

Terrorist Actions and Evangelicalism in Peru*

Augusto Mendoza

September, 2021

Abstract

This paper studies how terrorist events leads to the increase of evangelical religious affiliation in Peru. To do so, I use three cross-sectional Peruvian censuses and a detailed administrative terrorist fatalities data set. I employ difference-in-difference approach that exploits variation across time and space in the intensity of violence exposure to the terrorist events. I differentiate State and non-State terrorism. The capture of a terrorist leader engendered a sudden decrease in terrorist violence, which allows for a specific discontinuity. My results suggest Evangelicalism increased by 10.8 percentage points more in high-death districts compared to low-death districts, and this increase accounts for almost 150 percent relative to baseline levels. I explore supply and demand mechanisms and find that the former (number of Evangelical churches) may not explain the rise of Evangelicalism, whereas migration may be the driver of the results, which is associated with the theory of recognition. This theory argues that Evangelicals seek to be acknowledged by the society and this usually happens for the group of non-settler individuals.

*I express my profound gratitude towards Mohamed Saleh for his invaluable support as a thesis advisor on conducting this research. This thesis was based on a term paper from the course Historical Perspectives of Development, worked on with Claire Kraemer at TSE. I thank professor Oscar Amat y Leon for his kindness in answering all my questions as well as providing me with very useful information related to the Evangelicalism in Peru.

1 Introduction

Between 1980 and 2000, Peru suffered the most severe civil armed conflict in its Republican history with the emergence of the terrorist organisation *Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path, in English). During two decades, 23,969 people were officially reported missing or killed; however, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) estimated as many as 69,000 deaths and victims. At the national level, Shining Path was responsible for 54.3 % of the total deaths, whereas Military Force 33.7%. As we can see from Figure 1, the proportion of assassinations for the latter was almost the same as the former in the years 1983-1985, what is called "The Militarization of the Conflict" by the CVR. Although the economic and social consequences of the 20-year terrorist attacks has been widely studied, no work has examined the effect on religious affiliation. According to the CVR, religious groups were supportive against stressful events towards victims of terrorism, however, there are reasons to believe that this support was heterogenous across space and time as it may have generated competition among religious groups.

My main motivation to study terrorism and its effect on social and religious outcomes in the Peruvian context is to assess the effect of terrorists attacks on religious affiliation. Peru is mainly Catholic since its independence from Spain (1821), however, Catholic affiliation has been decreasing over the last 40 years. In particular, this decreased from 94.6 to 81.3 between 1981 and 2007, whereas the second main religious group of the country, Evangelicalism, increased from 5.6 to 12.5 over the same period (Bureau of Statistics, 1981 and 2007). As the terrorist attacks occurred mainly in the highlands of the country, and violence was selective toward the most vulnerable populations and community leaders, my research objective is to investigate the interaction between affected populations and religious organizations, in particular, whether the psychological and social support of evangelicalism to communities was conducive to the increase of the membership of this religious affiliation.

The main data sets that I use are from three Censuses that collect information on individual socioeconomic variables which include the self-reported religious affiliation in the years 1981, 1993 and 2007. These data sets allows me generate my outcome variable. My second source of information is the register of all murders and missing people of the civil conflict from 1980 to 2000 provided by the CVR. This database contains information about the perpetrator of the murder (Shining Path or Military Forces), in which district the murder occurred, year of the murder, among other individual-level characteristics of the victims. I collapse this data set at the district-Census-year level and after I define high-death districts as from 50th percentile above, whereas low-death districts, the opposite, as my main explanatory variable.

I use a difference-in-difference approach that exploits variation across space and time in the intensity of the exposure to the civil conflict. In doing so, I argue that the capture of the terrorist leader of Shining Path in 1992 generates a discontinuity and allows me to define high-death and low-death exposure district based on the total number of deaths from the beginning of the civil conflict to the year 1992. This methodological approach requires suggestive evidence that before the time of the discontinuity the outcome variable between high-death and low-death district evolves similarly. I provide evidence that this happens in almost all the main specifications that I test.

