simple answer: America should leave the Philippines in order to get back to the right track.²⁴ They presented the Philippines as the great contradiction that United States must solve in order to survive as the beacon of freedom.

Thus, American republicanism was a complex concept that combined a sense of mission and divine destiny, with notions of freedom, exceptionalism, and the universal value of American political institutions.

Republicanism, isolationism, and military threat

The impact of militarism on American political institutions was a cause of concern for some congressmen.²⁵ They associated imperialism with militarism and war: colonies were not only economic assets, but military liabilities and risks. Imperial countries had to be ready to protect their colonies from external and internal threats through the use of military force, and U.S. colonial control of the Philippines would not

Christ. I am in favor of the United States continuing as a **peaceful Republic, not a conquering empire**. We should not become entangled in the rivalries of European kingdoms, but be content with the banishment of European tyranny from this hemisphere. I would not sell the principles upon which our Republic is founded for a mess of potage in the Philippines. Why we should run after 'strange gods?' Let this Government move along in the same orbit has transformed a few scattered colonies into a great nation, and fanned a feeble spark into a beacon light among the nations of the earth." For Stedman, "If the Republic could not live half slave and half free, tell me how it will fulfill the high destiny for which it was intended by Providence with millions of men 10,000 miles away held in bondage against their will, with no voice in the Government which controls them. [...] The greatness of the American Republic does not rest upon the accumulation of colonial possessions." John L. McLaurin (D-SC), Op cit and Stedman Op. cit. See also Gray, CR, H, 63rd-2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 14, 1914, p. 16615. Emphasis mine.

²⁴ Cline, Op. cit.

²⁵ Harvey Helm (D-KY), CR, H, 63rd-2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 14, 1914, p. 16614 and Marcus A. Smith (D-AZ), CR, S, 64th-1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, p. 74.

be an exception to that rule.²⁶ The Philippines would force the United States to keep a large standing army and build a powerful navy in order to protect the archipelago,²⁷ transforming the United States into a military and naval power.

European countries' colonial empires posed no threat to their monarchical political systems, because militarism was a normal element in their societies: they had nothing to lose. The United States, on the other hand, could not keep control of the Philippines without becoming a military power; and could not become a military power without endangering its democratic and republican institutions.²⁸ Therefore, retention of the Philippines risked transforming the United States into an imperialistic and undemocratic nation.

Some members of Congress also saw retention of the Philippines as a menace to what they identified as the foundation of American foreign policy: isolationism. They claimed that before the acquisition of the Philippines the United States was an isolated country that did not have to worry about invasions or political alliances. The Pacific and Atlantic oceans kept the nation safe and made a large military and naval establishment unnecessary. The Treaty of Paris, however, had made the United States no longer an isolated country, but an Asian-power. Legislators argued that America's new international responsibilities could take the United States into the very "entangling alliances" George Washington had warned against a century before.²⁹ Because of the Philippines, the United States risked involvement in European and Oriental politics, with the myriad political, military and economic dangers that entailed. In addition, the end of

²⁶ According to William G. Brantley (D-GA), retention of the Philippines would force the United States "to be ever ready for war, just as all Europe is today." William G. Brantley (D-GA), "What is to be done with the Philippines," House of Representatives, February 22, 1900, pp. 25 and 29.

²⁷In 1914, Representative Helm (D-KY) argued that "If we are going to embark in this war game and colonial, we need a Navy that will be as much greater than England as England and her allies are now to Germany a standing Army stronger and more efficient than Germany's. How long will this Republic last after this warlike policy has been established." Harvey Helm (D-KY), CR, H, 63rd -2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 14, 1914, p. 16614.

²⁸ For example, 1901 Representative Charles A. Towne (D-MN) argued that one of the risks of retaining the Philippines was "dangerous growth of the executive power:" militarism would open the door to dictatorship. Towne, Op. cit, pp. 31-33.

²⁹ Brantley, Op. cit.

American isolationism and the sudden emergence of new military and strategic needs threatened to make the United States a “warlike nation.”³⁰ No previous republic, they concluded, had survived such changes and the United States would not be an exception. Again, the only way out of these dilemmas was to leave the Philippines as soon as possible.

Expansionism vs. Imperialism

A related issue involved the Philippines’ historic and political significance for the United States. Some members of Congress were concerned about how acquisition of the Philippines fit into American traditional expansionism. They saw it as not only illegal and immoral, but also a departure from America’s previous territorial expansion. For example, in 1900, Representative Adolph Meyer (D-LA) contended that acquisition of the Philippines was not “**honorable, natural, and wise.**”³¹ He identified four main reasons why acquisition of the Philippines broke with the nation’s traditional expansionism: the Philippines were not a contiguous territory; they were populated by an inferior race that could endanger American political system; they were not an “unsettled and unoccupied territory open for American emigration; and they were acquired by force. Meyer’s list reflects an imagined American continental expansionism: a peaceful and legal expansion over an empty land, from which the Indian wars, the Mexican American War, and the conquest and deprivation of indigenous nations of their land, freedom, and cultures—during the congressman’s own lifetime—were strikingly absent.³²

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Adolph Meyer (D-Louisiana), War is the Sport and Game of Kings, H, March 26, 1900, pp. 19-20. Emphasis mine.

³² Ibid. For American continental expansion, see Anders Stephanson. *Manifest Destiny American Expansionism and the Empire of Right*. New York: Hill and Wang; 1995; Reginald Horsman. *Race and Manifest Destiny the Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981; Eric J. Sundquist. "The Literature of Expansion and Race." Sacvan Bercovith (Editor), *The Cambridge History of American Literature*. pp. 127-328. vol. 2. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1995, and Richard Drinnon. *Facing West: the Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980.

Geographical separation was a distinct problem for congressional opponents of American control of the archipelago.³³ They argued that the Philippines were not only populated by different races (or groups of races), but were too far from the United States. Unlike Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Philippines were out of America's natural geographical sphere. There was no geographic contiguity with the Philippines that could justify acquisition and retention of the islands.³⁴ For them, acquisition of the Philippines not only broke with the tradition of expansion into contiguous territory, but also moved America's borders thousands of miles away into a problematic and dangerous international arena. On March 1, 1900, Senator Alexander S. Clay (D-GA) replied to Senator Albert Beveridge's defense of U.S. policy in the Philippines. According to Clay,

If the Senator's [Beveridge] information be reliable, does he calculate for a minute what a responsibility our government assumes when we **become responsible for the future of this barbarous and ignorant race on the other side of the world, 10,000 miles away from our Capitol**; especially, Mr. President, when this people have been conquered by our soldiers and have been embittered against the American people and look at us with the same jealousy and hatred they have so long cherished toward Spain?³⁵

Clay underlined racial composition, geographical distance, and the use of violence against Filipinos as problems the United States faced in the Philippines. The islands were too far from the United States, and inhabited by a recently-conquered alien race who, therefore, had no reason to be happy under American flag.

Fifteen years later, the distance between the Philippines and the United States was still a problem. According to Senator Porter J. McCumber (R-ND),

³³ William G. Brantley (D-GA), *What is to be done with the Philippines*, H, February 22, 1900, p. 25; Alexander S. Clay (D-GA), *Policy Relative to the Philippine Islands*, March 1, 1900, pp. 11, and 14-15; Henry A. Cooper (R-WI), CR, H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 2, 1914, p. 16094, non-typed; Charles F. Curry (R-CA), CR, H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 14, 1914, p. 16620, non-typed; Charles S. Thomas (D-CO), CR, S, 64-1, 53, S 381, January 24, 1916, p. 1449; United States Congress, H, 63rd, 2nd, CIA, Report No. 115, August 26, 1914, *Report to Accompany H. R. 18459, Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands*, p. 8; William E. Borah (R-ID), LC, M D, Papers of William E. Borah, Box 32, Philippines, 1915-1916, Letter, February 15, 1916; Porter J. McCumber (R-ND) CR, S, 64th-1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 28, 1916, p. 1682; and Meyer, Op. Cit.

³⁴ William G. Brantley (D-GA), *Op. cit.*

³⁵ Clay (D-GA), *Op. cit.* Emphasis mine.

There is a vast difference between expanding upon this side of the hemisphere, between purchasing and making part of our domain a territory adjoining us, peopled by a white race, and pressing control over into Asiatic waters and seizing upon a people of an entirely different race, with little or no Caucasian blood in their veins. They have their civilization; we have ours.³⁶

Clay emphasized cultural and racial differences, as well as geographical distance. The United States now ruled a distant colony, peopled by an “entirely different race.”

RACIAL ANTI-IMPERIALISM

Race played a very important role in congressional discussions of the Philippines. According to Eric Foner, in the 1890's, white middle-class Americans abandoned an egalitarian vision of American citizenship and adopted racially determined definitions of freedom and citizenship, for which only white Anglo-Saxons qualified.³⁷ According to Foner, this resulted from the social conflicts (strikes, Populism, social and political violence, etc) that characterized the last decades of nineteenth century, as well as the arrival of thousands of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. According to Foner,

By the turn of the century, the language of ‘race’- race conflict, race feeling, and race problems- has assumed a central place in American public discourse.³⁸

Foner also argues that white middle-class Americans were influenced by the late 19th century's dominant idea of race as a set of determined characteristics that defined an individual or a group of persons.³⁹

³⁶ McCumber Op. cit. Senator William E. Borah (R-ID) also saw distance as a great obstacle for American colonialism in the Philippines. He favored Filipino independence because: “I do not want a noncontiguous territory seven thousands miles from home mainland.” LC, M D, Papers of William E. Borah, Box 32, Philippines, 1915-1916, Letter, February 15, 1916.

³⁷ Foner, Op. cit. p. 130.

³⁸ Ibid. p. 131.

³⁹ Ibid, pp. 185-189. For more about the development of American racism in the late 19th and early 20th century, see Hazel M. McFerson. *The Racial Dimension of American Overseas Colonial Policy*. Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies, no. 33. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood

As part of American society, members of Congress were influenced by the new ideas and racial definitions developed in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century. Discussion of the Philippine issues gave them a great opportunity to discuss their ideas about the United States' racial future. For some of them, the Philippines were not only a political, but also a racial menace, which led them to oppose retention of the islands. Supporters of this 'racial anti-imperialism' had two concerns: incorporation of the Philippines as a state of the Union, and transformation of the Filipinos into American citizens. They argued that incorporation of Filipinos into the American body politic would drastically change the nation's political structure and destroy American political institutions. For them, Filipinos were racially inferior, and therefore incompatible with the American political system. Filipinos were a racial menace for the United States because they could not be Americanized and, therefore, they could not be incorporated into American political body without endangering it.⁴⁰

For congressional opponents of American colonialism in the Philippines, especially southern Democrats, democracy and republicanism were not universal, but racial products.⁴¹ Only white Anglo-Saxon peoples had developed democratic and republican governments. In their racial ideology, American political system was not only a product of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, but also its brightest and highest expression. They focused on Filipinos' political capabilities, arguing that Filipinos political incapability was caused by their racial composition. For them, Filipinos' racial inferiority

Press, 1997; Rubin Francis Weston. *Racism in U.S. Imperialism the Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893-1946*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972; Matthew Frye Jacobson. *Whiteness of a Different Color European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1998; and Dyer, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race*. Baton Rouge and London, Louisiana State University, 1980.

⁴⁰ James K. Vardaman (D-MS), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 17, 1916, p. 1152 and January 24, 1916, pp. 1501 and 1558, and William P. Borland (D-MO), CR, H, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 17, 1916, p. 1152 and January 24, 1916, p. 7199.

⁴¹ For an analysis of historical relations between Anglo-Saxonism and American imperialism see: Horsman, Op. Cit, Stephanson, Op. cit., and John Carlos Rowe. *Literary Culture and U. S. Imperialism. From The Revolution to World War II*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 104

was a serious and insuperable obstacle.⁴² There was no future for Filipinos in the American union because they lacked the racial conditions, discipline, and intelligence for self-government. In other words, the Filipinos' racial inferiority could never be overcome; they would never be ready for self-government and could never be incorporated into American political system.⁴³ Therefore, the United States should end its involvement with these islands.

This was a strong argument among congressional opponents of retention of the Philippines during the first thirty years of U.S. colonialism in the islands. As early as 1900, Representative William G. Brantley (D-GA) argued that

The character, the habits, the interests, and the civilization of the people inhabiting them (the Philippines) are such that our **Anglo-Saxon civilization**, or better still, our American civilization, **would never consent that these people should have equal voice and equal power with us in the management of our own affairs.** They (Filipinos) **are too far removed from us** also for a community of interest and action to ever exist between them and us.⁴⁴

Brantley saw American control of the Philippines as a mistake because Filipinos were racially incompatible with the American political system and Anglo-Saxon civilization.

⁴² It is necessary to underline that, unlike many American producers of knowledge on the Philippines, many members of Congress saw Filipinos as a single people, not a group of heterogeneous and irreconcilable tribes, but homogeneous in their racial undesirability.

⁴³ Alexander S. Clay (D-GA), Policy Relative to the Philippine Islands, March 1, 1900, pp. 9-10, 11, 14-15; Vardaman (D-MS), CR, S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 24, 1916, p. 1501,1558; James B. Clark, (D-MO), 1900,#5; Colt, S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, pp. 1069-1070.

⁴⁴ William G. Brantley (D-GA), What is to be done with the Philippines, House of Representatives, February 22, 1900, p. 25. Representative Alexander S. Clay (D-GA) emphasized the consequences of acquisition of the Philippines. He argued that "We necessarily take with them [the Filipinos] the very population which he describes as ignorant, barbarous, dishonest, indolent, corrupt, treacherous, and incapable of understanding the elementary principles of Anglo-Saxon government? **You can not separate the country from the population; when you take one you become responsible for the other.**" Alexander S. Clay (D-GA), Policy Relative to the Philippine Islands, March 1, 1900, # ix. Emphasis mine.

For Brantley, the Philippines could never be incorporated into the American body politic because of irreconcilable differences between Filipinos and Americans.⁴⁵

During the discussion of the 1916 Jones Bill, Senator Thomas Sterling (R-SD) also identified self-government as an Anglo-Saxon quality. He argued that Anglo-Saxon racial capacity for self-government and colonial administration was a historical fact. He identified British colonial policy as the best example of Anglo-Saxons' natural political ability, and that history had shown that tropical races were incapable of developing or maintaining a democratic political system. For Sterling, Congress should pay attention to those facts in determining the Philippines political future. According to him,

History fails to record, Mr. President, that any other race than the white or the Caucasian race in the Tropic Zone ever formed or maintained for any time any system approaching that of popular self-government; and it is a serious question, to say the least, whether it ever will.⁴⁶

For Sterling, only Caucasian peoples were able to develop self-government, and Filipinos as a non-Caucasian race, were politically incompetent and unassimilable by the U.S.⁴⁷

On October 3, 1914, Representative William D. H. Murray (D-OK) proposed an amendment to the second Jones Bill asking for the extension of the right to trial by jury to the Philippines,⁴⁸ leading to a debate in which racial arguments figured prominently. During that debate, Representative Charles L. Bartlett (D-GA) argued that the right to

⁴⁵ Sixteen years later Senator LeBaron B. Colt (R-RI) also argued that Filipinos could never incorporate into American body politic, because they were racially unacceptable. According to him, Anglo Saxon political system was "based upon custom and usage and representing a growth of centuries. [...] Our history also demonstrates that this form of government can only be successfully carried on by an intelligent people long accustomed to self-restraint, experienced in the art of government and who are imbued with a legal spirit. Senator William E. Borah (R-ID) also thought that Filipinos were unfit for Anglo-Saxon political structures. According to him, "I am equally satisfied that these people will never be fitted for self-government so as to become responsible factors in Anglo-Saxon civilization." LeBaron B. Colt, S, 64th-1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, pp. 1069-1070 and William E. Borah, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Borah, Box 32, Philippines, 1915-1916, Letter, February 15, 1916.

⁴⁶ Thomas Sterling (R-SD) CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S 381, January 8, 1916, p. 723.

⁴⁷ For Sterling, Argentina was more capable of self-government "after about 100 years of trial at self-government and by a Caucasian race." Ibid, p. 714.

⁴⁸ William D. H. Murray (D-Oklahoma), CR, H, 63rd -2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 14, 1914, 16134. Murray amendment was not approved.

trial by jury was part of Anglo-Saxon history. However, he thought that it was America's duty to apply this right in the Philippines as part of her civilizing mission in the archipelago.⁴⁹ On the other hand, Representative Clarence B. Miller (R-MN) rejected the Murray Amendment arguing that not all the "principles of liberty peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon race" could be applied to Filipinos, who lacked the aptitude to deal with them. In addition, Miller reminded members of Congress that there were in the islands 1,200,000 non-Christians and non-civilized peoples that were not ready for this kind of right.⁵⁰ In other words, Miller thought that Anglo-Saxon civilization was too much for the Filipinos.

Representative Finis J. Garrett (D-TN) also thought that Filipinos were racially unqualified for trial by jury. During debate over the 1914 Jones Bill, he argued that

We, all springing from the **Anglo-Saxon race**, entertain the same sentiments with regard to the jury system; but in the light of the conditions existing in the Philippine Islands we in committee, I think I may say with practical unanimity, come to the conclusion that it was not wise to ingraft upon the judiciary system of that people an institution which is purely a development of **our race**, and to which **that race** [Filipinos] has never been accustomed.⁵¹

For Garrett, trial by jury was an Anglo-Saxon invention that could not be applied to islands populated by a race unaccustomed to such an institution.

Like Brantley, Sterling, Garrett, and Barlett, other members of Congress also argued that the Philippines could not become an American state because of insuperable racial and cultural differences. For them, Filipinos were not only different from Americans, but totally opposed; therefore, Filipinos could never be incorporated into American nation. They could never become American citizens, could never be Americanized, and could never be incorporated into the American body politic.⁵² They concluded that if the Philippines could never become a state and Filipinos could never

⁴⁹ CR, H, 63rd -2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 14, 1914, 16135.

⁵⁰ Clarence B. Miller (R-MN), CR, H, 63rd -2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 14, 1914, 16135-36.

⁵¹ Finis J. Garrett (D-TN), CR, H, 63rd -2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 14, 1914, 16136. Emphasis mine.

⁵² According to Senator Shafroth, "We will never treat them as citizens, because as such they will be entitled to statehood." William F. Shafroth (D-CO), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S 381, January 7, 1916, p. 654.

become American citizens, then American control of the archipelago was against the fundamental bases of American political system.⁵³

The virus of miscegenation

Some members of Congress focused on racially-determined cultural differences between Filipinos and Americans. For example, in 1914, Representative Charles F. Curry (R-CA) argued that Filipinos were “an alien and **nonassimilable** race, with different habits of thought and mode of living.”⁵⁴ Also in 1914, Representative Cyrus Cline (D-IN) argued that,

We have nothing in common with the Filipinos, and never can have, **because of race differences that are insurmountable.** [...] These people are opposed to us in every essential of life, character, and personality; yield to us with an increasing aversion, while we proclaim to them and to the world our belief in the essential principles of personal liberty.⁵⁵

For some members of Congress, Filipinos were not only different, but also dangerous because they could infect American political system and society, like a racial virus.⁵⁶ For example, in 1916, Senator John S. Williams (D-MS) argued that political

⁵³James B. Clark, (D-MO), *The Philippine Problem*, H, Missouri, February 5, 1900, pp. 4- 5; Norris, CR, S, 64th- 1st, S. 381, January 31, 1916, p. 1793; Henry A. Cooper (R-WI), CR, H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 2, 1914, p. 16094; Charles S. Thomas (D-CO), CR, S, 64-1, 53, S 381, January 24, 1916, p. 1449; Vardaman (D-MS), CR, S, 64-1 S, 53, S. 381, January 24, 1916, p. 1501,1558; Marcus A. Smith (D-AZ), S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, p. 1076; Cyrus Cline (D-IN), H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 16, 1914, p. 1224; William G. Brantley (D-GA), *What is to be done with the Philippines*, H, February 22, 1900, p.7,17, 27; Alexander S. Clay (D-GA), *Policy Relative to the Philippine Islands*, March 1, 1900, #ix; Charles F. Curry (R-CA), CR, H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 14, 1914, 16620, handwritten; John S. Williams (D-MS), S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 8, 1916, p. 724; Cummings, S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, February 1, 1916, p. 1936; William P. Borland (D-MO), CR, H, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 17, 1916, p. 1152 and January 24, 1916, p. 7199; and William E. Borah (R-ID), Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Borah, Box 32, *Philippines, 1915-1916*, Letter, February 15, 1916.

⁵⁴ Charles F. Curry (R-CA), CR, H, 63rd-2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 14, 1914, p. 16620.

⁵⁵ Cyrus Cline (D-IN), H, 63rd-2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 16, 1914, p. 1224. Emphasis mine.

⁵⁶ Senator Benjamin S. Tillman (D-SC) also used the virus metaphor to argue against retention of the Philippines, attacking one of the imperialists' main arguments: that the United States should not leave the islands until the political education of Filipinos was completed and the Philippines were ready for self-government. According to Tillman, Filipinos would never be ready for self-

integration of the Philippines body would poison American “body politic with an **inalienable and nonassimilable blood.**”⁵⁷ Similarly, Senator James K Vardaman (D-MS) argued that the United States should leave the Philippines to avoid “black virus of incompetence.”⁵⁸ According to him,

As a matter of fact, we have always contended that we were not going to hold them. We knew they were not fit for citizenship in this Republic. **We did not desire that the Philippine Islands become States,** because we did not want any more of that **colored virus** injected into the body politic, and we were only holding them there until such time as they might be qualified under the control of the United States Government to maintain a government of their own. Not such a Government as ours, but a government for themselves.⁵⁹

Vardaman thought the United States had too many problems with African Americans to incorporate another inferior and incompatible race into the U.S. body politic.

Members of Congress were also concerned by the specter of miscegenation. They claimed that retention of the Philippines would open the door to interaction between the white and the brown race. That interaction could lead to dangerous miscegenation, weakening America’s racial stock. Any change in the society’s racial composition would endanger American civilization and political system. For example, in 1916, Senator James K. Vardaman (D-MS) argued that

government because they were a non-white people with a “**Spanish virus of misgovernment injected into their blood and bones.**” He concluded that it was unfair to use Filipinos political incapability “as a pretext for U. S. stewardship.” In other words, for Tillman, the Filipinos were incapable of self-government not only because of their racial stock, but also because they were colonized not by an Anglo-Saxon country, but by what he saw as a Latin, Catholic and medieval nation. Representative Clarence R. Miller (R-MN) and Senator Albert J. Beveridge (R-IN) also saw the Philippines’ Spanish colonial background as a cause of Filipinos’ political incompetence. Quoted by Stephen Kantrowitz, *Ben Tillman and the Reconstruction of White Supremacy*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000, pp. 262-263; Clarence R. Miller (R-MN) CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, April 21, 1914, p. 7037, and Beveridge, Policy Regarding the Philippines, January 9, 1900, p. 3. Emphasis mine.

⁵⁷ John S. Williams (D-MS), S, 64th-1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 8, 1916, p. 724. Emphasis mine.

⁵⁸ Vardaman (D-MS), CR, S, 64th-1st, S, vol. 53, S. 381, January 17, 1916, p. 1152.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, January 24, 1916, p. 1558. Emphasis mine.

We all know that race political equality means ultimate social equality- social equality will be followed in turn race amalgamation- race amalgamation will produce race deterioration- race mongrelization, and that will be followed inevitably by disintegration and death of our civilization. Of course, Mr. President, I am speaking of races as diametrically different as the Negro, the Mongolians, and the white races.⁶⁰

For Vardaman, Filipino incorporation into the U.S. body politic would open the (bedroom) door to dangerous and unnecessary intercourse between Filipinos and whites. Because Filipinos were an inferior race, that miscegenation would weaken America's racial stock, and thus weakened, America's civilization and political institutions would decline. Thus, miscegenation was a national security issue.

In conclusion, members of Congress who deployed racial arguments against American control of the Philippines were more concerned about the racial and political future of the United States than in Filipinos' welfare, American international interests or other geopolitical or ideological considerations. They did not want the Philippines because they saw the islands as a menace to their idea of the United States as a white (Anglo-Saxon) society.⁶¹ They also wanted to protect American "internal colonial hierarchies" and keep white hegemony over American society and political institutions.⁶² Congressional opponents of American control of the Philippines saw Filipino

⁶⁰ Vardaman (D-MS), CR, S, 64-1 S, 53, S. 381, January 24, 1916, p. 1501.

⁶¹ Marcus A. Smith (D-AZ), S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, p. 1076, handwritten; Jacob T. (R-NJ), CR, H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 1, 1914, p. 16040; Cyrus Cline (D-IN), CR, H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 16, 1914, handwritten; George F. Burgess (D-TX), H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 2, 1914, p. 16087; Henry A. Cooper (R-WI), Ph Independence, H, CIA, H. J. Res. 131, H. R. 3924, H. J. Res. 127, H. R. 2817, 1924), Charles A. Towne (D-MN), 1901; William E. Mason (R-IL), 1899; George F. Hoar (R-MA), 1898) (Berry, 1899) (Thomas W. Hardwick (D-GA), S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 19, 1916, #137; William E. Chilton (D-WV), CR, S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, # 76; Marcus A. Smith (D-AZ), CR, S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, #74; William P. Borland (D-MO), H, 63-2, 51, Jones Bill, October 1, 1914, p. 16034, hand-written; William F. Shafroth (D-CO), CR, S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 7, 1916, p. 653, hand-written.

⁶² According to Rowe, "The apparent paradox that many groups were anti-imperialist precisely because they feared the collapse of the imperium at home helps explain, I think, why so many organized anti-imperialist movements, like the Anti-Imperialist League, were politically conservative and often overtly racist." The phrase is from Rowe. Rowe Op. cit. p. 7.

independence as necessary for racial and political self-defense.⁶³ Only Filipino independence could adequately protect America's civilization and political system from the Filipino threat. In 1900, Representative for Georgia William G. Brantley made this position explicit:

Mr. Chairman, in all that I have said I have not discussed the Filipinos themselves. **My concern has not been for them, but for us.**⁶⁴

DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Chapter 1, described the hotly-contested issue of defending the Philippines: architects of American knowledge production about the Philippines strongly debated the strategic and military meaning of the archipelago for the United States,⁶⁵ and Congress was an important locus of that debate. For more than twenty years, members of Congress grappled with several basic questions: Were the Philippines a strategic asset or a source of weakness? Could the Philippines be defended? How much should the United States government invest in the protection of a colonial possession located thousands of miles away? It should not be surprise that like the writers analyzed in chapter 1, congressional representatives developed two opposing answers to each of those questions.

This section will describe how congressional opponents of U.S. control of the Philippines answered those questions, justifying Filipino independence as necessary for national defense.

The Philippines as a strategic weakness

Representation of the Philippines as a security liability was a very important rhetorical strategy for congressional opponents of retention of the islands. Although they used different phrases ("weak-link," "weak point," "source of danger," etc), they agreed in their representation of the Philippines as the most vulnerable piece of land under the

⁶³ Vardaman (D-MS), CR, S, 64-1 S, 53, S. 381, January 24, 1916, p. 150; Marcus A. Smith (D-AZ), CR, S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, #74; William F. Shafroth (D-CO), S, 64-1, 53, S. 381, January 7, 1916, p. 653.

⁶⁴ William G. Brantley (D-GA), What is to be done with the Philippines, H, February 22, 1900, #x. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁵ Chapter 1, pp. 35-40

American flag. They strongly argued that the islands were not a strategic asset, but a source of continuous weakness and danger, exposing the United States to attacks against which it could scarcely defend.⁶⁶

Congressional opponents of colonialism in the Philippines argued that retention of the archipelago ended America's traditional isolationism and exposed the United States to unnecessary and unworthy dangers. In February 1899, Senator Horace Chilton (D-TX) argued that retention of the Philippines made the United States vulnerable to any enemy who might attack where the Americans were weak, the Philippines, and then wait for the U.S. government to react. The United States would then have no choice but to send a fleet to fight thousands of miles away, allowing America's enemy to decide when and

⁶⁶ Horace Chilton (D-TX), "Acquisition of Territory- we should take no partnership in the Social and political troubles of the Old World," Senate, Feb 4, 1899, p. 11-13; Adolph Meyer (D-LA), "War is the Sport and Game of Kings." -H, March 26, 1900, p. 17-18; Edward W. Carmack (D-TN), CR, S, 58th- 2nd, vol. 38, March 3, 1904, p. 2733; Augustus O. Bacon (D-GA), CR, S, 58th, 2nd, vol. 38, March 3, 1904, p. 2733; Horace M. Towner (R-IA) CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, September 26, 1914, p. 15802; Andrew Jackson Montague (D-VA) CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, October 14, 1914, Jones Bill, p. 16624; Charles S. Thomas (D-CO), CR, S, 63rd, 3rd, vol. 51, June 2, 1914, Naval Appropriation Bill, p. 9640; Cyrus Cline (D-IN) CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, October 16, 1914, Jones Bill, p. 1224; Finis J. Garrett (D-TN), CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, October 14, 1914, Jones Bill, p. 16624; John W. Weeks, (R-MA), CR, S, 63rd, 3rd, Committee on the Philippines, *Government of the Philippines, Hearings*, H. R. 18459, December 16, 1914. p. 133; Charles F. Curry (R-CA), CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, October 14, 1914, p. 16620; Finly H. Gray (D-IN), CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, October 16, 1914, Jones Bill, p. 16615; Finly H. Gray (D-IN), CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, October 16, 1914, Jones Bill, p. 16615; Joseph Taggart (D-KS), CR, H, 63rd, 3rd, vol. 52, January 29, 1915, NAB, p. 2726; John S. Williams (D-MS), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916 p. 725; Charles M. Stedman (D-NC), CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 52, January 23, 1915, p. 2166 and 2168; LC, MD, Papers of Storey, Box 11, 1916, John F. Shafroth (D-CO), "Independence for the Philippines," *The Filipino People*, 3:9, January 1916, p. 9. [Originally published by *The New York Evening Post*, December 4, 1915]; James H. Lewis (D-IL) CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 19, 1916 p. 1258; James K. Vardaman (D-MS), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 25, 1916 p. 1497; Henry Lane (OR) CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 26, 1916 p. 1560 and February 2, 1916 p. 1995; James P. Clarke (D-AR), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916 p. 1682; Kenneth D. McKellar (D-TN), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916 p. 7178; Heflin (AL) CR, H, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916 p. 7169; William A. Jones (D-VA) CR, H, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916, p. 7149; Francis G. Newlands (D-NV), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 17, 1916, p. 663;; William A. Jones (D-VA) CR, H, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916, p. 7149; [signed by John C. Schafer (R-WI), Hallet S. Ward (D-NC), Guinn Williams (D-TX), Jacob L. Milligan (D-MO), Frank Gardner (D-IN), William C Salmon (D-TN), Heartsill Ragon (D-AR), and T Webber Wilson (D-MS); Joseph T. Robinson (D-AR), CR, S, 64th-1st, vol. 53, S. 281, January, 25, 1916, p. 1504; Henry F. Lippitt (R-RI) 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 19, 1916, p. 1252; Marcus A. Smith (D-AZ), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916 p. 1076; 68th-1st, H, Committee on Insular Affairs, Report 709, Pt. 2, *Minority Report to accompany H R 8856*, May 17, 1924, p. 15

where to fight.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Chilton argued, controlling the Philippines would entangle the United States in Europeans problems and wars. According to him,

When we go over the Philippines we have thrown ourselves upon the red-hot stove of international politics in the Eastern Hemisphere. [...] When we go to the Philippine Islands, we take our place on the Sea of China. France is there, England is there, Russia is there. Germany is there. **Trouble will be certain to ensue, and it will not be long in coming.** In my judgment twenty years will not elapse until we will be driven into hostile conflict with one or all the great Europeans nations.⁶⁸

Like Chilton, Representative Adolph Meyer (D-LA) saw acquisition of the Philippines as the end of America's natural and historical defense policy: isolationism. Before the retention of the Philippines, the United States was an invulnerable nation protected by two vast oceans and without permanent enemies, alliances or international interests. Retention of the Philippines changed this ending America's strategic invulnerability and reducing "our security at home against a foreign foe."⁶⁹ In other words, acquisition of the Philippines changed the rules of international game for the United States.

This conversation continued throughout the 1910's. During the debate over the 1916 Jones Bill, Senator Henry Lane (D-OR) argued that the Philippines were "**the weak point in the line of our defense.**"⁷⁰ Lane combined his strategic concerns with a republican approach. For him, American first responsibility was to perpetuate American political institutions, and retention of the Philippines threatened them. Thus, for Lane, the

⁶⁷ Horace Chilton, (D-TX), "Acquisition of Territory- we should take no partnership in the Social and political troubles of the Old World. Senate, Feb 4, 1899, p. 11.

⁶⁸ Ibid. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁹ Adolph Meyer (D-LA), "War is the Sport and Game of Kings." House, March 26, 1900, p. 18.

⁷⁰ Henry Lane (D-OR), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, February 2, 1916 p. 1995. Emphasis mine.

Philippines were a political and strategic problem for the United States that had to be solved, both to keep the country safe and to protect American republican institutions.⁷¹

According to Senator James K. Vardaman (D-MS), the Philippines were “the most vulnerable point in all American possessions.”⁷² For Senator Thomas W. Hardwick (D-GA), the Philippines not only ended American isolationism, but also were “a great source of national weakness to this country” and a “source of ever-present and ever-increasing danger.”⁷³ Representative Kenneth D. McKellar (D-TN) argued that the Philippines were “a constant menace to us.” According to him, retention of the archipelago forced the United States to keep a fleet in the Pacific Ocean that could be used to protect American coastline. In other words, American control of the Philippines dangerously over-extended America’s homeland defenses.⁷⁴

For some members of Congress, the Philippines were a strategic security risk, without any positive strategic value for America.⁷⁵ During the debate over the second Jones Bill in 1914, Representative Finis J. Garrett (D-TN) denied that the Philippines were an economic or strategic asset, calling them “a source of military weakness.”⁷⁶ Two

⁷¹ According to Lane, the United States should “notify the world that this is going to continue to be a great, strong, self-respecting Government, compelling the respect of the other nations of the earth.” *Ibid.*

⁷² James K. Vardaman (D-MS), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 25, 1916 p. 1497.

⁷³ According to Thomas, “So that the continued permanent possession of these islands, in my judgment, not only increases the danger that this country is in trouble with foreign powers, but it infinitely and almost indescribably weakens our strong position of isolation from other powers and our strong defensive position against aggression from any quarter.” Thomas W. Hardwick (D-GA), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 19, 1916 p. 1253.

⁷⁴ According to McKellar, “As long as it is divided, one part in one hemisphere and a part in another hemisphere, we are vastly weakened. Nothing could add to the strength of our Navy like our having it around our own country.” Kenneth D. McKellar (D-TN), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916 p. 7179.

⁷⁵ Andrew Jackson Montague (D-VA) CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, October 14, 1914, Jones Bill, p. 16624; Finis J. Garrett (D-TN), CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, October 14, 1914, Jones Bill, p. 16624; and John S. Williams (D-MS), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916, p. 724.

⁷⁶ Garrett, 1914, Op. cit.

years later, John S. Williams (D-MS) agreed with Garrett, arguing that the Philippines were strategically worthless. According to him,

The Philippines are not for us a strategic defense; they are simply a useless offense, by the fact of our occupancy, to all the Orient- to all Trans-Pacific peoples, including Japanese.⁷⁷

Filipino independence as self-defense

The fear of war over the Philippines was very strong among some members of Congress, from the beginning of the U.S. presence in the archipelago. At the turn of the 20th century, Senator Horace Chilton (D-TX) and Representative Adolph Meyer (D-LA) argued that a war over the Philippines was a matter of time.⁷⁸ Senator Edward W. Carmack (D-TN) argued that the Philippines weakened America's strategic position, and—worse—would lead the United States inevitably to war. According to him,

The danger of our getting into a foreign war is greatly increased by our holding of the Philippines, and our defensive strength is increasingly weakened by our possession of the Philippine Islands. We are in greater danger of getting into a war and we would be a great deal weaker after we got into the war by reason if holding the Philippines.⁷⁹

For these members of Congress, Filipino independence was the only way to avoid the dangers associated with retention of the Philippines, an essential defensive move ending an unworthy and dangerous relationship.

A good number of Senators and Representatives represented Filipino independence as a defensive move was during the debates over the Jones Bills in the 1910s.⁸⁰ One of them, Senator James P. Clarke (D-AR), declared, “We want to get out of

⁷⁷ Williams, 1916, Op. cit.

⁷⁸ Meyer, 1900, Op cit and Chilton, 1899, Op. cit.

⁷⁹ Edward W. Carmack (D-TN), CR, S, 58th- 2nd, vol. 38, March 3, 1904, p. 2733.

⁸⁰ Samuel A. Witherspoon (D-MS), “Statement of Rear Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, Commander in Chief Atlantic,” December 9, 1914, House, Committee on Naval Affairs, Hearings, 1914, vol. 114, p. 553; US Congress, H, 63rd, 2nd, Committee on Insular Affairs, Report No. 1115, August 31, 1914; William A. Jones (D-VA) CR, H, 63rd- 2nd, vol. 51, September 28, 1914, p. 15834; CR, H, 63rd- 2nd,

there [the Philippines] because we do not want to defend or be attacked in that quarter of the globe.”⁸¹ He was not alone; during the 1914 Jones Bill debate, Representative Cyrus Cline (D-IN) claimed that Americans should be concerned with their own security, as well as the welfare of the Filipinos.⁸² Two years later, Senator James H. Lewis (D-IL) identified the Philippines as “burden and danger” that should be ended by granting Filipino independence.⁸³

On January 24, 1916, Senator Charles S. Thomas (D-CO) argued for Filipino independence for reasons of national security, called upon an unexpected source: former President Theodore Roosevelt, historically one of the prime forces behind American colonialism in the Philippines, published a controversial article in the *Everybody's Magazine*⁸⁴ that identified the Philippines as a source of weakness for the United States.⁸⁵ Senator Thomas quoted Roosevelt's article on the floor of the House of Representatives, agreeing with Roosevelt and proposing Filipino independence as a necessary and unavoidable “self-defense” move.⁸⁶

Representative William A. Jones (D-VA), a major advocate of Filipino independence, also referred to security concerns in support of his position, though it must

vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 2, 1914, p. 16078, and CR, H, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916, p. 7149; Charles M. Stedman (D-NC), CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 52, January 23, 1915, Jones Bill, p. 2168; Clement L. Brumbaugh (D-OH), CR, H, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916 p. 7191-92; Joseph T. Robinson (D-AR), CR, S, 64th-1st, vol. 53, S. 281, January, 25, 1916, p. 1504; Henry Lane (D-OR), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 31, 1916 p. 1803; John S. Williams (D-MS), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916 p. 725; James P. Clarke (D-AR), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 28, 1916 p. 1682; Charles S. Thomas (D-CO), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 24, 1916 p. 1449; James H. Lewis (D-IL) CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 19, 1916, p. 1257; Cyrus Cline (D-IN) CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, October 16, 1914, Jones Bill, p. 1224.

⁸¹ Clarke, 1916, Op. cit.

⁸² According to Cline, “Not only should we look to the well-being of the Filipino, but is not selfish to provide for own national safety.” Cline, Op. cit.

⁸³ Lewis, Op. cit.

⁸⁴ Theodore Roosevelt. "America -- on Guard!" *Everybody's Magazine* 32, no. 1 (1915): pp. 120-128.