My main findings is that Evangelicalism was 10.8-11.1 percentage points (pp) higher after the capture of the SP leader in high-death districts compared to low-death ones, and this accounts for an increase of 148-171 percent with respect to baseline mean. These magnitudes are huge although the one that can be interpreted as causal is the association with high-death districts perpetrated by the military forces. There is suggestive evidence that the parallel trend assumption holds as opposed to the Shining Path specification. As a robustness check, I found that Evangelicalism was 10.7-13.7pp higher after the capture of the leader for those districts that belong to the third quartile of number of deaths for military forces and Shining Path, suggesting that areas with high exposure to violence are more likely to being Evangelicals and at the same time, less likely to being Catholics.

I test demand and supply side mechanisms that seek to explain why Evangelicalism increases relatively in high-death districts. I failed to uncover evidence that there is a supply side explanation that drives the increase of the Evangelicalism on average at the national level. Evangelical proportion decreased in high-death exposure districts with respect to low-death ones, which is the opposite of what I expected. However, it is possible that this supply-side mechanism may explain the increase of Evangelicalism in the most affected region as the normalised number of churches doubles the national level before and after the capture of the terrorist leader and its growth rate was 150 percent between 1989 and 2003 whereas it was only 50 percent for the whole country. Related to the demand side, people who convert to Evangelicalism seek to be recognized as equal members of society as they are usually rural-urban migrants that move to big cities and they feel alone and discriminated. Although I cannot test entirely this theory from a quantitative perspective, I found that indeed migrant people are more likely to be Evangelicals in high-death districts compared to their counterparts districts. This suggests that the theory of recognition seems to be conducive to Evangelicalism's conversion.

The mechanisms that I cannot test due to the lack of data are related to the demand side. First, people affected by terrorist attacks in high-death exposure districts may use the religion to cope with large, stressful and negative events. They can develop an increase in personal faith in response to a traumatic health shock. Violence targeted at one group of victims can increase those individuals' sense of identity resulting in more engagement in social religious activities. Second, it is possible that individuals could move gradually away from their religion and start decreasing their participation to religion activities without necessarily losing faith. Thus, attacks against an individual's religion and the response of the religious members community to those attacks may lead to doubt of his religious group legitimacy, and move to other religion groups.

My contribution to the literature on the economics of religion is to provide evidence of an unknown determinant on Evangelical religious affiliation and explore in more depth supply and demand mechanisms. My paper is close to the work of Bellog et al. (2016) and Bentzen (2019), though they study the effects of change on political institutions and religiosity when occurred unpredictable events, respectively, whereas mine on religious affiliation. What makes my work different from Buser (2015) is that I provide quantitative based reasons of why Evangelicalism increases, which is mainly driven by a demand side, and reject the hypothesis of a supply side perspective. Second, this papers contributes to the literature of political institutions and its effects on well-being outcomes as State terrorism leads to an increase of an alternative religious membership presumably because people have the necessity to a more close spiritual and personal religious guidance to face difficult times. Actions with more violence against population perpetrated by the State are equally harmful and have contemporaneous and long-lasting negative consequences. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that differentiates effects per type of perpetrator in the Peruvian civil conflict 1980-2000.

Related to the literature review, there are some papers that assess the economic consequences of the Shining Path on the long-run human capital accumulation of victims.¹ However, to my knowledge, no attention has been given to the consequences of this war on religiosity despite evidence that religion played a central role in providing moral support to victims against violence perpetrated by Shining Path and Military Forces (Klaiber, 2002). While the positive role of religion on health is largely documented (Deaton, 2009), few studies have

¹León (2010) finds that the average individual would accumulate 21 less years of education if exposed to political violence in its pre-school and early preschool age and that individuals which had already entered the school life cycle are able to catch-up. Galdo (2013) finds that one standard deviation increase in war exposure leads to 4 percent fall in adult earnings.