⁸⁵ See Chapter 1, pp. 29-30.

⁸⁶ Thomas, Op. cit.

be emphasized that this was only one of the strands of his larger argument. In 1914, Jones recognized that the Philippines were “a source of military weakness and constant menace to our peace.”⁸⁷ For him, the Philippines jeopardized American security because they were too distant to be protected. Filipino independence would strengthen the United States’ global position.⁸⁸ Two years later, Jones again argued that the Philippines compromised national security:

I do not argue with the gentleman that an armed conflict between the Far East and Far West is inevitable. But if such a conflict shall ever come to provoking cause will be that the far-away Philippines constitute our most, if not our only vulnerable point, rather than any question of mere trade rivalry.⁸⁹

Thus, real or imagined dangers associated with the Philippines—rather than Filipinos’ welfare or promotion of American interests in Asia—moved a good number of congressional representatives to favor withdrawal from the archipelago as the solution to American dilemmas.

Defensibility of the Philippines

Debates about the Philippines’ defensibility revolved around one basic question: Was an indefensible colony worth holding? Opponents and supporters of U.S. rule debated this question for over thirty years,⁹⁰ and Congress was one of the main arenas of that debate. This section will focus on how congressional opponents of retaining the Philippines faced the question of Filipino defensibility by focusing on geographical issues. They argued that the distance between the islands and American continental

⁸⁷ William A. Jones (D-VA) CR, H, 63rd-2nd, vol. 51, September 28, 1914, p. 15834.

⁸⁸ Jones argued, “There may be room for difference of opinion as to what constitutes ample provision for national defense, but there can be none as to the obligation of the United States to defend every foot of territory over which the American flag floats, and the obligation to defend the Philippines against foreign attack, if they are to be held indefinitely, will be all the stronger, since they are held against.” William A. Jones (D-VA) CR, H, 64th-1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916, p. 7149.

⁸⁹ William A. Jones (D-VA) CR, H, 63rd-2nd, vol. 51, Jones Bill, October 2, 1914, p. 16078.

⁹⁰ See Chapter 1, pp. 35-41.

territory was an insurmountable difficulty that made defending the islands an impossible task. The United States' best course, for them, was to acknowledge that the Philippines could not be defended from external attack, and leave them as soon as possible.⁹¹

During the 1914 Jones Bill debate, Representative Finly H. Gray (D-IN) argued that distance between the United States and the Philippines made defending the islands too expensive. According to him, defense of the Philippines was only possible "at an appalling cost in treasure and an awful sacrifice of the lives of our citizens."⁹²

Two years later, Senator Marcus Aurelius Smith (D-AZ) also identified distance between the Philippines and the United States as an insurmountable obstacle:

We went into those islands (the Philippines) without a reason and remain there without any just cause to stay. They do not want us, and we do not need them. They are 3,000 miles farther from our shores than London or Berlin or Paris. From the Atlantic seaboard, they lie exactly through the globe, and from New York, it is as near to go through the Suez as the Panama Canal to reach them. They are no help to our trade or commerce. **They are a menace in times of peace, a veritable danger to our prestige, if not a deep humiliation at the end of any war with any maritime nation.**⁹³

For Smith, the Philippines were a distant, worthless possession that jeopardized American security and prestige. The nation risked too much by holding them; better to acknowledge that Filipinos did not want American protection and leave the islands.

Senator James H. Lewis (D-IL) argued considered the distance not only a major obstacle, but also a burden which extended

⁹¹ Charles F. Curry (R-CA), CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 51, October 14, 1914, p. 16620; Frederick H. Gillett (R-MA), CR, H, 63rd, 3rd, vol. 52, January 30, 1915, Naval Appropriation Bill, p. 2742; Marcus A. Smith (D-AZ) CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916 p. 1076; William A. Jones (D-VA), 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, may 1, 1916 p. 7149; Henry Lane (D-OR), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 31, 1916 p. 1803; Clement L. Brumbaugh (D-OH), CR, H, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916 p. 7191-92; John F. Shafroth (D-CO), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 7, 1916, p. 665; Finly H. Gray (D-IN), CR, 63rd, 3rd, vol. 51, October 14, 1914, Jones Bill, p. 16615; David A Reed (R-PA), National Archives, RG 46, SEN 68A-F20, folder 1, 68th Congress, 1st session, Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, *Philippine Independence*, S. 912, March 1, 1924, p. 54.

⁹² For Senator Shafroth (D-CO), distance between the Philippines and the United States "increases the difficulty of defense in almost a geometrical ratio." Gray, Op. cit and Shafroth Op. cit.

⁹³ Smith, Op. cit.

...our fortifications 7,000 miles away, with great seas between, increasing our Navy proportionately, adding to our Army reinforcements sufficient and such other burdens as are incident to an island possession bearing the relation which the Philippine Islands do to this Republic.⁹⁴

For Lewis, retention of the Philippines necessitated increased American military commitments, including a large standing army and navy.

Other members of Congress paid less attention to geographical concerns in their arguments that the Philippines were indefensible. One of them, Senator Thomas W. Hardwick (D-GA), acknowledged Filipino indefensibility as a serious problem for the United States, but focused on the international problems American retention of the Philippines would entail. In Hardwick's words,

If foreign complications are ever to come to this country from the East it will come because of our possession of the Philippine Islands or because of some question connected therewith, and that if such complications are to arise it will be almost, if not quite impossible to defend the Philippine Islands successfully against any considerable oriental power.⁹⁵

Representative William A. Jones (D-VA) also contended that Filipino independence was necessary because the Philippines were indefensible in case of war. However, though he considered the cost defending the Philippines be too high, Jones emphasized that the main element for a successful defense of the Philippines were not battleships, fortifications or the number of American soldiers stationed on the islands, but Filipinos' good will. The main problem the United States faced in the Philippines was that it held them against the will of their population, and thus could not count on Filipinos' loyalty in case of an invasion. Still, even with Filipinos' loyalty, Jones argued that the United States could not defend the islands, and thus Filipino independence was the only solution to American dilemmas in the Philippines.⁹⁶ Jones concluded,

⁹⁴ Lewis, Op, cit.

⁹⁵ Hardwick, Op. cit.

⁹⁶ Jones, Op. cit.

I do not hesitate to express the opinion that it would be impossible to successfully defend them (the Philippines) against any first military and naval power.⁹⁷

Representative Frederick H. Gillett (R-MA) also argued that retention of the Philippines endangered American security. For him, the Philippines were an exposed possession that could be easily conquered by any power, especially the Japanese. He argued that fortifying the islands was nonsense and concluded that the United States had to get rid of them. Most interestingly, however, Filipino independence was not necessarily Gillett's first option; instead, he proposed selling the islands:

I should not mourn over their loss, because I have always considered them a burden rather than an advantage. I would gladly sell them now for what they cost us, and the natives would doubtless gladly be sold except for the hope from us they will some day receive independence. But after the Philippines were lost I can not see that a war with Japan alone would have serious effect on either combatant. Neither side would dare to send its navy to the distant home of its enemy and we could but hurl epithets at each other across the Pacific, only varied by an occasional daring raid.⁹⁸

For Robinson, it made no sense to keep the Philippines under the American flag if the government of the United States could not seriously defend them.

In conclusion, congressional opponents of U.S. control of the Philippines agreed that it was unwise to hold a territory whose indefensibility compromised American security; thus, Filipino independence was the best way out of this problem.

American honor

For some members of Congress, what was at stake at the Philippines was not only American security, but also American honor, pride, and prestige. They were very clear: if the Philippines were attacked and conquered, defense of American honor would compel the United States to regain them by any means or cost. American people would never

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Gillett, Op. cit.

tolerate any power wresting the Philippines from the United States; therefore, should the islands be lost, the United States would be forced to pay dearly—in blood and treasure—to recapture them.⁹⁹

These lawmakers argued that the Philippines were not only very distant, but also located in a turbulent region, and surrounded by European and Japanese colonies. They worried that colonial rivalry, economic competition (especially over China), military and naval arms races, and Japan's increasing power, all made a war over the Philippines a dreadful likelihood.

In 1916, John S. Williams (D-MS) reminded his congressional colleagues that what was at stake in the Philippines was not only American national pride, but also racial honor. According to him,

The American people, with their pride, **national and racial**, would not permit any administration to live its life out after it had deserted the Philippines as long as the flag floated there was being attacked by a public enemy. We would be compelled to defend them, and we would be compelled to exhaust men and treasure in doing it, in order to satisfy popular sentiment.¹⁰⁰

Representative Kenneth D. McKellar (D-TN) agreed with Williams that conquest of the Philippines by any world power would force the United States to reconquer the archipelago regardless of cost. Moreover, this sacrifice would be a waste of blood and treasure, because Filipinos were “the kind of people that could never become amalgamated with ours.” In other words, for McKellar, Filipinos were racially incompatible with American society and political system; therefore, whatever it might cost to protect them would be wasted.

Williams, McKellar, and other lawmakers identified Filipino independence as the only way to safeguard American honor from the dangers associated with the Philippines.

⁹⁹ Edward W. Carmack (D-TN), CR, S, 58th-2nd, vol. 38, March 3, 1904, p. 2733; Charles M. Stedman (D-NC), CR, H, 63rd, 2nd, vol. 52, January 23, 1915, Jones Bill, p. 2168; John S. Williams (D-MS), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 14, 1916 p. 724; Kenneth D. McKellar (D-TN), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916 p. 7178; and William A. Jones (D-VA) CR, H, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916, p. 7149.

¹⁰⁰ Williams, Op. cit. Representative Charles M. Stedman (D-NC) also used American prestige in arguing that the Philippines were “...a source of weakness to us and a constant menace to the prestige of the American flag.” Stedman, Op. cit. Emphasis mine.

American control of the Philippines as a menace for the islands

One interesting argument raised in Congress regarding defense of the Philippines was that American occupation of the islands endangered **Filipino** security: some members of Congress argued that rather than a source of protection, American flag was a source of danger for the islands. For them, the Filipinos would be safer as a free nation because no other power would be interested in conquering them; as an American colony, on the other hand, the islands would be a likely target for any potential rival of the United States in Asia. Furthermore, they argued, since the United States could not protect the islands anyway, why expose them to an unnecessary attack and very likely bloody war? Thus, independence was the only way to guarantee Philippines security and peace.¹⁰¹

AN ECONOMIC-MINDED CONGRESS

In addition to distance, congressional opponents of American control of the Philippines worried about costs. For them, retention of the Philippines was against America's best interests because of its high costs and meager benefits. Retention of the archipelago increased American military, and especially naval expenses, money which could be used to defend and develop the United States.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Shafroth, *Op. cit.*; Robinson (AR), CR, 64th, 1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 25, 1916, p. 1503; Moses E. Clapp (R-MN), 64th, 1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 19, 1916, p. 1253-1254; 68th-1st, H, Committee on Insular Affairs, Report 709, Pt. 2, *Minority Report to accompany H R 8856*, May 17, 1924, 15 [signed by John C. Schafer (R-WI), Hallet S. Ward (D-NC), Guinn Williams (D-TX), Jacob Leroy Milligan (D-MO), Frank Gardner (D-IN), W. C. Salmon, Heartsill Ragon (D-AR), and T Webber Wilson (D-MS)].

¹⁰² Francis G. Newlands (D-NV), *Public papers*, vol. 1, January 21, 1902, p. 68; John W Gaines (D-TN), CR, H, 58th- 2nd, vol. 38, February 23, 1904, p. 2277; William A. Jones (D-VA), CR, H, 58th, 2nd, vol. 38, Appendix, February 22, 1904, p. 162; John F. Rixey (D-VA), CR, H, 58th, 2nd, vol. 38, February 22, 1904, pp. 2210-2212; Augustus O. Bacon (D-GA), CR, 58th, 2nd, vol. 38, March 2, 1904, p. 2195; Edward W. Carmack (D-TN), CR, S, 58th- 2nd, vol. 38, March 3, 1904, p. 2733; Thomas W. Hardwick (D-GA), CR, H, 58th, 2nd, vol. 38, February 20, 1904, p. 2156; James L. Slayden (D-TX), CR, H, 59th, 2nd, vol. 41, February 12, 1907, p. 2775; LC, MD, Storey, Box 7, 1907, James B. Clark (D-MO), Cost of the Philippines and Imperialism, February 22, 1907, p. 1; Lemuel P. Padgett (D-TN), CR, H, 60th, 1st, vol. 42, April 10, 1908, pp. 4578-80; Eugene Hale (R-ME), CR, S, 60th, 1st, vol. 42 April 10, 1908, p. 5612; Charles S. Thomas (D-CO), CR, S, 63rd, 3rd, vol. 51, June 2, 1914, Naval Appropriation Bill, p. 9640; Finly H. Gray (D-IN), CR, 63rd, 3rd, vol. 51, October 14, 1914, Jones Bill, p. 16615; US Congress, H, 63rd, 2nd, Committee on Insular Affairs, Report No. 1115, August 26, 1914, *Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands. Report to Accompany H. R. 18459*;

Congressional debates over the real or imagined costs of acquiring and retaining the Philippines were intense. One of the main issues in those debates was how much money the United States government already had spent, and would spend by continuing to occupy the Philippines. Large sums allegedly spent by the United States were frequently cited in these debates. For example, in 1907, Representative James B. Clark (D-MO) argued that American expenses in the Philippines were “Not less than \$1,000,000,000 in nine years, or about \$110,000,000 a year, on an average.”¹⁰³ Eight years later, Representative Joseph Taggart (D-KS) argued that “We have spent more than a billion dollars holding those islands.”¹⁰⁴ The Democratic Senators from Colorado, William F. Shafroth and Charles S. Thomas, claimed that as of 1916, the United States had spent \$800,000,000 in the Philippines. Another figure came from Senator Henry F. Lippitt (R-RI), who estimated that the United States spent in the Philippines \$119,000,000 between 1903 and 1914, or \$9,475,000 annually.

The amounts varied, but the legislators who claimed these alleged high costs of colonial rule agreed that Filipino independence was necessary,¹⁰⁵ not only because retention of the Philippines was politically, racially, and strategically wrong for the United States, but also because the islands were a “continuing drain upon Treasury.”¹⁰⁶

Joseph Taggart (D-KS), CR, 63rd, 3rd, vol. 52, January 29, 1915, Naval Appropriation Bill, p. 2726; Henry F. Lippitt (R-RI), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 19, 1916, p. 1252; John F. Shafroth (D-CO) and Charles S. Thomas (D-CO), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 7, 1916, p. 661; James H. Lewis (D-IL), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 19, 1916, p. 1256-57; Joseph J. Russell (D-MO), CR, S 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, may 1, 1916, p. 7157; Moses E. Clapp (R-MN), CR, S 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 19, 1916, p. 1252; George W. Norris (R-NB), S, 64th- 1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 31, 1916, p. 1793; Clement L. Brumbaugh (D-OH), CR, H, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916 p. 7192; Henry Lane (D-OR), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 31, 1916 p. 1803; Francis G. Newlands (D-NV), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916 p. 663.

¹⁰³ Clark, Op. cit.

¹⁰⁴ Taggart, Op. cit.

¹⁰⁵ For example, Senator James H. Lewis (D-IL) argued that controlling the Philippines cost \$25,000,000 annually in military and naval expenses; in ten years, independence would save the United States \$250,000,000. Lewis, Op. cit.

¹⁰⁶ Gray, Op. cit.

Retention of the Philippines and American Military Expenses

Congressional opponents of American control of the Philippines cited U.S. military expenses to justify Filipino independence. According to them, acquiring the Philippines caused a dramatic increase in American military, and especially naval expenditures. They claimed that retention of the islands forced the United States to become a naval power, because only a powerful navy could protect them. Their primary objection to that transformation was its cost.

In 1904, Representative Thomas W. Hardwick (D-GA) argued that acquiring the Philippines was not good business for the United States. According to him, the War Department had spent \$170,000,000 in the Philippines from 1898 until May 1902. For him, the Philippines were the cause of increased American naval expenses, because retention of the Philippines forced the United States to possess a powerful and costly navy. He saw no justification for that expense, and proposed Filipino independence as a way out from what he saw as a heavy economic burden.¹⁰⁷

Hardwick was not the only congressional representative to link the Philippines and American naval expenses. In 1907, Representative James L. Slayden (D-TX) argued that without the Philippines “our naval expenses could cut half in two and our military budget greatly reduced.”¹⁰⁸ Nine years later, Representative Joseph J. Russell (D-MO), argued that “a large percentage of the amount desired for the maintenance of the Navy is made necessary by reason of our possession of the Philippine Islands, and that if our control over them should cease the appropriation could be decreased many millions of dollars.”¹⁰⁹ Senator Moses E. Clapp (R-MN) emphasized that it was necessary to consider the Philippines’ indirect, as well as direct costs for the United States. Prominent among these were the increased U.S. military and naval budget, “the many battleships that have probably been constructed, properly and necessary, because of our occupancy of the

¹⁰⁷Hardwick, *Op. cit.* Also in 1904, Augustus O. Bacon (D-GA) cited the Philippines’ “unprofitableness” in arguing for Filipino independence. According to him, the cost of defending the islands was a financial burden. Bacon argued that the United States was spending more money in the Philippines than it was getting back. Bacon, *Op. cit.*

¹⁰⁸ Slayden, *Op. cit.*

¹⁰⁹ Russell, *Op. cit.*

Philippines, and because of our duties and obligations and dangers there, and of the increase in naval armament for the same reasons.”¹¹⁰

Some members of Congress asked who profited from American military spending related to Philippines. During the 1916 Jones Bill debate, Senator Charles S. Thomas (D-CO) argued that there was a big-business conspiracy behind American control of the Philippines. According to Thomas, only military-related economic interests had been profiting from retention of the Philippines, whose defense gave them a great excuse to justify U.S. military expansion, and to keep their profits out from American tax-payers.¹¹¹ According to him,

The only benefit to anybody that our accession of the Philippines has thus far conferred has been to give the war trust one more point to press home upon the apprehensions of the American people and enable them to get bigger appropriation for war and naval purposes. The greatest mistake that war ever made in the history of this country, or one of the greatest, was when Dewey, after destroying the Spanish fleet, failed to sail away from the harbor of Manila and have that country its own destinies. I say, no Mr. President; that is merely one of the pretences for this enormous armament.¹¹²

For Hardwick, Slayden, Russell, Clapp, and Thomas, Filipino independence was the only way to save millions of American taxpayers’ dollars. For these congressional opponents of American control of the Philippines, Filipino independence presented was necessary not only for strategic, but also economic reasons.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Clapp. Op. cit. For Senator Thomas W. Hardwick (D-GA), retention of the Philippines was an economic mistake because the United States had spent some \$25,000,000 annually in increased military and naval expenses associated with the islands. In total, the Philippines have cost the United States not less than \$600,000,000. Hardwick, Op. cit.

¹¹¹ Thomas, Op. cit.

¹¹² Ibid. Representative Cyrus (D-IN) also thought retention of Philippines promoted military-related interests. CR, H, 63rd, 3rd, vol. 52, January 29, 1915, Naval Appropriation Bill, p. 2733.

¹¹³ Senator George W. Norris (R-NB) agreed with his colleagues that Filipino independence was necessary because of the millions the United States had spent in the islands’ defense.

American Priorities

Congressional opponents of U.S. Philippine policies also focused on the economic impact of ruling the islands on domestic issues and problems. They argued that the money being spent in the Philippines could be used not only to defend America's continental territory, but also to improve it.¹¹⁴

As previous sections discussed, some members of Congress saw no sense in investing millions of dollars on an indefensible territory, money they thought would be better used to defend American continental territory. This pragmatic approach emphasized American interests over Filipinos' needs.

The pragmatic approach was summed up by Senator Clement L. Brumbaugh (D-OH), who argued in 1916 that "**We need Corregidor at home.**"¹¹⁵ For him, the United States' security priority should be American continental territory, not a group of islands thousands of miles away. Senator Brumbaugh also argued that national relocation of U.S. naval and military forces from the Philippines would not only strengthen American national defences, but also save American taxpayers \$30,000,000.¹¹⁶

Also during debate over the 1916 Jones Bill, Senator William F. Shafroth (D-CO) added a geographical element to the pragmatic anti-colonial discourse: American expenses in the Philippines. He argued that the length of the Philippines' coastline complicated the archipelago's defense. The Philippines were not only too far from the United States, but were made up of thousands of islands with thousands miles of coastline, of which only a few miles of Filipino coastline could be fortified, According to

¹¹⁴ Newlands, *Public papers*, vol. 1, January 21, 1902, p. 68; John W Gaines (D-TN), CR, H, 58th- 2nd, vol. 38, February 23, 1904, p. 2277; John F. Rixey (D-VA), CR, H, 58th, 2nd, vol. 38, February 22, 1904, pp. 2210-2212; Edward W. Carmack (D-TN), CR, S, 58th- 2nd, vol. 38, March 3, 1904, p. 2733; Clement L. Brumbaugh (D-OH), CR, H, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916 p. 7192; Henry Lane (D-OR), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 31, 1916 p. 1803; Shafroth, CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, January 7, 1916 p. 665; Francis G. Newlands (D-NV), CR, S, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916 p. 663.

¹¹⁵ Brumbaugh, Op. cit. Emphasis mine. Corregidor is an island in Manila Bay where the U.S. Army built a powerful base that came to symbolize U.S. military presence in the Philippines. See Brian McAllister Linn. *Guardians of Empire: the U. S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1949*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1997.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. Senator Henry Lane (D-OR) also thought the money spent in the Philippines could be used for the defense of American continental territory. Lane, Op. cit.

the Senator, only through a multi-million-dollar investment the United States could be able to protect the Philippines a very difficult and costly task in any case. This moved the senator to ask, “Are we willing to make such expenditures when our own cities are defenceless.”¹¹⁷ For Shafroth, only independence offered a way out of this dilemma.

Besides the security of American continental territory, congressional opponents of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines also worried about domestic issues. They argued that the money being spent in, or because of, the Philippines could be used for domestic improvements like irrigation, construction of public buildings, harbours facilities, roads, bridges, etc. In other words, they thought that the federal government should pay more attention to the development of the American nation than to the Filipinos’ welfare and enlightenment. For them, Filipino independence was necessary for fiscal and budgetary reasons.

Senator Francis G. Newlands (D-NV) was insistent in this reasoning. In 1902, he asked why the money the United States government had been spending in “subjugation” of the Philippines was not being used to irrigate the West.¹¹⁸ Fourteen years later, he was still criticizing expenditures in the Philippines:

I am rather inclined to think that we should protect our own interests and withdraw, whether that withdrawal should result beneficially to the Philippine people or not, **I am for legislating for America first.**¹¹⁹

Representative John W Gaines (D-TN) also thought the money spent in the Philippines would be better invested at home: “...it does seem to me like we should call a halt on spending so much money for permanent improvements in the Philippine Islands

¹¹⁷ Shafroth, *Op. cit.* In 1904, Senator Carmack made exactly the same argument. Carmack. *Op. cit.*

¹¹⁸ Newlands, *Public papers*, vol. 1, January 21, 1902, p. 68.

¹¹⁹ Francis G. Newlands (D-Nevada), *CR, S*, 64th -1st, vol. 53, S. 381, May 1, 1916 p. 663. Emphasis mine.

and look after our own people's wants, whose moneys are **lavishly** sinking in those islands."¹²⁰

Senator William E. Borah (R-ID) also thought the American people should be the United States government's number one priority:

Whatever may be supposed to be our duty toward the Filipino, our first duty is to take care of our own people and those who are actually a part of our civilization and who are to participate in the making of our laws the building of our institutions.¹²¹

Budget-oriented members of Congress were also concerned about the Philippines' political future. For them, investing millions of dollars in the defense of land whose future as an American territory was not clear was ill-advised. They argued that Philippines political future should be settled before so "generously" spending American taxpayers' money fortifying a possession thousands of miles away.¹²² In Representative Jones' (D-VA) words,

The character and nature of the works constructed in the Philippine Islands should depend in a great degree upon the final disposition which shall be of those islands.¹²³

Thus, economic concerns were a significant theme in congressional debates over the Philippines' future.

Conclusion

Congressional debates played an important role in American knowledge production about the Philippines. Members of Congress reproduced and produced knowledge about the Philippines through their public lectures, books, and articles, and

¹²⁰ Gaines, Op. cit. Emphasis mine. Representative John F. Rixey (D-Virginia) agrees with Gaines and Newlands that American government was wasting money that was needed in the United States. Rixey, Op. cit.

¹²¹ William E. Borah (R-Idaho), LC, M D, Papers of William E. Borah, Box 32, Philippines, 1915-1916, Letter, February 15, 1916.

¹²² Lemuel P. Padgett (D-Tennessee), CR, H, 60th, 1st, vol. 42, April 10, 1908, pp. 4578-80; Eugene Hale (R-Maine), CR, S, 60th, 1st, vol. 42 April 10, 1908, p. 5612; William A. Jones (D-Virginia), CR, H, 58th, 2nd, vol. 38, Appendix, February 22, 1904, p. 162.

¹²³ Jones, Op. cit.

also during their speeches on the floor of the House and the Senate. Through those debates, legislators joined the writers analyzed in chapters 1 and 2 in their search for answers to the questions raised by American control of the Philippines. During that process, they represented, examined, and described the Philippines and the Filipinos for their colleagues.

Congressional debates and discussions about the Philippines produced two opposing discourses: one opposed retention of the Philippines based on moral, racial, political and strategic concerns; the other supported American control of the Filipino archipelago, based primarily on strategic and ideological concerns.

This chapter has analyzed Philippines' representation as a "menace" by congressional opponents of U.S. rule there. These lawmakers saw the Philippines as a danger to America's military, political, racial and economic integrity, and advocated Filipino independence. Retention of the Philippines endangered American democracy, republicanism, and exceptional nature because the islands could not be incorporated into American political system. Filipinos racial inferiority made them unfit to join the American body politic; like a racial virus, they threatened to contaminate American society and political institutions.

The legislators analyzed in this chapter were also worried about the Philippines' strategic meaning. They represented the islands as a strategic liability, as a weak spot in American defences located too far from American traditional hegemonic centre, and squarely in the middle of a dangerous region. For them, Philippines's indefensibility was an insurmountable obstacle that endangered the United States' security.

Retention of the Philippines could also transform the United States into a militaristic nation, endangering America's democratic and republican system. Congressional opponents of Philippine policy contended that colonialism threatened American political institutions, practices, and traditions. For them, militarism was not only an inevitable consequence of colonialism, but also incompatible with a republican political system. Retention of the Philippines would force the United States to become a military power, endangering American republican and democratic system. In other words, Philippines were not only a direct menace for American national security, but also a threat to America's political essence.

Unlike the writers, journalists, travellers, and colonial officers analyzed in chapters 1 and 2, members of Congress studied in this chapter showed significant concern for economic issues, especially the costs of ruling the Philippines. The Philippines were represented by them as a worthless and overly expensive possession, a waste of money.

Filipinos played a very limited role in this debate, as the U.S. lawmakers analyzed in this chapter paid little attention to them. They racialized the Filipinos, identifying them as members of an inferior, but unspecified race; they did not classify, describe or analyze them. Filipino history, especially the Filipino-American war, was scarcely mentioned in the anti-imperialist congressional discourse. Members of Congress did not appropriate or use Filipino history to criticize American colonialism or justify Filipino independence. Although they favored Filipino independence, members of Congress did not argue for the existence of a Filipino nation or use it as a justification for Filipino independence. They did not even mention the idea of an American enlightened colonialism. However, the anti-imperialist legislators disclaimed any responsibility for Filipinos' welfare or security. Filipinos defensive capabilities played no role in this debate: whether the Filipinos could defend their independence was not a matter of concern. In general, members of Congress analyzed here shared a very pragmatic approach that emphasized on American interests.

In conclusion, members of Congress analyzed in this chapter proposed Filipino independence as a strategy to protect American political institutions, to assure American racial character, to save American tax-payers' money, to guarantee American national security, and to reassert isolationism as the basis of American foreign policy. For them, the issue was not whether independence was good for the Filipinos, but whether Filipino independence was necessary for the economic, political, ideological and racial welfare and safety of the United States.

Chapter 5

“ALL BLESSINGS WE CONFERRED UPON THEM:” AN ANTI FILIPINO INDEPENDENCE CONGRESSIONAL DISCOURSE, 1912-1924¹

¹ Senator Knute Nelson (R-MN), *Congressional Record (CR) Senate (S)*, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 14, 1916, p. 1075.

“Of course, the Filipinos desire independence. Any school children always like to be rid of the restraint of the **wisest and kindest teacher** and to be allowed to determine their own discipline.” Frederick H. Gillett (R-MA)²

The last chapter focused on congressional opposition to U.S. control of the Philippines, which produced an anti-colonial discourse based on representations of the Philippines as politically, racially, ideologically, and strategically dangerous for the United States. Their approach was very pragmatic; their main concern was American welfare and security, not Filipinos'. As a result, they advocated Philippine independence necessary to ward off the alleged dangers.

This chapter will focus on congressional supporters of retention of the Philippines, and the discourse they created, rejecting Philippine independence and stressing America's responsibilities and the archipelago's economic and strategic value. This approach was much more ideological than their opponents: American colonialism in the Philippines was represented and justified as a civilizing, democratizing mission. Embracing American exceptionalism and U.S. colonialism as beneficial to the Filipinos, they cast withdrawal from the archipelago as an unmanly, treacherous, and cowardly act.

CONGRESSIONAL TRUTH-MAKERS

Before addressing the congressional debates, a group of congressional supporters of American control of the Philippines, who played a special role in American knowledge production on the islands, merit particular attention. During the first decades of the 20th century, a group of U.S. lawmakers joined the public discussion about the Philippines.³ Like the authors analyzed in Chapters 1 and 2, some of these congressmen spent some

² CR, House of Representative (H), 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, October 14, 1914, p. 1227, Jones Bill. Emphasis mine.

³ James R. Mann (R-IL), Gilbert Hitchcock (D-NB), Richard F. Pettigrew (R-SD), John F. Shafroth (D-CO), Fred T. Dubois (R-ID), William C. Redfield (D-NY), Francis G. Newlands (D-NV), George W. Norris (R-NB), Henry B. Hawes (D-MO), Francis Burton Harris (D-NY).

time in the Philippines and returned to the United States, eager to share their knowledge and experiences and claiming expertise on Filipino issues. Others, who did not visit the islands, nevertheless contributed to American knowledge production about the islands.

This section will discuss the non-congressional production of knowledge about the Philippines of three of these legislators, analyzing their public speeches, interviews, publications, and letters, to understand how they analyzed and represented the Philippines for their audiences.

Austin

In 1915, Representative Richard W. Austin (R-TN) spent four months in the Far East visiting China, Japan, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands.⁴ After returning home, he published a pamphlet titled *An American Congressman in the Orient* sharing his travel experiences.⁵ This pamphlet incorporated some of the main ideas discussed in Chapters 1 and 2: America's enlightened colonialism in the Philippines, the theory of the Filipino elite pro-independence conspiracy, the Filipinos' alleged political incapability, the islands' strategic importance for the United States, and concerns over Filipino stability after independence.⁶ Austin's main concern was Filipino independence, which he viewed as a great mistake that would cost the Filipinos the freedom, progress, and protection that American colonialism had brought the islands.⁷ Austin presented American colonialism

⁴ Austin was born in Alabama in August 26, 1857. He studied law at the University of Tennessee, was admitted to the bar in 1878, and served in the House of Representatives between 1909 and 1918. He died in April 1919. See: Congressional Biographic Directory, <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=A000341>.

⁵ Richard W. Austin. *An American Congressman in the Orient: Should the Philippines Be Retained? Hawaiian Islands as a Great Asset; Trade with Our Insular Possessions; Wages and Industrial Conditions in China and Japan*. Knoxville, Tennessee: Larew Printing Co., 1915. Austin's pamphlet was introduced in the *Congressional Records* by Senator Jacob Gallinger (R-NH) on January 7, 1916. *Congressional Record (CR)*, Senate (S), 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 7, 1916, p 666. Quotes are from the congressional reproduction of Austin's essay.

⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 666-668.

⁷ According to Austin, "You [the Filipinos] will then live your remaining days in sackcloth and ashes, mourning over the supreme folly you committed by those who, betraying your best interests, inflicted lasting misery upon your beloved land by severing her relations from the best Government on the face of the earth, which brought to you countless blessings you failed to understand or appreciate." *Ibid.* p. 668. Emphasis mine.

as a liberating and civilizing force, and the only path to freedom and progress for the Filipinos,⁸ whom he represented like children. In his view, Filipinos, unable to understand that they could not survive without American protection, nor progress without America's wise and altruistic guidance, were very easy manipulated by their selfish leaders. It was thus America's responsibility to make them understand that colonialism, not independence, was best for them.⁹

According to Austin, Filipino independence would also be a great mistake for the United States, because the Philippines were an economic and strategic asset. Austin argued that the Philippines were a large and important market for American products and a source of tropical raw materials. He argued that in just the first fifteen years of American control over the islands, Filipinos had bought \$145,315,503 in American products.¹⁰

Austin rejected the argument that retaining the Philippines endangered U.S. security in Asia. He contended that Japan, not the Philippines, was the main menace to U.S. interests in Asia, and that controlling the islands was crucial to protecting those interests. Philippine independence would cost the United States a strategic territory, a key base from which to defend and project of U.S. interests in Asia. Moreover, Philippine independence would only strengthen Japan, which Austin was sure would seize the islands and use them against the United States.¹¹ He argued that instead of leaving the Philippines, opening the door for a Japanese conquest of the islands, the United States should fortify the archipelago and build a large Navy and a powerful Army to check the

⁸ See Chapter 1, pp. 15-23.

⁹ See Chapter 2, pp. 29-34.

¹⁰ *Op cit.* For Austin, "In proportion to size and population, they [the Philippines] are the best, the most valuable customers we have today. Is it our interest to give them, or any one of them, up - surrender our trade and legislative control over them to some other authority or power?" *Ibid.* p. 667.

¹¹ Austin raised an important question: "Will not the absorption of the Philippines, along with Korea and Formosa and the ever-increasing concessions Japan is securing in China by threats and force, result in her immense commercial growth and power until she will soon be financially able to increase her army and navy to an extent where she will, indeed and in fact, be more than a menace to the United States in the Pacific?" *Ibid.*

Japanese threat.¹² For him, it was Congress' responsibility to appropriate monies to make the Philippines a U.S. stronghold in Asia.

Austin also argued the Philippines' vulnerability to attack, like many other analysts of American presence in the archipelago:¹³ Reverend Arthur Brown, former President Theodore Roosevelt, N. P. Chipman, James Abbott, Governor Francis B. Harrison, Goldwin Smith, Charles F. Dole, James Schouler, James Blount, Charles B. Elliot, Thomas Millard, and Admiral Bradley A. Fiske all discussed the Philippines' strategic importance for United States. Some of them offered geographical and economic reasons to argue that the United States could never be able to protect the Philippines from an external attack; Representative Austin countered that leaving the archipelago for those reasons would be to

[...] make a confession to all mankind- to all the world- that our noble ancestors signally failed to transmit **to the men of this generation** any of their indomitable courage, undimmed loyalty, unceasing bravery, unswerving determination to hold and forever defend our rightful possessions, purchased not only with millions of the people's money under a treaty ratification [William J.] Bryan favored, but, above all, **with the priceless lives of our heroes, many of whom sleep in the very soil they now tell us we must give up for lack of courage, for fear we have a 'menace on our hands.'** God forbid.¹⁴

For Austin, America's principal stake in the Philippines seems to have been national honor. What is interesting in this quote is its gendered language, casting an American withdrawal from the Philippines as lack of courage, will, and other male-identified virtues. Austin's concerns followed this line: What kind of message did the United States want to send the world? Were Americans so effeminate that they could not face the risks behind retention of the Philippines? What happened to the manly values inherited from the Founding Fathers? For Austin, retention of the Philippines was a sacred mission that the United States could not avoid without tarnishing American manliness and betraying the thousands of U.S. soldiers who died fighting in the Philippines.

¹² Ibid. p. 668.

¹³ Chapter 2, pp. 30-35.

¹⁴ Ibid. Emphasize mine.

Beveridge

The Philippines were very important to Senator Albert J. Beveridge's (R-IN) senatorial career: one of his first speeches as a Senator was about the islands.¹⁵ On January 9, 1900, Beveridge addressed the Senate for two hours, with galleries full, in a forceful defense of retention of the Philippines.¹⁶ Notwithstanding critiques from the anti-imperialist newspapers, Beveridge's speech received such good reviews that the Republican Party published and distributed a million copies of it. This address catapulted the Senator to national recognition and fame, and symbolized his commitment to U.S. control of the Philippines.¹⁷ For the rest of his senatorial career, Beveridge's support of

¹⁵ Senator Beveridge was born in Indiana in 1862. He studied law at De Pauw University, and was admitted to the bar in 1887. He was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1899 as a Republican where he served until 1910. According to his biographer Claude Bowers, Beveridge had clear presidential aspirations when he was elected to the Senate in 1899, asking to be assigned to the most important Senate committees. His greatest ambition was to become the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Toward this goal, Beveridge traveled to the Philippines in May 1899, to meet with American colonial and civil officers, merchants, 'wealthy Filipinos,' and American soldiers. Beveridge's trip continued to Hong Kong and Japan, but this first visit to the Philippines had tragic personal consequences: his wife contracted dysentery there, and died after they returned to the United States. Beveridge's second visit to the Philippines was part of a five-month tour that also included England, Germany, Russia, Japan, Manchuria, and Siberia. Bowers, *Beveridge*, pp. 146-147. He died in April, 1927. For more details about Beveridge's life see: Congressional Biographic Directory, <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=A000341>; Claude G Bowers. *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1932, pp. 146-147; and John Braeman. *Albert J. Beveridge: American Nationalist*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.

¹⁶ In this speech, Beveridge claimed knowledge about the Philippines based on direct contact: his conclusions about the Philippines, he said, "**were forced upon me by observing the people** in all walks of life in the different islands, and by conversations with foreign merchants, priests, mestizo, pure Filipinos, and every variety of mind, character, and opinion from San Fernando, in Luzon, on down through the entire archipelago to the interior Sulu." Like other truth-makers, Beveridge staked his claim to Philippine expertise on one visit to the islands. He asserted that what he was sharing with his fellow senators were not only facts, but the truth about American Asiatic colony, because his knowledge was based not on readings or the use of his imagination, but on direct—however brief—contact and observation of the Philippines and the Filipinos. Beveridge, "Policy Regarding the Philippines. Speech of Hon. Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana, in the Senate of the United States, Tuesday, January 9, 1900, Library of Congress (LC), Manuscript Division (MD), Papers of Albert J. Beveridge (Beveridge), Box 292, 1900.

¹⁷ For example, *The Chicago Times-Herald* said Beveridge's address seized "the psychological moment in the tide of our national affairs, and makes himself famous at a leap." Ibid. pp. 45-46. Emphasis mine.

U.S. colonialism in the Philippines went beyond his legislative role, as he produced knowledge about the islands for the public at large.¹⁸

Although Beveridge framed the Philippine issue in strategic terms, his larger concern was American economic prosperity. For him, the Philippines became an American possession during a very special moment of American history: the “historic conjunction of the elements of **national growth**, **national duty**, and **national necessity**.”¹⁹ In other words, the U.S. government took control of the Philippines just when American economic development necessitated acquisition of new overseas markets, and when Americans were ready to share responsibility of ruling peoples who were “not ready to govern themselves.”²⁰

For Beveridge, the Philippines were an important commercial asset, as new market, and as a base of operations to promote U.S. interests in Asia.²¹ Beveridge saw growing industrial and agricultural surpluses as menaces to American economic prosperity, and believed it was the U.S. government’s responsibility to find new markets for American products. From the Philippines, he thought, American industrial and agricultural products could penetrate what he identified as the world’s biggest and most important market: China.²²

¹⁸ My analysis of Beveridge’s contribution to knowledge production about the Philippines will be based on his public speeches and lectures during his years in the Senate. Some of Beveridge’s speeches were published in 1908 (Albert J. Beveridge. *The Meaning of the Times and Other Speeches*. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1908). Others could be found in the Library of Congress’ Manuscript Division.

¹⁹ According to Beveridge, “American duty, American preparedness, American commercial necessity came in the same great hour of fate.” Beveridge, “The Command of the Pacific,” September 15, 1902, *The Meaning of Time*, p. 190. Emphasis mine.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ For Beveridge, retention of the Philippines was crucial to U.S. “command of the Pacific;” this strategic position was essential for American economic expansion in Asia, and that expansion was, in turn, essential to American economic prosperity. Therefore, he argued, American supporters of Filipino independence were traitors. Beveridge, “The Command of the Pacific,” September 15, 1902, *The Meaning*, pp. 188-199.

²² Beveridge also saw the Philippines as a stepping-stone to the markets of British India. Speech, September 1902, LC, MD, Beveridge, Box 298, 1902.

Besides strategic and economic concerns, Beveridge also used moral arguments: the United States had to carry its share of the white man's burden. He wanted the United States to play an international role commensurate with its power, and in defense of America's strategic and economic interests. A staunch believer in American exceptionalism, Beveridge saw U.S. economic expansion as a necessary blessing for the rest of the world: American 'command' of Asia would not only help the United States economy, but also promote Asian peoples' renovation and progress.²³ He wanted the United States to become the dominant power in Asia, and the Philippines were a crucial element in his plan.²⁴ Only control of the Philippines offered the U.S. the advantage of a strategic and commercial base near the Chinese market. ²⁵ Furthermore, a U.S. retreat from the Philippines would allow Japan to take control over the islands, and eventually use them against the United States.²⁶ For Beveridge, American economic prosperity demanded

That we adopt a strong constructive foreign trade policy. We must open again the door to China's market and see that American goods go through that door. **We must hold the Philippines.** ²⁷

Senator Beveridge also addressed the alleged dangers of the Philippines. In a series of debates with former Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan, published by *The Reader* in July and August of 1907, Beveridge rebutted representations of the Philippines as a security risk. For him, American control over the islands did not

²³ Beveridge, "The Stars of Empire." n. d., *The Meaning*, p. 128.

²⁴ Beveridge, Speech, Kansas City, November 19, 1908, LC, MD, Beveridge, Box 301.

²⁵ In 1916, Beveridge emphasized that the Philippines were "the American commercial outposts in the Pacific, **our center of trade at the door of the east**. What would we think of Holland if she abandoned Java? Or of Great Britain if she surrendered Ceylon? Or of France if she fled from Morocco and Algiers? And administration that would strike the flag in the Philippines ought not to be kept in power.' Emphasis mine.

²⁶ Beveridge was against "to strike the flag in our outpost at the door of the east and abandon the Philippines to the rule of Japan, our great rival for the trade of the Orient and the one and only power that can and will dispute our trade activities in the Pacific." Beveridge, Speech at the Formal Opening of the Republican Speaking Campaign, at the Auditorium in Chicago, October 5, 1916, LC, MD, Beveridge, Box 306.

²⁷ Ibid.

expose American national security, but strengthened it, especially in Asia. To support his argument, Beveridge used the U.S. contribution to the defeat of the Boxer Rebellion as an example: American control of the Philippines had allowed the United States to send troops to China to protect American citizens besieged by the Boxers. The Russo-Japanese war offered him another argument in defense of retaining the Philippines. According to Beveridge, the Russians were defeated by Japan because they did not have a naval base for their fleet to “gathered there to coal, dry-dock, and prepare to strike the enemy when and where she pleased.”²⁸ Thus, far from an exposed or dangerous possession, the senator saw the Philippines as base from which American military and naval forces could be deployed throughout Asia.²⁹

In his debates with Bryan, Beveridge also addressed the political and ideological meanings of retaining the Philippines. He rejected Bryan’s idea that American colonialism in the Philippines was against the ‘foundation principles’ of the American government, that American freedom, democracy, and republicanism were endangered by American control over the Philippines. On the contrary, Beveridge argued, control over the Philippines strengthened American political institutions by fulfilling the nation’s civilizing and democratizing mission:

If we govern a foreign people without their consent, will the spirit of liberty decay in the breasts of Americans themselves? [...] Is our **love of liberty** so frail that it can be deadened by administering a just and free honest government to a people themselves incapable and who came to us as a result of war of liberty?³⁰

Hobson

²⁸ “Senator Beveridge’s Reply,” *The Reader*, August 1907, p. 261, LC, MD, Beveridge, Box 300.

²⁹ According to him, “**We must fortify them**, of course, and we will do that just as soon as we quit playing politics with world questions. The expenses of fortifications, which is the objection that penny-wise statesmen make, is infinitesimal compared with the advantages which the Philippines, when fortified, give us throughout the Pacific and the Orient.” *Ibid.* Emphasis mine.

³⁰ Speech, September 1902, p. 12, LC, MD, Beveridge, Box 298, 1902. Emphasis mine.

Finally, one of the biggest supporters of American control of the Philippines was Representative Richmond P. Hobson (D-Alabama).³¹ From 1902 to 1915, Hobson tirelessly campaigned for an aggressive and active American foreign policy, including retention of the Philippines. During that period he delivered a consistent message through public lectures, interviews, magazines articles, and speeches and debates in Congress: American interests and security were menaced by Japan, and the only way to protect them was through a large and powerful Navy.³²

Unlike Austin and Beveridge, Hobson did not visit the Philippines. His 'authority' and knowledge about the Philippine question came not from his direct contact with the islands, but from his naval experience and his fame as a war hero.³³

³¹ Richmond P. Hobson was born in Alabama in August 17, 1870, graduated from the Naval Academy in 1889, and served in the US Navy from 1885 to 1903, and the House of Representative between 1907 and 1915. Hobson was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in 1933, was named Rear Admiral in 1934, and died on March 16, 1937. He was a great orator, a reformer concerned with alcoholism. According to one of his biographers, Walter E. Pittman, Hobson supported all these causes with fanatic zeal because "he tended to believe in absolutes." For more details about his life see: Walter E. Pittman. *Navalist and Progressive the Life of Richmond P. Hobson*. Manhattan; Kansas, MA/AH Publishing, 1981; Harvey Rosenfeld. *Richmond Pearson Hobson Naval Hero of Magnolia Grove*. Las Cruces, New Mexico: Yucca Tree Press, 2000; and Richard N. Sheldon. "Richmond Pearson Hobson as a Progressive Reformer." *The Alabama Review* (1972): pp. 243-261, and Congressional Biographic Directory, <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000667>.

³² In 1902 Hobson published an article in the *North American Review* titled "America Mistress of the Sea" arguing that the United States should have a Navy "almost equal to the combined navies of the world." In 1908, Hobson published a series of articles in *Cosmopolitan Magazine* entitled "If War Should Come!" analyzing the development of a theoretical war between the U.S. and Japan, and arguing for a large and powerful Navy. In 1915, he analyzed the impact of the great war in Europe on America's strategic position, again advocating a strong Navy. "America Mistress of the Sea." *North American Review* 175 (1902), p. 550; "If War Comes," *Cosmopolitan Magazine*, May 1918; and "Defense of America," *Evening Journal*, May 5, 1915.

³³ In 1908, *The Boston America* argued that Hobson's warnings about American security should be heeded because he was not only a war hero, but also an expert on naval and military affairs. Hobson became a hero during the war with Spain. During the blockade of Santiago Bay in Cuba, he commanded a group of volunteers on a suicide mission: sink the *USS Merrimac* at the entrance of the bay to block the Spanish fleet of Admiral Cervera. The mission failed because the *Merrimac* was sunk by the Spanish before it could block the bay, and Hobson and his men were captured. After almost three months in a Spanish jail, he was set free in an exchange of prisoners of war. His odyssey made him a national hero. He retired from the Navy in 1903 because of health problems, and entered politics. LC, MD, Papers of Richmond P. Hobson (Hobson), Box 31, folder 1, "Better listen to Hobson than laugh at him," *The Boston America*, July 10, 1908.

U.S. control of the Philippines was part of Hobson's plan for a new world order, under the leadership of the United States and the protection of the American Navy. He proposed a drastic reorientation of American foreign and naval policies, arguing that the United States should play an international role commensurate with American power. Hobson rejected isolationism, reinvented Manifest Destiny, and supported navalism³⁴ as the new American national philosophy.³⁵ For him, America's new national destiny and mission should be to guarantee world peace by disarming the European powers.³⁶ Asserting American moral, economic, and political superiority, Hobson argued that the only way the United States could enforce a new world order was through American naval pre-eminence.³⁷

A follower of Alfred T. Mahan, Hobson saw naval power as the principal component of world power: the nation with the most powerful navy would control the seas, and, therefore, the world. He argued that only the United States could become the preeminent naval power without menacing world-peace. He was convinced that American naval supremacy would open a new era of peace, progress, and justice because

³⁴ Historian Mark Russell Shulman defines navalism as "dedication to the creation of an imperial navy." For him, the rise of navalism was an element in "an emerging internationalist agenda evoked a new strategy, with the United States independent of Britain's defensive umbrella and capable of undertaking its own defensive operations against the navies of other nations." Mark Russell Shulman. *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882-1893*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995, pp. 1-2.

³⁵ LC, MD, Hobson, Box 28, folder 3, *College Men and Naval expansion*, n. d. and Box 29, folder 13, letter to an unidentified editor, May 15, 1915.

³⁶ Hobson also reinvented the Monroe Doctrine. He proposed what he called 'the American Doctrine,' a world-wide version of the Monroe Doctrine. The extension of the Monroe Doctrine would allow the United States to help the "less happy" peoples of the world by "exerting powerful influence for the oppressed of all lands, and for the all the yellow and black peoples as they come under the dominion of the white race." Hobson, "American Mistress of the Sea," *North American Review*, #175, 1902, p. 552.

³⁷ LC, MD, Hobson, Box 75, Folder 11, Why America Should Hold Naval Supremacy, Letter to Hon. A. A. Wiley, M. C. House of Representatives, November 25, 1903; Box 32, folder 5, "Naval Expansion," *The Washington Post*, December 4, 1906; Box 17, "In Time of Peace, Prepare to War," 1908; Box 32, folder 5, "Hobson pleads for great Navy," *The Salt Lake Herald*, April 22, 1908; Box 32, folder 5, "Sees war cloud on the Pacific," *Desert Evening News*, April 22, 1908; Box 32, folder 5, "Prepare to war, says Capt. Hobson," *The Pasadena Star*, May 8, 1908; Box 31, folder 1, "Uncle Sam to fight Japan," *The Sioux City Journal*, June 29, 1906.

the United States was a nation without enemies or imperial ambitions, altruistic and ‘innately peaceful.’³⁸ The United States was not only a historically, but essentially anti-imperialist country—a young, liberal, and egalitarian nation that should replace the old, militaristic, and undemocratic Europe as the leader of the white race and the civilized world.³⁹

Hobson’s analysis linked a strong messianic tendency with navalism. He saw the United States as a divinely chosen nation with a sacred mission: to become “the advocate and champion of peace for the world.”⁴⁰ The United States could only fulfill God’s will, and its national mission, by becoming an unrivaled naval power.

Hobson, Japan and the Yellow Peril

Hobson identified Japan as the greatest menace to the United States. According to him, the Japanese people believed that the standing of a nation was defined by its military power and, according to Hobson, Japan had been transformed into a “vast army.”⁴¹ In

³⁸ Hobson, “America Mistress of the Sea,” *North American Review*, #175, 1902, p. 523. See also: LC, MD, Hobson, Box 33, folder 6, Hobson, “The World’s Peace. Address Before the Peace Society of New York City,” *The Patriot*, February 1907.

³⁹ According to Hobson, “We are the only **completely liberal nation of the earth**. Europe has been evolved by series of conquests, the processes of which have left its society stratified, men and women living and dying where they are born, the vast bulk being born peasants. We have been evolved by free processes only, **never ruling over others**, and never being ruled over ourselves, producing in our body social and body politic a homogeneous medium, in which men and women rise and fall and seek their levels, according to their relative weights, according to individual force and usefulness, according to individual attainments and worth. Being the only complete liberal nation of the earth, we are constituted the champion of free institutions, and the advocate of human liberties for the whole earth.” Hobson, “America Mistress of the Sea,” p. 551. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 553. Hobson, “American Mistress of the Sea,” *North American Review*, #175, 1902, p 503. According to him, “**We are a peculiar people, like the Israelites of old, a different species from the rest of the world. [...] We are the nation to whom Heaven has confined the ten talents.** This is the fulcrum of the seas, far away from the nations hate each other. This is to be a neutral friend among the nations of the earth, keeper of the world’s peace, cut out for a great and beneficent. We are called by our sacred duty to assume the naval supremacy of the world.” LC, MD, Hobson, Box 32, folder 5, “America to keep World Peace,” *The Daily Ledger*, April 17, 1903 and Box 72, folder 1, Letter to Mrs. Martha P. Owen, *California Lady Magazine*, San Francisco, n. d. Emphasis mine.

⁴¹ “The Japanese Crisis”

other words, Japan's militaristic nature was a menace to the United States, and the white race as a whole.

However, Japanese militarism nature was not the only threat the United States faced. According to Hobson, Japan appropriated to "the utmost the inventions and discoveries made by the white race. As in consequence Japan holds today the mighty forces of nature and organization more completely at her command than any nation of the white race."⁴² Writing in 1907, Hobson stressed that Japan had the human power (50 million inhabitants), the right ally (Great Britain)⁴³, the military experience (the victory over Russia in the 1904-1905 war), and a well-trained and experienced army of 1,500,000 men, to constitute a potential threat to the United States.⁴⁴ In addition to her military power, Japan was a naval power that was constructing powerful dreadnoughts, and had an experienced and victorious fleet operating close to home.⁴⁵ This Japanese menace was compounded by American weakness. To face Japanese threat, the United States only had a regular army of 60,000 men and 140,000 "raw militiamen." The U.S. was also in a weak naval position, lacking a Pacific naval force equivalent to the Japanese fleet, and naval bases to increase its operational range.

Japanese expansionism was another cause for concern. For Hobson, it was clear that Japan sought to establish hegemony in Asia, and viewed the U.S. presence in the

⁴² LC, MD, PH, Box 28, "Is War to Come? Extracts from an Article on "The Question of Preparedness in the May *Cosmopolitan Magazine* by Captain R. P. Hobson," 1907?.

⁴³ On January 1902, Japan signed an alliance with Great Britain that "provided that if other powers attacked one of the signatories, the other would come to its aid." Walter LaFeber. *The clash: a History of U.S.-Japan Relations*. New York: W.W. Norton; 1997, p.76. For more about the Anglo-Japanese alliance see Akira Iriye. *Pacific Estrangement; Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972, pp. 73-74.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ In July 17, 1907, Hobson gave a lecture in Kansas City titled "The Japanese Crisis and its Relation to our Navy" arguing Japanese naval superiority over American Navy. According to him, "We have no naval base out there. We have neglected Subig bay, near Manila, and Pearl Harbor, near Honolulu. Japan is in home waters, and has fewer than four bases. Consequently, tomorrow morning the Japanese could take the Hawaii Islands and the Philippine Islands and hurl America bodily out of the Pacific." LC, MD, Papers of Hobson, Philippines, Box 31-1, "Hobson Says War may Come," *The Kansas City Star*, July 18, 1907, Clipping.

Philippines and Hawaii as a major obstacle.⁴⁶ According to Hobson, “Japan realizes that if America were thrown out of Hawaii and the Philippine Islands, then she (Japan) **could absolutely dictate the commercial and other policies of China**. It is natural for Japan to wish to dominate the Pacific Ocean. With the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippine Islands in her possession, she would be undisputed mistress of the Ocean.”⁴⁷

There was also a strong racial element in Hobson’s analysis of the Japanese threat: Hobson was a prophet of the Yellow Peril concept, developed at the end of the 19th century as the Western powers became concerned about Japanese military and economic competition. According to Gina Owens, the Yellow Peril idea combined a sense of Western racial superiority with a growing concern over Japan’s rising power to create “the imagery of a civilisational confrontation between East and West.”⁴⁸ According to historian Ikira Iriye, the Western powers were concerned about “a Japanese combination with China” that would sweep the Western powers from Asia.⁴⁹

For Hobson, war between the white and the yellow race was only a matter of time, with Japan the undisputed leader of the yellow race and the United States the leader not only of the white race, but of Western Civilization writ large.⁵⁰ Hobson was particularly concerned about a Japanese-Chinese alliance, which was made more likely because the Western imperialistic powers were pushing China into Japan’s camp. A Japanese-

⁴⁶ According to Hobson, with the United States out of the Asian picture, Japan would have no problems establishing its hegemony over Asia. Seven years later Hobson was still arguing that the United States was the main obstacle for Japan imperialism in Asia. According to him, “The only security for permanent peace in the Pacific Ocean is our unquestioned control of the sea in that ocean.” LC, MD, Papers of Hobson, Box 31-1, “War with Japan inevitable and U. S. Discomfiture sure” Asserts Captain R. P. Hobson, *New York Press*, February 2, 1907, Clipping and CR, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 52, January 29, 1915, pp. 2703.

⁴⁷ LC, MD, PH, Box 28-3, “The Japanese Crisis,” July 9, 1907, p. 2. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁸ Gina Owens, “The Making of the Yellow Peril: Pre-war Western Views of Japan,” in Philip Hammond. *Cultural Difference, Media Memories Anglo-American Images of Japan*. London, Herndon, VA: Cassell, 1997, p. 33.

⁴⁹ Iriye. *Pacific Estrangement*, pp. 103-104 and 112. According to Owens, “The vision of a yellow peril conjured up an image of Oriental hordes, perhaps led by the Japanese, descending on Europe and bringing despotism where there had been enlightened rule.” Owens, Op. cit, p. 32.

⁵⁰ “If War Comes,” p. 588.

Chinese alliance uniting a half billion members of the yellow race and combining Japanese technology with Chinese natural and human resources, would create a super power which could overpower the West. Hobson even claimed that Japan was already training and organizing a Chinese army with Japanese weapons and military techniques.⁵¹ In Japan he saw not only hegemonic ambitions in Asia, but also a push for world supremacy of the yellow race.⁵²

According to Hobson, the Yellow Peril was a clear and present danger, not only to the future of American colonies, but to America's very survival:

The Yellow Peril is here. It is America's peril first; absolute control of the Pacific Ocean is our only safety. [...]It is the time patriotic Americans were considering the possibility of war for our very existence. They should realize that everything would hinge on the control of the sea in the Pacific.⁵³

Only the construction of a powerful American navy of 25,000-ton dreadnoughts could keep the Yellow Peril at bay by persuading Japan that war with the United States would be suicidal.⁵⁴ Only through sheer naval intimidation could the United States stop Japan.

Hobson and the Philippines

The Philippines played an important role in Hobson's geopolitical views. Hobson clearly acknowledged the strategic meaning and potential consequences of American colonialism in the Philippines. He recognized that retention of the Philippines ended America's traditional isolationism, and embroiled the nation in the worldwide

⁵¹ LC, MD, Papers of Hobson (PH), Box 17, "In Time of Peace, Prepare to War," 1908.

⁵² "The Japanese Crisis."

⁵³ LC, MD, PH, Papers of Hobson, Box 31-5, "Japan may Seize the Pacific Slope says Hobson," *The Washington Times Magazine*, November 3, 1907, also published in *The New York American*, November 3, 1907, p. 47. Emphasis mine.

⁵⁴ LC, MD, Hobson, Box 31, folder 1, "War with Japan looks inevitable," *Independent Star*, February 1907.

struggle for imperial power.⁵⁵ He also acknowledged that the Philippines' vulnerability to Japanese invasion posed a strategic problem for the United States. For Hobson, a Japanese-American conflict was inevitable because U.S. control of the Philippines was an obstacle to Japanese expansionism in Asia.⁵⁶

She [Japan] wants them [the Philippines] badly. Wants them, for she knows that **as long as we have possession of those islands we hold the key to the Eastern trade.** [...] Owing the Philippines brings us home to them. They see what we have in the way of possessions and what we can compel them to do, for our warships will be continually demonstrating in their neighborhood.⁵⁷

Why, given Hobson's understanding of the risks American colonialism in the Philippines entailed, did he so enthusiastically support retention of the islands? First, because he believed that naval supremacy was not possible without naval bases, and holding colonies was the easiest way to build a network of naval bases. Second, he thought the risks involved in American colonial rule over the Philippines were justified by the archipelago's strategic value. Third, he thought that with the Philippines the United States, would be in a better position to defend the Open Door Policy,⁵⁸ check Japanese expansionism, and join the world naval race. Fourth, he believed American colonial rule in the Philippines would showcase America's efficiency and power for Japan. In other words, Hobson strongly advocated U.S. control of the Philippines because he saw the islands as an asset that could help the United States prevail in the struggle for Asian supremacy.⁵⁹ For him, the United States should not only keep control over the

⁵⁵ According to him, with the acquisition of the Philippines the Monroe Doctrine "crossed the Pacific and today covers the Philippine Archipelago." Hobson, "American Mistress of the Sea," p. 550.

⁵⁶ LC, MD, Hobson, Box 31, folder 1, "War with Japan looks inevitable," *Independent Star*, February 1907.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ The Open Door Policy and the Chinese market were very important in Hobson's strategic vision: American naval supremacy was necessary to keep the Chinese market open for American products. He also re-framed the Open Door Policy, arguing that the future of China would determine the future of the world. LC, MD, Hobson, Box 72, folder 1, Letter to the Editor of *The Chicago Herald*, March 1, 1905. Emphasis mine.

⁵⁹ LC, MD, Hobson, Box 17, *In Time of Peace*, 1908, pp. 9-10.

Philippines, but also should fortify the islands, making them a base of operations for American naval forces in Southeast Asia.

Hobson had no problems recognizing that defense of the Philippines was an American responsibility.⁶⁰ For him, American honor was at stake, and the United States had two choices: acknowledge its responsibilities in the Philippines and prepare to defend the islands with a powerful Navy, or risk military humiliation. Granting Filipinos independence was, in his view, not prudent self-defense, but cowardly retreat.⁶¹

U.S. control of the Philippines was part of Hobson's geopolitical vision, in which the United States was not an isolated nation, but a world power with vital interests around the globe. The United States should be ready to enforce the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Policy, and protect the east, west and gulf coasts as well as Cuba and the American possessions and territories. Millions of people depended on the United States for their security, progress, and prosperity.⁶² With the Philippines the United States would be in a better position to protect American interests,⁶³ but only with a powerful navy.

⁶⁰ In a letter to Representative Ariosto A. Wiley (D-LA) Hobson acknowledged America's responsibilities: "Americans are a unit, regardless of politics, in recognizing America's duty to protect the Filipinos against conquest and oppression by any military power of Europe. The Filipinos are eight thousand miles away from us, across the sea, and are helpless to protect themselves. This bounded national duty can, therefore, be fulfilled only through the agency of a mighty American navy." LC, MD, Box 75, folder 11, Why should America, November 25, 1903, p. 2.

⁶¹ In 1902, Hobson asked: "How can we, a nation of action that means what it says, how can we fulfill our bounden duty of protection of the Filipinos except through a strong Navy?" Hobson, "American Mistress of the Sea," p. 551.

⁶² Hobson's idea of American national security went far beyond the defense of U.S. continental territory, to include defense of Hawaii, Panama Canal, and the Philippines. Given his conviction that the major threat to American security was in the Pacific, it is unsurprising that Puerto Rico was totally absent from his conception of American national security. CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, April 23, 1914, p. 7151 and April 28, 1914, p.7381.

⁶³ LC, MD, Hobson, Box 75, folder 11, Why America Should Hold Naval Supremacy? Letter to Hon. A. A. Wiley, House of Representatives, November 25, 1903; Box 31, folder 9, "The True Relations of Our Navy to the Nation. Speech of Richmond P. Hobson of Alabama in the House of Representatives, February 22, 1913, p. 4; Box 31, folder 9, "The Philosophy of Our Naval Policy. Speech by Hon. Richmond P. Hobson of Alabama, in the House of Representatives, December 14, 1909, p. 6.

Hobson denied one of the main accusations of the enemies of a big Navy, that naval supremacy would endanger American political institutions. He argued that American naval supremacy would not diminish American exceptionalism, but improves it. He saw no contradiction between navalism and republicanism. On the contrary, he argued that there was a strong historic link between navalism and republicanism. For him, it was historical fact that navies have never been a menace to elected government.⁶⁴

In a sort of naval progressivism, Hobson argued that navalism could help American society solve the social, moral, and political problems the country faced at the turn of the 20th century: individualism, corruption, and civil apathy. According to him, naval supremacy could cure American social illness because the fresh sea-air would kill the “morbid germs from all the tissues of the body of politic, offsetting tendencies toward commercialism and materialism.”⁶⁵

The strong strategic and naval basis of Hobson’s argument did not stop him from representing American colonialism in the Philippines as an enlightened enterprise. During the discussion of the Naval Appropriation Bill of 1914, Hobson argued that the United States were occupying the Philippines not for its own benefit, but for the benefit of the Filipinos only. According to him,

⁶⁴ CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, April 23, 1914, p. 7147. Hobson argued that “**No navy has ever usurped civil power or overthrown a home government.**” LC, MD, Hobson, Box 75, folder 11, “Why American should Hold Naval Supremacy,” p. 4 and CR, 63rd Congress, 2nd session, vol. 52, January 25, 1915, p. 2704. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁵ Hobson, “American mistress of the Sea,” p. 554. According to Hobson: “As a matter of fact, the responsibility that go with naval power, particularly the protection of the weak **would steady America and make her more careful and tolerant, would ennoble her life. The one besetting sin and inherent weakness and danger in our free institutions is that as individuals as a nation, we tend too much to live unto ourselves. The individual absorbed in personal affairs tends to forget and neglect his duty to the State. The nation absorbed in domestic affairs tends to forget world affairs and neglect world duties.** The neglect of the individual entails maladministration, glaring in municipal governments. The neglect of the nation entailed decay of the navy and the relegation of America to an inferior role in world affairs where America’s influence is so much needed. **No man can live unto himself, neither a nation.** America is the nation with the ten talents. She cannot dig a hole in the ground and bury ten talents; on the contrary, she must live the life of the good and faithful servant: and it is only living such a life, in the fulfilling of duty, that the nation can expect the smile and continued blessing of Heaven.” LC, MD, Hobson, Box 75, folder 11, Why America Should hold Naval Supremacy, p. 4 Emphasis mine.

A corollary to her (American) occupation of the Philippine Islands, with the underlying principle that **we are there for their good** and will in time give them self-government and retire ourselves, is that no other nation shall occupy the Philippines for purposes of oppression or even for purposes of ruling over those people against their consent.⁶⁶

Hobson seemed to understand that American occupation of the Philippines could be seen to conflict with his representation of the United States as a non-colonial nation. This may be why, despite his strong strategic approach, he felt obliged to clarify that America's presence in those islands was not a traditional colonial enterprise, but another reflection of America's exceptional nature.

Austin, Beveridge, and Hobson paid more attention to strategic concerns than the majority of non-congressional analysts and commentators analyzed in Chapters 1 and 2. They were more concerned with the strategic significance of the Philippines, American international interests, the future of the navy, and isolationism, than in cultural or ideological elements such as republicanism or enlightened colonialism. In their pragmatic approach, the Philippines were portrayed as an indispensable possession for the defense and promotion of America's economic, strategic, and diplomatic interests.

ENLIGHTENED COLONIALISM

During the three decades of congressional debate over the Philippines, one of the basic justifications for American colonial rule was the idea of an enlightened colonialism. For supporters of U.S. colonial policy in the Philippines, the U.S. administration of the islands was an exceptional, unique colonial experience because the Americans were not ruling the Philippines for their own economic benefit, but exclusively for the Filipinos' welfare. As Chapter 1 discussed, advocates of retention portrayed American control of the Philippines as a civilizing and democratizing mission, a new kind of colonialism

⁶⁶ CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, May 5, 1914, p. 8114.

which was not exploitative, abusive, or repressive and was oriented toward promoting Filipinos' progress and freedom.⁶⁷

Congressional supporters of American retention of the Philippines reproduced the idea of a new and exceptional colonial enterprise extensively during the debate over the Philippines' political future in the 1910's and 1920's. Like the writers, colonial officers, journalists, and travelers analyzed in Chapter 1, U.S. lawmakers portrayed American control of the Philippines as an enlightened administration: not only a reflection of American exceptionalism, but also its confirmation.⁶⁸

American acquisition of the Philippines

The origins of U.S. colonial rule in the Philippines played a key role in the representation of American colonialism as an enlightened enterprise. As we know, opponents of U.S. control of the Philippines rejected the idea of an enlightened colonialism, arguing that the American presence in the archipelago was a military imposition.⁶⁹ By questioning American innocence, they disputed American benevolence. Congressional supporters of retention of the Philippines refuted that accusation, arguing that American possession of the Philippines was not deliberate, but a historical "accident" caused by "a war for humanity."⁷⁰ According to this theory, American conquest of the Philippines was not part of any premeditated plan, because the United States was fighting to free Cuba. Once the Philippines became a U.S. possession, Americans had no other choice than selflessly fulfill their duty civilizing and developing Filipinos political capabilities.

In 1904, Representative Charles E. Townsend (R-MI) reacted to Representative Charles Cochran's (D-MO) arguments against American policies in the Philippines,

⁶⁷ See Chapter 1, pp. 16-25.

⁶⁸ For example, Representative Richmond P. Hobson (D-Alabama) argued that American selfless occupation of the Philippines was evidence of American moral superiority. CR, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, May 14, 1914, p. 8114, NAB.

⁶⁹ Chapter 1, pp. 24-26.

⁷⁰ See for example, Representative Charles E. Townsend (R-Michigan) CR, H, 58th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 38, Number 3, February 20, 1904, p. 2169.

reminding the congressman from Missouri that “a war for humanity led us into the Philippines, and there has never been a minute since when we could shirk our duty and abandon the islands.”⁷¹ Ten years later, Representatives Simeon D. Fess⁷² (R-OH), James R. Mann⁷³ (R-IL), and John C. McKenzie⁷⁴ (R-IL) were still arguing that American acquisition of the Philippines was not premeditated. McKenzie even claimed that U.S. acquisition of the Philippines was a product of a divine design.⁷⁵ For Fess, “in 1898, we received the Philippines **as a result of a war which was not our choice**, the result of which were not of our own choosing, but when we received those islands we received an obligation with the islands, and there was no possibility of our performing that obligation by settling the islands free [...] **Our duty compels** us to fulfill the obligation, stay there as we have thus far done, and do a work the like of which world has never seen before.”⁷⁶ Mann also emphasized Americans’ duty. According to him, “Now, we have the Philippine Islands. **They came to us not by our taking away their independence. We did not seize them.** We took them from Spain. I think that in justice to our own country and those who will come after us it is **our duty**, first, to keep the Philippines under the flag of the United States, and, second, to make them our friends.”

Townsend, Cochran, Fess, Mann, and McKenzie represented American acquisition of the Philippines as a historical accident: Americans were fighting against Spanish tyranny, not to fulfill any expansionist goal, and control of the Philippines came as a side effect of this war for humanity and freedom, not an imperialistic action. This

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, October 14, 1914, p. 16622, Jones Bill.

⁷³ Ibid, October 1, 1914, p. 16025, Jones Bill.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 16029-30, Jones Bill.

⁷⁵ According to McKenzie, “[...] in my judgment, the hand of **Him** who controls the destiny of men and nations pointed the way, and by a series of events placed the millions of people in the Philippines in our hands.” McKenzie, Op. cit.

⁷⁶ Fess linked American retention of the Philippines with alleged American exceptional nature. For him, American colonialism in the Philippines was something complete new because it was an expression of American exceptionalism. Simeon D. Fess (R-Ohio), CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, October 14, 1914, p. 16622, Jones Bill. Emphasis mine.

stress on American innocence, helped them portray American colonial rule in the Philippines as enlightened.

A Filipino nation?

The existence of a Filipino nation was a contested topic between supporters and opponents of the U.S. presence in the Philippines.⁷⁷ Opponents of American control of the Philippines argued that Americans troops found not only a Filipino nation, but also a republican government. Therefore, Americans had not only destroyed the first Oriental republic, but also established an illegal and immoral government. On the other hand, supporters of American colonialism in the Philippines strongly argued that American soldiers did not find a nation, but a group of tribes, speaking many languages and dialects, and worshipping different gods.

As Chapter 4 analyzed, the existence of a Filipino nation was not a major theme in the anti-colonial discourse created by the congressional opposition to U.S. policies in the Philippines.⁷⁸ Congressional supporters of American rule in the Philippines, on the other hand, paid very much attention to the question of a Filipino nation.⁷⁹ Their denial of the existence of a Filipino nation, underlining Filipinos' religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic heterogeneity, helped justify American colonialism in the archipelago.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ See Chapter 2, pp. 15-18.

⁷⁸ See Chapter 4.

⁷⁹ Senator John L. McLaurin (D-South Carolina), *The Philippines Island*, February 28, 1900, pp. 1-4; William C. Redfield, (D-NY), *The Philippines Island*, February 13, 1913, pp. 17-18; Representative Julius Kahn (R-CA), CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, October 1, 1914, p. 16032, Jones Bill; Representative Clarence R. Miller (R-MN), CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 51, April 21, 1914, p. 7036; Representative William P. Ainey (R-PA), CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, October 1, 1914, p. 16036; Representative Horace M. Towner (R-IA), CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, October 2, 1914, p. 16074, Jones Bill; Senator James A. Reed (D-MO), CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, February 1, 1916, p. 1948, S. 381; Senator George Sutherland (R-UT), CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 26, 1916, p. 1554, S. 381; and Senator Knute Nelson (R-MN), 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 14, 1916, pp. 1070-71, S. 381.

⁸⁰ The Filipinos did not fit in the legislators' definition of a nation as a linguistically, racially, and religiously homogeneous people living in a common geographic space. It seems clear that their analysis of the Philippines reflected the way members of Congress imagined the United States, ignoring the serious social, racial, and political differences within American society during the first decades of the 20th century.

In February 1900, Senator John L. McLaurin (D-SC) justified American retention of the Philippines arguing that the American troops did not find a Filipino nation when they arrived on the islands.⁸¹ According to the Senator from South Carolina, when the first Americans arrived in the Philippines, they did not find a national government, but sixty independent tribes.⁸² One of those tribes resisted American sovereignty, but this tribe and its leader (Emilio Aguinaldo) did not represent a Filipino people, because there was no such thing. Thus, McLaurin simultaneously denied the existence of a Filipino nation, and challenged Aguinaldo's political legitimacy by casting him as the leader of only one of the tribes that inhabited the islands. The Senator argued that anarchy and chaos would have swept the islands if the U.S. had left the Philippines in 1898. With Spain defeated and without any national Filipino government, the Americans had no choice but to stay and rule over the Philippines for the Filipinos' own security and welfare.⁸³

Fourteen years later, Representatives Horace M. Towner (R-IA) and Julius R. Kahn (R-CA) used the same argument to justify U.S. control of the Philippines. Kahn argued that the Filipinos were not a homogeneous people, but were divided in tribes. In addition, after three hundred years of Spanish colonialism, the Filipinos spoke not Spanish, but myriad languages and dialects.⁸⁴ To complicate this scenario, the Filipinos

⁸¹ In 1899, McLaurin had opposed American acquisition of the Philippines from a republican standpoint. However, by 1900 he was arguing that American occupation of the Philippines was necessary to avoid anarchy and violence. I have found no evidence that might indicate what made him change his position. See Chapter 3, pp. 17-18.

⁸² The use of the "tribe" concept by McLaurin linked the congressional discussion of the Philippines with American domestic colonial past. McLaurin used a concept familiar to Americans, one which evoked backwardness, savagery, and violence. The writers, journalists, travelers, and colonial and military officers analyzed in chapter 2 used it extensively. See Chapter 2, pp. 12-15.

⁸³ According to McLaurin, "The difference between Aguinaldo and Washington is the difference between a **local insurrectionary** movement in a people accustomed to **tribal government** inspired by barbaric instinct and a homogeneous, united, people, trained to self-government and inspired by a determination to be free or die." McLaurin, *Op. cit.*, p. 5. Emphasis mine.

⁸⁴ The use of Spanish colonialism to justify American control of the Philippines was common among members of Congress. They used what they saw as failures and limitations of Spanish colonialism to justify their idea of an American enlightened colonialism contrasting the two of them. While Spanish colonialism was exploitative and oppressive, American presence in the Philippines sought only the Filipinos' welfare. See Chapter 1, p. 19. note 59 and Norberto

were divided among religious lines between Christian and non-Christians. Even Christian Filipinos were not a homogenous people, because they were divided by language, customs, and traditions. Cultural, racial and linguistic differences between the inhabitants of the Philippines were the cause of the intertribal conflict that, according to Kahn, characterized the Philippines before 1898. Kahn rejected the use of Cuba as a point of comparison to oppose U.S. retention of the Philippines. He argued that, contrary to the Philippines, at the time of their independence, Cubans had a common language and religion.⁸⁵ In other words, the Cubans deserved independence because their linguistic and religious homogeneity qualified them as a nation. Another concern for Kahn was Filipinos' lack of political organization. For him, the Filipinos' tribal organization was an insurmountable obstacle for the development of a national government necessary for independence.

American colonialism as a nation making-process

Representations of U.S. colonial rule in the Philippines as a nation-building endeavor stemmed logically from the denial of Filipino nationhood. Supporters of American colonialism argued that the non-existence of a homogeneous Filipino nation in the Philippines forced the Americans to "create" it.⁸⁶ Thus, the U.S. presence in the archipelago was presented not as crushing an incipient nation, but actually creating it as the islands' inhabitants were prepared for self-government and freedom, in yet another example of American altruism. American colonialism was, therefore, a liberating experience that not only enabled the Filipinos to become free, but actually brought them into being as a people. Of course, only the Americans could determine when the Filipinos' tutorship was over.

Barreto-Velázquez, "Advancing Civilization: Race, Nation, and Imperialism in Late 19th Century America," unpublished paper, 1998.

⁸⁵According to Kahn, "[...] conditions in Cuba and the Philippines are entirely dissimilar. The people of Cuba have one language and one religion. There is no fanatical Mohammedan population in Cuba. There are no heathen tribes in Cuba." Kahn, *Op. cit.*

⁸⁶ See Chapter 2, pp. 15-18.

Congressional advocates of retaining the Philippines identified American education and the teaching of the English language as the main tools used in the construction of a Filipino nation.⁸⁷ For them, the Filipinos could only develop national cohesion by adopting English as a national language, something made possible by the public educational system the American government was establishing. A premature American withdrawal from the Philippines would abort this Filipino nation-building process, with disastrous results for the Filipinos.⁸⁸ American colonialism thus became a prerequisite for Filipino national development.