tried to empirically evaluate the impact of health shocks on individual's religiosity. A 2004 southeast Asia tsunami caused mixed results which find that more intense disaster exposure is associated with both stronger and weaker religious beliefs (Hussain, Weisaeth, and Heir, 2011). Falsetti, Resick, and Davis (2003) find that individuals with PTSD were more likely to self-report a change in religious belief, with more individuals becoming less religious. In relation to war, Cesur, Freidman, and Sabia (2020) find that servicemen sent to combat zones are more likely to engage religious practices than their counterparts assigned to non-overseas deployment. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Zussman (2014) finds that violence² from politically motivated violence makes both Muslim and Jews self-identify as more religious. Similarly, in their recent work on the civil wars³ consequences on religiosity, Henrich et al. (2019) find that war exposure increases the likelihood to be a member of a Christian or Muslim group and rituals attendance, even several years after the end of the conflicts. Extending this previous work in the Peruvian context, this study tries to evaluate the consequences of terrorism on individual religious affiliation.

The field of economics of religion is a growing area of research that has received attention lately in top journals. Belloc et al. (2016) study how negative shocks such as earthquakes make the transition from feudalism to communal movements slower and thus this preserves the political power of religious authorities in Italian cities. The main reason for that is people may feel panic and afraid of seismic events and when they occurred, it was interpreted as God's message against them. Similarly, Bentzen (2019) examine whether religious coping determines religiosity across the world. The value-added is to explore in deep the demand-side mechanisms that explains why people are more religious than others when earthquakes take place. They disentangle intrinsic versus extrinsic religiosity, unpredictable versus predictable events and psychologic reasons themselves. Based on a controlled experiment, Auriol et al. (2020) provide evidence that people give money to their non-Christian church as a mean of insurer against negative shocks. This setting allows them to analyse two types of mechanisms: material and non-material necessity although people face economic hardship. In a context of Latin America, Valencia (2019) find a long-run effect of Jesuit missionaries on human capital and the main mechanism is the adoption of technology differentially to control areas. By using a regression discontinuity approach, Buser (2015) measures the causal effect of a positive income shocks due to a change of the eligibility criteria of a cash transfer program on religious participation, affiliation and church attendance. One of the results is that people tend to convert to Evangelicalism, however, the author does not test

²Measured by the number fatalities perpetrated by Israeli civilian and security forces.

³Uganda Lord's Resistance Army insurgency, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan civil war.

empirically any mechanism.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I describe the civil conflict of 1980-2000 and the historical context of Evangelicalism in Peru. In Section III, I present the data and empirical strategy. In Section IV, I show the main results, robustness checks and testable mechanisms. In Section V, I draw conclusions and discuss a potential next stage of the research and future research questions.

2 Background

2.1 The Peruvian civil war (1980-2000)

Prior to 1980, Peru was facing political, social and economic turmoil that hit harder peasants in rural areas and deepen regional inequalities. Paradoxically, access to tertiary education increased significantly due to more public expenditure (León, 2010). This created an illusion of progress in the population and the economy faced the inability to integrate this new trained graduates into the workforce (CVR, 2004). At the same time, the Marxism-Leninism’s ideology started to spread in universities in a series of social science handbooks whose topics were oriented to historical materialism, dialectical materialism, and Stalinist political economy⁴. Young students, migrants and children or grand children of peasants caught between the Andean traditional world and the reject of urban community found meaning in this proletarian ideology⁵. It became notably popular in San Cristobal of Huamanga University in Ayacucho and in 1969, the Shining Path was born headed by Abimael Guzman⁶.

Shining Path was a terrorist organization that wanted to destroy the State by perpetrating cruel attacks against public infrastructure, civil leaders, and any type of well-structured organizations that promotes social cohesion such as religious groups. They did not want to negotiate with the State because they asserted that everything must be rebuilt. From 1980 to 1982, violence started consisting mostly in selective killings and targeted attacks in the Andean region, mainly rural and with a majority of Quechua populations. At this time the threat was underestimated by authorities. Militarization of the conflict took place from 1982 to 1986, often targeting civilians and failing to contain the violence. From 1986 to 1989, the violence scaled up across regions. During the ”extreme crisis period” (1989 to

⁴Degregori (2010) referred to this as “the revolution by handbooks”.