During the debate of the 1914 Jones Bill, Representative Horace Towner (R-IA) argued that the educational system established by the Americans in the Philippines and the teaching of English will allow the Filipinos to develop a “**uniform language**” and community cohesion. For him, none of the local Filipino languages could unify the Philippines. If independence was granted prematurely, the teaching of English would cease and “with this would come the old tribal jealousies and animosities, and the great progress toward homogeneity and unity would be lost.”⁸⁹ Towner presented English as a homogenizing language, and indispensable for forging the Filipino nation out of the Philippines’ diverse local tribes: the colonial language as instrument of national liberation.

⁸⁷ Filipino historian Cecilio Duka did not share this optimistic opinion about the U.S.-imposed educational system in the Philippines. According to him, “It can be deduced that from the inception of the American educational system in the Philippine Islands’ the Americans had no other motive but to divert the attention of the masses from the ideals of independence to the idea of submission to, and acceptance of, their new destiny in the hands of their American masters. Definitely, education was used as a means of pacifying a people who were protecting their freedom from an ogre who was posturing as an ally by instilling in them American colonial policies.” Cecilio D. Duka, “Education as a Tool of Submission.” *Kasaysayan Journal of the National Historical Institute* vol. 1, no. 3, 2001, p. 188.

⁸⁸ Representative Towner, *Op. cit.*, p. 16075; Senator Nelson, *Op. cit.*; Senators, Henry F. Lippitt (R-RI), Gilbert M. Hitchcock (D-NB), and John S. Williams, (D-MS), CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 14, 1916, pp. 1072-73, S. 381; Senator Sutherland, *Op. cit.*, p. 1426; U S Congress, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on Insular Affairs, Report No. 1115, August 16, 1914, *Report to Accompany H. R. 18459, “Political Status of the people of the Philippine Islands;”* Senators John F. Shafroth (R-CO) and Francis G. Newlands (D-NV), CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 7, 1916, pp. 662-663; Senator Newlands, CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 17, 1916, p. 1142; and Miller, *Op. cit.*

⁸⁹ Towner, *Op. cit.* p. 16075.

Senator Knute Nelson (R-MN) also paid attention to American educational system in the Philippines. Like Towner, Nelson claimed that American educational work had made English the language of the “growing generation” of Filipinos; he predicted that the Philippines would become “an English speaking people” in one generation.⁹⁰ What is interesting about Nelson’s arguments is that he used the U.S. experience with the Native Americans to support his argument. For Nelson, the Americans had the same problem teaching English in the Philippines that they had faced with the American Indians. Like the Native Americans, the Filipinos returned home after school to speak their local languages, relapsing “the progress and attainment they had acquired in the schools.”⁹¹ This quote offers another example of how the United States’ domestic and overseas colonial spheres were intertwined during congressional discussion of the Philippines.

Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock (D-NB) had no doubts as to the success of America’s nation-making experiment in the Philippines. In a speech delivered in 1915 before the Omaha Club during a Washington’s Birthday celebration, he argued that the Philippines would become a nation “inhabited by 30,000,000 people speaking the English language, practicing Christianity, skilled in the arts and manufactures and developing a country rich in resources. They will be using American methods and they will be guided by American standards. [...] They will have at their service all of the devices of a civilization received **as a free gift from the people of the United States** they will have a form of government devised by and given by the United States.” For the Senator from Nebraska, thanks to the America’s altruistic intervention the Philippines were becoming a culturally, linguistically, and politically western nation “in the very midst of Asiatic surroundings.”⁹² Hitchcock seemed to view the transformation of the Philippines into a Western nation as part of America’s cultural penetration of Asia. In other words, the Philippines were a base from which American culture would reach other Asian countries.

⁹⁰ Nelson, Op. cit. 1071.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Library of Congress (LC), Manuscript Division (MD), Papers of Moorfield Storey, Box 10, 1915, Gilbert M Hitchcock, “The Future of the Philippines,” *The Filipino People*, n. d.

In Towner, Hitchcock, and Nelson's reasoning, American colonialism was not an obstacle for the development of a Filipino nation and the creation of a Filipino republic but the only path to Filipino national cohesion and sovereignty. In the same line of thinking, the English language was cast not as the colonizers' language, but as the tool that would allow Filipinos to become a nation: yet another instance of enlightened American colonialism.

AMERICAN MANHOOD AND HONOR

Some members of Congress identified the U.S. colonial project in the Philippines as an expression of American "manhood." For them, the Philippines were a test of American political will, capacity and efficiency. They were concerned that a premature departure from the Philippines that will blemish the nation's honor.⁹³ For them, the honorable and manly thing to do was to stay in the Philippines until America's civilizing mission had been fulfilled.⁹⁴ One lawmaker who followed this line of argumentation was Senator Albert J. Beveridge (R-IN). In 1900, Beveridge argued that it was necessary to civilize and educate the Filipinos by sending to the Philippines American men who were morally and physically capable of becoming role models for the Filipinos--who, like children, needed adult figures to imitate:

The men we send to administer civilized government in the Philippines must be themselves the highest examples of our civilization. [...] **They must be men of the world and of affairs, students of their fellow men, not theorists nor dreamers. They**

⁹³ The American truth-makers about the Philippines examined in Chapter 1 also used the idiom of honor and manhood. See Chapter 1, pp. 23-24, 28, 35, 44, 85, and 91.

⁹⁴ Senator Albert J. Beveridge (R-IN), *Regarding the Philippines*, January 9, 1900, p. 17; James W. Bryan (P-WA), CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, October 14, 1914, p. 16617, Jones Bill; Extension of Remark of Hon. Nelson E. Matthews of Ohio, CR, H, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, Appendix, May 9, 1916, p. 1680, S. 381; Representative Leonidas C. Dyer (R-MO), CR, H, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, May 1, 1916, p. 7204, S. 381; Horace Towner, CR, H, 64th Congress, 1st Session, May 1, 1916, p. 7153; Extension of Remarks of Hon. David Hollingsworth of Ohio, CR, H, 64th Congress, 1st Session, May 1, 1916, vol. 53, Appendix, , p. 900, S. 381; Senator Sutherland, Op. cit., January 26, 1916, p. 1553, S. 381; Representative Charles H. Dillon (R-SD), CR, H, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, May 1, 1916, pp.7197-98, S. 381; Charles E. Townsend (R-MI), CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, February 2, 1916, p. 1991, S. 381; and Extension of Remarks of Hon. S. D. Fess of Ohio, CR, H, 64th Congress, 1st Session, May 1, 1916, vol. 53, Appendix, , p. 849, S. 381.

must be brave men, physically as well as morally. They must be as incorruptible as honor, as stainless as purity, men whom no force can frighten, no influence coerce, no money buy. [...] Better abandon this priceless possession, admit ourselves incompetent to do our part in the world-redeeming work of **our imperial race**; better now haul down our flag of arduous deeds for civilization and run up the flag of reaction and decay than to apply academic notions of self-government to these children or attempt their government by any but most perfect administration our country can produce.⁹⁵

Beveridge presented Filipinos civilizing process as an exercise of American superior masculinity: incorruptible, brave, pure, and realistic. For him, “real” Americans were not academics, but men of action. Beveridge’s use of this idiom also overlapped with his racial ideology, as civilizing the Filipinos was not only a test of American masculinity, but also a racial responsibility. As members of a superior race, Americans were responsible for raising Filipinos from ignorance and darkness.

Fourteen years later, Representative James W. Bryan (Progressive-WA) framed the meaning of American retention of the Philippines in partisan, racial, and geopolitical terms, raising a couple of very interesting questions:

Is the open-door policy less important now? Are the interests of the Caucasian race less important at this juncture? Is our duty to maintain equilibrium in the Far East and to preserve peace any less pronounced now? **Are we a nation of quitters? Are we going to flee for our lives?** When we get out of the Philippines, are we going to get out of the other islands and out of Alaska? The whole propaganda is absurd. I do not blame the Democrats for keeping such a disgraceful policy out from under the enacting clause of any bill, leaving in where it is vain and void; **but the manly, decent thing to do** would be to stand firm for American sovereignty in the Philippines, for the open door in China, and for the white man on the Pacific.⁹⁶

Bryan linked American retention of the Philippines with American strategic and commercial interests in the Far East, and the interests of the white race in Asia. For him, the “manly” thing to do was to stand behind those interests by keeping the Philippines

⁹⁵ Beveridge, Op. cit. p. 17.

⁹⁶ Bryan, Op. cit, p. 16617.

under American control. To “quit” the Philippines, would be a cowardly—womanly—and shameful act for the United States, as it implied the relinquishment of America’s international responsibilities.⁹⁷

During the Senate debate over the 1916 Jones Bill, Senator George Sutherland (R-Utah) also worried about American honor, arguing that the United States had an ineludible moral “duty” to fulfill in the Philippines:

A nation, like an individual, may be obliged to carry a burden for the sake of righteousness. Responsibilities come to nations as they come to individuals. Every individual that is strong and self-reliant is obliged to take upon himself burdens which he would be glad to get rid of if he could do so consistently with the performance of duty; and so we must consider that phase of the subject in dealing with the Philippine Islands.⁹⁸

For Sutherland, America’s work in the Philippines was a collective test of Americans’ individual capabilities, and a premature withdrawal could be understood as failing the test, showing those American capabilities to be lacking.

Representative Simeon D. Fess (R-OH) associated the defense of the Philippines and American honor. Acknowledging the argument that the Philippines were a “weakness from a military point,”⁹⁹ he countered that the United States was not a nation frightened of fulfilling her duties, especially when American national honor was at stake.¹⁰⁰ In other words, Americans were not “sissies” that would run from the Philippines to avoid the risks of ruling and uplifting them.

⁹⁷ Representatives Nelson W. Matthews (R-OH) and Leonidas C. Dyer (R-MO) also agreed that “the fair, honorable, and manly thing to do” was to stay in the Philippines until America’s work there was done; a premature retreat from the Philippines would be unmanly and shameful, and they further reminded their colleagues that the United States was not a nation that avoided her responsibilities. Matthews, *Op. cit.* p. 1680 and Dyer, *Op. cit.* p. 7204.

⁹⁸ Sutherland, *Op. cit.*

⁹⁹ *Op. cit.*

¹⁰⁰ Senator Townsend argued that the U.S. should withdraw from the Philippines only when its work there was over, not as a cowardly act, but he did not explain why such a withdrawal would be cowardly. He may have been referring to avoidance of international conflicts, especially with Japan, or the high cost of defending the Philippines, but what is clear is his emphasis on the United States’ mission in the islands. It was an American duty to stay in the Philippines despite any other consideration. An American earlier exit from the archipelago would not only be a

For the members of Congress analyzed in this section, American manhood and honor was at stake at the Philippines. Any “wrong,” hasty, or cowardly decision about the Philippines would inevitably affect how the rest of the world saw the United States. Premature withdrawal would not only jeopardize the Filipinos’ welfare, but call into question American manliness and tarnish American honor. Because failure to civilize and democratize the Filipinos was not an option, there was only one choice: to stay in the Philippines and fulfill America’s self-imposed mission.

APPROPRIATION OF FILIPINO HISTORY

As truth-makers about the Philippines,¹⁰¹ congressional supporters of colonialism appropriated¹⁰² Filipino history and used it to justify American colonialism in the islands.¹⁰³ Since Filipinos’ version of their history did not agree with these lawmakers’ image of altruistic and unintentional American colonialism, it was discarded and substituted by a more useable version. During the 1910’s debate over the Philippines’ future, members of Congress discussed two major issues in Filipino history: the controversy around the role played by American diplomatic and naval officers before the battle of Manila, and the origins of Filipino-American War.

According to Filipino nationalists and American anti-imperialists, Admiral Dewey and American diplomats in Hong Kong and Singapore offered Aguinaldo independence in exchange for his help against the Spaniards.¹⁰⁴ In this version, Dewey and other Americans officers manipulated the Filipinos, realizing that they need Filipino help to defeat the Spanish army and blithely made Aguinaldo an offer which Congress later refused to honor, causing the Filipino rebellion after Spain was defeated. These

mistake, but also an act of treason. But treason to whom? It seems that for Townsend, the Americans will betray themselves. Townsend, Op. cit.

¹⁰¹ See Chapter 2, pp. 5-10.

¹⁰² For the use of the concept of appropriation as an element of Western imperialistic rhetoric see David Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993, pp. 28-42.

¹⁰³ Representative Julius Kahn (R-CA), Op. cit.; Towner, Op. cit. p. 16075; Nelson, Op. cit. p. 1075.

¹⁰⁴ See Chapter 2, p. 6, note 18.

accusations posed serious problems for supporters of American policies in the Philippines because, if substantiated, they showed American colonialism in the Philippines not to be an altruistic accident, but the result of deceit and betrayal. Therefore, advocates of retention of the Philippines emphatically denied that Dewey or any other American diplomatic or military officers offered or promised independence to Aguinaldo. Like the writers analyzed in Chapter 2, congressional supporters of U.S. colonialism focused on the issue of credibility: should the American people believe a bandit like Aguinaldo, or a national hero like Admiral Dewey?¹⁰⁵

During the debate over the Jones Bill in October 1914, Representative Julius Kahn (R-CA) had a very interesting exchange with Filipino Resident Commissioner Manuel L. Quezon about Dewey's alleged independence offer.¹⁰⁶ Kahn, reacting against the 1914 Bill Jones preamble promising independence to the Philippines,¹⁰⁷ argued that oriental peoples were untrustworthy; therefore, an offer of independence was dangerous because the Filipinos could use it to justify another insurrection. He reminded his colleagues how Aguinaldo had justified the Filipino rebellion by claiming that Admiral Dewey had promised him Filipino independence.¹⁰⁸ The congressman thus presented the war as a consequence of Aguinaldo's treachery and spurious accusations against Admiral Dewey. Kahn used the *Bianacabato Treaty*, signed by the Spanish colonial authorities and the Filipino rebels to end the 1896 Filipino rebellion, to question Filipinos' claims

¹⁰⁵ See Chapter 2, p. 6. Representing Aguinaldo as a criminal depoliticized Aguinaldo's actions against the United States: Aguinaldo was not a freedom fighter, but a bandit.

¹⁰⁶The Resident Commissioner was a delegate elected by American insular territories "enjoying, either by right or by courtesy, a seat and voice, but no vote, in the House of Representative in Washington. The Philippines had two commissioners in Washington, while Puerto Rico elected one. Julius W. Pratt. *America's Colonial Experiment: How the United States Gained, Governed, and in Part Gave Away a Colonial Empire*. New York: Prentice Hall, 1950, p. 164. See also Jose Trias Monge, *Historia Constitucional de Puerto Rico*. Río Piedras, Editorial Universitaria, 1980. Vol. 1, p. 227.

¹⁰⁷ The second Jones Bill's preamble stated "that independence would be granted as soon as a stable government had been established." Borden, *Philippine Independence*, p. 25.

¹⁰⁸ Kahn, *Op. Cit*, p. 16031.

against Dewey and to justify his opposition to Filipino independence.¹⁰⁹ Since the Filipino revolutionary leadership received money from the Spanish government in exchange for ending their rebellion, their allegations against Admiral Dewey were suspect.¹¹⁰ For him, the treaty was an inexcusable and reprehensible act of treason against the rebels' own stated principles, that decisively impugned Aguinaldo's morality. According to the Republican from California, Aguinaldo and other Filipino leaders' betrayal of their people was proof enough that their accusations against Dewey were false.¹¹¹ Kahn asked how the American people could believe someone who sold out the future of his own people. Calling Aguinaldo a liar and a traitor, he simultaneously depoliticized the Filipino leader's actions, arguing that they were economically motivated.¹¹² Since Aguinaldo's rebellion against the Americans was not an expression of Filipino nationalism, but proof of his greed. The United States did not fight in the Philippines against freedom fighters, but against bandits. Between an American national

¹⁰⁹ On December 14, 1897, the Spanish Governor of the Philippines General Fernando Primo de Rivera signed a treaty with the Filipino revolutionary leadership ending the Filipino rebellion against Spanish rule that had started on August 1896. As part of the treaty, the Spanish government agreed to pay 800,000 pesos to the rebels "on condition that they lay down their arms and accept Spanish sovereignty." The Spanish authority also agreed to the Filipinos' demands for political reforms that were not specified, and the Filipino leadership were to leave the Philippines as part of the agreement. Part of the money was paid by the Spanish authorities and deposited by Aguinaldo in a bank in Hong Kong. Jose S. Arcilla, *An Introduction to Philippine History*. 4th ed., Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998, p. pp. 88-89 and 93 and Molina, *Historia de las Filipinas*, tomo II, pp. 375-377.

¹¹⁰Kahn reminded his colleagues "that treaty of Bianacabato provided for the exile of Aguinaldo and some of his followers, and that he was to receive P800,000 on condition of his going away. Can the gentlemen imagine George Washington or John Adams or any of the American patriots during the Revolution selling out for P800,000, or any other amount, and agreeing to go away." *Ibid.* October 2, 1914, p. 16096.

¹¹¹ That Kahn justified his argument quoting from Worcester's *The Philippines Past and Present* reveals Worcester's influence.

¹¹² Kahn also used James A. Leroy's book on the Philippines. He reproduced a quote from General Primo de Rivera, the Spanish officer who negotiated the Bianacabato Treaty, arguing that the treaty "would destroy the prestige of the chiefs who sold out and emigrated" Following Le Roy, Kahn argued that Aguinaldo knowingly accepted a bribe. *Ibid.*, October 2, 1914, pp. 16126-16127 and Leroy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, 2nd edition, p. 130.

hero and a Filipino villain, it was obvious for Kahn that American people should believe Dewey, not Aguinaldo.¹¹³

The beginning of the Filipino American War was another contentious issue between Filipinos and American opponents and supporters of U.S. policies in the Philippines.¹¹⁴ According to the Filipino nationalists and their American friends, the war was provoked by Americans soldiers' racism, violence, and arrogance. On the contrary, supporters of American colonial rule argued the war was caused by the Filipinos' cowardly and unprovoked attack against American forces.¹¹⁵ Representative Kahn also joined this debate, arguing there had been no war in the Philippines, but an unjustified and criminal insurrection. Kahn argued that when the Filipino-American war started, American sovereignty over the Philippines was a fact recognized by the Treaty of Paris; therefore, Aguinaldo rebelled against the archipelago's legal government. Kahn minimized the conflict's importance, arguing that the "insurrection" lasted only months, but also demonized Aguinaldo, making him the only cause of the war.¹¹⁶ The Filipino leader did not fight for his country's freedom, but for his personal benefit. By the same token, Kahn presented American soldiers in the Philippines as victims of Aguinaldo's perfidy; they could not be blamed for protecting American sovereignty and enforcing law and order. The soldiers were not imperial agents, but guardians of freedom and democracy.

Kahn's comments caused a strong reaction from Filipino Resident Commissioner Manuel L. Quezon. Quezon acknowledged that Aguinaldo accepted money from the Spanish government to end the 1896 Filipino rebellion, but argued that Aguinaldo wanted the money to buy weapons to "compel Spain to comply with the treaty."¹¹⁷ Quezon also defended Aguinaldo personally, calling him "a man of high character and

¹¹³ Ibid. October 1, 1914, p. 16032.

¹¹⁴ See Chapter 2, pp. 2-6.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Kahn, *Op. cit.*

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p. 16031.

patriotism.”¹¹⁸ According to Quezon, the Bianacabato Treaty was not an act of treason, but of rational and real patriotism. Quezon portrayed Aguinaldo as a patriot who understood that he could not keep fighting the Spaniards and choose exile to obtain peace and reforms for his people. Quezon emphasized that Aguinaldo did not use the money he received from the Spaniards for his personal benefit. The Filipino Commissioner rejected Kahn’s representation of the Filipinos as liars arguing that Aguinaldo was not a corrupted leader, but a self-sacrificing leader. This debate shows how Filipino history was a contested topic between the master and the colonial subject. While Kahn emphasized the Bianacabato Treaty as a proof of corrupt leadership, Quezon held it up as a proof of true and selfless patriotism.

Kahn was not the only member of Congress to explain the Filipino-American War by demonizing Emilio Aguinaldo. In January 1916, Senator Knute Nelson (R-MN) acknowledged that blood was spilled in the Philippines during the “suppression of what I call **the Aguinaldo rebellion**.”¹¹⁹ According to Nelson, American soldiers did not fight against a people, but against a single man’s ambitions. The Senator acknowledged that in 1896 the Filipinos rebelled against Spain, but argued that the rebellion was controlled by the Spaniards through a bribe (the Bianacabato Treaty). He depoliticized Filipinos’ rebellion against Spain, downplaying their demand for independence and focusing only on the Bianacabato Treaty. Like Kahn, Nelson explained the Filipino-American war as Aguinaldo’s fault. According to the Senator, after American defeated the Spaniards, Aguinaldo “took it into his head that he would drive the US troops out of the islands and take possession of the government.”¹²⁰

Nelson concluded that the repression of “Aguinaldo’s rebellion” was a service the United States provided to the Filipino people. According to him, “Of all the good things we did in those early days for the Filipino people, **of all the blessings we conferred upon them**, the chief was the suppression of that **wild, reckless, savage rebellion of**

¹¹⁸ Ibid, October 2, 1914, pp. 16094-16095.

¹¹⁹ CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 14, 1916, p. 1075. Emphasis mine.

¹²⁰ Ibid. Nelson rejected any Filipino role in the defeat of the Spanish in 1898. For him, the U.S. defeated Spain without Filipinos’ help—another example of U.S. legislators manipulating Filipino history.

Aguinaldo. If he had succeeded in that rebellion and obtained control of the country, the Filipino people would have been in a far worse condition than were even under the worst condition of Spanish tyranny in that country.” Nelson identified the suppression of “Aguinaldo’s rebellion” as another element of American altruistic and enlightening work in the Philippines. Nelson represented American colonialism not as-tool of oppression, but as a tool of freedom, because by defeating Aguinaldo, the Americans saved the Filipinos from tyranny and opened the doors for freedom.

PROTECTING THE FILIPINOS FROM THE FILIPINOS

Filipino minorities

Supporters of American colonialism in the Philippines analyzed in Chapter 2 used Filipino non-Christian minorities, Moros and heathens, to justify American colonialism.¹²¹ According to them, Christian and non-Christian Filipinos were incapable of living together because of their religious, cultural, and racial differences: they were natural enemies incapable of building a free and sovereign nation, and independence would only mean anarchy and violence.¹²²

Some members of Congress subscribed this idea arguing that any disruption of American control of the Philippines would open the door for instability, anarchy, and civil and religious wars. They represented American colonialism as a neutral player, as a necessary intermediary between the Philippines inhabitants, as a guarantor of peace in the Philippines, and as the only protection available for all Filipinos. According to them, the United States should keep control of the Philippines to protect non-Christian Filipinos from their Christian neighbors and vice versa. In other words, Americans should stay in the Philippines to protect the Filipinos from each other.¹²³

¹²¹ The Spanish conquerors found in the southern islands of the Philippines a strong group of Muslims that they called the Moros, after the Muslims conquerors of Spain. They also found people living in the mountainous areas of the archipelago with different levels of cultural development and diverse non-Christian religious beliefs.

¹²² Chapter 2, pp. 34-36.

¹²³ This idea was also present in the demonization of Aguinaldo and the representation of his defeat as an American favor to the Filipino people. See *Supra* p. 22.

This was a topic discussed during the congressional debates about the first Jones Bill. In October 1914, Representative Horace Towner (R-IA) proposed an amendment creating a commission that would rule over the Moros and other non-Christian Filipinos. According to him, non-Christian Filipinos were a responsibility “which we ought not to place upon the [Filipino] legislature at this time.” Towner argued that the non-Christian Filipinos needed U.S. government protection,¹²⁴ for which he proposed the creation of a Presidentially-appointed commission to supervise them. Towner believed that there was a natural and insurmountable animosity between Christian and non-Christian Filipinos, and that the Moros, in particular, would fiercely oppose any attempt by the Christian Filipinos to rule over them. Consequently, an American departure would inevitably lead to a civil and religious war. The Republican from Iowa concluded that independence could not be an option.

Alleged Moro aggressiveness was one of the main elements used to argue that the Philippines would be wracked by civil war after independence. According to the proponents of this idea, Christian Filipinos could not control the Moros after independence because of the Moros’ aggressive and violent nature.¹²⁵ In this scheme, American control of the Philippines was the only guarantee of peace because the Moros saw the Americans as their allies and protectors. If the Americans were to leave the Philippines, the Moros would feel betrayed, and would react violently to any Christian-Filipino attempt to rule over them. In other words, colonialism was portrayed as necessary to keep peace among Filipinos. During the debate over the 1914 Jones Bill, Representative Clarence R. Miller (R-MN) argued that non-Christian Filipinos had no place in a Filipino republic because of Christian Filipinos’ attitude toward them.

¹²⁴ Representatives Clarence R. Miller (R-MN), Harvey Helm (D-KY), and Simeon Fess (R-OH) also debated whether it was advisable to put non-Christian Filipinos under the supervision of the Filipino Legislature that would be created by the Jones Bill. Like Towner, they thought that Christian Filipinos were still in need of direct American tutelage. Clarence R. Miller (R-MN), CR, (H), 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, April 21, 1914, pp. 7038-7039; United States Congress, House Committee on the Philippines. *Government of Philippines, Hearings on H. R. 18459 to Declare Purpose of the People of United States as to Future Political Status of the People of the Philippines and to Provide More Autonomous Government for the Islands*, 1915. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pp. 620, 645, and 646 and CR, H, 63rd- 2nd, vol. 51, October 12, 1914, pp. 16485-16486.

¹²⁵ See Chapter 2, pp. 14 and 15.

According to him, “[...] the Filipinos generally believe they could and would, in case of independence, dispose of the wild tribes by placing a government over them, opening their lands to Filipino colonization and quite specially eliminating them. What would follow the attempt to carry out such a program makes one shudder to his very soul.” That is why the wild tribes reject Filipino independence and resist Christian Filipinos’ pretension to rule over them. Miller was explicit: “the Moros will never submit to Filipino rule. It will be war to death, and there those who predict a conquest by the Moros, not of the Moros.” It seems clear that for Miller there were three irreconcilable peoples inhabiting the Philippines and only American colonialism prevented an open war between them.¹²⁶

Other members of Congress were concerned about the pagan population of the Philippines. For them, the American flag was the Filipino pagans’ only protection against Christian Filipinos’ tyranny. They were sure that the pagan minority would be in serious trouble in a Christian-dominated Filipino republic. Senator William S. Kenyon (R-IA) asserted this as he argued that the non-Christian Filipinos were not capable of self-government. To sustain his point he quoted one of the main characters of American colonialism in the Philippines, Dean C. Worcester: “The people whom I see over here, who assume to be Filipinos, are, for the most part, not Filipinos in the proper sense of the world. They are Filipinos by birth, of course, but, so far as their blood is concerned, they are not Malays.”¹²⁷ Worcester, the great benefactor of the non-Christian Filipinos, denied not only their capability for self-government, but also that they were Filipinos at all.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, April 21, 1914, vol. 51, p. 7038 and 7040.

¹²⁷ Ibid. Kenyon acknowledged Worcester’s authority as one of America’s most important Philippines truth-makers, saying that Worcester had “an intimate knowledge of their condition [the non-Christian Filipinos] and their habits, and apparently a real affection for them CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, January 10, 1916, Vol. 53, p. 773, S. 381. For Worcester’s role in American knowledge production about the Philippines see Chapter 2 (1), pp. 68-90.

¹²⁸ During his colonial career, Dean C. Worcester identified himself not only as an authority on heathen Filipinos, but also as their best and sincerest friend and benefactor. See Carla M. Sinopoli, “Dean Worcester and the Philippines,” p. 7 in Carla M. Sinopoli and Lars Fogelin (editors), University of Michigan, and Museum of Anthropology. *Imperial Imaginings the Dean C. Worcester Photograph Collection of the Philippines, 1890-1913*. 1 computer optical disc electronic resource. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Museum of Anthropology, 1998.

Representative Miller (R-MN) also offered his impressions of pagan Filipinos, based on his 1915 trip to the Philippines as a member of a congressional commission which gave him a claim to direct knowledge about the islands:

There are many wild tribes which I visited, notably the Negritos, the Bagobos, the Subarros, the Manobas, the Tagbarras, and the Mangyans, but the tale as to them is but a repetition of that which has been told. These people occupy half the entire area of the archipelago. They have rights, if human beings have rights. Filipino rule would mean bloodshed and injury. It would undoubtedly mean the abuse and annihilation of the weaker of these tribes. These tribes are violently opposed to that rule. If consent as governed is to be our guide, we must apply it here as elsewhere.¹²⁹

For Miller, Christian Filipinos' rule over the archipelago's non-Christian minorities would be disastrous, inaugurating a period of internecine violence in the Philippines because non-Christian Filipinos would resist the rule of their Christian neighbors.

Towner, Kenyon, and Miller's arguments hid an important element: the idea of the impossibility of a Filipino nation. In other words, for them, Filipino independence was not possible because Filipinos' ethnic heterogeneity could not be overcome. The Philippines were not only inhabited by ethnic groups with different languages, cultures, and religion, but there was also an insuperable animosity between them that made impossible the construction of a Filipino nation. In this view, American presence in the Philippines could arguably never end.

Protecting the poor

Filipino class relations were another concern for these legislators. For them, American colonialism was not only necessary to protect non-Christians from Christians, but also to defend poor Filipinos. They argued that American colonialism was the only protection available for the Filipino *taos* (peasants) against exploitation by the elite. According to those members of Congress, average Filipinos were easily manipulated by

¹²⁹CR, H (?), 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, April 21, 1914, p. 7040, NAB. By classifying the Filipinos as tribes, Miller pointed to the persistence of America's domestic colonial past, applying to the Filipinos a term evoking U.S. experiences dealing with Native American populations between the 17th and 19th centuries. In so doing, he linked American domestic and international colonial subjects. See Chapter 2, pp. 50-54.

the elite, who wanted the U.S. out of the islands so as to be free to exploit their compatriots. That was why poor Filipinos did support independence even though they had no idea of what it was about.¹³⁰ In other words, popular support for Filipino independence was not a product of legitimate nationalistic feeling, but a of manipulation and deceit.¹³¹ Once again Filipinos were represented by members of Congress as defenseless and ignorant children.

Senator William E. Borah (R-ID) was one of the lawmakers concerned about the impact of independence over the poor Filipinos. During the discussion of the 1916 Jones Bill, Senator Borah argued that America was responsible for the Filipino masses, not the educated classes. For him, any decision about the future of the Philippines should not be based on Filipino elite's independence demands, but on what was good for the average Filipinos. What the Filipino elite really wanted was to end the U.S. presence in the Philippines, so as to be able to exploit Filipino masses. In other words, American control of the Philippines offered protection for average Filipinos the elite wished to remove. The Republican from Idaho turned to Spanish colonialism to explain Filipino's elite attitude. According to him, Filipino independence would lead to despotism because of the Filipino elite's Spanish background.¹³² For Borah, despotism was associated with Filipinos' Spanish colonial heritage while American colonialism was associated with democracy and order. As direct heirs of Spanish colonialism, the Filipino elite wanted to restore despotism by removing the Americans from the archipelago.

Representative Miller raised an explicitly racial concern, arguing that Filipino leadership was "not full-blood Filipino." According to him, "It is safe to safe to say that practically every Filipino in public life today is a mestizo, either Chinese mestizo, or Spanish mestizo."¹³³ If independence was granted, those Filipino leaders will exploit

¹³⁰ Kahn, *Op. cit.*

¹³¹ By arguing this, they followed the conspiracy theory of Filipino elite developed by the authors and writers analyzed in Chapter 2. See Chapter 2 pp. 31-34.

¹³² William E. Borah (R-ID), CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 6, 1916, p. 608, S. 381.

¹³³ CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, April 21, 1914, pp. 7037-7038.

Filipino masses without any compassion because there were not from the same racial stock.

Miller also focused on Filipinos' ignorance and alleged feeble character. According to him, majority of the Filipino population was ignorant and easily manipulated; this was why eighty percent of Filipino population favored independence, even though they did not understand its meaning.¹³⁴

I found practically no one of this class who had anything like a correct idea of what independence is; but by far the majority of this tao class- and that means a majority of living Christian Filipinos- have no ideas whatever regarding independence, and many have never heard of it.¹³⁵

In Miller's schemes, Filipinos were not capable of understanding the meaning and consequences of independence. Because they were incapable of determining what was advisable for their country, the Americans had to take the right decisions about the islands for them. Miller de-legitimized the Filipino independence movement dissociating it from the Filipino masses and transforming it into a class conspiracy of Filipino elite. In Miller's design, the Filipinos were children, easily manipulated by their own elite.

FILIPINOS' CAPABILITY

As we saw in Chapter 2, Filipino political capability was a contested question between supporters and enemies of American control of the Philippines.¹³⁶ While American supporters of Filipino independence strongly asserted Filipinos political capability, their adversaries emphatically denied that America's Asian colonial subjects were ready for self-government.

¹³⁴Spanish colonial authorities also used a conspiracy theory to explained 1896 Filipino rebellion. According to Filipino historian Cornelio Bascara, Spanish colonial authorities argued that average Filipinos were not fighting for independence because they did not understand what it meant, but because they had been manipulated by the enemies of Spain. Cornelio R. Bascara. *Stories From the Margins the other Narrative of the Philippine-Spanish Revolution*. Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House, 2002, pp. 134, 168, and 171.

¹³⁵ Ibid. p. 7035.

¹³⁶ See Chapter 2, pp. 20-29.

The United States Congress was an important site for this debate. Alleged Filipino lack of political capability was a major element in the congressional justification of American colonialism in the Philippines. For some members of Congress, the Filipinos could not be set free until they were qualified for self-government, and that could only happen after a period of American training and assistance.¹³⁷ They saw American presence in the Philippines not as colonialism, but as a nation-making process and a training school in political skills and attitudes. For them, the Americans had to keep training the Filipinos “in character, in intelligence, in capacity, in initiative, to spread the spirit of self government among them, language and solidarity, and unity of spirit, and then talk them about independence.”¹³⁸ Through the use of this argument, members of Congress arrogated the right to determine when the Filipinos would be ready for independence.

Some members of Congress believed the Filipinos were incapable for self-government and independence, because they were like children. For example, Senator Beveridge, argued in 1900 that

As a race their general ability is no excellent. [...] They (the Filipinos) are not even good agriculturists. Their destruction of hemp fiber is childish. **They are incurably indolent.** They will quit work without notice and amuse themselves until the money they have earned is spent. **They are like children playing at men’s work. [...] We must never forget that in dealing with the Filipinos we deal with children.**¹³⁹

¹³⁷ William E. Borah (R-ID), CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 6, 1916, p. 607, S. 381.

¹³⁸ Borah, Op. cit, p. 607. For Borah, no country had developed “capacity for self-government within less than centuries.[...] It has never been possible under any conditions for a people to acquire that great power (self-government) except through centuries of struggle and sacrifice, even when they have had the guiding hand and controlling influence of higher and more civilized nations to lead them. The Filipinos were not the exception.” Ibid, 1438-39.

¹³⁹ Albert J. Beveridge (R-IN), *Policy Regarding the Philippines*, January 9, 1900, pp. 15-16. Sixteen years later, Senator Sutherland reminded his colleagues “[...] **that the people of the Philippine Islands are no more fitted for self-government today than are 8,000,000 children being educated in the primary schools of the United States.** It would be a futile and vain thing to undertake to set up 8,000,000 school children in the business of carrying on a government; and yet I think that number of American children, educated in the grammar schools of the United States would be better fitted to carry on an independent government than the people of the Philippine Islands, as a whole, are today.” Senator George Sutherland (R-Utah), 64th Congress, 1st Session, January 31, 1916, p. 1797, S. 381. Emphasis mine.

Beveridge raised an argument that was used against Native Americans during American continental expansion: because the Filipinos could not develop or use their land and their resources according to European criteria, they did not deserve them.¹⁴⁰ Following this logic it could be argued that Filipinos' indolence and mismanagement of their resources justified American colonialism. By treating them as children, Beveridge also questioned Filipinos' manhood. For him, Filipinos were not only like children, but also less masculine than their colonial masters.

Racialization of the Filipinos was important for representing the Filipinos as children incapable of self-government.¹⁴¹ Filipinos were presented as a people whose behavior and political capability was racially determined. According to this, they were unqualified because they were a non-white people and self-government was a white race's monopoly. In addition, some members of Congress identified Filipinos' three hundreds years under Spanish rule as another impediment for Filipinos' political capability. Despite their long presence in the archipelago, Spaniards were unable to develop Filipinos' political capabilities because self-government was an Anglo-Saxon product.¹⁴² In other words, members of Congress racialized not only Filipinos' political capabilities, but Spaniards' as well. The Filipinos were unable to govern themselves because they were not white, while the Spaniards were incapable for self-government because they belonged to an inferior branch of the white race. The Filipinos had been unlucky enough to have been colonized by the wrong white people.¹⁴³ The only way they could develop enough political skills for self-government was through the guidance of what members of Congress saw as the higher expression of Anglo-Saxon political accomplishments, the United States of America.

¹⁴⁰ Patricia Nelson Limerick . *The Legacy of Conquest the: Unbroken Past of the American West* . New York: Norton, 1987, pp. 190-191 and Richard Drinnon. *Facing West: the Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980, p.83.

¹⁴¹ For the meaning of the concept racialization see Chapter 2, pp. 10-11, notes 20 and 21.

¹⁴² Colt, Op. cit.

¹⁴³ American presence in the Philippines was necessary because of Spanish colonialism's racial incapability to educate the racially inferior Filipinos politically.

Filipinos oriental nature was another argument used in Congress to question their political capability. For some members of Congress, Oriental peoples were racially incapable not only of self-government, but also of democracy and republicanism. For them, self-government was a monopoly of Western Civilization; therefore, it was wrong to expect that an Asian country like the Philippines could turn into a successful democratic republic after American withdrawal. Since democracy and republicanism were Anglo-Saxon achievements, the Filipinos could not achieve them without American political tutelage. In February 1916, Senator Francis G. Newlands (D-Nevada) reacted against an amendment to S. B. 381, introduced by Senator Hitchcock, requiring a future Filipino sovereign government to be organized as a republic. For Newlands, that was impossible because a republic “is the highest achievement of civilization, possible only with a people of the highest intelligence, poise and self-control. The people of the Orient are not accustomed to a republican form of government. They hardly know what it is.”¹⁴⁴

Filipino racial and cultural diversity emerged during congressional debates over Filipinos’ political capability.¹⁴⁵ Filipino linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity was identified as an obstacle for the development of Filipinos’ political skills. In 1924, Representative Louis W. Fairfield (R-IN), asserted that 50% of the Filipino population over ten years old was still illiterate and despite American effort, there was not linguistic homogeneity in the Philippines because 87 dialects were still spoken in the islands.¹⁴⁶ For Fairfield,

The evolution and unification of any people into a **homogeneous body politic** is not accomplished within a single generation. Those of us who are at all familiar with the processes in the evolution of human society know that, starting where we did, it was an impossible task to have done by this time the work which we had in mind at the beginning. Wonderful progress has been made. Marvelous things have been done, which reflects great praise upon

¹⁴⁴ CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, February 2, 1916, p. 1988, S. 381.

¹⁴⁵ When the Americans arrived in the Philippines they found an important variety of religions, cultural levels, and languages among Filipino population. See Chapter 2 (1), pp. 3, 30, 50, 51, 53, 67, and 86.