⁵Degregori (2010): “*The Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL), or Shining Path, emerged from the encounter, which took place during the 1960s and 1970s in Ayacucho, of a mestizo intellectual elite “de provincia” and university students who were also Andean and mestizo highlanders.*”

⁶Former philosophy professor and ex leader of PCP-Bandera Roja.

1992) the terrorist attacks made by Shining Path targeted for the first time urban populations and institutions, with a particular emphasis in Lima. The decline of violence started from September 1992 onwards, with the incarceration of Abimael Guzmán and most of the central committee. Organization collapsed and violence dropped significantly, until it left only some remnants in rural areas with limited action (CVR, 2004).

The Catholic Church was seen as a serious competitor having big power and legitimacy (CRV, 2004)⁷. Shining Path's actions varied across regions from church infiltration, infrastructure destruction to the threat, torture and killing of Church members⁸. However, the State and its armed forces played a substantial role in promoting anti-Church actions⁹. Moreover, the support from the Church to the poor, its speech in favor to social justice and need for structural changes was often mistaken for terrorism. The anti-Catholic Church actions from the armed forces ranged from activities monitoring, verbal attacks to arrests and torture. To counter this, the Catholic Church used organized groups to denounce violation of human rights, offered support to victims and refugees and mobilised for peace CVR (2004).

The conflict also affected members of the Evangelical community¹⁰. They were seen as cohesive social organization and thus were serious enemies from the Shining Path perspective. The most affected communities in the rural zone started developing solidarity movements through the formation of citizen defense committees in order to regain their rights¹¹. They formulated a religious discourse of resistance and a pastoral care of consolation in the face of death threats, as well as the valorisation and symbolic representation of the Andean culture (CRV, 2004). In particular, rural Evangelic church had an active role to denounce crimes perpetrated by the terrorists, which was the opposite to urban Evangelic ones, who were indifferent. CVR (2004) points out that the degree of support from these religious organizations, Catholics and Evangelics, towards people was heterogenous.

Military forces did not have a determined policy against Evangelical churches as a public institution. However, they were not interested in understanding Evangelical's philosophy (CVR, 2004). In fact, the army showed signs of disrespect for Evangelical's ceremonies and

⁷Degregori (2010): *"As for Andean religion and popular Catholicism, Shining Path considered such beliefs archaic and disgusting, and actively tried to suppress community rituals and fiestas"*.

⁸Some attacks occurred in Ayacucho Church (1981), Huari Cathedral (1981), Trujillo Cathedral of St. Mary (1989).

⁹Rumors and accusations against Catholic Church were extensively reported by the news media (CVR, 2004).

¹⁰This refers to Christian groups, 75% Pentecostal and Neo-Pentecostal (Lecaros, 2011).

¹¹Del Pino (1995): *"It was in the midst of the war that this new social movement was born, now the most important in the countryside, which, like the displaced people, the women of 103 Mothers' Clubs and the evangelical churches, constitute the newest and most dynamic social actors in the region"*

pastors, treated with contempt and other prejudices related to the false idea that Evangelicals were colluded with Shining Path. The proportion of evangelicals murdered by them was 6.1%, whereas 9.1 % was perpetrated by Shining Path. “*Matanza de Callqui*” was one of the most emblematic murders against the Evangelical church perpetrated by the military under the false reason to found subversive material in 1984. Furthermore, the *Comites de Autodefensa*, which were peasants organizations formed for the particular purpose to fight against Shining Path, were trained by the military forces, but it did not consider how to treat Evangelicals, thus it triggered hostility against them in some cases as well (CVR, 2004). It is worthwhile mentioning that military forces did not attack urban Evangelical churches and those located in the main cities as they did with rural Evangelical members. Some researchers argue that the racism against rural population is the underlying reason for these attacks.