¹⁴⁶ Louis W. Fairfield (R-IN), 68th Congress, 1st Session, *Philippine Local Autonomy Hearings*, Bill Fairfield, (H. R. 8856), April 30, 1924, p. 2.

the Filipino people. They have shown a marvelous adaptation and a keen, discrimination sense of the spirit and character of the institutions of the Great Republic. Yet, thoroughly convinced, as I am, that we have not yet accomplished what we should accomplish in the interests of the Philippine people, before we make them wholly independent.¹⁴⁷

It seems clear that for Fairfield, only Americans were qualified to determine when the Filipino nation-building process had been completed. Like other, previously analyzed, members of Congress, Fairfield thought that only through American intervention could the Filipinos become a nation. Fairfield also portrayed the Filipinos as good colonial subjects that deserved to be rewarded, not with their freedom, but with some level of self-government.

The debate over Filipinos' political capability led to a discussion of racial limitations on self-government. In 1916, Senators John F. Shafroth (D-CO), James K. Vardaman (D-MS), and George Sutherland (R-UT) debated the relationship between the American Declaration of Independence and the Filipino problem. Their debate focused on one basic question: Was American occupation of the Philippines a contradiction to the Declaration of Independence? For Shafroth, American occupation of the Philippines was a clear rejection and denial of the Declaration of Independence because the Americans were ruling the Philippines without the Filipinos' consent. Sutherland was more flexible than Shafroth. For him, self-government was "**more a matter of ability than it is of right.**"¹⁴⁸ He acknowledged that everyone had the right to self-government, but went on to argue that it could only be exercised when a person was capable of it. He reminded his colleagues that although the Declaration of Independence was "extended" to the "Indians" they were kept "in **subjection** for a good many generations, because we thought that while in some remote sense they had a right to self-government they were not capable of governing themselves. The two things must coexist- the right of self-government and the ability as well."¹⁴⁹ Sutherland's remarks provoked Vardaman to

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. Emphasis mine.

¹⁴⁸ CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 26, 1916, p. 1558, S. 381. Emphasis mine.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

remind the Senator from Utah that the Declaration of Independence did not mention the “Indians,” but only the Caucasian race, because it was written by a “slaveholder.” Vardaman changed the discussion to the African Americans arguing that “His present civilization [the African American’s] in America is due to white domination, and the continuation of his civilization in America will depend upon the white man’s control.”¹⁵⁰ Vardaman and Sutherland agreed that there were intelligent Negroes, but they were not qualified for self-government without white male supervision. They agreed that African Americans political participation was against American social and political order.

The debate between Sutherland, Vardaman, and Shafroth shows how the discussion of American colonial policies led to discussion of American domestic issues. American domestic (Blacks and Native Americans) and overseas colonial subjects (Filipinos) were united in their racial incapability for self-government, and in the dangers their inassimilable nature posed for American political and social system. Vardaman, Sutherland, and Shafroth acknowledged that the Filipinos were not the first non-white minority that to which United States government had denied political rights, so as to guarantee white Americans’ political predominance. It is clear that the idea of self-government was presented and understood by these members of Congress in racial terms. Although Vardaman and Sutherland had different interpretations of the Declaration of Independence, they agreed on one essential element: control over non-white domestic and international subjects was necessary for the survival of American civilization and political institutions.

In this section we saw how Filipinos’ political capacity was questioned on racial grounds. For most of the legislators analyzed, Filipinos were members of an inferior race that could not be ready for self-government and independence without the training and supervision of a superior race, the Americans.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

THE STRATEGIC ARGUMENTS

The strategic value and meaning of the Philippines were disputed topics between supporters and opponents of U.S. colonialism in Congress.¹⁵¹ As Chapter 4 analyzed, congressional opponents of U.S. rule in the Philippines argued that the islands could not be defended from an external attack, thus constituting a major strategic liability and security risk. They saw American occupation of the Philippines, as the end of America's traditional and best defense: geographic isolation. Occupying the Philippines had moved the American frontier thousands of miles to the west and into a dangerous and unstable area. They proposed Filipino independence as a self-defense move to free the United States from the strategic and military problems involved in occupying the Philippines.¹⁵²

For congressional supporters of American rule, Philippine independence had to be seen in the broader context of American economic and strategic interests in Asia.¹⁵³ Some of them justified American control of the Philippines arguing that the islands' geographic location made them a strategic asset for the United States. Those legislators linked the retention of the Philippines with the defense and promotion of American interests in Asia (preservation of China's territorial integrity, control of Japanese migration, Yellow Peril, and American commercial expansion). They saw the Philippines as a naval and commercial base for the United States in Asia.

Other members of Congress were concerned about the international meaning or consequences of Filipino independence.¹⁵⁴ Some of them were also concerned that Filipino independence would open the door for a Japanese invasion of the Philippines and the eventual use of the islands against the United States.

¹⁵¹The strategic meaning of the Philippines was also discussed by the authors we analyzed in Chapter 1. See Chapter 1, pp. 28-37.

¹⁵² See Chapter 4, pp. 24-38.

¹⁵³ Horace Towner (R-IA), CR, H, 64th Congress, 1st Session, May 1, 1916, p. 7151.

¹⁵⁴ Simeon D. Fess (R-OH), CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, September 26, 1914, pp. 15807-15808; Charles F. Curry (R-CA), CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 51, October 14, 1914, p. 16620, Jones Bill.

The Philippines as a strategic asset

During the debate over the 1914 Jones Bill, Representative James W. Bryan (Progressive-WA) opposed Filipino independence based on strategic arguments. Bryan linked American geopolitical interests in Asia with control of the Philippines. For him, the retention of the archipelago was vital for “the preservation of the integrity of China”, for “the maintenance of Caucasian authority in the Pacific,” to control Japanese immigration to the United States, to promote trade with China, and to show “our American character to the Orientals.”¹⁵⁵ According to Bryan,

If we give away the Philippines, then Guam and Tutuila and Wake, then the next we will be asked to give away the Hawaiian Islands, and then the Aleutian Islands and Alaska, and foreign nations will then own them all, and we **will get into our shelf and be safe**. Any such policy as that is ridiculous. What will become of the statesmanship and the accomplishments of our fathers? I say we ought to put our battleships into the Pacific Ocean and hold our costs and our boundaries and our island dependencies, and go forward with a firm hand for the commercial advancement of the country, and the necessary economic conditions ought to be considered.¹⁵⁶

Bryan adopted a clear interventionist and imperialist stand, arguing that the Philippines were a key part of American penetration of Asian markets. Filipino independence was against U.S. interests and strategic stance in Asia. Filipino independence would also lead to the disintegration of America’s Asian empire. In addition, Bryan saw no ideological, political or historical contradiction in U.S. retention of the Philippines, but another chapter of America’s historical expansion.

Senators Thomas Sterling (D-SD) and Knute Nelson (R-MN) focused on the Philippines’ strategic value from a commercial point of view. For Sterling, the Philippines were important as a market and as a base for American economic penetration of Asia. Sterling argued that Filipino independence would damage American economic interests and slow the expansion of U.S. overseas trade. For Sterling, the forces of the “ever-expanding trade” would have brought the United States closer to the Philippines

¹⁵⁵ Bryan, *Op. cit.*, October 14, 1914, pp. 16615-16616.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, October 2, 1914, p. 16092. Emphasis mine.

even without the war with Spain.¹⁵⁷ In a clearly Mahanian approach, Nelson opposed Filipino independence arguing that thanks to American intervention, Manila could become an American commercial center of operations in Asia. He also thought that Manila could be “a place where if we have a fleet, as we have always had in the China seas, it can go there and find a haven of rest and be at home in those Oriental countries.”¹⁵⁸ In other words, the Philippines could be American commercial and naval base of operations in Asia.¹⁵⁹

Representative James R. Mann (R-IL) approached the strategic value of the Philippines in a different way. His concern was that the Philippines might be used against the United States. For him, a war between the East and the West was a matter of time, and Filipino independence would, inevitably, lead to the islands’ being conquered by another power which might then use them against the United States:

If we should let the Philippine Islands go today without a string tied to them they would belong to some other country inside of 10 years. But if they could keep their independence for 25 or 50 or even 100 years, in the end they would be used against us instead of in our favor in this inevitable conflict between competing races. I am opposed to giving the Philippine Islands independence.¹⁶⁰

Mann’s quote summarized the concerns of the members of Congress analyzed in this section. For him, the Philippines were a strategic asset in the hands of the United States and a threat in the hands of America’s enemies. It was better for the United States to keep the islands than see them used against American interests in Asia. This concern, that the Philippines might be used against the United States, was not developed by the authors analyzed in Chapter 1, but originated in Congress itself.

¹⁵⁷ Sterling, *Op cit.*

¹⁵⁸ Nelson, *Op. cit.*, p. 1074.

¹⁵⁹According to Nelson, “I want a place in those islands where the American people and the American troops, and the American Navy will not be strangers and be driven away from the shores.” *Op. cit.*, p. 1075.

¹⁶⁰ James R. Mann, CR, H, 63-2, October 1, 1914, pp. 16024-25

The strategic meaning of the Philippines

Congressional supporters of retention of the Philippines also addressed the archipelago's broader strategic importance for the United States.¹⁶¹ They were concerned about the Philippines' alleged indefensibility because this was a major issue raised their congressional opponents.¹⁶² Like other supporters and opponents of U.S. control of the Philippines, members of Congress directly linked the defense of the islands to the size and power of the U.S. Navy. They were also very concerned about the possible Japanese threat to the Philippines and the "Yellow Peril."

The Philippines and the American Navy

During the 1900's naval debates, the Philippines were used to both justify and criticize the plans for an expanded U.S. Navy. Congressional supporters of a big Navy argued that a strong and powerful Navy was necessary not only for the defense of the Philippines, but also for the protection of everything that was at stake in those islands (American honor, international prestige, and economic interests). On the other hand, critics of a big Navy also used the retention of the Philippines to justify their position. Agreeing that a big Navy was necessary to defend the Philippines, they argued that the problems and risks associated with that defense should be avoided by granting the Filipinos independence.¹⁶³

During the 1910's, this discussion was continued in Congress, but not as intensely as in the previous decade. For example, in May 1916, Representative Horace Towner (R-IA) acknowledged that the defense of the Philippines was not an easy job because the islands were too far from the United States and too close to the area contested by the imperialist powers. However, Towner did not see defending the islands as an impossible task. For him, the Philippines could be protected by making the United

¹⁶¹ It is necessary to make a distinction between the strategic meaning and value of the Philippines. For members of Congress, the Philippines' strategic value involved commercial and military opportunities related to U.S. occupation of the archipelago. On the other hand, the strategic meaning of the Philippines involved the direct consequences of American control of the Philippines for America's defensive and strategic position.

¹⁶² See Chapter 4, pp. 24-36.

¹⁶³ See Chapter 3.

States the first, or at least second, world naval power. In his analysis, Towner linked possession of the Philippines with American national security and interests in Asia. For him, the United States had to control the Pacific Ocean “for our own self-preservation.”¹⁶⁴ According to Towner,

If we are to surrender the Philippines because of their military weakness, we should also surrender Guam, Samoa, the Hawaiians, Alaska, and the Canal Zone. This is not suggested we should do, and with a Navy sufficient to protect these we can not only protect the Philippines, but it will strengthen our Navy to have them as a base. [...] **Unless we have the power to hold the Philippines we might as well surrender in advance the control of the Pacific.** A power so dreaded as to compel our surrender of the Philippines can drive our commerce from the Pacific, take our other insular possessions, dispossess us of the Panama Canal, and dictate on what terms we may trade with the Orient. **Gentlemen who so believe and advise are not in accord with the traditions and spirit of true Americanism.**¹⁶⁵

This was one of the strongest geopolitical defenses of American control of the Philippines I encountered. For Towner, the Philippines and the rest of the American possessions and territories could only be protected by a powerful Navy. However, what was at stake in the Philippines was not only the future of American influence and power in Asia, but America’s own security. If the U.S. withdrew from the Philippines to avoid the problems associated with their defense, America would thereby surrender her position in Asia. In Towner’s geopolitical scheme, the Philippines played a principal role in the defense and promotion of American economic and strategic interests in Asia, and an American withdrawal from the islands would be catastrophic in the middle to long run.

Many other members of Congress saw a link between retention of the Philippines and the size and power of the United States Navy,¹⁶⁶ but there was no consensus about it.

¹⁶⁴ Towner, *Op cit*, p. 7151.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 7151-7152. Emphasis mine.

¹⁶⁶ Henry F. Lippitt (R-RI) and Thomas W. Hardwick, (D-GA), CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 19, 1916, pp. 1252-1253, S. 381; Porter J. McCumber (R-ND), CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 26, 1916, pp. 1564, S. 381; William E. Williams (D-IL), CR, H, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, May 30, 1916, p. 8903, NAB; George E. Foss (R-IL), CR, H, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, May 27, 1916, p. 8796, NAB; and Wesley L. Jones (R-WA), CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, July 17, 1916, p. 11198, NAB

Some members of Congress argued that retention of the Philippines was the cause of American growing naval power while others denied it. For example, Senator Henry F. Lippitt (R-RI) argued, in 1916, that possession of the Philippines did not cause an increase in American military and naval expenses. For him, neither the Army nor the Navy was bigger because of the Philippines.¹⁶⁷ Senator Thomas W. Hardwick (D-GA) argued, also in 1916, that a big Navy was only made necessary by U.S. control of the Philippines.¹⁶⁸ In 1916, Senator Porter J. McCumber (R-ND) argued that, regardless of the Philippines, the Americans needed an adequate naval and military force in the Pacific, but he acknowledged that defending the islands was a major responsibility. According to him, "It needs a very much larger Navy, and a very much larger standing Army to be transported to **this weakest point** than it would require if we were not under obligation to protect them."¹⁶⁹ Senator Frank B. Brandegee (R-CT) also argued that the Philippines could only be defended by a powerful navy; therefore, the United States should be ready to maintain such a navy or leave the islands. He was very empathic: "How could we hold the Philippine Islands without a navy? We must either defend them or abandon them."¹⁷⁰ Brandegee's approach was pragmatic: Why to hold the Philippines if the United States would not be able to protect them?

As in the previous decade, the debate over the Philippines in the 1910's involved discussion of the navy's future. However, the debate during the 1910's was less intense, and also less ideological. Issues like republicanism, American honor, and militarism were less often invoked in those discussions; legislators foregrounded more pragmatic concerns.

¹⁶⁷ Lippitt, January 28, 1916, *Op. cit.*, p. 1682.

¹⁶⁸ Hardwick, *Op. cit.*

¹⁶⁹ McCumber, *Op. cit.* Emphasis mine.

¹⁷⁰ CR, S, 64th- 1st vol. 53, July 21, 1916, p. 11378.

The Yellow Peril

One of the main questions involving the strategic meaning of the Philippines was whether holding the islands would lead the United States into a war. This question was related to a broader concern with the “Yellow Peril,”¹⁷¹ an idea which emerged during the 1910’s congressional debates over the future of the Philippines.¹⁷² Some lawmakers, arguing that American control over the islands would drag the United States into a racial war, proposed withdrawal from the Philippines as a defensive strategy to avoid involvement in the inevitable conflict between the white and the yellow races.¹⁷³

On the other hand, other members of Congress argued that the United States would become involved in an Asiatic conflict with or without controlling the Philippines, because American commercial and strategic interests in Asia went far beyond the Philippines, and the defense of those interests would force an America to intervene in any conflict with the yellow race. In addition, some of them argued that the United States had a racial responsibility to become the champion of the Caucasian race; it was America’s responsibility and duty to fight alongside the other white nations against the yellow menace. The Philippines could play a major role helping the United States fulfill its racial obligations, and promoting and protecting American interests. They saw Filipino independence as big mistake that would lead to the islands eventual use against the United States. Therefore, Filipino independence was against American interests in Asia.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ *Supra* pages 13 and 14, notes 47 and 48.

¹⁷² See for example: James R. Mann (R-IL), “Man’s View on the Philippines,” *Times* (Seattle), October 16, 1914, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of James R. Mann, Scrapbook, Vol. 21, August 1914-January 1915; William B. Madden (R-IL), CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, October 3, 1914, p. 16133, Jones Bill; William H. D. Murray (D-OK), CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 52, October 2, 1914, p. 16090, Jones Bill.

¹⁷³ Chapter 3, pp 37, 44, and 56.

¹⁷⁴ See for example Mann, “Man’s View on the Philippines.”

The Japanese menace

Japan played a central role in congressional debates over the strategic meaning of the Philippines. Some Senators and Congressmen saw Japan as the United States' natural enemy and competitor. They were concerned about Japanese economic and military development, immigration, and expansionism. Specifically, they saw Japan as the main menace facing the Philippines. According to them, only American control over the islands had stopped Japan from fulfilling her ambition over the archipelago. They were convinced that Philippine independence would only benefit Japan, making the islands easy prey for Japanese expansionism. The inevitable Japanese conquest of the Philippines would turn the islands a weapon against American interests in Asia.

In 1914, Representative James W. Bryan (P-WA) linked American occupation of the Philippines with American-Japanese racial competition. According to him, the Caucasian race had been challenged by Japan's 1905 victory over Russia. As the leader of the Caucasian race, it was the United States' duty to confront the Japanese menace. However, the United States could not successfully face Japan without controlling the Philippines.¹⁷⁵ Two years after Bryan's comments, Senator Thomas Sterling (R-SD) acknowledged that he had no evidence that Japan was seeking to conquer the Philippines, but this did not stop him from arguing that Japanese migration to Philippines was a silent invasion of the archipelago. Sterling concluded that the only way to avoid a Japanese conquest of the Philippines was to keep the islands under American rule.¹⁷⁶ For him, American presence in the Philippines was enough protection for the islands.

Senator Miles Poindexter (R-WA) analyzed the development of a hypothetical war between Japan and the United States. For him, it was clear that the Philippines would be

¹⁷⁵ James W. Bryan (P-WA), CR, H, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 51, October 14, 1914, p. 16616, Jones Bill.

¹⁷⁶ CR, S, 64^{th-1st}, vol. 53, January 8, 1916, p. 721. According to Filipino historian Lydia N. Yu-Jose, in 1896 there were only twenty-six Japanese in the Philippines. However, that number increased to 1,215 in 1903 and 9,874 in 1919. The bulk of those Japanese immigrants came to the Philippines to work on the construction of a road (Benguet Road) and stayed in the islands after the road was done. Despite the tensions between Japan and the United States in the early 20th Century, Japanese immigration to the Philippines was not stopped because "Americans had high regard for Japanese laborers, and low esteem for Filipinos." Lydia N. Yu-Jose. *Japan Views the Philippines, 1900-1944*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992, pp. 13-14.

at the center of such a conflict. Poindexter argued that even should Japan successfully invade the Philippines, the war would not be over because Japan still would have to face the American Navy. Consequently, a decisive naval battle between the nations will be inevitable, and an American victory would force a Japanese withdrawal from the Philippines. However, a Japanese victory would not only be a serious humiliation for the United States, but also would expose America's Pacific coast. According to Poindexter,

Not only that, Mr. President, but she (Japan) can deny us the right to sail the high seas of the world if she destroys our fleet; she can dictate to us the terms upon which we shall trade with the Orient. **We shall be a humbled and subject power if Japan ever reaches the point where she is able to take and hold the Philippines against the United States, regardless of the question of the Philippines themselves.**¹⁷⁷

Poindexter saw a Japanese conquest of the Philippines as a nightmare looming over America's future.

However, not all the members of Congress saw Japan as a menace. Some of them thought that Japan was not America's natural enemy, and argued that Japan was satisfied with the U.S. presence in the Philippines and wanted the Americans to stay. Official American support for Filipino independence would help relax Japanese hostility toward U.S. occupation of the Philippines because it was clear that the United States did not plan to stay in the islands indefinitely.¹⁷⁸ In 1916, Senator Borah argued that Japan had no problems with the United States. According to him, the American presence in the Philippines did not irritate the Japanese. Therefore, the decision about Filipino independence should not be based on Japan's attitude toward the United States, but on the American nation's duty and interests.¹⁷⁹ Senator Shafroth argued that Japan's attitude toward American control of the Philippines was determined by the fact that Japan knew

¹⁷⁷ Poindexter, CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 17, 1916, p. 1154, S. 381. Emphasis mine.

¹⁷⁸ For Senator Hardwick (D-GA), U.S. control of the Philippines was "entirely satisfactory to Japan." CR, S, 64th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 53, January 19, 1916, p. 1225, S. 381.

¹⁷⁹ CR, S, 64th-1st, vol. 53, January 24, 1916, p. 1438.

that American occupation would not be permanent. Only an American change of policy would change Japanese attitude.¹⁸⁰

Thus, members of Congress were very interested in the meaning and possible consequences of American presence in the Philippines for American-Japanese relations. For some of them, though retention of the Philippines might lead to war with Japan, that risk was worth taking because of the archipelago's real or imagined strategic and commercial value. Other lawmakers were very concerned about Philippine independence as a prelude to a Japanese conquest of the islands, that would allow Japan to use the Philippines against the United States.

Conclusion

Through their speeches, letters, public presentations, and articles, Hobson, Beveridge and Austin became directly involved in American knowledge production about the Philippines. They produced knowledge about the Philippines and the Filipinos not only for their congressional colleagues' consumption, but also to inform Americans at large about their Asian colony. Although they paid some attention to moral, ideological, and cultural matters in arguing for retention of the Philippines, enlightening the Filipinos was a secondary concern for them. They were more concerned about the strategic issues associated with the Philippines, and saw American control of the islands as part of a bigger picture: the imperial power struggle in Asia. For them, the Philippines were important because of the role they could play in defending and projecting American interests in Asia. Therefore, they argued that an American withdrawal from the Philippines would invite Japanese conquest of the archipelago, which would damage American interests in Asia. Their pragmatic approach was mostly concerned with the Chinese market and U.S. rule of the Philippines was a means to the larger goal of protecting U.S. access to China.

On the other hand, others members of Congress analyzed in this chapter paid more attention to the cultural, ideological and political issues involved in the Philippines. They justified the U.S. presence in those islands based on the idea of an enlightened

¹⁸⁰ CR, S, 64th-1st, vol. 53, January 26, 1916, pp. 1557-1558.

colonialism, the denial of Filipino political capability, representation of Filipinos as children, and the Philippines' value as a strategic asset.

The idea of an enlightened colonialism served to justify American colonialism in the Philippines as a democratizing and civilizing mission, a non-exploitative and altruistic endeavor. American rule in the Philippines was presented as a guardianship, rather than a colonial imposition; Filipinos were America's trainees, not colonial subjects. American work in the Philippines was not only an expression but also the confirmation of American exceptionalism: only a democratic and non-imperialistic nation like the United States could carry out such unique work in the Philippines. They concluded that independence would be disastrous for the Filipinos, costing them the progress, justice, and order the U.S. brought to their backward islands.

In order to justify American colonialism in the Philippines as an enlightened enterprise, congressional supporters of American denied the existence of a Filipino nation. They argued that the U.S. did not find in the Philippines a racially, culturally, and linguistic homogeneous people, but a group of dissimilar tribes. Americans, then, came to the Philippines to rescue the Filipinos from their diversity, and were now molding them into a nation: American colonialism was a nation-building endeavor, in which the U.S.-established educational system, and specifically the teaching of English, were the means by which the Filipinos' many tribes were made into a nation.

Congressional advocates of retention used Filipinos' alleged lack of political ability to reject independence, on the grounds that the Filipinos were incapable of ruling themselves. America's main mission in the Philippines was to teach the Filipinos self-government; American colonial rule was represented as a boarding school inculcating political manners and skills.

These legislators' understanding of political ability was racially determined: Filipinos could not develop self-government, republicanism, and democracy on their own because they were not Anglo-Saxons, but Orientals who needed the guidance of Americans, the highest expression of the Anglo-Saxon race's political achievements, to become a free and sovereign nation. Thanks to America's unique colonial endeavor the Filipinos could transcend their racial limitations and become a politically capable people. This racist and paternalistic discourse cast Filipinos as children in need of American

tutelage to become a nation, and American judgment to determine when they had reached this goal and could become a sovereign country.

Congressional advocates of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines also placed the islands in an international frame linking the retention of the archipelago with U.S. economic and strategic interests in Asia. They justified retention pragmatically, arguing that the islands were needed to promote American interests in Asia.

The impact, real or imagined, of the retention of the Philippines on American political institutions and traditions was not a major issue for congressional supporters of American rule there; ideas like republicanism and militarism played no significant role in their analysis of the Philippines. They did not worry about the United States' becoming a militaristic and undemocratic nation, as did their congressional opponents. Advocates of U.S. control of the Philippines saw no political or ideological danger in holding colonies or building a powerful Navy. On the contrary, they argued that a strong navy was needed not only to defend the Philippines, but also to promote and protect American interests in Asia. For them, the United States should assume an international role commensurate with American power, and retention of the Philippines was a clear and necessary step in that direction.

However, they acknowledged that retention of the Philippines entailed some risks. Some of them were particularly concerned about a war with Japan. They even argued that an American-Japanese war was inevitable because their nations' interests were irreconcilable, and identified the Philippines as a possible cause of such a war, but supported retention of the islands nonetheless. Some of them were willing to face those risks because of the islands' strategic value.

CHAPTER 6
“THE SKELETON IN OUR CLOSET:” CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES OVER
THE PHILIPPINES IN THE 1930’S

"There is no place in this Republic for a dependent colony. [...] We have no legal or moral right to hold the Filipinos a dependent people. Not being an integral part of the Nation and our country not an empire with dependent colonies, but a Republic composed of free States and Territories, we should take immediate steps to grant them independence."¹

Edwin S. Broussard (D-Louisiana)

"No colonization scheme in all history of the world, especially insofar as the Orient is concerned, can compare with that of the United States in the Philippine Islands."²

John McDuffie (D-Alabama)

In October 1929, the U.S. economy entered a severe crisis as a result of the relentless speculation of the 1920s. In less than a year, eight hundred banks had declared bankruptcy, taking with them the savings of millions of Americans. By 1933, 12.6 millions of workers were unemployed. The gross national product dropped from \$104 billion in 1929 to \$56 billion in 1933. The economic loss had several social and political repercussions³. The nation was threatened by unemployment, hunger, despair and social conflicts⁴.

The effects of this crisis had serious repercussions on the discourse regarding the political future of the Philippines. In their deep frustration and despair, the American agricultural and working class sectors became enraged against the Philippines. They saw unfair competition from Filipino products and migrant workers as one of the causes

¹ CR, S, 70th-1st, vol. 71, September 30, 1929, pp. 4063. Emphasis is mine.

² CR, H, 73rd- 2nd, May 3, 1934, p. 8040.

³ Walter LaFeber, *The American Age U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad*. Volume 2, p.349.

⁴ Howard Zinn gives us good examples of the social impact of this crisis over the American people. See *A People's History of the United States*. New York, Harper Perennial, 1995, pp. 378-381.

underlying the economic crisis.⁵ They favored the Philippines' immediate independence to end this competition, and intense political pressure from these sectors opened a new stage in the national debate regarding the political future of the Philippines.

The United States Congress was one of the main stages where this debate took place, and, Congress took concrete measures to deal with the Philippine problem. During the first few years of the 1930s, various bills were presented before Congress, seeking to solve the Philippine problem by granting the country's independence. Towards the beginning of 1932, Senators Harry Hawes (D-MO) and Bronson Cutting (R-NM) introduced a bill for the independence of the Philippines. The Hawes-Cutting bill provided for a transition period to during which the Filipinos would govern the islands under the supervision of a United States High Commissioner. In March 1932, Congressman Butler B. Hare (D-NC) introduced a similar bill in the House of Representatives. After the discussion of each bill in the House and the Senate, an agreement was reached to create a single bill, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting (HHC) bill. The HCC established a 15-year period of transition to independence, allowing for the drafting of a constitution with full local autonomy, and requiring the approval of the Filipino Legislature⁶. The bill passed the Senate and the House, but was vetoed by President Hebert Hoover.⁷ Congress then overrode the presidential veto,⁸ but the Philippine Legislature rejected the HCC in October 1933⁹.

⁵ Borden, Karen Wells. "Philippine Independence Legislation in the United States Congress, 1912-1934." M.A. State University of California, 1969, pp. 92-93 and "Persuasive Appeals of imperialist and Anti-Imperialist Congressmen in the Debates on Philippine Independence, 1912-1934." Ph D., University of California Los Angeles, 1972, pp. 133-134.

⁶ Borden, *Persuasive*, pp. 94-95. See also Frank H. Golay. *Face of Empire United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press in cooperation with the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1997. pp. 288-301, and H.W. Brands. *Bound to Empire the United States and the Philippines*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 149-156.

⁷ In his veto, Hoover underlined American responsibilities for Filipinos' welfare and security. He vetoed the bill, arguing that U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines would open the door for an external aggression. Hoover also contended that U.S. policy in the Philippines should not be based on "selfish interests." Borden, *Op. cit.* pp. 118-119 and Brands, *Op. cit.*, p. 153.

⁸ Borden, *Op. cit.*

⁹ *Ibid.* p. 121.

In 1934, Manuel L. Quezon, ex-Resident Commissioner, President of the Philippine Senate and central architect of the defeat of the HHC in the Philippine legislature, traveled to Washington to negotiate another independence bill for the islands¹⁰. Using the contacts, he had established during his years as Resident Commissioner, Quezon managed to get Senator Millard Tydings (D-Maryland) and Representative John McDuffie (D-Alabama) to introduce a new bill, Tydings-McDuffie, which added the provision that, after independence, the United States would close down all military bases in the islands, with the exception of a naval and coaling base¹¹. Both the House and the Senate approved the Tydings-McDuffie bill without major opposition; it was signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 24th, 1934 and unanimously ratified by the Philippine Assembly on May 1st of the same year¹². An important chapter in the history of Filipino-American relations was thus sealed.

This chapter will examine the congressional debate around the HHC and Tydings Mc-Duffie bills. For almost four years, both Senators and Representatives analyzed and debated the meaning of keeping the Philippines in the U.S. hands. These discussions offer a unique chance to study the way in which the set of ideas and representations of the Philippines that had been created in the first two decades of the 20th century were deployed during the crisis of the 1930s.

KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE 1920'S AND 1930'S

The production of knowledge about the Philippines did not disappear during the 1920s and 30s. On the contrary, the Philippines continued attracting the attention of Americans during that period. The search for answers to the questions raised by U.S. control of the Philippines caused a never-ending public discussion characterized by the

¹⁰ For an analysis of the reasons why Quezon opposed and defeated the HHC see: Borden, *Op. cit.* 119-123; Golay, *Op. cit.*; and Brands, *Op. cit.*

¹¹ According to Borden, the bill established that "Conferences will be held by the governments [Filipino and American] after independence to discuss naval bases". Borden, *Op. cit.* p. 124.

¹² *Ibid.* p. 126

publication of books and articles, speeches, lectures, and even high school debates.¹³ This discussion intensified after the collapse of the American economy in 1929.

The main ideas and representations about the Philippines and the Filipinos that had been created during the first decade of the 20th century were redeployed in the 1920s and 1930s. Themes such as American exceptionalism, enlightened colonialism, republicanism and imperialism, widely used in the first decades of the 20th century, continued to play a very important role during those years Americans imagined, described and understood the Philippines and the Filipinos in a quite consistent manner between 1900 and 1934.

American legislators were similarly consistent in the way they analyzed and approached the subject of the Philippines between 1900 and 1934. The strategic and geopolitical analysis of the islands' importance for the United States is a clear example of this continuity. Throughout the period between 1900 and 1934, the members of Congress asked the same questions, voiced the same concerns and proposed the same solutions to the strategic and defense issues U.S. control of the Philippine archipelago entailed.

The political and ideological meaning of the Philippines also received the consistent attention of Congress during the first three decades of the 20th century. For

¹³ For example, in 1927 a compilation of articles about the Philippines entitled *Independence for the Philippines* was published. According to the compiler, Eleonor Ball, the book was a publication of the Reference Shelf Collection that "supplements and takes place of a previous number in the series, *Independence for the Philippines*, compiled by Julia E. Johnsen, and now out of print." Another example of the attention the Philippines received in the 1930s comes from a high school debating handbook, published in 1931 and compiled by E.R. Rankin, entitled *Independence for the Philippines*. The book was published by the High School Debating Union of North Carolina for the 1930-1931 debating season. According to its compiler, "The question as to whether the United States should grant independence to the Philippines has long been an important national question and events of the past several months have served to arouse a great deal of interest in this subject at the present time. It is the hope of the central committee that the state-wide debate on the subject of independence for the Philippines will be one of the most successful state-wide contests which have been held. [...] The thanks of the compilers of this debate handbook are extended to the publishers who kindly gave permission for the reprinting of articles carried in the handbook." See Eleonor Ball, compiler, *Independence for the Philippines*, New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1927, p.4 and Rankin, E.R., and High School Debating Union. *Independence for the Philippines*. University of North Carolina Extension Bulletin, v. X, no. 5. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1931, p.1. Emphasis is mine. For a more detailed list of books and articles about the Philippines published in the 1920s and 1930s see Appendix 2. Emphasis mine.

more than 30 years, senators and representatives reproduced the same ideas and concerns about the Philippines' meaning for American democracy.

Thus, it could be argued that the major issues in congressional debates about the Philippines during the first three decades of the 20th century were not economic in nature, but rather ideological, strategic and political. Proof of this can be found in the fact that even those congressmen who were most concerned about economic problems were not able to approach the issue of the Philippines from a purely economic perspective. Rather, they resorted to cultural, racial, strategic, ideological and political arguments to justify independence for the islands. Though it might be argued that these ideas were deployed merely as justification of an economic agenda, the mere fact that they were used confirms their importance, usefulness and continuity.

ENLIGHTENED COLONIALISM

As the previous chapters have argued, the representation of American colonialism in the Philippines as an expression of American exceptionalism was a constant among those who supported keeping the islands under the dominion of the United States. According to them, the American presence in the archipelago constituted a break with European colonialism, given that it was based on altruism and not on exploitation; Americans were not in the Philippines in search of economic profit, but in order to civilize, democratize and enlighten the Filipinos. For those who supported this argument, only an exceptional nation with a solid democratic and anti-colonialist tradition such as the United States could take control of a people like the Filipinos and govern them as disciples, rather than colonial subjects.

This idea was reproduced with no major changes in the congressional debates of the second half of the 1920s. An example can be found in the reaction to Otis T. Wingo's address to Congress in 1925. Representative Wingo (D-AR) launched a withering attack on the concept of enlightened colonialism. According to him, the American presence in the Philippines was not altruistic at all, but promoted the sugar growers and commercial interests.¹⁴ He also maintained that the national development and protection of the

¹⁴ CR, H, 68th 2nd, 1925, Vol. 56, January 28, 1925, p. 2595.

Filipinos was not the responsibility of the American government, contrary to what others had suggested.¹⁵

Wingo's comments drew a strong reaction from representatives Louis W. Fairfield (R-IN), James H. MacLafferty (R-CA) and Heartsill Ragon (D-AR). They reaffirmed that the American presence in the Philippines was exclusively dictated by the altruistic desire to help the Filipinos. To them, U.S. rule in the Philippines was not only an expression of the American nation's exceptional nature, but also its ultimate demonstration.¹⁶ In MacLafferty's words, the work of the United States in the Philippines was "the greatest act of altruism ever manifested by any government **since history began**".¹⁷

Enlightened colonialism was also invoked during the congressional debates of 1926.¹⁸ Representatives Robert L. Bacon (R-NY) and Charles L. Underhill (R-MA), and Senator Samuel M. Shortridge (R-CA) used it to justify the American presence in the Philippines.¹⁹ According to Shortridge, the American occupation had been a blessing for the Filipino people because the U.S. had "lifted them up" morally, materially and intellectually; Americans had freed Filipinos from three hundred years of Spanish tyranny.²⁰

¹⁵ In his own words: "What is our duty in the Philippines? Why [...] is the duty of this great, strong, benevolent Government to protect these people from their own sins and stupidity and confusion of tongues." Ibid. 2597. Emphasis is mine.

¹⁶ CR, H, 68th 2nd 1925, Vol. 56, January 28, 1925, p. 2596, 2599, and 2601.

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 2596. Emphasis mine.

¹⁸ In 1929, Senator Knutson, a staunch advocate of Filipino independence based on economic reasons, reproduced the idea of an enlightened colonialism on a letter to the *Saint Paul Pioneer Press*. He also identified American work in the Philippines as part of worldwide American altruism. CR, H, December 14, 1929, p.690.

¹⁹ CR, Senate 69th-1st, 1926, vol. 67, February 16, 1926, p.4075; February 18, 1926, p.4242; May 28, 1926, pp.10351-52; and June 30, 1926, pp. 1238082.

²⁰ In Shortridge's own words: "We have been an unmixed blessing for the people of those islands. [...] We have given them within a few years all the blessings for which our ancestors fought for centuries." CR, Senate, 69th-1st, 1926, vol. 67, February 16, 1926, p.4075. Shortridge's use of Spanish colonialism to justify American control of the Philippines must be emphasized.

During the 1930s, the debate around the altruistic nature of American colonialism in the Philippines intensified, but very few congressmen used this notion to justify retention of the Philippines.²¹ On the contrary, it served to justify Philippine independence as the logical end of more than 30 years of American work in the archipelago. Neither rejected nor denied, the idea of enlightened colonialism was transformed into an argument in favor of independence: Philippine independence was not only possible because of the unselfish work of the United States; it was the ultimate confirmation of its success.²² According to this new formula, to deny the Filipinos' competence to be independent would also deny American colonialism's success. Furthermore, granting independence would confirm the notion that the U.S. presence in the Philippines had always been driven by altruistic and generous intentions. For instance, in 1930, Representative Harold Knutson (R-MN), a major defender of Philippine independence on economic grounds, proposed that American work in the archipelago had been completed since the Filipinos had already developed the ability to govern themselves. Therefore, Knutson argued, it was time to grant them independence.²³

However, the notion of enlightened colonialism was not exempt from criticism. For instance, Senators Harry B. Hawes²⁴ (D-MO) and Huey Long (D-LA) highlighted the limitations of American colonialism in the Philippines²⁵, arguing that the American ability to transform the Filipino people had been racially limited. In Hawes' words:

²¹ Representatives Carroll L. Beedy (R-ME) in 1930 (CR- H, 71st-3rd, December 13, 1930, p. 620) and Charles J. Colden (D-CA) in 1934 (CR, h, 73rd-2nd March 19, 1934, p.4839).

²² Representatives Adolph J. Sabath (D-Illinois) and Ralph F. Lozier (D-Missouri).

²³ CR, H, 71st-2nd, May 13, 1930, p.8869. Representatives Conrad G. Selvig (R-Minnesota) (CR, H, 72nd-1st, July 5, 1932, p.14362), Lozier (CR, H, 71st-2nd May 6, 1930, p.8465), and Adolph J. Sabath (D-Illinois) (CR, H, 73rd-1st, May 5, 1934, p. 8134) agreed with Knutson.

²⁴ Hawes was a lawyer from Missouri with a long public career. He was president of the St. Louis Police Board (1898-1904), member of Missouri State Legislature (1916-1917), veteran of World War One, member of the House of Representatives (1921-1925), and Senator (1926-1933). He was also one the authors of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act granting independence to the Philippines. University of Missouri, Western Historical Manuscript Collection-Columbia, This Week in Missouri History, <http://www.umsystem.edu/whmc/Mohist/nov15.html> and Bioguide, <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000362>.