2.2 Evangelicalism in Peru

There are three stages of the evangelical process in Peru according to Perez-Guadalupe (2017). First, the beginning of the Protestantism (1822-1915) was the period of time where they look for helping to poor people through charity and solidarity, being acknowledged for the Peruvian Constitution as a religion and thus have the same rights for the Catholic church. Second, the period called ”conservative Evangelicals” (1916-1992) had as Evangelical members Pentecostals who were apolitical and against Catholicism. In the beginnings, it was markedly influence by US Christians missions to Latin America and their purpose was to make the power of the Catholic church weaker (Lecaros, 2016). During the Cold War period, US financed Evangelical organizations in Peru with the objective to spread the Evangelical message and avoid the advancement of the liberation theology that had a Marxism character and whose one the leaders was a Peruvian theologian. However, the composition of the Evangelical organizations changed as Peruvians started to lead this organizations and foreigners fled the country as a result of the military regime that make nationalizations of the property, distribution of the land in favor of the peasants. Third, the last period of Evangelicals is called ”Conquering Christians” and it started from 1993 until now. The main feature of this period is the surge of New Pentecostal members who are now interested in politics, want to limit the rights of LGBT people, and want to avoid the teaching of sexual education in primary and secondary education. The main followers are people from middle and high class economic status. They argue that the traditional political class has failed as corruption has increased in many instances of the government.

The religious market theory points out that there are supply and demand factors that drive religious affiliation. On the supply side, evangelicals use marketing and church building strategies to offer their religious services and to compete not only with the Catholic church, but also with other evangelical denominations. On the demand side, people have the necessity to belong to a social group that can be good-listeners and supporters as the modernization and industrial process make them isolated and limit their social interactions. This fact occurs with rural-urban migrants who moved to big cities settlements with the purpose to look better economic conditions. Followers of Evangelicalism seek to be acknowledged as members of a society without being discriminated for its race and socioeconomic conditions. They want to increase their self-esteem, have the perspective of personal growth, become pastors after some time of hard work in the church, and improve their social status¹². This is called theory of recognition.¹³ This theory argues that material needs such as lack of money and personal problems are not the main reasons for insertion in the evangelical church; on the contrary, it is the fact of feeling acknowledged by the group that is the main reason. This allows to orient their lives, reinterpret and rebuild it (Lecaros, 2016).

There are differences between Evangelical and Catholic practices. First, Evangelical churches welcome all interested people and give testimonials of how they joined the church. The Evangelical pastors are usually married and has a family, whereas the Catholic priests are not, so people can see as the former's more closed to them. Second, Evangelicals orally quote passages from the Bible, while Catholics do not. This is an important element that gives status and security to the Evangelical leader and members, who now have the ability to defend their views firmly as someone educated. Third, although most of the Evangelical members are poor, Evangelical churches ask for a tithe as an offering for their community. This aspect is not seen as a negative for these members as they feel grateful for the new life that they have within the Evangelical churches. Auriol et al. (2020) argue that Pentecostals seek this aspect as a life insurance, and are willing to pay for it. Fourth, most of the evangelical churches has a method to attract more members by preaching through the direct contact with the potential follower, going door-to-door, visits at home for the studying of

¹²Social exclusion has been a big problem in Peru since the Spanish colonization. The social changes took place lately compared to other Latin America countries. Illiterate people had the right to vote since 1979, the agrarian reform occurred in 1968, and the inaction of the military forces triggered that Shining Path conquered more rural areas in the beginnings of 1980's.

¹³Lecaros (2016) makes a distinction between the market theory and the theory of recognition. The author argues that the former is based on the individual's decision to choose a religious community using an utilitarian approach which has rational principles and has a materialistic purpose. Although this is true, I believe that the demand side of the market theory can also consider spiritual aspects. In this regard, I consider that the theory of recognition is part of one of the factors that can be considered demand.

the evangelical philosophy before they intend to go to the church, promoting videos and marketing, and less often, through crusades in which many denominations reunite to spread the message.

3 Data and Methodology

3.1 Data

My primary source of information is the CVR which collected data on victims' sociodemographic characteristics and types of violence they experienced¹⁴. The CVR and volunteers travelled to most of the towns and cities affected by the conflict to host public hearings for the victims. Based on this process, CVR concludes that 23,969 people were reported missing or death. However, there are reasons to believe that underreporting was considerable¹⁵. For this reason, the CVR used the Multiple Systems Estimation (MSE) technique in order to calculate the number of deaths and disappearances attributed to the civil armed conflict, that would capture the cases not reported by any of the sources available¹⁶. In order to better reflect the heterogeneity of the conflict, two stratifications were made: one by region and one by the identity of the perpetrator of violence (terrorist group, armed force, police officers or others).