²⁵ CR, S, 71st-2nd, February 17th, 1930, p. 3376; CR, S, 72nd-1st, July 1, 1932, p. 14476; and CR, S, 73rd-1st, March 22, 1934, p. 5098

The inhabitants of these islands belong to the Malay race. They are active, intelligent, and have had 30 years of education supplied by the United States Government. It is claimed by selfish interests that their education is not yet complete, that it will require another 30 years to complete their understanding of Anglo-Saxon theories and Anglo-Saxon law. **For over 300 years, the Spaniards controlled them, and while conditions change, 300 years of Spanish rule did not change their characteristics. We have had 30 years' control and their characteristics, according to the best observers, have not changed, will not change.** In my opinion the thought of a change is a dream, iridescent, incapable of realization. **We can no more change the minds, the thoughts, the characteristics and national aspirations of these people than we can change the color of their hair, the texture of their skin, or their physical characteristics. They will always be Malays; they will always think with a Malay mind.**²⁶

Hawes pointed to the limitations of the American civilizing work in the Philippines. According to him, Americans could not change the Filipinos' racial nature; attempting had been utopian. If the Spaniards had not been able to do it in 300 years, it was not surprising that Americans had not yet managed it in 30. And given that the Filipinos could not be changed (i.e. Americanized), there was no reason for the United States to keep the archipelago under its control.²⁷

On the other hand, Long not only highlighted the limitations of American colonialism in the Philippines described it as far from enlightened. For this Louisiana senator, Americans had never been capable of Americanizing Filipinos because the latter were Asiatic.²⁸ It was therefore absurd to retain a territory that would never be politically incorporated into the American nation. He also suggested that the work undertaken by

²⁶ CR, S, 71st-2nd, vol. 72, February 17th, 1930, p. 3376. Emphasis mine.

²⁷ It should be noted that Hawes did not share the idea of Spain as a medieval, exploitative and oppressive colonial power that was so popular among the members of Congress. On the contrary, Hawes used Spanish colonialism's "failures" in the Philippines to underline American colonialism's limitations. In doing this, he equated the American and Spanish colonial efforts in the Philippines. The notion of Spain used during the congressional discussions of the 1930s will be discussed later in the present chapter.

²⁸ "We do not owe the Filipinos so much that we have to go over there and try to Americanize them. **We will never be able to Americanize them.** The whole world is disturbed. I think the Filipinos should swim along with the Asiatic; in other words, according to what is over there." CR, S, 73rd-1st, March 21, 1934, p. 5009. Emphasis mine.

Americans in the Philippines was not the result of altruism but an act of charity motivated by pity.²⁹ It was time, according to Long, for the American government to start to exercise that same charity towards its own citizens.

Senator William H. King (D-UT) also denied that U.S. colonialism in the Philippines had been enlightened, but from a perspective different from Hawes' and Long's. In his arguments, King combined forceful anti-imperialism with a bit of idealism. To him, it was impossible to deny the fact that in the Philippines, just as in many other regions of the world, the United States had acted as an imperialistic nation.³⁰ King had no problem acknowledging that United States imperialism, and denied any American altruistic motivation in the Philippines. The situation according to him was quite clear: the American government in the Philippines was not based on the consent of the governed, but on military force. Therefore, it was impossible to claim that it was a generous and unselfish government, and the fact that, after more than 30 years of American government, the Filipinos were still demanding their independence gave lie to the United States' supposed altruism.³¹

²⁹ "I have great trouble reconciling myself to the view that in our pity and charity we should go to the point of undertaking to Americanize the Filipinos. We have an American industry here which is growing, and we need to lift Americans engaged in that industry to the standards enjoyed by other American people. If we can bring about a condition in which these Asiatics, living under entirely different conditions, and under entirely different climatic conditions from those obtaining in America, may so adjust themselves that will be able to live on a level with oriental standards, according to the oriental manner and oriental customs, enjoying the ordinary fruits of other oriental peoples, that seems to me to be about all the duty we have to discharge toward them." Ibid.

³⁰ "Mr. President, notwithstanding the constant asseverations that we are not imperialistic, there are more than symptoms of imperialism in our attitude toward and treatment of other countries. There is economic imperialism, as well as other forms. American capital is flowing in golden streams from the borders of the United States. Enormous investments are being made in Haiti, Santo Domingo, Cuba, Nicaragua, and various countries of South and Central America, the Philippine Islands, and in other lands and climes. Large investments are being made in Cuba. Sugar plantations are being developed in the Philippines by American capital and important American interests are acquiring control of resources which will strength the grip of the United States upon them." King, CR, S, 70th-2nd. Vol. 70, February 20, 1929, p.3838.

³¹ CR, S, 73rd-2nd, March 1, 1934, p.3461.

King noted that it is common for colonial powers to justify their control over other peoples by claiming that the relationship benefited the subjugated.³² He acknowledged that the latter might benefit from it, but also stated that “many wrongs have been committed against helpless people by powerful nations under this and other pretexts. [...] Under the imperialistic policies serious wrongs and indeed crimes, have been committed. Peoples have been held in slavery, physical and economic, as well as mental. **Self-determination is the right of small states.**”³³ In this way, King not only questioned the basis of American colonialism in the Philippines, but the idea of exceptionalism itself. In arguing that their presence in the Philippines was driven by the desire to help the Filipinos, Americans were behaving like every other imperialistic nation had behaved, and not exceptionally at all. King’s advocacy of self-determination for small nations is significant.

Thus, the idea of an enlightened and altruistic U.S. colonialism in the Philippines underwent a serious transformation during the 1930s. It was used by a southern Democrat (Sabath), and northwestern Republicans (Knutson and Selvig) from a sugar beet-producing state (Minnesota), to justify granting independence to the islands. Despite their political and regional differences, they appropriated a traditionally anti-independence argument to justify American withdrawal from the Philippines. There was also a tendency among some southern Democrats (Long and Hawes) to question the limits of the alleged American altruism, a more traditional pro-independence stance.³⁴

³² This is not an idea that King developed in the 1930s. In February 1926, King argued that: “Every imperialistic nation that has subjugated a people loudly proclaimed its high purposes and its altruistic designs; and yet history is replete with examples where conquest, even when inspired by honourable motives, has corroded the victor, dulled its conscience, and roused ambitions harmful to its own moral and material progress. [...] The conquering nation usually declares that its purposes are lofty and altruistic and that it only desires the moral and material welfare of the subjugated people.” CR, S, 69th-1st, 1926, vol. 67, February 16th, 1926, p. 4075.

³³ CR, S, 73rd-2nd, March 1, 1934, p.3461. Emphasis mine.

³⁴ See Chapter 4.

REPUBLICANISM

Since the beginning of the 20th century, opponents of American retention of the Philippines used a series of ideological arguments, among which republicanism was one of the most important. They argued that colonialism and republicanism were absolutely incompatible, given that the former negated the fundamental basis of the latter: a government based on the consent of those who are being governed. The argument further maintained that the international competition associated with colonialism inevitably led to militarism, which in turn led to the destruction of republican institutions. Given that the nature of the American retention of the Philippines was colonial, it constituted a threat to the political institutions of the United States. The independence of the Philippines would not only reconcile the United States with its anti-colonial tradition, but also ensure the survival of freedom, democracy and the American way of life.³⁵

The potential impact of the Philippines upon American political institutions was also discussed in Congress during the 1930s, although the discussion did not reach the intensity of the previous years.³⁶ As in previous decades, Philippine independence was presented as the reaffirmation of the republican and, thus, anti-imperialist character of the United States. For those who shared this belief, granting independence would bring the United States back to its “foundation principles”.³⁷

The most consistent among the defenders of this idea during the 1930s was Representative Ralph Lozier (D-MO), one of the main congressional supporters of Filipino independence during the 1930's. During that period, Lozier participated in almost every congressional discussion on Filipino independence. Why did a lawyer and

³⁵ See Chapter 1.

³⁶ Crail, Martin, Lozier, King, Broussard, Jones.

³⁷ CR, H, 73rd-1st, March 19, 1934, p.4842. Utah Senator King defined this issue during the 1929 congressional debates: “This great Republic cannot afford to embark upon imperialistic policies. It would weaken our institutions, corrode the spirit of liberty and democracy which should guide our lives and determine our national policies. Lincoln perceived that the United States could not exist half free and half slave. This Republic can not be imperialistic and at the same time preserve its integrity, its ideals, and its democratic institutions. We must have a democratic republic, and if we depart from the ideals and the spirit of a government of that character, and embark upon the tempestuous sea of conquest, of colonial possessions, of imperialism, economic or otherwise, the work of our fathers will be in danger and the foundations of this Republic imperilled. CR, S, 70th-2nd, vol. 70, February 20, 1929, p.3836.

farmer from Carrolton Missouri engage in such passionate and intense defense of Filipino independence? There is no a definitive answer for this question, but a tentative one could be found in Lozier's agricultural interests. After he was not renominated for the 1934 election, Lozier returned to Carrolton and "engaged in agricultural pursuit."³⁸ Three years later, he was a witness during the House Committee on Ways and Means hearings on the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act.³⁹ He testified as "General Consul" of the National Institute of Oilseed Products, "an association composed of about 15 or 20 concerns dealing in and crushing vegetable oil-bearing seed."⁴⁰ During the 1930's, American vegetable oil producers, concerned about real or imagined competition from Filipino coconut oil, joined farmers and labor leaders in their crusade in favor of Filipino independence.⁴¹ Consequently, it could be argued that Lozier's Filipino pro-independence stand was influenced by his links with American vegetable oil production interests. Significantly, however, despite Lozier's ties to economic interests, he based his defense of Filipino independence on moral, ideological, and political issues.

Lozier opposed the retention of the Philippines based on ideological principles. For him, the United States was "the outstanding Republic of the world":

It may not be inconsistent for monarchies to rule subject people on the other side of the globe, hold in subjection alien races, and deny their subjects to the birthright of self-government, but those policies are absolutely repugnant to the genius and spirit of our institutions. We must not allow cynical and baneful doctrine to swerve us from the old paths and landmarks or permit it to override the sober judgment, destroy the high ideals, dull the conscience, repress the better impulses or smother the overwhelming sentiment of the American people.⁴²

³⁸ Biographical Directory of the United States Congress (From now on Bioguide), <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000489>.

³⁹Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, <http://www.druglibrary.org/Schaffer/hemp/taxact/lozier.htm>.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Brands, *Bound to Empire*, p. 150.

⁴² CR, H, 72nd-1st, February 26, 1932, p.4834. Emphasis mine.

Thus, for Lozier, the possession of colonies was compatible only with monarchic governments, not republics; U.S. retention of the Philippines was an aberration because it went against “the **genius and spirit of our institutions.**”⁴³ Lozier also related retention of the Philippines to the despotism that was associated to monarchies. To him, liberty and democracy were both republican expressions, and to deny freedom was, therefore, anti-republican. Thus, to keep the Filipinos under U.S. rule was also anti-republican.⁴⁴ The United States had to be true to itself, and grant the Philippines independence.

The Democratic Senator for Louisiana, Edwin S. Broussard, also opposed the retention of the Philippines on ideological grounds. However, his stance was different because the Senator advocated the archipelago’s independence for economic reasons. On September 30, 1929, Broussard supported the Philippines’ independence as a way to end competition from Filipino agricultural products, which affected American farmers. Significantly, although Broussard’s speech began justifying the need for the Philippine independence on economic grounds, it ended with the theme of republicanism:

There is no place **in this Republic** for a dependent colony. We repudiated the colonial idea when we separated from the British Empire. Our ideal, as demonstrated by the past, has been a country of free States and Territories, each an integral part of the Nation between which free trade is provided. [...] We have no legal or moral right to hold the Filipinos a dependent people. Not being an integral part of the Nation and our country not an empire with dependent colonies, but a Republic composed of free States and Territories, we should take immediate steps to grant them independence.⁴⁵

Broussard’s use of ideological elements to conclude his argument confirms these elements’ importance in the congressional debates over the future of the Philippines.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid, April 5, 1932, p.7516.

⁴⁵ CR, S, 70th-1st, vol. 71, September 30, 1929, pp. 4063. Emphasis mine.

THE PHILIPPINES AS A MORAL DILEMMA

During the 1900s and the 1910s, those congressmen who opposed the retention of the Philippines used moral arguments in order to question the U.S. presence in the archipelago.⁴⁶ The use of these arguments during the 1920's and 1930s reveals an interesting turn: it not only became more intense, but it was characterized by a strong anti-colonial tendency and the defense of the right of self-determination.

A good number of congressmen questioned U.S. rule on the grounds that it was immoral, since it was not based on the Filipinos' consent. To them, it was unfair and wrong to maintain the islands under the American flag against the will of their inhabitants. In using this sort of argument, they questioned the ideological basis of American control: the idea of enlightened colonialism itself. How could a government based on military force be altruistic?

On January 28, 1925, Representative Otis T. Wingo (D-AR) proposed that U.S. control of the Philippines was immoral because it lacked the Filipinos' consent. To Wingo, the Filipinos' alleged economic and cultural backwardness was not reason enough to justify American rule. He also did not believe that independence should depend on the ability of the Filipinos to maintain "that **peculiar form of government** which the American people in their wisdom have set up in continental United States".⁴⁷ Wingo believed that the Filipinos, just as any other people who inhabit the Earth, would be capable of developing the kind of government "that meets their peculiar needs."⁴⁸

Wingo's comments provoked the reaction of Representative Knutson (R-MN), who asked him if he believed that Native Americans and Haitians also had the right to self-government. Wingo's reply is very interesting, since he defended both the right of self-government and the decolonization:

I stand for the independence of the individual; for the independence of every community to govern itself; and it certainly

⁴⁶ See Chapter 1, pp. 19 and 23; and Chapter 3, pp. 12, 20, and 22.

⁴⁷ CR, H, 68th-2nd, Vol. 56, January 28, 1925, pp. 2594-95. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁸ "I do not like for my government to hold a people who are alien in their history, in their habits, and in their customs in political bondage over their protest." Ibid. p. 2595.

is the right of every people segregated away from us, as are the Filipino people, to govern themselves as they see fit. Lets rise above partisan politics and recognize their right.⁴⁹

This reply reflects a strongly liberal position, acknowledging three non-white peoples' right to govern themselves. Furthermore, Wingo is the first member of Congress I have found defending the independence of the Philippines as a right, which Americans could not deny the Filipinos without damaging the nature of the American nation itself.⁵⁰

In February 1926, Senator William H. King (D-UT) launched an intense partisan attack against Calvin Coolidge administration's naval expenses. During the debate, King criticized the U.S. naval presence in the Philippines. For him, the administration's insistence on "maintain naval bases indefinitely at Manila Bay or some other point or harbor" proved that the Republicans wanted to keep "control over the Philippine Archipelago."⁵¹ For him, that was a terrible mistake, because American naval authorities had acknowledged that the Philippines were indefensible. What is interesting about King's comments is that what began as an attack on the strategic wisdom behind retention of the Philippines, ended as an assault on the morality of American rule. The Senator from Utah questioned American control of the Philippines in terms that were very similar to Wingo's: U.S. rule in the Philippines was immoral because it did not have the Filipinos' support. Like Wingo, King brought together moral propositions and a serious concern regarding the potential impact that the Philippines could have on the American political system. For the Utah Senator, no republic could govern another nation without endangering its own political institutions. In other words, King made use of an

⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 2597.

⁵⁰ "I do not want the opportunity to pass without registering any protest as a **citizen of this Republic** against the Nation holding another people in political bondage. That bloodguilt ought not to be on the Nation's soul. We ought to the Filipino people go their way and order their life to suit themselves. [...] let them work out their own destiny, and **let us show them we believe that no man is wise enough to govern another man against that man's consent**". Ibid. p.2595. Emphasis mine.

⁵¹ CR, S, 69th-1st, vol. 67, February 16, 1926, p.4070-73.

argument that had been extensively used by those who opposed U.S. policy in the Philippines: colonialism and republicanism were absolutely incompatible.⁵²

During the 1930s, the moral challenges to U.S. control of the Philippines grew stronger. Given the strength of some of the economic arguments used to justify Philippine independence, a group of legislators⁵³ insisted that the Philippine issue was more than just an economic matter but presented a serious moral and ethical problem. In the words of Representative Edward E. Cox (D-GA), the Philippines were “**the skeleton in our closet**, as a long as we keep it there we will be trouble with self-accusation.”⁵⁴ For these legislators, independence was a Filipino right that the American government could not and should not deny.

Representative Ralph F. Lozier (D-MO) was the most persistent of the members of this group and also one of the strongest advocates of Filipino independence during the 1930s. Lozier argued for independence on both moral and ideological grounds, combining a strong anti-imperialism, republicanism and idealism.⁵⁵ Lozier proposed that both United States foreign policy, and specifically its Philippine policy, should be based on respect, consistency and sincerity.⁵⁶ American control was immoral because it was not based on Filipinos’ consent, and independence was a right that the United States could not deny the Filipino people. He also denied that the Filipino problem was economic, arguing that what was at stake in the Philippines was the honor and prestige of the United States. Thus, the only way out was complete and absolute independence:

⁵² Ibid., p. 4075.

⁵³ Ralph F. Lozier (D-MO) (CR, H, May 6, 1930, p.8463), Fiorello LaGuardia (D-NY) (CR, H, 72nd-1st, April 4, 1932, pp.7410-11), Edward E. Cox (D-GA) (CR, H, 72nd-1st, January 4, 1932, p.1240), Byron Berry Harlan (D-OH) (CR, H, June 13, 1932, p.12860), Ralph Waldo Emerson Gilbert (D-KY) (CR, H, April 4, 1932, p. 7410), Adolph J. Sabath (D-IL) (CR, H, 72nd-1st, April 5, 1932, p.7487), Conrad G. Selvig (R-MN) (CR, H, 72nd-1st, July 5, 1932, pp. 14362-3, Hawes (D-MO) (CR, S, 72nd-1st, June 21, 1932, p. 13555 and July 1, 1932, p.14474), Cross (CR, II, 72nd-1st, April 4, 1932, p. 7408), King (D-UT), and John M. Nelson (R-WI) (CR, H, 71st-2nd, January 31, 1930, pp.2787-88).

⁵⁴ CR, H, 72nd-1st, January 4, 1932, p.1240.

⁵⁵ CR, H, 72nd-1st, February 26, 1932, p.4835.

⁵⁶ CR, H, 72nd, 1st, April 5, 1932, p. 7517.

We should compose our controversy with the Filipinos in a manner that will involve no sacrifice of our national honor, no violation of the principles and ideals on which our Government is founded, no infringements on the rights of the Filipinos, no abandonment of their self-respect and God-given rights, and no diminution of the confidence, good will, and affection that now exists and should always continue between the people of the United States and the Filipino race.⁵⁷

“An American Pledge”

The congressmen who placed some weight on the moral side of the Filipino problem claimed the existence of a pledge of independence made by the United States. None of them made the origin of this alleged pledge clear, but it seems that some of them based their demands on the preamble of the Jones Act and on an alleged historical commitment to the independence of the Philippines.⁵⁸ Regardless of the origin of this pledge, the legislators who supported its existence argued that the honor and credibility of the United States were at stake in the Philippines. To them, breaking such a “**solemn pledge**” would damage the international reputation of the United States.⁵⁹ Therefore, there was no choice regarding the granting of independence to the Philippines, and it was not to be conceived of as an act of cowardice, but as an obligation. That is, Americans had to abandon the Philippines, not because they feared the (mainly military) consequences of their presence in the islands, but because they had given their word.⁶⁰

The idea was not important during the congressional debates that took place between 1925 and 1929,⁶¹ but this does not mean that during this period the issue of

⁵⁷ CR, H, 72nd-1st, May 26, 1932, p. 11356.

⁵⁸ For the preamble of the Jones Act, see Chapter 5, page 187, note 107.

⁵⁹ The phrase is from Representative John E. Rankin (D-MS), CR, H, 73rd-2nd, March 19, 1934, p.4840. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁰ Among the members of Congress that supported this argument were Senators Kenneth D. Mackellar (D-TN), William H. King (D-UT), Dingell (D-MI), and Representatives Ralph Gilbert (D-KY), John McDuffie (D-AL), Richard J. Welch (R-CA), Ralph F. Lozier (D-MO), John D.M. Johnson (Farmer Laborite-MN), John E. Rankin (D-MS), Charles G. Edwards (D-GA), Edward E. Cox (D-GA), Jones (D-TX), and Oliver H. Cross (D-TX).

⁶¹ During that period, I only found two members of Congress who supported Filipino independence from a moral standpoint: Gilbert, in 1926 and 1928, and King, in 1929.

Filipino independence was not approached from an ethical standpoint. For instance, in 1929, Senator King argued that there was an American commitment towards the independence of the Philippines, and strongly defended the Filipinos' political capacity:

The United States cannot afford to be **insincere or to indulge in sharp practice or to trifle** with a proud and progressive people. **The Philippine Islands belong to the Filipinos, not to the United States.** They are demanding that this Government redeem its promise and withdraw its sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and recognize the independence of the Filipinos. They have demonstrated their capacity for self-government; they have made progress and are advancing in a satisfactory manner along the pathway of national development and intellectual and moral progress.⁶²

During the 1930s, a number of congressmen used the idea of a pledge for independence. One of them was Representative Richard J. Welch (R-CA), who in 1934 argued that in 1898, the United States expressed its wish not to occupy the Philippines permanently, but to assist the Filipinos in the development of a stable government that would guarantee their freedom.⁶³ The Filipinos' request for independence was in perfect harmony with the "pledge" that had been made thirty years before. In other words, the Filipinos' request was not extraordinary; they were asking for something for which they were fully prepared, and had been promised they would receive.⁶⁴

Representative Magnus Johnson (Farmer Laborite-MN) joined economic and moral concerns in his argument in favor of Filipino independence. Johnson, a representative of a labor party, was a fierce defender of independence to stop competition from Filipino products and Filipino immigrants' labor.⁶⁵ The labor movement was one of

⁶² CR, S. 70th-2nd, Vol. 70, February 20, 1929, p.3835. Emphasis mine.

⁶³ Unfortunately, Welch did not make clear how or when that pledge was made.

⁶⁴ CR, H, 73rd-2nd, March 19, 1934, p.4842.

⁶⁵ On March 19, 1934, Johnson made a strong economic defense of Filipino independence, arguing that Filipino independence was crucial for American farmers and workers because it would stop unfair competition from Filipino agricultural products and immigrants, and aid America's economic recovery. Ibid. p. 4842.

the biggest sources of support for Filipino independence,⁶⁶ but he also acknowledged that there was a moral aspect to independence that the United States could not neglect, because there was a pledge that had to be fulfilled. For Johnson, Filipino independence would do justice both to American workers and farmers and the Filipino people.⁶⁷

Representative Charles Gordon Edwards (D-GA) believed the United States had not fulfilled its independence pledge to the Philippines because of the size of American dollars investments in the archipelago. According to him, the United States had to live up to its own traditions and fulfill the pledge. Interestingly, Edwards endorsed the innocence of the United States, stating that the American nation **“has never been an imperialistic country.”**⁶⁸ The U.S. occupation of the Philippines was not colonial in nature, since a pledge of independence lay behind it. Edwards asserted the altruistic nature of the United States, insisting that it had always been acted “in the interests of humanity, wherever her flag has gone”⁶⁹. However, the Georgia democrat believed the United States had to fulfill its pledge in order to demonstrate that in fact it was not an imperialistic nation. Moreover,

⁶⁶ The Minnesota Farmer Labor Party (FLP) was created in 1919 by the Non Partisan League of Minnesota and some labor unions. During the 1920's and 1930's, the FLP became a major political force in Minnesota electing two federal senators (Henrik Shipstead and Mangus Johnson). See: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Fred L Israel, and William P Hansen. *History of American Presidential Elections, 1789-1968*. New York, N.Y: Chelsea House Publishers, 1985, vol. 6, pp. 2369-2370; Lowell K Dyson. *Red Harvest the Communist Party and American Farmers*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982; and Daniel A Mazmanian. *Third Parties in Presidential Elections*. Studies in Presidential Selection: Studies in Presidential Selection. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974.

⁶⁷CR, H, 73rd-2nd, March 19, 1934, p.4842. Representative Oliver H. Cross (D-TX) also combined moral, economic and strategic concerns. In 1930, he stated that “if we would befriend the primary industry of this country, agriculture, if we would maintain our international prestige and avoid the destruction, sooner or later, of our billion dollar navy, if we would live up to our pretensions and fulfill our oft-made promises and keep our national honor unsullied, then we should grant to the Filipinos their unqualified independence without further delay”. Senator Kenneth D. McKellar combined moral concerns with ideological issues. According to him, “it seems to me we ought not to violate our own Constitution, we ought not to violate our own governmental policies and principles, **and above all, we ought not to violate the word we have given to these people to give them their freedom.** I think they have met every requirement and their freedom ought to be granted to them at the earliest possible moment.” CR, H, May 12, 1930, p. 8797 and CR, S, March 5, 1930, p. 4803. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁸ CR, H, 71st-3rd, December 13, 1930, p. 630.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

fulfilling the pledge was not difficult, because after thirty years of training the Filipinos were ready to govern their own country.

I am proud of that great flag of ours, because it has never been one of aggression; it has never been a land-grabbing flag, but it has moved only in the interest of human welfare wherever it has gone. Let us hope our country will never depart from this course. **We promised independence to these people, who have been quite patient, as soon as they were capable of self-government. Is there any doubt at this time they are capable of governing themselves?**⁷⁰

It is necessary to point out that the idea that the United States had promised the Philippines independence found very little opposition. Representative Jonathan M. Wainwright (R-NY) stated, in 1930, that some generals and presidents had committed to the independence of the Philippines, but that was no reason to argue that there was a pledge by the American people. Furthermore, there was no law or political promise that would stand above the will of the American people, who had expressed their support of the retention of the Philippines in 1900.⁷¹

Independence as a right

As we have seen, some of the congressmen who questioned the retention of the Philippines on moral grounds approached the Filipino problem from a human rights perspective. For them, the Filipinos had the right to self-determination and to independence; denying them their right to be free would be immoral. These congressmen believed the United States had no choice but to acknowledge the Filipinos' right to independence and to leave the islands.⁷²

The Democratic Senator from Utah, William H. King, was the most ardent proponent of this idea. In 1934, he argued that the Filipino problem was one of human rights, whose solution was beyond any legal formula. King saw independence as a

⁷⁰ Ibid. Emphasis mine.

⁷¹ CR, H, 71st-2nd, Vol. 72, January 13, 1930, pp.1534-1535.

⁷² John D. Dingell (D-MI) and William H. King (D-UT).

“precious right of man” that the United States had been denying the Filipinos. He argued, furthermore, that this position was “unworthy of this Republic” and had to be corrected.⁷³

King had a broad view of the meaning of Philippine independence, linking it to the promotion of respect for small nations worldwide:

We must not return to the days of autocratic government; to the rule of powerful states, which exercise dominion over distant lands and alien peoples. Rather we must encourage democracy, a spirit of liberalism, the development of smaller units, the recognition of the individual as the real vital unit, and the most important factor in the social, political, intellectual and moral development of the world.⁷⁴

For King, the independence of the Philippines was one step towards the de-colonization of the world, and the creation of a new world order based on equality of all nations. King favoured a foreign policy that would promote democracy and liberalism, with the United States on the side of the weak and the small, confronting the colonial aggressiveness of the other world powers. King’s attitude toward Filipino independence was close to the ideas of group of congressional dissenters called the peace progressives. This group of congressmen adopted a clear anti-imperial position during the 1920’s. They wanted to promote world peace through an American foreign policy based on “reformist lines.”⁷⁵

According to Robert D. Johnson, the peace progressives

[...] wanted the United States to employ a variety of economic, moral, and diplomatic tactics on behalf of weaker states and peoples to help create what they hoped would be a more stable and peaceful international order.⁷⁶

Despite his closeness to the peace progressives, King was an unusual congressional dissenter because he was a conservative politician. A Mormon corporate lawyer from

⁷³ CR, H, 73rd-2nd March 1, 1934, p. 3466. According to King, “When we deal with human rights, with liberties of peoples, legal formula must not stand in the way of justice and liberty in the rights of humanity.” CR, S, 70th-2nd, vol. 70, February 20, 1929, p.3840.

⁷⁴ CR, S, 70th-2nd, vol. 70, February 20, 1929, p. 3840.

⁷⁵ Robert D. Johnson *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations*. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 2-3.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 3.

Utah, King was a “Red-baiter” that “did not fit the profile of a classic Senate dissenter.”⁷⁷ However, he became an obstinate enemy of naval spending, fierce opponent of the U.S. occupation of Haiti, and strong supporter of the League of Nations. He opposed a big Navy arguing that it would be used against “the rights of smaller states.” He also authored a number of amendments calling for a U.S. withdrawal from Haiti. Like the peace progressives, King wanted an American foreign policy based on respect for small countries’ rights.⁷⁸

King posed the issue of Filipino independence as necessary to put an end to the questions about the United States’ anti-imperialist nature. In honoring its pledge to the Filipinos, the U.S. would significantly improve its worldwide credibility and leadership.⁷⁹

Thus, King’s attitude combined moralism, anti-imperialism and idealism. Another example of such blend can be found in a debate with Senator Millard Tydings (D-MD) in February 1929, during which Tydings argued that the Philippines were safer as a United States’ colony than they would ever be as a sovereign nation. According to Tydings, once the United States had left, the Philippines would become the easy prey of some other world power that would not treat them as “kindly” as Americans had. The Senator from Maryland admitted that this possibility troubled him. Tydings’ arguments provoked a strong reaction from King, who reminded the Senator that ever since Roman times the colonial powers had justified their dominion over weaker nations on the basis of the supposed benefits of colonialism; such an argument was anti-republican and, therefore, un-American. In a fit of idealism, King told Tydings he would rather see the Philippines subjugated by another power than retained under the American flag against the will of the Filipinos.⁸⁰ He closed his speech underlying his anti-colonialist position:

⁷⁷ Ibid, pp. 263-265.

⁷⁸ Ibid. H. W. Brands notes that King was a senator from a sugar state, which helps explain his support for Filipino independence because U.S. sugar interests also favored it. Op. cit., p. 155.

⁷⁹ For King, “The world will acclaim our course and people everywhere who now criticize because they fear we are imperialistic will be disarmed and will add their voices to the chorus of praise and good will which I feel will sure be heard in all parts of the world” Ibid. p. 3842.

⁸⁰ Ibid. pp. 3842-43.

“We have no right to impose upon them [the Filipinos] our views by force, even though our views and civilization measure up to a higher standard.”⁸¹

In this debate, Tydings reproduced the idea of enlightened colonialism, the representation of American colonialism as a source of protection and material progress for the Filipinos. For Tydings, American dominion was preferable to the uncertainties and dangers of independence. On the other hand, King believed that the Philippines’ right to freedom was more important than any supposed material benefit that they could obtain in their role as colonies of the United States, including the potential for protection against an attack. In other words, colonialism was not justifiable in King’s eyes. The Senator from Utah also expressed concern for America’s republican institutions. For him, ruling the Filipinos against their will was contrary to American republican values. King defended Filipino independence as the necessary reconciliation of American political discourse and practice. It was not enough for the U.S. to claim to be a democratic, anti-colonial republic. It had to act like one.

Again, King was arguing that the idea of enlightened colonialism was not exclusive to Americans. On the contrary, he linked it to imperialism since Roman times, arguing that empires had always justified their dominion on the basis that it was beneficial for those who were dominated. King thus struck hard against one of the main justifications of the U.S. presence in the Philippines: American colonialism was not exceptional at all and there was no possible way to justify it.

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE FILIPINOS

From the moment the Americans arrived in the Philippines, the Filipinos were submitted to observation and scrutiny by American writers, colonial officers, missionaries, journalists, travellers and intellectuals,⁸² who analyzed, described and catalogued the Filipinos for their readers in the United States. The Filipinos were represented as a people who lacked linguistic and religious homogeneity, a savage, racially inferior people with no history who were divided in tribes and completely

⁸¹ Ibid. p. 3843.

⁸² See Chapter 2.

incapable of self-government. This representation played a vital role in the justification of American control as a civilizing and nation-building process⁸³.

As previous chapters have described, the images and stereotypes of Filipinos created in the first decades of the 20th century were often used in the congressional debates over the Philippines. Members of Congress used them to justify or to attack American colonialism in the archipelago, but they also participated in producing these representations. Congressmen such as Richmond P. Hobson (D-Alabama) and Albert J. Beveridge (R-Indiana) created their own images of the Filipinos.⁸⁴

Between 1925 and 1934, the questions regarding the Filipino political ability, educational level, racial nature and history continued to generate serious debate among U.S. lawmakers. After the more than thirty years of American control, some congressmen felt the need to explain and describe the Philippines. To them, it was because of the American people's ignorance regarding the Philippines that they failed to understand the true dimensions of the Filipino issue.⁸⁵ In trying to remedy this ignorance, some members of Congress explained and described the Philippines and the Filipinos not only to their colleagues, but also to their fellow citizens. One of them, Representative John M. Nelson (R-WI), argued in 1930 that Americans had an incorrect impression of the Philippines due to the publicity campaign launched by the enemies of Filipino independence. According to Nelson, his comments sought precisely to overcome this incorrect representation of the Filipinos that was prevalent among Americans.⁸⁶

⁸³ See Chapter 1.

⁸⁴ See Chapters 3 and 4.

⁸⁵ According to Senator Hawes, "If Americans will for a little while withdraw their gaze from Haiti, at our door, and Nicaragua, to both of which countries we have sent our marines, and devote attention to the Philippines, the problem which these people present to us and to themselves could be adjusted otherwise. Once Americans come to realize that the Philippines are part of Asia; that their 13,000,000 people are Malays and Orientals; that the islands are not in the trade route between the United States and China and Japan; that the distance from our coast to Manila is almost beyond the ability of our Navy or our Army to neutralize, they will deal decisively with the question of Filipino independence." CR, S, 72nd-1st, July 1, 1932, p.14476.

⁸⁶ According to Nelson, "**From a false propaganda America has a mistaken idea of the Philippines.** It is not unusual for one country to have a bizarre opinion of the whole people of another country. The story is told that after a Chinese lecturer had appeared before an American audience an American woman went up to the Chinese and said 'Is it true that they eat mice in

Also in 1930, Representative Lozier, a fervent supporter of Filipino independence, argued “many Americans lack accurate information in reference to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands.”⁸⁷ To combat such ignorance, Lozier provided a description of the geography, history and racial origins of the Filipinos. He described the Philippines as a set of islands found 12,000 miles from New York City and 7,000 from San Francisco.⁸⁸ Lozier then recounted the history of the Philippines, from the arrival of the Spaniards in the 16th century to the time of the American conquest in 1898. Interestingly, Lozier began his history of the Philippines before the arrival of the Spaniards, paying particular attention to the archipelago’s historic relationship with China and the Muslim world.⁸⁹ Lozier further informed his fellow congressmen that the Philippines had been part of the Malaysian Empire.⁹⁰ By acknowledging that the Filipino history and culture did not begin with the arrival of the Spaniards or the Americans, Lozier justified Philippine independence by portraying the Filipinos as a nation.

Lozier also devoted attention to the population of the Philippines, classifying it in three cultural-religious groups: the “mountain people”, the Moros, and the Christians. He subdivided the Christians into two social classes: the “caciques” (“largely mestizos or mixed [Spanish and Chinese] blood”), who constituted the “moneyed class”, and the Taos, who constituted the peasant class.⁹¹ It is important to note that he made no mention of the supposedly irreconcilable differences between the cultural groups (Moors vs.

China?’ He politely replied, ‘Madam, is it really true that they eat hot dogs in America?’ **Some of the misrepresentations about the Filipinos are just absurd.**” CR, H, 71st-2nd, January 31, 1930, p. 2787. Emphasis mine.

⁸⁷ CR, H, 71st-2nd June 25, 1930, p.11701.

⁸⁸Ibid. Lozier emphasized the great distance between the Philippines and the United States as an element that Americans should pay attention to. This was a topic other members of Congress addressed when they analyzed the strategic meaning of the Philippines for the United States.

⁸⁹Representative John E. Rankin (D-MS) also emphasized the Filipinos’ historical links with Japan and China, stating that “They have a civilization that goes back as far as that of the Japanese or that of the Chinese; and to say that we are giving them something they cannot handle is beside the question, it seems to me. In my opinion they can take as good care of themselves as many of the other nations of the world are doing at this time.” CR, H, 73rd-2nd, March 19, 1934, p.4840.

⁹⁰ Op. cit., p.11702.

⁹¹ Ibid. p. 11701.

Christians), and that he does not classify them as tribes. Lozier acknowledged that there were differences between the groups, but did not give them any importance, nor consider them an obstacle for independence. This was a significant rupture with traditional representations of the Filipinos, given that Lozier acknowledged the religious and cultural differences between the Filipinos, without considering them an obstacle to the islands' independence.

Lozier racialized the Filipinos by identifying them as members of the Malayan race,⁹² but again broke with previous representations of the Filipinos by describing them as the most civilized members of that race, thanks to their direct contact with western civilization and religion. According to Lozier, they were a more Christian race than other "backward or subject race."⁹³

Nelson's and Lozier's arguments are important because they spoke for a number of members of Congress who, in the 1930s, reinvented the Filipinos and their history in order to justify an American departure from the islands.⁹⁴ In their speeches, Filipinos were no longer a savage people, religiously and linguistically divided, lacking history and political ability, but a people ready for independence.

⁹² Lozier argued that "the Malayan, or brown race, of which the Filipino is an offshoot, is one of the five great families of humanity according to the classification made by Jean Frederick Blumenbach in 1775, and comprises the dominant and non-Nigrific inhabitants of the coastal regions of the Malay Peninsula and Oceania, or the East Indian Archipelago, extending from the Malay Peninsula to Timor and from Timor north of Luzon, which, of course, includes Sumatra, Java, Celebes, the Philippines and numerous smaller islands." Ibid. p. 11701-02. Emphasis mine.

⁹³ For him, "It is a significant fact, and one too frequently overlooked, that the Filipinos are more universally Christian than any other so-called backward or subject race. Largely of Malayan blood, they have developed the spiritual side of their natures to a remarkable degree, and in religion, ethics, morals, culture and right living they have outstripped and left all other Malayan groups far behind. Of this numerous and far-flung ethnological stock, the Filipinos have demonstrated the greatest genius and capacity for efficient self-government. They are highly imitative and readily accept and skillfully utilize that which is best in western civilization." Ibid. p.11703.

⁹⁴ Lozier, Hawes, John M. Nelson (R-WI), Wingo, Dyer, Wheeler (D-MT), McDuffie, Snyder (D-PA), Rankin (D-MS), Colden, King, Cross, Gilbert, Lamneck, and Crail.

The political ability of the Filipinos

Since 1898, retention of the Philippines had been justified by the argument that Filipinos lacked the political ability to govern their own country, and therefore the U.S. could not abandon them. In other words, Americans' motivation to retain control of the Philippines was not expansionistic or imperialistic in nature, but a product of the Filipinos' lack of political ability, a kind of historical accident which left the U.S. no other choice but to retain the Philippines to fulfil their responsibility to educate the Filipinos. For those who shared this view, the United States could not abandon the islands until the Filipinos were capable to govern themselves. This idea was one of the bases upon which the representation of American colonialism as an altruistic enterprise was built. Thus, to argue that the Filipinos were ready for self-government meant that it was time for American tutelage to end. This was, therefore, a topic that was discussed from the beginning to the end of American rule in the Philippines.

During the period between 1925 and 1934, the Filipinos' political ability figured prominently in the congressional debates about the future of the Philippines.⁹⁵ For instance, in 1926 Representative Ralph Gilbert (D-KY) argued that it was not fair to use American political achievements as a standard for judging the Filipinos.⁹⁶ Gilbert reminded his colleagues "the English-speaking people are as outstanding in matters of government in the modern world as the Romans were in the ancient world and, of course, it is not fair to apply the standard of that government which has the greatest capacity for governing."⁹⁷ In other words, political ability was an innate skill of the Anglo-Saxon race. For Gilbert, the Filipinos would be able to develop this ability to some degree, but would never equal Americans' achievements because of their racial limitations.

⁹⁵ The legislators who addressed this issue were Wingo (D-AR), Lozier, Lamneck, Ralph Gilbert (D-KY), Cross, Tydings, McDuffie, Snyder, Ranking, Colden, Dyer, Crail and Nelson.

⁹⁶ Senator King also argued against evaluating Filipinos' political skills using American standards. For him, it was wrong to expect the Filipinos to develop their political skills as the Americans had done after independence. He also argued that American control was not helping the Filipinos prepare to be a free and sovereign nation, because only free peoples could develop self-government abilities. CR, Senate, 69th-1st, 1926, vol. 67, February 16, 1926, p.4075.

⁹⁷ CR, H, 69th-1st Session, March 5, 1926, Vol. 67, p.5087.

In the 1930s, Filipinos' political ability was again discussed in Congress. However, during this period, very few legislators questioned Filipinos' political skills.⁹⁸ On the contrary, a large group of congressmen defended the Filipinos' political ability as they advocated independence for the archipelago.⁹⁹ They acknowledged that the Filipinos' supposed political inability had been an argument put forward by those who opposed the independence of the islands. However, they argued, there was no reason to further postpone independence, since the Filipinos were now ready for it.

In 1931, Representative Leonidas C. Dyer (R-MO) argued that, as long as the Filipinos remained under American control, it would be impossible to determine with certainty how ready they were for self-government. Personally, he believed they were capable of self-government, and recommended that they should first be granted independence, for only after this could their political ability be judged.¹⁰⁰ In other words, the Filipino people would never be able to fully demonstrate their political abilities as long as they remained colonial subjects.¹⁰¹ Significantly, Dyer's efforts to demonstrate that the Filipinos were ready for independence included his acknowledgement that they had organized a republic in 1899. However, he did not fully break with the past, failing to mention what happened to the republic Aguinaldo had organized.¹⁰²

Undoubtedly, the most ardent defender of the Filipinos' political ability during the congressional debates of the 1930s was Representative Lozier. Like Dyer, Lozier acknowledged that the alleged lack of political ability had been used to deny

⁹⁸ I found only one representative arguing that Filipinos were not ready for self-government in 1934: Representative Colden (D-CA). CR, H, 73rd-2nd, March 19, 1934, p. 963.

⁹⁹ Among them were Lamneck, Gilbert, Lozier, Dyer, McDuffie, Nelson, Crail and King.

¹⁰⁰ Representative Lozier also thought that it was unfair to ask the Filipinos to show their administrative efficiency without granting them independence because that efficiency was a "fruitage of opportunity and experience." CF, H, 71st-3rd, May 6, 1930, p.8466.

¹⁰¹ CR, H, 71st-3rd, vol. 74, part 7, January 13, 1931, p. 2113.

¹⁰² According to Dyer, "the Philippine people have acquired a reasonable degree of appreciation of the Anglo-Saxon concept of individual rights. **Even before the operation of American influence on the islands there was set up by the people in their own constitution for the Philippine republic a guaranty of individual rights.** Thirty years of the application of the American Bill of Rights cannot have had a salutary influence in furthering these concepts." Ibid. Emphasis mine.

independence to the Philippines.¹⁰³ Lozier expected that the Filipinos would develop “the same genius and capacity” that the American people had developed:¹⁰⁴

It would be extremely unreasonable to demand or expect of the Filipino masses, but recently emerging from three centuries of exploitation and oppression, the same intimate knowledge and efficient application of the useful mechanic, liberal, and fine arts, the same passion for power, the same nationwide culture. The same comprehension of governmental problems, and the same mastery of statecraft that the citizens of the United States are presumed to possess after 150 years of national life and experience.¹⁰⁵

Lozier believed that the Filipino people were not at the same level of political maturity of Americans, but that they had in fact developed enough political skills to govern themselves. The quotation above includes also an ideological element: Lozier believed that American exceptionalism required the United States to behave in a fair and magnanimous way when judging the Filipinos’ abilities, since it was impossible for them to reach the Americans’ level of political development. To Lozier, such magnanimity would further demonstrate the altruistic nature of American rule in the Philippines.

Lozier believed that the Filipinos’ political abilities were, to a great extent, the result of the Americans’ educational work in the islands. Both education and teaching in English were important in Lozier’s arguments,¹⁰⁶ but it is important to note that he was not the only member of Congress to praise American educational work in the Philippines. A group of congressmen argued that the Filipinos had developed the political ability required for independence thanks to the nation-making experiment implemented by

¹⁰³ Lozier called this argument “an ancient sophistry [...] It has been invoked and worked overtime by the governing classes since the beginning of time in order to withhold from citizens and subjects a participation in the affairs of their own Government. No republic has ever been established that did not have to combat this fallacy.” CR, H, 72nd-1st, April 5, 1932, p.7516. *Emphasis mine.*

¹⁰⁴ CR, H, 71st-3rd, May 6, 1930, p.8466.

¹⁰⁵ CR, H, 72nd-1st, January 4, 1932, pp.1240.

¹⁰⁶ Dyer, Crail, Cross, McDuffie, King, and Snyder (D-PA) also mentioned the impact of American education on Filipino political skills.

Americans in the archipelago.¹⁰⁷ They agreed with Lozier in that the teaching of English had played an important role in transforming the Filipinos into a nation that was ready for independence.¹⁰⁸

In 1934, Senator King analyzed the meaning of the educational system that had been established by the United States in the Philippines. King emphasized its achievements: 8,000 schools built, 30,000 teachers trained, and the creation of colleges and universities. Despite the American government's undeniable achievements, there was no guarantee that continued U.S. control of the Philippines would better prepare Filipinos for independence. King had no doubts that Americans had fulfilled their task, and believed that proof of this was the democratic character and political abilities the Filipinos now demonstrated. It was thus necessary, according to King, to give them the opportunity to prove the world that they were ready to be free.¹⁰⁹ King's approach was quite realistic, given that it conceded that the Filipino independence entailed great risks, but believed that those risks needed to be faced. To continue American colonial rule would not guarantee the continuation of the Filipinos' progress to date, and independence would not necessarily lead to its automatic destruction.

REINVENTING FILIPINO HISTORY

The history of the Philippines played an important role in the congressional debates the islands' future during the first two decades of the 20th century. Both opponents and defenders of U.S. Philippine policy used the islands' history to support their positions, appropriating the right to define the Filipinos' history and denying that

¹⁰⁷ According to Dyer, "While there are many dialects in the Philippines, just as there are in all oriental countries, there are but three basic dialects, the Tagalog, the Ilocano, and the Visayan. There are three other important dialects, but the testimony was that it was a simple matter for the people to have a speaking knowledge of two or three of these dialects. Moreover, as the result of the teaching of English in the islands for more than 30 years, a great number of Filipinos, regardless of their groups or their dialects, speak the English language, which is rapidly becoming a common language throughout the islands, especially among the younger generation." CR, H, 71st-3rd, vol. 74, part 7, January 13, 1931, p.2112.

¹⁰⁸ Cross, Cr, H, 72nd-1st April 4, 1932, p.7407; Crail, CR, H, 72nd-1st April 8, 1932, p.7776-7; Snyder (D-Pennsylvania) CR, H, 73rd-2nd, March 19, 1934, p.4870 and 4835.

¹⁰⁹ CR, S, 73rd-2nd, March 1, 1934, p.3465.

right to the Filipinos. In this regard, the interpretation of the first few years of American presence in the Philippines are remarkably interesting and important, and in particular, the actions of a group of American diplomatic, military and naval officers during the period between Dewey's victory, in May 1898, and the beginning of the Filipino-American war in February 1899. The existence of an alleged Filipino-American alliance against Spain that was based on the promise of independence to the Philippines, and the issue of who began hostilities in the Filipino-American war, were controversial subjects not only in Congress, but also in the public arena.¹¹⁰

During the 1930s, Congress addressed these questions in ways very different from those of previous years. The 1930's witnessed the reinvention of the history of Filipino-American relations by a group of congressmen who had no problem acknowledging the existence of a Filipino-American alliance, or the Filipinos' contribution to the defeat of Spain. They criticized the process that made the Philippines an American territory, harshly questioned the actions of Admiral George Dewey and other American officers, made Aguinaldo a national hero and accepted American troops' responsibility for the outbreak of the Filipino-American war.

The acquisition of the Philippines

The United States' acquisition of the Philippines was one of the topics of Filipino history that was least mentioned by members of Congress during the 1930s. Some of them repeated the traditional explanation, which attributed American presence in the Philippines to a historical accident. According to them, the acquisition of the Philippines had been the indirect result of a war to free Cuba. Those who used this argument posited purely humanitarian, as opposed to imperialistic and expansionistic, motivations for the war against Spain. In this view, the Philippines ended up in U.S. hands because Americans had no choice but to keep them, given the Filipinos' lack of political skills.¹¹¹ For instance, in May 1930, Representative Lozier argued that

¹¹⁰ See Chapter 2.

¹¹¹ Representatives Lozier and John D. Dingell (D-MI), and Senators Tydings and Hawes.

By the **fortunes of war** into which we were reluctantly drawn, these islands [the Philippines] with their millions of brown-skinned men and women **were left on our front doorstep. They are not the fruits of a war of conquest, of for territorial expansion or for national aggrandizement. They are the residue of an adventure in the initiation of which we were undeniably actuated by altruistic, unselfish, and humanitarian motives.**¹¹²

Even Lozier, a staunch defender of Philippine independence, adopted this traditional explanation for the U.S. acquisition of the Philippines: the United States did not conquer the Philippines, but inherited them. Americans welcomed the Filipinos under their protective wing, like an orphan who abandoned on a convent's doorstep.

Not all congressmen shared Lozier's views. For instance, in 1932, Representative Edward E. Cox (D-GA) argued that the annexation of the Philippines happened against the will of the American people. According to him, Americans expected that after the defeat of Spain, the Philippines would receive the same treatment as Cuba: they would be granted independence. However, American imperialists had other plans for the islands. It is important to note that Cox admitted that the Filipinos were fighting for their independence when Dewey's fleet arrived, that there was a Filipino-American alliance, and that the Filipino contribution was vital to the American victory.¹¹³

Senator Huey P. Long (D-LA) harshly criticized the acquisition of the Philippines. Long was a very important political figure of the 1930's, a flamboyant southern senator with presidential ambitions. As governor of Louisiana (1928-1932) he developed a strong populist agenda and a strong state political machinery which helped Long to become a U.S. Senator in 1932. He supported Franklin D. Roosevelt's election in 1932, but split with the President in 1933, expressing disappointment with the New Deal's extent and nature. Long was a radical populist who supported income redistribution, not reforms, as the only way out of Depression. For him, the federal government should use its power to close the gap between rich and poor Americans taxing the millionaires and the corporations. After breaking with the President, Long

¹¹² CR, H, 71st-2nd, May 6, 1930, p. 8463. Emphasis mine.

¹¹³ CR, H, 72nd-1st, January 28, 1932, p.2918.

launched a campaign against Roosevelt and New Deal with clear presidential ambitions. In 1935, an assassin ended Huey P. Long's political career.¹¹⁴

Long's remarks about the Philippines can be understood as part of his campaign against the Roosevelt administration, but also as a reflection of his staunch isolationism. He saw the war with Spain and American participation in the First World War as costly mistakes. Furthermore, according to him,

The acquisition of the Philippines as the Senator from Maryland [Tydings] disclosed yesterday, **represents a black mark against the American Government that it never has washed off.** In the first place, we went into war with Spain that we had no business ever going into. Then, after we had gone into war with Spain, we hailed over toward the Philippine Islands, and we propagated among the Filipinos the idea that they ought to throw off the Spanish yoke and declare themselves free. **It was the American envoys and the American admirals and the American generals who encouraged Aguinaldo's forces in the Philippine Islands to throw off the Spanish yoke and declare themselves free and independent. When the Filipinos had won their independence,** Spain did not want to surrender to the Filipinos, but wanted to surrender to the United States; and after we had aroused the Filipinos to throw off the Spanish yoke and had declared war on Spain, we turned around and accepted a surrender of the Philippines from Spain, and paid \$15,000,000 and took over the Philippine Islands ourselves. If that was not double-crossing both Spain and the Filipinos at the same time, I do not know how a nation could do it. It was **a perfect piece of international piracy** that was done by the United States Government in encouraging those people in one breath to declare war and throw off the Spanish yoke, and then, when they had declared war and had won independence in a war that the Americans had encouraged them to make, America went in and accepted the surrender of the islands to keep the Filipinos from having what they had won by force of arms.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ See: Alan Brinkley, *Voices of Protest Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression*. New York: Knopf, 1982; Henry C. Dethloff, *Huey P. Long: Southern Demagogue or American Democrat?* Boston: Heath, 1967; William Ivy. Hair, *The Kingfish and His Realm the Life and Times of Huey P. Long*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991; and Williams, T. Harry. *Huey Long*. New York: Knopf, 1979.

¹¹⁵ CR, S, 73rd-2nd, March 22, 1934, p. 5097. Emphasis is mine.

This quote reflects a complex interpretation of Filipino history. First, Long described the acquisition of the Philippines as a black mark in the history of the United States, making clear his opposition to retaining the islands and questioning the basis of American colonialism. However, he did not recognize the existence of an independence movement in the Philippines before the arrival of the United States. For him, the Filipino people had only rebelled against the Spaniards because they were incited to do so by the Americans. In taking this position Long forgot or ignored the fact that the Filipinos had been fighting for independence since 1896. Finally, Long acknowledged that the Filipinos had earned their independence and that the U.S. had betrayed them by taking it from them.¹¹⁶

Senator King also offers an interesting interpretation of the U.S. acquisition of the Philippines. According to him, Americans had not freed the Filipinos, since by 1898 the Filipinos had full control of the islands and had organized a republican government. For King, the Filipino people had freed themselves and it was Americans who deprived them of that freedom.¹¹⁷ This led King to make a much more radical argument than Long's. According to King, the Filipinos had ended Spanish rule before the arrival of American troops. Therefore, Spain had no power to transfer the islands to the United States, and the Treaty of Paris and American control of the Filipino archipelago were illegal because by 1898 the Philippines were a sovereign country.¹¹⁸

Representatives John M. Nelson (R-WI) and Oliver H. Cross (D-TX) agreed with King that the Filipinos had freed themselves before the arrival of American troops. According to Nelson, "it becomes self-evident that the Filipino people had won their independence before we Americans came in."¹¹⁹ Cross even agrees with King in that Spain had no power to transfer the Philippines to the United States in exchange for

¹¹⁶ Long saw Spain was a tyrannical power, but he saw no reason why the United States had to fight Spain in 1898.

¹¹⁷ According to King, "**we did not free the Filipinos; they freed themselves from Spanish rule and we, by force of arms, destroyed their government and imposed upon them our will and our rule.**" CR, S, 69th-1st, Vol. 67, February 16, 1926, p. 4077. Emphasis mine.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p. 4076; CR, S, 70th-2nd, vol. 70, February 20, 1929, p.383; CR, S, 73rd-2nd, March 1st, 1934, pp.3461 and 5005.

¹¹⁹ CR, H, 71st-2nd, January 31, 1930, p.2785.

\$20,000,000. According to Cross, sovereignty in the Philippines was “exercised by the Philippine Republic, with General Aguinaldo **as its president**” at the time the Treaty of Paris was signed.¹²⁰ He thus acknowledged the existence of a republic created by the Filipinos, denied that Spain had any right to turn the Philippines over to the United States, and challenged the legality of American control of the Philippines. The quote also casts Aguinaldo not as a bandit, but the legitimate leader of the Filipino people.

The Filipino-American alliance

The issue of an alleged Filipino-American alliance was a recurrent topic in the congressional debates regarding the Philippines. According to Filipino nationalists and their American supporters, in 1898 American naval officers and diplomats had offered independence to the Filipino rebels in exchange for a military alliance against Spain. In fulfilment of this alliance, the Filipino rebels attacked the Spanish forces in the islands and besieged Manila, the capital city. According to Filipino nationalists, the rebels actions facilitated the American forces’ victory.

Throughout the first two decades of the 20th century, opponents of Philippine independence minimized the Filipino contribution to the defeat of Spanish forces, and denied the existence of any alliance. However, in the 1930s a group of congressmen not only recognized the alliance, but emphasized the Filipinos’ role in defeating Spain.¹²¹

In 1932, one of these congressmen, Representative Oliver H. Cross (D-TX), presented a detailed analysis of events in the Philippines from Dewey’s victory in May 1898 until the Spanish surrender in August. Cross, a lawyer and farmer, arrived at seven conclusions.¹²² First, that the Filipinos supported the Americans against the Spaniards because they believed that they would thus achieve their independence. Second, that this assumption was correct because the Americans had achieved their own independence through French aid. Third, that the American consul in Hong Kong had met with

¹²⁰ CR, H, 71st-2nd, May 12, 1930, p.8798. Emphasis mine.

¹²¹ Cross, Cox and Nelson.

¹²² For more information about Cross see: Bioguide, <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000931>.

Aguinaldo in November 1897, to discuss the terms of an alliance against Spain. Fourth, that Admiral Dewey was in contact with Aguinaldo while the Filipino leader was in Hong Kong. Fifth, that Aguinaldo returned to the Philippines on board a U.S. navy ship after the destruction of the Spanish fleet in Cavite. Sixth, that the American consul in Hong Kong bought rifles that were delivered to Aguinaldo. Finally, that Dewey himself ordered that all rifles and cannons captured from the Spaniards should be handed over to Aguinaldo.¹²³ Thus Cross concluded that there had in fact been a Filipino-American alliance.

Cross also emphasized the Filipinos role in defeating Spain, arguing that the Filipinos weakened the Spanish troops, facilitating the American victory. Proof of this was the fact that when American troops arrived in the Philippines, they found most of the archipelago in hands of the Filipino rebels who had besieged the Spanish garrison in Manila.¹²⁴ According to Cross:

Had not been for the insurgents, instead of having 20 killed and 105 wounded, would we not have thousands killed and wounded, not to mention those would have languished with disease in the jungles?¹²⁵

Cross completely broke with earlier explanations of the 1898 American victory in his advocacy of Filipino independence: Filipino help had been crucial for that victory, sparing the lives of thousands of American soldiers. According to Cross, such valuable help had been rewarded with betrayal, because once the victorious American troops entered Manila, they kept out the Filipino troops who had so gallantly aided them.¹²⁶

It is interesting to note how, in his reinvention of Philippine history, Representative Cross harshly questioned Admiral Dewey's credibility. This is because Dewey's image as a national hero had been previously used to reject any questioning of

¹²³ CR, H,, 73rd-2nd, April 4, 1932, p.7405-06.

¹²⁴ CR, H, 71st-2nd, May 12, 1930, p.8797.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ CR, H, 72nd-1st, January 28, 1932, pp.2918-19 and April 4, 1932, p.7406.

his actions in the Philippines.¹²⁷ Cross posed a series of simple questions: How could Dewey and other naval and military officers not understand that Aguinaldo believed that the war against Spain would lead to the independence of the Philippines? How did Dewey and other American officers understand the fact that the Filipinos organized a republic? How could they contact Aguinaldo in Hong Kong, bring him back to the Philippines, arm him and, at the same time, argue that they did not know Aguinaldo sought independence for his country?¹²⁸ For Cross, Dewey's version was completely implausible, because Aguinaldo's intentions were obvious.

“The great Filipino revolutionist”

Chapter 5 described how opponents of Filipino independence demonized Emilio Aguinaldo.¹²⁹ They de-politicised Aguinaldo by describing him not as the leader of a political movement but as an ambitious bandit, a tyrant and a traitor of his own people who was responsible for the outbreak of the Filipino-American war. Thus, the war was explained as the result of a madman's ambition, rather than the consequence of American actions in the Philippines.

In the 1930s, in one of the most striking aspects of the reinvention of the Filipino history, representations of Aguinaldo made an abrupt about-face: no longer a bandit and traitor, he suddenly became a national hero. For instance, in 1932, Senator Harry Hawes (D-MO) justified Philippine independence on the grounds that Aguinaldo's call for independence was supported by the majority of Filipinos. According to Hawes,

But, so far, all that we have heard is the united voice of all the Philippine people expressed in their national congress, expressed by old Aguinaldo, **their national hero**, expressed in

¹²⁷ See Chapter 2 (1), p.44 and Chapter 4, p.8.

¹²⁸ In 1932, Cross questioned Dewey's alleged ignorance of Aguinaldo's intentions: "Did Admiral Dewey and the Americans in command at Cavite have any doubts as to the purpose actuating Aguinaldo and his followers in taking up arms?" Two years before, he raised the same question using the same words. CR, H, 72nd-1st, April 4, 1932, p.7406 and CR, H, 71st-2nd, May 12, 1930, p. 8797.

¹²⁹ See pages 178-184.

communications by their leading business men, pressed by every group in the islands.¹³⁰

Hawes not only argues that the majority of Filipinos favored independence, he also identifies Aguinaldo as a Filipino national hero, although that he does not specify against whom Aguinaldo acted so heroically. That is, Aguinaldo's heroism was acknowledged, but not the context in which it was expressed, rendering American colonialism invisible.

Representative Cox also participated in Aguinaldo's political rehabilitation. In 1932, he told the House of Representatives that

At the time the war was declared, Aguinaldo, **the great Filipino revolutionist**, was at Singapore; and the American consul at the port, realizing his value as a leader of his people, counseled with him in behalf of his rejoining the Philippine insurgents and making common cause with the United States in warring upon Spain. Aguinaldo accepted the proposal, whereupon the consul telegraphed Commodore Dewey through our consul at Hong Kong as follows: Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hong Kong. Arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired. To which message the Commodore replied: Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible.¹³¹

In this quote, Cox acknowledges Aguinaldo's political leadership, recognizes that there was an exchange between Aguinaldo and American diplomatic authorities, and hints at an alliance between the two. Cox also re-evaluated other aspects of Filipino history.

Why this revision of Aguinaldo's historic role? Sources are not clear in this respect, but it could be ventured that by the 1930s Aguinaldo was not a major threat to the United States, so recognizing his leadership appeared less treasonous than when he was a political force to be reckoned with.

The Filipino-American war

The origin and causes of the Filipino-American war were debated in Congress from the beginning of American control of the islands. Determining how and why the war started was an important issue because if it were true that the Americans had

¹³⁰ CR, S, 71st-2nd, vol.72, February 17, 1930, p.3376. Emphasis mine.

¹³¹ CR, H, 72nd-2nd, January 28, 1932, p.2917. Emphasis is mine.

provoked the war, as the supporters of Filipino independence argued, then American altruism could be questioned and with it the ideological bases of U.S. rule.

During the 1920s and 1930, Congress debated this issue with less intensity than in previous periods. Most congressmen did not hesitate to question the official account of the war's origin. That is, they did not blame the Filipinos for starting the conflict, and were highly critical of American troops' behavior during the war. For instance, in 1930, Representative John M. Nelson (R-WI) argued that Americans behaved in the Philippines in the same way that General Valeriano Weyler had behaved in Cuba, creating "reconcentration camps." Nelson argued that Americans had not only betrayed the Filipinos, but they had also concentrated them in death camps and had brutally repressed them. Nelson actually cast the Filipino insurgents not as savages or bandits, but as men fighting for their country's freedom against an invading power.¹³²

Representative Cox also addressed this issue, agreeing with Nelson that American behaviour during the war had been highly questionable, but focusing his attention on exonerating Filipinos of any responsibility for the outbreak of war. To him it was clear that the Americans had started hostilities.¹³³

It is interesting to note that both Nelson and Cox resurrected the issue of alleged atrocities committed by American soldiers during the Filipino-American war, a topic of great importance at the beginning of the 20th century, but which had disappeared from congressional debate. In this way, Cox and Nelson contributed to the reinvention of Filipino history as they justified independence for the islands.

SPANISH COLONIALISM

The use of Spanish colonialism to justify its American counterpart in the Philippines has been a constant element in this study. Since 1898, Americans repeatedly referenced Spanish colonialism's "wrongs" and "limitations" to justify American colonialism as a liberating experience for the Filipinos. The idea did not disappear from congressional debates in the 1930s, but an interesting change in the attitude of certain

¹³² CR, H, 72nd-1st, January 31, 1930, p.2785.

¹³³ CR, H, 72nd-1st, January 28, 1932, p.2819.

congressmen towards the three hundred year of Spanish presence in the Philippines did take place. They continued referring to the Spanish yoke and tyranny in the Philippines, but the aim of this reference was no longer to justify the continuation of American colonialism in the archipelago, but to highlight the alleged American altruism towards the Filipino people. That is, the United States had retained control over the Philippines, not because of economic or imperialistic ambitions, but with the hope of freeing the Filipinos from Spanish tyranny. The American presence in the Philippines was thus presented as an altruistic act and as a sacrifice on the part of the American nation. However, the supporters of this position in the 1930s also believed that the task of the United States in the Philippines had ended, and that it was time to grant the Filipinos independence.¹³⁴ In other words, Spanish colonialism was not invoked to justify the prolongation of American colonialism, as had previously been the case.¹³⁵

Lozier, the great champion of the Philippine independence during the 1930s, also described Spanish colonialism as medieval, bloodthirsty, cruel, selfish and tyrannical.¹³⁶ According to him the reason underlying American retention of the Philippines in 1898 was not mere expansionism, but rather “because no other course was open to us consistent with our national dignity and honor, and because the interest of the inhabitants required that they be forever removed **from the pitiless control of Spain.**”¹³⁷ Here Lozier not only reaffirms American innocence and altruism, but he also argues that the United States did not conquer, but rescue the Philippines. It was this liberation that,

¹³⁴ Long, Lozier, Lamneck and Cox.

¹³⁵ According to Lamneck, “Our mission in the Philippines was one of humanity. **They were rescued from Spanish tyranny** and a government formed, the purpose of which was to prepare them for control of their own affairs. Our mission there has been performed, and it is our duty now to withdraw in orderly fashion, with all American concessionaries leading the procession. There is no valid reason for further delay in granting them independence. It is up to the American Government to make its word good. The Filipinos had faith in us. We should show faith in them. **“Justice delayed is justice denied”**, someone has said.” CR, H, 72nd-1st, April 19, 1932, p.8502. Emphasis is mine.

¹³⁶ For Lozier, “After an age-long carnival of Spanish usurpation and unabating oppression, the United States snatched the Philippines from the savage lordship of Spain.” Ibid, April 5, 1932, p.7517.

¹³⁷ CR, H, 71st-2nd, June 12, 1930, p.10582. Emphasis mine.

according to Lozier, enabled the development of the political capacity for self-government, which in turn allowed independence to be granted to the islands. In other words, the Americans not only rescued the Filipinos, but prepared them for freedom.¹³⁸ The culmination of America's liberating and nation-building work in the Philippines had to be the immediate granting of independence.

On the other hand, another group of congressmen used the three hundred years of Spanish presence in the Philippines to justify its independence. They promoted an image of Spain that completely opposed the one just described. Congressmen such as Harlan, Hawes, Colden, King and Nelson expressed a very positive opinion of Spain and of the Spanish work in the Philippines. They did not describe Spain as a tyrannical, medieval power, but as a nation that had played a truly important role in civilizing and Christianizing the Filipinos.¹³⁹ In 1930, for instance, Nelson argued:

The Filipinos were not savages when America “discovered” them, nor even when the Spaniards discovered them [...] With ages of contact with the enlightenment of eastern civilization in India and China, with 300 years of contact with Spanish culture and civilization, both secular and religious, and 30 years of contact with American economic and political civilization, the Filipino people, 90 percent Christians, have reached the stage of development that demands self-expression and self-government.¹⁴⁰

In this quote, Nelson reinvents the Filipinos as a civilized people whose history preceded the arrival of the Spaniards. According to him, Filipinos were not a savage people when the Americans arrived because they had been under the influence of Spain for 300 years. Nelson then adds 30 more years of contact with American civilization and political institutions: the Filipinos had been in contact with western civilization for 330 years. It is

¹³⁸ According to Lozier, “With a spontaneity, renunciation, self-abnegation and exalted justice that have always characterized the American people, we promptly granted them a generous, humane and benevolent autonomy, promising full and complete independence after they had established a stable government.” CR, H, 72nd-1st, January 4, 1932, p.1240

¹³⁹ For Harlan, “They (the Filipinos) have Christianity: that was one thing Spain gave them and left with them, and they have assimilated American ideals and methods.” During the 1934 debate, Representative Colden also praised Spain's work in the Philippines. According to him, the Spaniards created in the Philippines “a culture and love for music that is rare among Orientals.” CR, H, 72nd-1st, June 13, 1932, p.12860 and CR, H, 73rd-2nd, March 19, 1934, p.4838.

¹⁴⁰ CR, H, 71st-3rd, January 31, 1930, p.2787. Emphasis mine.

necessary to point out that Nelson's representation does not describe Spain as an exploiting colonial power, but one of the sources of Filipino civilization; he thus breaks with earlier references to the failures and limitations of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines in order to justify American control of the archipelago.

Senator Hawes also used Spanish colonialism to justify Philippine independence, highlighting the limitations of American work in the islands:

For over 300 years the Spaniards control them [the Filipinos], and while conditions change, 300 years of Spanish rule did not change their characteristics. We have had 30 years' control, and their characteristics, according to the best observers, have not changed, will not change.¹⁴¹

Hawes emphasizes that Americans could not change the nature of the Filipinos; if the Spaniards were not able to change them in 300 years of rule, it was not surprising that Americans had not achieved this goal in only 30 more years. If the Filipinos could not be changed, there was no reason for the United States to keep the archipelago under its control.¹⁴² On the other hand, Hawes' view of Spain stands out, since he did not depict Spain as a medieval, exploiting and repressive metropolis. On the contrary, one could argue that Hawes equates the colonizing efforts of Spaniards and Americans.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

For over thirty years, the Philippines' strategic importance was extensively debated in Congress. The growing danger posed by Japan, the problems related to the defense of the Philippines, the islands' strategic value and other topics dominated the congressional debate over the future of the archipelago. Some legislators justified the American presence in the Philippines with the argument that the islands were of great strategic and commercial value for the United States. Others described the Philippines as the Achilles' heel of the United States, and demanded the immediate withdrawal from the islands to protect the nation's security.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ CR, S. 71st-2nd, vol. 72, February 17, 1930, p.3376.

¹⁴² Hawes is very clear: "We cannot remake a race". Ibid. April 22, 1930, p.7433. Emphasis mine.

¹⁴³ See Chapters 1 (2), 3, and 4.

The strategic concerns related to American control of the Philippines did not disappear amid the urgent economic problems of the 1930s. On the contrary, the Philippines' strategic and defensive meaning was central to congressional debates during this period. However, there was a significant change in the way congressmen approached the issue of the islands' strategic meaning. It began to be used to justify Philippine independence for the sake of American national defense.¹⁴⁴

The Philippines as a liability

The notion that the Philippines were a liability for the United States was tightly linked to the notion that the United States was not capable of defending the archipelago from an outside attack. Elements such as the archipelago's great distance from the U.S. mainland, its geographic location in Asia, its geographic features and the weak American naval presence in Asia were used to question America's ability to defend the Philippines. According to those who supported this idea, the Philippines could be easily conquered by another world power, specifically Japan, and the United States would be unable to do anything about it.¹⁴⁵

The problems involved in defending the Philippines were widely discussed in Congress from the beginning of the American presence in the islands.¹⁴⁶ During the 1930s, as in previous years, a group of congressmen used this issue to justify granting the islands independence.¹⁴⁷ They argued that since the Philippines were an American territory, any attack on the archipelago would generate an immediate reaction from the American people. This in turn would force the United States to engage in a costly war of

¹⁴⁴ Between 1925 and 1934, I found only one member of Congress representing the Philippines as a strategic asset for the United States: In 1926, Representative Robert L. Bacon (R-NY) argued that American control of the Philippines was necessary for the defense and promotion of American interests in Asia. According to him, without the Philippines, the United States would be at a disadvantage in competing for Asia's markets. Without the control of the Philippines, the American government would lose power and influence over Asia.

¹⁴⁵ See Chapter 1.

¹⁴⁶ See Chapters 2, 3 and 4.

¹⁴⁷ Jones, Cross, Gilbert, Broussard, Hawes, Cox, Vandenberg and Crail.

re-conquest. For this theory's proponents, the chances of such attack taking place were quite high because the islands were "the weaker spot in our armor" and, therefore, it was to be expected that any attack on the U.S. would start there.¹⁴⁸ In 1932, Representative Edward Cox (D-GA) warned that

Delay is dangerous for the United States as it is for the Philippines. The islands constitute our chief military weakness. They bring down upon us world suspicion and the constant dread of war. They are paralyzing American agriculture and impoverishing a quarter of the population of the land. For the Philippines, delay is breaking the hope of the people who trusted us. It is killing the national spirit of a whole race. It is destroying their individual initiative and breaking their faith in the high intentions of this Republic.¹⁴⁹

Here Cox, combining economic and strategic arguments, showed concern for the Philippines' impact on American farmers. Cox saw Filipino independence as a matter of economic self-defense, protecting American agricultural interests from alleged Filipino agricultural competition. To him, the Philippines were not only an economic threat, but also a strategic menace since they were the Achilles' heel of the United States. To postpone independence any further delayed American economic recovery as it exposed the nation to attack.

Other members of Congress used different elements in order to justify the alleged American inability to defend the Philippines. Some of them argued that the Four Powers Treaty (FPT) had dramatically restricted the United States' defensive capacity in the Philippines.¹⁵⁰ The treaty was signed by the United States, Japan, France and the United Kingdom in 1922 as part of negotiations for the reduction of naval armaments that took

¹⁴⁸ Senator Hawes, CR, S, 72nd-1st, July 1, 1932, pp.14474-75. For Cox, the Philippines were "our chief military weakness". CR, H, 72nd-2nd, February 19, 1932. p.440. Senator Broussard and Representative Crail reminded their colleagues that in 1898 the United States attacked Spain in its weakest point: the Philippines. CR, S, 70th-1st, vol. 71, September 30, 1929, p.4065 and CR, H, 72nd-1st, April 8, 1932, p.7780.

¹⁴⁹ CR, H, 72nd-1st, February 19, 1932, p.4401.

¹⁵⁰ Hawes, CR, S, 72nd-1st, July 1, 1932, pp. 14474-75 and King CR, S, 70th-1st, vol. 71, September 30, 1929, p. 4066.

place in Washington. In this treaty, the United States agreed not to build new fortifications in the Philippines.¹⁵¹

Some argued that an effective defense of the Philippines would entail a very high cost, which Americans had not been willing to pay. In other words, although the United States might successfully defend the Philippines, the cost would be exorbitantly high.¹⁵²

Other congressmen, such as Senator Long, argued simply that the United States was not ready to defend the Philippines because they had not built adequate fortifications and did not have an adequate number of soldiers or warships. Although Representative Leonidas C. Dyer (D-MO) agreed with Long, he also believed that the issue of the defense of the Philippines was complex. To Dyer, the FPT constituted a great obstacle to this defense, since it limited the United States' capacity to fortify the archipelago. Without such fortifications, a garrison of seventy or eighty thousand soldiers would be necessary "or a body nearly as large as the standing Army of the United States."¹⁵³ To Dyer, the Philippines would be a military burden for as long as the Washington treaties stood. However, he believed it was unlikely that the Philippines would lead to a war against another country because, in his opinion, none were interested in the archipelago.¹⁵⁴ Dyer was certain that, should the Philippines be taken by a foreign power, the United States would be able to re-conquer them. However, he believed that such re-conquest would require at least two years of fighting and that it would be very costly both in economic and human terms.

¹⁵¹ Walter LaFeber, *The American Age United States Foreign Policy at home and Abroad since 1896*. 2nd Ed. New York: Norton; 1994, volume 2, pp. 339-340.

¹⁵² Gilbert, H, 69th-1st, March 5, 1926, p.5088.

¹⁵³ CR, H, 71st-3rd, vol. 74, January 13, 1931, p.2113-14. According to Dyer, "In their present state of preparedness the Philippine Islands could be useless as a post of defense. The army personnel in the islands at present is limited to some 4,000 Regular Army men and to some 6,400 Philippine Scouts. There is also limited equipment." Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid p.2113. However, Dyer did not rule out the possibility of a war because of the Philippines. According to him, "there is still a possibility that they may involve us in dispute with a foreign power." Ibid.

Senator Hawes also mentioned the issue of the costs of re-conquering the Philippines. He believed that the Philippines “could not be held, would be lost.”¹⁵⁵ Like Dyer, Hawes believed the U.S. had the power to retake the islands, but did not want to face the human and economic cost such a fight would entail. Thus, he saw no other solution to the issue than to grant the archipelago independence, as a necessary self-defense measure.

Independence as a self-defense move

Hawes was not the only member of Congress to believe a tactical retreat from the Philippines was necessary. There were also others who saw the independence of the islands as the only solution to the dilemmas faced by the United States.¹⁵⁶ To them, the Philippines were the weakest link of American defense. Therefore, they considered the immediate independence of the archipelago as a mechanism for the strengthening of U.S. national security. Philippine independence, they believed, would improve the United States’ strategic position by eliminating the vulnerability associated with American control of the islands. Furthermore, they thought it absurd to retain control of a territory it was impossible to defend and which endangered the American nation.

In March 1926, Representative Ralph Gilbert (D-KY) invoked the Japanese spectre when analyzing the strategic meaning of the Philippines. According to Gilbert, the retention of the archipelago exposed the United States to a war against Japan. Should this war start, Americans would have to fight under disadvantageous conditions, since they would have to fight “at Japan’s door and around the world for us.”¹⁵⁷ To Gilbert, the Philippines were a source of weakness for the U.S.

A few days later, Representative John M. Jones (D-TX) made it clear that his main concern was the safety and well being of the United States. According to him,

My main reason for favoring the granting of Philippine independence is from the standpoint of America. [...] Everyone who has studied the question for a moment must admit that the

¹⁵⁵ CR, S, 71st-2nd, Vol. 72, February 17, 1930, p.3376.

¹⁵⁶ Cross, Gilbert, Ragon, Knutson, and Robinson.

¹⁵⁷ CR, H, 61st-1st, March 5, 1926, p.5088.

Philippines are our weakest point. Any nation in the Orient which might attack us would naturally attack us at that point. Of course, they would attack us at the place they considered weakest. If they captured the Philippines that would put us in the attitude either of sending an army twice as far as we sent it in the World War, or of losing the war. If we sent them, we would have a battle line 6,000 miles long, subject to flank attack all along the line. Thus, the war not only would be tremendously expensive but also would necessarily entail great loss of life. From almost every angle, therefore, it would seem to me that the Philippines are a liability rather than an asset.¹⁵⁸

This quote integrates some of the most important points analyzed thus far. First, it is clear that Jones saw Philippine independence as the solution to the strategic-defensive dilemmas faced the U.S. faced. Second, the Philippines were the weakest point of American defenses. Third, that a potential enemy of the United States would attack the Philippines because they were so vulnerable. Fourth, that the economic and human cost of a war of re-conquest would be enormous. For these reasons, Jones concluded that the Philippines were a problem that could only be solved granting them independence.

Six years later, Senator Arthur R. Robinson (R-IN) analyzed the strategic situation of the U.S. in the Philippines. According to him, the United States' ability to fortify the Philippines had been seriously limited by the FPT. The U.S. had only one naval base in Cavite, which Robinson described as pitiful. The garrison of the islands in the islands consisted of 6,000 soldiers, mostly natives, whose responsibility was to protect 7,000 islands stretching 1,000 miles from north to south, and 600 from east to west. Robinson concluded that:

Anyone who has examined the situation over there, or who has made the most cursory investigation, must know that a powerful army –one division, even, of some 30,000 units- could land on the west side of Luzon, the largest island and the northernmost, on which Manila, the capital is situated, and march immediately to Manila, and take the island and take the Archipelago without resistance. Why do we want more reservations there? Why further aggravate the discontent of the Orient in times like these, when we

¹⁵⁸ CR, H, 69th-1st, March 10, 1926, p.14435-6

are not in position at all even think of war, much less to engage in war?¹⁵⁹

Robinson was also concerned with the situation in Asia. To him, the Philippines' location in the midst of that conflict-prone unstable region made the islands a dangerous possession for the United States. Robinson was particularly concerned with the possibility of a war against Japan. To him, Americans would breathe more easily if they did not have to face the international complications related to the retention of the Philippines. Therefore, the Philippines had to be granted independence.¹⁶⁰

Representative Harold Knutson (R-MN) also voiced concern over the possibility that the Philippines would involve the United States in a war, again integrating economic and non-economic arguments in the congressional debates of 1930's. Knutson championed Philippine independence for economic reasons, but this did not prevent him from approaching the Filipino problem from a non-economic perspective. To him, the Philippines were "a source of weakness as well as danger."¹⁶¹ Furthermore, he believed the retention of the Philippines forced the U.S. to keep a powerful naval and military force that cost American taxpayers millions of dollars. In other words, the independence of the Philippines was not only a necessary for self-defense, but also to save taxpayers significant amounts of money.

The Japanese threat

Japan's alleged threat to the U.S. was a common theme for supporters of American colonialism in the Philippines. According to them, Japanese militarism and imperialism constituted a direct threat to the Philippines. American presence was all that kept the Japanese in check, since they knew that any attack on the Philippines would lead to a war against the United States. Independence of the Philippines, therefore, would open the door to Japanese conquest of the islands. This idea was linked to Filipinos'

¹⁵⁹ CR, S, 72nd-1st, July 1, 1932, p.14435-6.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. Robinson argued that it was necessary to focus on the defense of Hawaii, "the final outpost of America in the Pacific."

¹⁶¹ CR, H, 71st-2nd, May 13, 1930, p.8868.

alleged inability to defend their country from a foreign aggression. To those who shared this view, American presence in the Philippines was necessary because the Filipinos lacked the resources and military capability to protect their country. This notion, a version of enlightened colonialism, cast America's colonial presence as a shield protecting the Philippines from other colonial powers, Japan in particular. In other words, without the Americans' altruistic protection, the Filipinos would be at Japan's mercy.¹⁶²

During the 1930s, a remarkable change took place in the use of the Japanese threat in debating American colonialism in the Philippines. Japan's threat was no longer used in defending the retention of the Philippines. On the contrary, a group of congressmen denied the existence of such a threat in order to justify the independence of the islands. In order to do this, they had to minimize the implications of Japanese action in Asia, in particular the invasion of Manchuria in 1931.¹⁶³ Their logic was compelling: Japan did not constitute a threat to the Philippines, so there was no reason to further delay the islands' independence.

In 1929, Senator King denied that Japan would attack the Philippines after independence had been granted. According to the Senator for Utah, the Japanese threat was an excuse that "American capitalists" used in order to justify American control of the Philippines thereby being able to maintain the exploitation of the islands.¹⁶⁴ To King, the Philippines did not face a threat from any of the colonial powers, so that there was no reason to delay their independence.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² See Chapters 2, 3, and 4.

¹⁶³ Cross, Wheeler, Hawes, Underhill, Norris, King, Colden, Nelson, and Bacon.

¹⁶⁴ According to King, "I regret that there have been no many unjust and wanton attacks in the American press upon Japan. Even in this body I have heard serious charges made against Japan, her good faith, her national honor. I have upon a number of occasions defended Japan against what I believed to be unwarranted and unjust criticism. I have called attention to her problems, to her insular position, to her precarious situation with China and her teeming millions, and Russia with her enormous population and her great resources blocking the way to expansion in perhaps the only direction where it is possible for Japan to go." Senator Norris agreed with King that Japan was a "friendly nation". CR, S, 70th-2nd, vol. 70, February 20, 1929, p.3838.

¹⁶⁵ According to him, "I failed to discover a scintilla of evidence indicating that if the Filipinos were given their independence they would be molested by any nation or their independence interfered with in the slightest degree". Ibid. p.3837.

A year later, Senator Burton K. Wheeler (D-MT) agreed with King that “business-minded Americans” used the supposed Japanese threat in order to justify American control of the Philippines.¹⁶⁶ In other words, Wheeler and King argued that Japan’s alleged danger was a ploy by corporate America to manipulate “ethically minded” Americans.¹⁶⁷ According to Wheeler, opponents of Philippine independence knew that American citizens would not support independence if it meant that the archipelago would be exposed to a potential Japanese attack; thus the colonialists used the notion of “yellow peril”: to manipulate American public opinion.¹⁶⁸

To Wheeler, the accusations against Japan were “wholly groundless” for various reasons. First of all, Wheeler argued that Japan was a “poor colonizer.”¹⁶⁹ According to him, the Philippines’ climate would protect the islands from Japan because the Japanese could not tolerate tropical weather. It was for this reason that Japan faced serious problems when trying to convince its citizens to emigrate to its colonies. Furthermore, Japanese control over Korea and Formosa was tenuous and nationalistic revolts could break out at any time in those two colonies. This threat would keep Japan’s attention on

¹⁶⁶ Wheeler was a lawyer with an impressive professional and political career. He served in the Montana House of Representatives (1911-1913) and as U. S. District Attorney of Montana (1913-1918), and U.S. Senator (1922-1946). He also ran unsuccessfully for Montana governorship (1920), and for Vice President (1924) on the Progressive Party ticket. In the Montana House of Representatives, Wheeler fought against the Anaconda Copper Mining Company. Ideologically he could be defined as peace progressive isolationist with pro-labor sympathies. He favored diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, opposed American military occupation of Nicaragua, and favored naval disarmament. According to Robert D. Johnson, Wheeler’s support of Filipino independence was influenced by “a degree of isolationism.” See: Howard Zinn, *A people’s History of the United States*, p. 376; Johnson, *The Peace progressives*, p. 275; Bioguide, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodis_play.pl?index=w000330, Justin Raimondo, “Wheeler’s Progress. The Evolution of a Progressive,” <http://www.antiwar.com/justin/pf/p-j090501.html>; The Political Graveyard. A database of Historic Cemeteries, <http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/wheeler.html>; and American National Biography, <http://www.anb.org>.

¹⁶⁷ CR, S, 71st-2nd, Vol. 72, March 14, 1930, p.5320.

¹⁶⁸ For Wheeler, “For years various unscrupulous groups with motives of mercenary self-interest have, through books, speeches, pamphlets, and particularly through the jingo press, carried on this offensive agitation against Japan”. Thus, Wheeler identified knowledge production about the Philippines as a campaign to manipulate American public opinion. *Ibid.* p.5121.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.* p.5323.

its colonies and, therefore, away from the Philippines. Second, Wheeler believed the League of Nations would protect the Philippines from a potential Japanese attack, since Japan would not expose itself to the international consequences such an action would entail.¹⁷⁰ Third, the balance of power among colonial powers would prevent any Japanese attack against the Philippines. Just as the balance of power guaranteed Siam's independence, it would guarantee Filipino independence, given that the Dutch, English and French would not tolerate Japan taking over the Philippines and endangering the safety of their colonies. In other words, the strategic location of the Philippines amid valuable European colonial possessions would guarantee Filipino independence.¹⁷¹ Fourth, the United States' moral protection of the Philippines could stop the Japanese. Japan needed to maintain good relations with the United States, and knew that any attack on the archipelago would negatively affect such relations. The United States were in no position to defend the Philippines because it was impossible to do so and yet Japan had not attacked the islands because friendship with the United States was more important to Japan than the conquest of the Filipino archipelago. According to Wheeler, this friendship would be vital for Japan once the Philippines were independent and, therefore, the Filipinos had nothing to fear.¹⁷²

Wheeler considered the accusations of those who used Japanese policy regarding Korea, Manchuria and Formosa to denounce Japan as an aggressor, arguing that in each instance, Japan had acted with the permission or consent of the American government:

“We see clearly that in her attitude toward Manchuria, Formosa, and Korea –and I do not defend her- she acted with the consent of American representatives. If she did wrong, how can we defend ourselves for consenting to that wrong? She was only following our own ‘land-grabbing’ example in the Philippines. It is so easy to see and condemn the mote in the eye of Japan, but we do not so

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. p.5320. Coming from a staunch isolationist, arguing in favor of Filipino membership in the League of Nations could be seen as a very cynical approach.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² According to Wheeler, “Would not Japan realize that taking them without our consent would be regarded by the American people as an unpardonable affront? Would she be likely to do a thing of this kind to us? Thus we see that there will be no real difference in the protective status of the Philippine Islands. Japan would no more risk our enmity after we have set the Philippines free than she has before setting them free.” Ibid. p.5121.

readily acknowledge the beam in the eye of America. Oh, the hypocrisy of setting up **this bugaboo of Japan's imperialism!** Oh, the hypocrisy of this propaganda of a 'yellow peril'. What about the 'white peril' in the Philippines? Who but the white peril has strangled the independence of most of the nations of the Old World and are holding them today as 'prey'?"¹⁷³

For the Senator from Montana, Japan was following America's imperialistic example; therefore, it was hypocritical to criticize Japanese behavior. The United States government was in no position to question Japanese expansionism because of American conquest and colonial control of the Philippines. Interestingly, Wheeler turned the yellow peril idea around: talking of the yellow peril ignored the more dangerous *white* peril in Asia, reminding his colleagues that Japan was not the biggest imperialistic country in the world, but the Western countries.

To Wheeler, the invocation of the Japanese threat precluded solving the problem the Philippines presented for the United States. According to him,

This absurd **bugaboo of Japanese imperialism** leads naturally to an absurd conclusion. If the Philippines are to wait for independence until Japan's power has been taken away from her in the Orient, the people of the Philippines are condemned to be a subject nation forever. When will Japan be removed further from the Philippines that she now is? And when will conditions of international good will be more favorable to protect our wards against a usurping power than at this time of peace parleys and peace conferences?¹⁷⁴

For Wheeler, Japan's alleged threat was absurd, but quite useful for the enemies of independence, since it allowed them to indefinitely prolong American control over the Philippines. Japan would never stop being geographically close to the archipelago, and the international conditions would never be perfect for granting independence. Therefore, it was necessary to forget the absurd image of a Japanese threat and to grant independence to the Philippines.

¹⁷³ CR, S, 71st-2nd, vol.72, March 14, 1930, p.5322. Emphasis mine.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 5323. Emphasis is mine.

Senator Hawes also paid attention to the issue of the Japanese threat. Unlike Wheeler and King, however, Hawes did not believe that the alleged Japanese threat was part of a conspiracy of American capitalist interests, resorting instead to geographic determinism in order to deny the Japanese threat.¹⁷⁵ According to the Senator from Missouri, the Japanese were not interested in the Philippines because they could not tolerate the islands' heat and humidity. It was for this reason that only 8,000 Japanese people had emigrated to the Philippines despite the fact that Japanese immigration was not limited.¹⁷⁶

Like Wheeler, Hawes touched on what was taking place in China. He did not deny Japan's expansionist policy, but he made it clear that such policy was not "south-bound", but directed to the north and east. That is, it was aimed at territories with a temperate climate. Therefore, the Philippines would be safe as a sovereign country and the United States would be able to leave the Philippines without fearing for the future:

The recent conflict between Japan and China, far from corroborating, actually contradicts the prediction that the Japanese will seize the Philippines after independence shall have been granted to them. It proves again that Japan's expansion is not to the Tropics but to the Temperate Zone; not to the archipelagoes of the eastern Pacific, but to the mainland of Asia; not to the Philippines but away from them.¹⁷⁷

Of course, not all members of Congress shared Wheeler's, King's and Hawes' optimism. Others worried about Japan's possible threat to the Philippines. For instance, during the discussion of the bill Tydings-McDuffie, Representative Charles J. Colden (D-CA) used Japan's actions in Manchuria to justify the retention of the Philippines.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ Jones also paid attention to climatic issues arguing that the Filipino tropical weather would protect the islands from an external attack. Because of their hot and humid weather, the Philippines were less attractive and, therefore, safe. CR, H, 69th-1st, Vol. 67, March 10, 1926, pp. 5362-63.

¹⁷⁶ CR, S, 72nd-1st, June 21, 1932, p.13555-56.

¹⁷⁷ CR, S, 72nd-1st, July 1, 1932, p.14477.

¹⁷⁸ Colden was born in Illinois, but moved to Missouri when he was ten years old. He was member of the Missouri House of Representatives between 1901 and 1905. In Missouri, he worked as a teacher, an editor, and a realtor. In 1912, he moved to California where he continued

Colden was concerned that the discussion of the future of the Philippines would be limited to economic issues. To him, there were other factors that Congress should consider. One of these factors was the Filipinos' safety. For the Representative from California, Japan's actions proved that Japan was a criminal, violent and militaristic nation that did not respect international order. Colden was convinced that after the American exit from the Philippines, they would find themselves at the mercy of Japan.

Conceding that the commercial **aspect** is of importance and should be considered, yet there are other factors that deserve careful consideration from the Membership of this House. Before we haul down the American flag and set **a helpless people** adrift in the face of a neighboring empire that is rampant with imperialism and militarism, we should pause and reflect. A nation that is disregarding its solemn treaties as mere scraps of paper, a nation that today is maintaining a mandate over the islands of the Pacific and flaunting the League of Nations, a nation that has invaded the territory of a peaceful neighbor and is taking advantage of China's chaotic domestic afflictions should not be given a license to override the will of the Filipinos. **We cannot at this moment overlook the conditions that exist in the affairs** and policies of nations whose good will, cooperation and international integrity are necessary to preserve the independence and the Territorial boundaries of the people we profess to protect.¹⁷⁹

It is clear that, to Colden, the safety of the Philippines was an American responsibility. The United States should not abandon the Philippines to their fate. Therefore, independence should be postponed. Colden's comments are particularly interesting given that they come from a congressman from a state where Filipinos were not very popular.

International repercussions of Filipino independence

The potential repercussions of Philippine independence at an international level also came up in congressional discussion during the period this chapter analyzes. The pitted those who believed the international impact of the independence would be positive, against and those who believed the opposite was true.

with the real state and building business. He served as California representative from 1933 to 1938. Bioguide, <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000605>.

¹⁷⁹ CR, H, 73rd-2nd, March 19, 1934, p.4838.

Those who argued most strongly that the Filipino independence would destabilize Asia and negatively affect American interests in the region were Representatives Robert L. Bacon (R-NY)¹⁸⁰ and Colden (D-CA). In 1926, Bacon argued that the independence of the Philippines would negatively affect world peace because it would alter “the military, economic and political equation of the Pacific,”¹⁸¹ altering the balance of Asian power. Bacon believed that independence would inevitably lead to a period of internal violence in the Philippines that would destabilize the entire region and that might necessitate an American intervention. He also argued that it would threaten the Christian influence related to American presence in the island, an influence that, according to him, was “perhaps our greatest contribution to the civilization of the Pacific.”¹⁸² In his words,

Our presence in the island does not constitute a threat to any other power; it does not endanger the national safety, trade or peace of any foreign country. On the other hand, our history there and elsewhere throughout the world has proved that America is actuated by the thoughts of international justice and concord. By remaining in the Philippines, we make it possible to exercise that beneficent influence over a wider sphere; withdrawal would virtually leave us without a say in matters of the greatest import not only to the United States but also to the peace of the world.¹⁸³

To Bacon, the United States needed the Philippines in order to exercise any influence in Asian affairs: without the Philippines, America would no longer be an Asian power.

Six years later, Representative Colden opposed Philippine independence on the grounds that it would have serious repercussions at an international level.¹⁸⁴ What was at

¹⁸⁰ Bacon was a lawyer and a banker from New York, a WWI veteran who was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. The Political Graveyard, <http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/bacon.html>, and Bioguide<http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000019>

¹⁸¹ CR, H, 69th-1st, Vol. 67, May 28, 1926, p.10352.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid. p.10353.

¹⁸⁴ Representative Carroll L. Beedy (R-ME) agreed with Colden. According to him, “In fixing upon the hour for Philippines independence we must consider the well-being of nations and peoples other than our own or the Filipinos. Indeed, we must look well to the cause of international peace. Today India seethes with revolt. China is rent with international conflict. The whole spirit of the Orient is one of unrest and dangerous uncertainty. **The launching of**

stake in the Philippines were, according to Colden, “**the relations of this country with the nations of the Orient.**”¹⁸⁵ The representative for California’s biggest concern was, no doubt, American trade in Asia. According to him, were the United States to withdraw from the Philippines, Japan would gain access to the Filipino copra, tobacco and oils markets.¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, the United States would lose its base for trading with China.¹⁸⁷

Manila is the front door to south China. It is but 400 miles away. An easy step for commercial purposes but far enough for naval defense. French Indo-China is the same distance, and Siam, the Malay States, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies beyond. Under the protection of the United States, Manila occupies a strategic location in regard to the trade of the Orient.¹⁸⁸

Colden rescued the idea of the Philippines as a base for the expansion of American trade in Asia. Like Bacon, he believed independence would end the prevailing Asian balance of power, inviting a war that would negatively affect American commerce in the region.

Colden feared the United States would not be able to stay out of such a war:

The American flag is a warning for others to keep out and also influence to retard the imperialistic designs of unscrupulous governments [...] Mr. Speaker, to haul down the American flag in the Orient is to invite the disgust of every nation hoping to preserve the balance of power and the peace of the world in the Orient. Mr. Speaker, the lowering of our flag in the Philippines and the sound of the bulge of our retreat will not only pain the hearts of

Philippines independence under existing conditions would be but and invitation to disaster.” CR, H, 71-3rd, December 13, 1930, p.620. Emphasis mine.

¹⁸⁵ CR, H, 73rd, 2nd, March 19, 1934, p.4838.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. p.4839.

¹⁸⁷ Colden worried about the impact of the impact of Filipino independence on American-Chinese China, reminding his colleagues that “Every fourth person in the world is a Chinese. His has been a friendly people. With America in the Orient, he has a friendly neighbor at his door. Think of the disappointment of the Chinese people when they learn that America has hauled down her flag and is no longer a near and friendly neighbor. **What will his respect be for our flag if it is hauled down because of sugar and butter and cottonseed oil?** What will be his opinion of this Nation which has heralded its ideals of democracy to every cranny of the globe? What will be his feelings when the unfriendly flag of the ‘rising sun’ supercedes the Stars and Stripes and his ancient enemy with its islands and its ships stretches a screen of guns and hostile implements of war before the doors of every port of the great Chinese Republic?” Ibid. p.4840. Emphasis mine.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

our friends in the Orient but it will inflame to a greater disregard the greedy ambitions of a peaceful people who at the present hour are intoxicated by the illusions of military ambition.¹⁸⁹

In other words, the American presence in the Philippines was needed to maintain the balance of power in Asia, guaranteeing the peace needed for the development of American trade in the region.

On the other hand, a different group of legislators categorically denied that the independence of the Philippines would destabilize Asia or affect American interests in the region. On the contrary, according to them independence would promote U.S. interests by confirming American altruism and exceptionalism. In freeing the Philippines, the United States would send a clear message to the peoples of Asia, a message that would resonate in the region. Furthermore, they did not believe that the interests of colonial powers should be considered when deciding the future of the Philippines.

In 1926, Representative Jones (D-TX) responded to allegations by Representative Underhill (R-MA) that the American presence in the Philippines was necessary in order to guarantee peace in the Far East. According to Jones, if this argument were true, then “we should permanently retain the islands, and if I thought that position a correct one I should certainly oppose independence either now or in the future, but in undertaking to defend this position, I think the gentleman’s logic breaks down utterly.”¹⁹⁰

Five years later, Representative Leonidas C. Dyer (R-MO) told Congress that to argue that Filipino independence would destabilize Asia, inspiring the region’s European colonies to seek their own independence, was contrary to the history and nature of the American nation. Dyer reminded his colleagues that the United States were the product of an anti-colonial struggle, and so in the Philippines they had to act in accordance with this past.¹⁹¹ Dyer believed the colonial powers’ interests should not be Americans’ main

¹⁸⁹ Ibid. p.4840.

¹⁹⁰ CR, H, 69th-1st, Vol. 67, March 10, 1926, p.5360.

¹⁹¹ “At this date of our supremacy over the Philippines, 30 years after our occupation of the islands, to assert that our granting their freedom would be unwise because of the stimulus it would give to other nations cherishing like hopes, is to validate a theory (that) will have but little weight with real Americans. We can hardly justify a course which began with the object of establishing a democracy in Orient and which is to end in colonial control. As will be verified by

concern when dealing with the Filipino problem. Americans should be more worried about promoting democracy in Asia than defending the interests of other colonial powers. Furthermore, Dyer believed that the Asian peoples would seek their independence regardless of what the United States did in the Philippines. Therefore, further postponing Filipino independence in order to preserve colonial order in Asia was absurd.

Dyer also responded to allegations that Philippine independence would negatively affect U.S. commercial interests in Asia. He argued that U.S. control of the Philippines did not have “a beneficial effect on our intercourse and trade with the Orient.”¹⁹² On the contrary, to deny that independence would adversely affect American trade in the region by leading the Asians to believe that Americans did not keep their word, and questioning the United States’ altruism in the Philippines.¹⁹³

Senator Hawes also rejected the notion that Philippine independence would destabilize the region.¹⁹⁴ Like Jones, Hawes believed that the United States should not consider the interests of other colonial powers, but only the future of the archipelago. He harshly criticized those who argued “that we should do nothing that might inspire in the hearts of subject races a love and longing for liberty.”¹⁹⁵ Thus, he tacitly admitted that Filipino independence would set a de-colonizing precedent in Asia, a prospect which did not seem to bother him. Like Dyer, Hawes argued that it would be denying the Filipinos independence that would have a negative impact upon the United States’ image in the region, destroying the Asian peoples’ faith in the American nation and damaging American commercial interests:

But our self-interest is inseparable from our self-respect. We cannot prejudice our commercial expansion and security in the Far

current events, there are eastern colonies now endeavoring to assert their aspiration for national identity and moving toward independence wholly without regard to our attitude in the matter of the Philippine islands. Our presence in the orient in these instances has not deterred desires for national self-expression.” CR, H, 71st-3rd, vol. 74, January 13, 1931, p.2113.

¹⁹² Ibid. p.2124.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ CR, S, 72nd-1st, June 21, 1932, p.13556.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. 14475-76.

East if we break faith with a far eastern people. Such conduct would make enemies not only of the Filipinos but also of the Chinese and the people of the East Orient. It would remove the old difference between the European nations and the United States, which has always respected their rights and their integrity. So long as we preserve our self-respect, therefore, we shall serve our self-interest.¹⁹⁶

In this quote, Hawes combines economic and ideological elements. The independence of the Philippines would reaffirm the United States exceptionality vis a vis the European countries, and this, in turn, would promote U.S. economic expansion in Asia.

Hawes also rejected the notion that controlling the Philippines had helped expand trade in Asia. According to him, it had added very little trade in the Orient, and Manila had not become “a great international mart.”¹⁹⁷ Therefore, commercial interests would not be at all affected by independence.

Representative Lozier also approached this issue, albeit from a different perspective. To him, the Filipinos’ Christianity made independence necessary.¹⁹⁸

Eleven million Filipino Christians are holding aloft the banner of the Galilean in a wilderness of pagan and non-Christian religions. [...] In the center of this picture of polyglottish, polygamous, and heathenish abominations nestle the Christian Philippines. [...] The little brown-skinned Filipino Christian is holding the outpost and battle line in the all-important struggle of Christianity and worldwide supremacy. **The Philippines are probably the most important strategic position now held by Christianity in its triumphant march for the mastery over the minds and consciences of mankind.**¹⁹⁹

Thus, Philippine independence would help promote Christianity in Asia by proving American altruism, and this ought to be considered in deciding the islands’ future.

Lozier also had a messianic vision of the role the Philippine republic would play in Asia. According to him “the Philippine republic will be a new center from which shall

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. p.14475.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ CR, H, 71st-2nd, June 25, 1930, p.11703.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. Emphasis mine.

radiate the forces of western civilization, which, I verily believe, the Supreme Ruler of the Universe has decreed shall quicken and rehabilitate the Far East.”²⁰⁰ The United States must help the Filipinos fulfill their destiny by granting the islands independence.

Despite his strong ideological-religious analysis, Lozier did not lose sight of the economic implications of Filipino independence. According to him, Asia was a sleeping giant that would wake up and experience “a new birth and a baptism of Americanism, and dedicated her myriad millions and limitless resources to the cause of freedom, enlightened government, and the happiness and well-being of mankind.”²⁰¹ In this process, the Filipinos would play an important role because the Republic of the Philippines would rejuvenate, democratize and modernize the region.²⁰² In granting the Filipinos their independence, the United States would promote American interests and ideals while fulfilling a historic commitment. Lozier presents the future Republic of the Philippines as a kind of Asian beachhead for the entire Western world.

CONCLUSION

The economic crisis that hit the United States during the 1930s revived the national debate around the Philippine issue. Overwhelmed by the consequences of this crisis, agricultural and working sectors found a much-needed scapegoat in the Philippines. For them, the problems faced by American agriculture and American workers became the consequence of unfair competition from Filipino agricultural products and migrant workers. They believed retention of the Philippines allowed or facilitated Filipino products’ and workers’ entry into the United States; the low cost of both of these, in turn, negatively affected American labor and agricultural producers. Therefore, American labor and agricultural interests embarked upon an intense campaign in favor of independence for the archipelago as a mechanism to stop what they saw as a

²⁰⁰ CR, H, 72nd-1st, January 4, 1932, pp.1240.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² According to Lozier “In liberating the Philippines we fulfill a solemn and sacred covenant, benefit ourselves and 13,000,000 Filipinos, the flower of the Malayan race, who yearn for independence and a place in the sun, and by the same token we serve mankind and light the fires of freedom on 10,000 oriental altars”. Ibid.

threat to their own interests. This campaign revived the Filipino issue at the national level, and Congress was one of the spaces where this debate strengthened. However, Congress did not limit itself to the discussion of the real or imaginary problem the Philippines posed for the United States. On the contrary, it took concrete measures seeking to end the U.S. presence in the islands through bills such as Hare-Hawes-Cutting (HHC) and Tydings-McDuffie (Tydings-McDuffie).

The debate over these bills opened a period of intense congressional discussion of the Philippine issue. Although economic concerns dominated the 1930's discussion, political, ideological and strategic factors played a crucial role. A great number of senators and representatives invoked non-economic arguments during the congressional debates over the Philippines' political future, while others effectively combined economic and non-economic arguments for Filipino independence.

During the period examined throughout this chapter, knowledge production about the Philippines did not stop: the ideas, images and stereotypes of the Philippines and Filipinos that Americans had created during the first two decades of the 20th century, were re-deployed during the 1930s with some interesting variants.

One of these ideas was the representation of American colonialism in the Philippines as an altruistic enterprise. During the 1930s, congressmen use the notion of enlightened colonialism not to justify the American presence in the Philippines, but to advocate granting the islands' independence. The senators and representatives whose statements this chapter analyzed saw Philippine independence as the logical and necessary consequence of the United States' altruistic work in the islands. Very few of them seriously questioned the idea of an enlightened colonialism. Rather, they transformed it into yet another argument in favor of independence.

The Philippines' threat to American republican institutions also came up in congressional debates during the 1930s, though with less intensity than in previous years. The congressmen analyzed here presented Philippine independence as the affirmation of the United States' republican, thus anti-imperialistic, character without identifying the islands as a serious threat to the survival of American political institutions. To them, the independence of the islands would close a chapter in the history of the United States and return the nation to its founding principles.

The representation of the Philippines and the Filipinos also underwent interesting changes during the 1930s. Filipinos' political ability continued to be a topic of great importance, but was not seriously questioned during this decade. On the contrary, most senators and representatives studied in this chapter argued that Filipinos were politically ready for independence, thanks to the educational work and the political training they had received from the Americans. For them, the very success of America's altruistic colonial rule now made it possible for independence to be granted to the Filipinos.

One issue that was substantially reframed was Filipino history. In the first two decades of the 20th century, the Philippines' history was used in order to justify the acquisition and retention of the archipelago. During the 1930s, the senators and representatives studied in this chapter revised the history of Filipino-American relations, questioning the justification for American colonialism in the islands and bolstering the case for independence. They condemned the process that made the Philippines an American territory, harshly questioned the actions of American naval officers and diplomats, recognized the role Filipinos played in the 1898 defeat of Spain, transformed Emilio Aguinaldo into a national hero, and acknowledged U.S. troops' responsibility for the outbreak of the Filipino-American war. In presenting U.S. rule in the Philippines as the result of deceit and lies, this group of congressmen seriously undermined the ideological basis of American colonialism in the islands, particularly the notion of an altruistic colonialism: if the American presence in the Philippines was militarily imposed, it could not be considered altruistic.

The idea of altruistic colonialism was also questioned from a moralistic point of view. As in previous years, the senators and representatives studied in this chapter framed the Philippine issue in moral terms. For many of them, the American presence in the Philippines was immoral because it was not based on Filipino consent. This moral approach intensified during the 1930s, and was accompanied by a strong anti-colonial strain. Philippine independence was not only presented as the morally correct course, and as a right of the Filipinos; some senators and representatives even acknowledged that granting independence would stimulate the de-colonization of Asia. They wanted the United States to stand on the side of the weak, not with the colonial powers, and Philippine independence would be an important step in that direction.

In justifying independence, the strategic issues involved in retaining the Philippines did not disappear beside the unquestionable importance of economic arguments. Congress debated topics such as the defense of the Philippines, the Japanese threat and the strategic meaning of the Philippines during the period analyzed here. However, unlike previous years, emphasis was not on the Philippines' strategic-commercial value, but on the risks and threats they entailed. The senators and representatives analyzed in this chapter portrayed the islands as a weakness and strategic liability for the United States, and Philippine independence was justified as a defensive move that was needed to strengthen the United States defenses and strategic position. The problem was not only that the United States were not capable of defending the Philippines, but also that the archipelago was located in an unstable region. Therefore, it was necessary to eliminate the menace they posed for the United States by granting them independence.

CONCLUSION

The United States' acquisition of the Philippines provoked an intense debate around the real and imagined meanings and consequences America's new Asian colony held for the nation. Americans' near-total ignorance concerning their most distant possession produced a need for information about the Philippines—and the Filipinos—that was filled, over more than thirty years by American writers, journalists, travelers, missionaries, scholars, and colonial and military officers who explained and described the archipelago and its people to the American public. The extensive body of images, generalizations, ideas and representations they produced influenced how the Americans imagined and understood the Philippines and the Filipinos.

That body of knowledge was used to question, as well as justify American colonial rule over the Philippines. American knowledge producers created two opposing discourses about the Philippines, which drew from the same group of ideas and concerns. Issues like American republicanism, exceptionalism, sense of mission, enlightened colonialism, militarism, navalism, and Filipinos' national identity, political capability, and potential for becoming racial and politically assimilated by the United States, were differently deployed in these contending views of American colonialism in the Philippines.

The islands' inhabitants were themselves portrayed using two conflicting sets of images and ideas. On one hand, advocates of colonialism represented Filipinos as child-like, easy to manipulate, and therefore incapable of independence. As members of an inferior racial stock, the Filipinos were presented as immature, unreliable, and weak, lacking the political, cultural, linguistic, and religious homogeneity necessary for independent nationhood. Supporters of this vision argued that only America's unselfish tutelage could help Filipinos overcome their racial, political, cultural and historical deficiencies and become a nation. Simultaneously, anti-imperialists portrayed the Filipinos as a nation robbed of her independence by American imperialists. In this version, Filipinos were a politically capable people, culturally, politically and historically ready for independence. This anti-colonial view of the U.S. presence in the Philippines

portrayed U.S. rule not as a nation-making process, but as a colonial enterprise in contradiction with America's history, democratic principles, and republican institutions.

The United States Congress was one of the main sites of production of knowledge about the Philippines. For more than thirty years, members of Congress extensively discussed the future of the Philippines as an American territory, using the ideas and images produced by American writers, journalist, scholars, missionaries, travelers, and colonial and military officers, but also looking for their own answers to the questions raised by U.S. control of the Philippines. Some lawmakers, including Richard P. Hobson, Albert J. Beveridge, Richard W. Austin, William A. Jones, and Harry B. Hawes, participated in American knowledge production about the Philippines. Through their travel accounts, books, interviews, articles, and public speeches and lectures, these men influenced how Americans imagined and understood the Philippines, even as they directly acted to determine the archipelago's future.

Congressional knowledge production about the Philippines was not limited to the publications and public lectures and speeches of some members of Congress. Congressional hearings, discussions and debates about the Philippines also gave members of Congress an opportunity to produce knowledge and reproduce the knowledge about the islands created by American cultural mainstream. The Philippines figured prominently during the debate over many different bills, giving legislators an opportunity not only to use the 'knowledge' about the Philippines created by writers like Worcester, Blount, or Mayo, but also to produce their own ideas and images about America's controversial Asian colony.

During three decades of debates, members of Congress developed two opposed discourses about the Philippines. Congressional supporters of U.S. control of the Philippines developed a discourse based on ideology and strategy, while their opponents discourse focused on moral, racial, political and strategic concerns.

Congressional opponents of American colonialism built an image of the Philippines as racially, ideologically, politically, and strategically problematic for the United States. For them, Filipinos' racial unsuitability for incorporation into the American nation made the Philippines a threat to America's democracy, republicanism,

and exceptional nature: because Filipinos were racially unfit to become Americans, the United States should grant them independence.

Anti-colonialist lawmakers were also concerned about the Philippines' strategic meaning of for the United States, seeing the islands as a strategic liability. The Philippines, thousands of miles away from the U.S. mainland, could not be defended from external attack, and thus jeopardized American security. In this view, only independence, reinstating isolationism as the nation's foreign policy, could protect the United States from its Asian colony.

Congressional opponents of American colonialism also represented the Philippines as an ideological and political threat: America's democratic political system was endangered by colonialism. For them, retention of the Philippines would transform the United States into a militaristic empire and destroy American political institutions, practices and traditions; they proposed Philippine independence as a necessary step to protect American democracy from the evils of colonialism.

On the other hand, congressional supporters of U.S. rule in the Philippines built a discourse based on representing the Philippines as a strategic asset. For them, American presence in the Filipino archipelago was essential for the promotion and defense of America's global interests. They emphasized the islands' significance as a base from which to promote U.S. interests in Asia, especially China. They cast Philippine independence as a cowardly, unjustifiable flight from a key possession.

Other congressional supporters of U.S. retention of the Philippines paid more attention to ideological, cultural and political issues, supporting American colonialism as an enlightened enterprise. According to them, the United States was civilizing, democratizing, and developing political skills in the Filipino population. They portrayed American rule over the Philippines as a new kind of altruistic colonialism. Americans sought no economic benefit from the Philippines, only their Asian pupil-subjects' well-being. For these legislators, the U.S. presence in the Philippines was not only an expression of American exceptionalism, but also its confirmation.

Congressional supporters of retaining the Philippines justified this enlightened colonialism by denying the existence of a Filipino nation, questioning Filipino political and defensive capabilities, representing the Filipinos as children, revising Filipino

history, and emphasizing Filipinos' religious and cultural heterogeneity. For them, there was no Filipino nation, only a group of tribes speaking different languages and worshipping different gods. They represented American colonialism as a nation-making process that was helping the Filipinos to overcome their differences and become a nation. By this representation, they made American colonialism a requisite for Filipino independence, arguing that only through America's unselfish guidance could the Filipinos become ready for independence.

For supporters of American colonialism in the Philippines, democracy and self-government were racially determined, reserved for the Anglo-Saxon race. Since Filipinos were not Anglo-Saxons, they could only overcome their racial limitations and become a sovereign country through American training.

The 1930's economic crisis sparked an intense debate about the Philippines' future as an American territory. American labor and farmers' groups found in the Philippines a much-needed scapegoat upon which to blame the Great Depression. According to them, American control of the Philippines opened the United States to Filipino agricultural products and workers, creating unfair competition for American workers and farmers. These groups revived public discussion of the Philippines as they embarked on an intense campaign for Filipino independence as the solution to the Philippine question.

Congress was one of the main sites of that discussion, but lawmakers were not content to debate the Philippines' future, and took concrete measures to end the U.S. presence in those islands, approving two independence bills.

The 1930's congressional debates on the Philippines reflect some interesting changes with respect to the preceding 20 years. During the 1930's, members of Congress used the idea of an enlightened colonialism not to justify U.S. control of the islands, but to support Filipino independence. For them, Philippine independence was the logical consequence of America's success enlightening and civilizing its Asian subjects. American altruism was no longer questioned, but used to justify withdrawal from the islands.

The meaning of the Philippines for American political institutions also suffered some important changes during the 1930's congressional debates. Members of Congress

presented Filipino independence as the affirmation of American political institutions and ideas, but did not represent the Philippines as a menace for American republicanism. They saw Filipino independence as the end of one chapter of American history and the return to American foundational values and beliefs.

Representations of the Filipinos and Philippine history also underwent important changes in the 1930's. During that period, Filipinos' political capability was not seriously questioned in Congress; rather, they were presented as a people ready for independence thanks to American altruism. Congressional representations of Filipino history also underwent a serious transformation in the 1930's, now serving mainly to justify independence. Members of Congress criticized American naval and diplomatic officers' actions in the Philippines, recognized Filipinos' role in the war with Spain, recognized Emilio Aguinaldo as a Filipino national hero, and acknowledged American responsibility for the outbreak of the Filipino-American war. In so doing, members of Congress undermined the notion of an enlightened and altruistic colonialism, which had been the ideological basis of U.S. rule in the Philippines.

During the 1930's, members of Congress did not deploy the idea of Philippines as a menace to American democratic political traditions, but they did reproduce the image of the Philippines as strategic menace to the United States because of the islands' indefensibility. The Philippines were an indefensible possession located in an unstable and dangerous region. Filipino independence was portrayed as a necessary tactical move to strengthen America's strategic position by minimizing the risks associated with ruling the islands.

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1

- “America's Duty to Her New Dependencies.” *The American Monthly Review of Reviews* (1899): 335-36.
- “American Rule in the Philippines.” *The American Monthly Review of Reviews* 19 (1899), 207-209.
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