My second source of information is the Peruvian Census of Individuals and Household for 1981, 1993 and 2007, which is collected by the Peruvian Bureau of Statistics (INEI, for its acronym in Spanish). This source of information is cross sectional at the individual level so it is not possible to track each individual across censuses¹⁷. These data sets collect basic sociodemographic data such as gender, age, education, place of birth and current residence, employment status and ask for individuals' religious affiliation (Catholic, Evangelical, other or none). The information of three out of 25 regions were lost accidentally for the Census 1981¹⁸. Thus my analysis is restricted to 22 regions and I select a 5% random sample of each of the Census for practical reasons because the total number of observations for all three

¹⁴This data set has three sources of information: the Peruvian Ombudsman, Non-Governmental Human Rights Organizations and the public audiences hosted by the CVR itself.

¹⁵Even though CVR audiences reached a national level, hearings were never held in small, rural towns in the Andes and the Amazon due to budgetary constraints.

¹⁶According to CVR (2004), it was first used by Petersen (1890) to estimate wildlife populations, but it has been used in the estimation of populations affected in civil conflicts in the Guatemalan Civil War and in the Conflict of Kosovo.

¹⁷INEI has a strict protocol to not provide any type of identification of the survey respondents.

¹⁸Apurimac, Loreto and San Martin, in which the former was the fourth region with more deaths and missing people during 1980-2000.

censuses is more than 60 million¹⁹.

My third source of information is the number of evangelical churches per province collected by Amanecer (2004). This was a census in which the Evangelical leaders across Peru were in charge of the collection of the information. The number of evangelical churches is based on what these leaders reported. It is the most complete data set that is available and consider the independent Evangelical churches as well²⁰. I use this data set to test the supply-side mechanism in the next section.

3.2 Empirical strategy

I use difference-in-difference approach that takes advantage of the variation across time and space in the intensity of the violence exposure to Shining Path and military forces. To do so, I establish a determined discontinuity in the occurrence of the terrorist attacks over my period of study. I propose the capture of the leader of the terrorist organization at the end of 1992 as this discontinuity which allows me to exploit the variation of the intensity of the violence. This event can be considered as a natural experiment which results in a dramatic drop of violence against the population subsequently. Indeed, Figure 2 shows that the number of deaths decreased dramatically after 1992.

The capture of the leader of the Shining Path in 1992 allows me to have a pre-period and post-period. Based on the three cross-sectional censuses available, I define as a pre-period the information provided by the census 1981 and 1993 and post-period, the census 2007. The reason for doing this is that difference-in-difference strategy requires to provide suggestive evidence that the parallel trend assumption holds, thus at least two periods of time before is required to test it. The purpose of testing parallel trends is to analyse whether the evolution of the religious affiliation before the capture of the terrorist leader in high and low intensity of violence districts due to terrorist deaths grows in a similar way. In order to do this analysis I assume that the capture of terrorist leader occurred at the end of 1992 had not have an immediate effect on people's religious beliefs so that people may take time for change their religious affiliation. This allows me to use the information from Census 1993 as a preperiod²¹.

¹⁹Due to the accident of the original Census 1981, INEI re-digitalized a 25 percent random sample of the census so I did not apply a 5% random sample for this data set.

²⁰The Peruvian Ministry of Justice has a formal register of the Evangelical denominations called *Registro de Entidades Religiosas*. However, this register does not represent all the Evangelical churches as it is not mandatory for them to being affiliated to the formal registration. Thus only the biggest Evangelical churches are more likely to register into this data set since it allows them to reduce the exoneration of paying taxes. This source of information is not digitalized, thus I did not use in this work.

²¹The leader of Shining Path was capture in September 1992 and the information collected in the Census

The definition of the treatment is based on the pre-existing variation across districts in the number of victims due to deaths perpetrated by Shining Path and Military Forces. Thus, I calculate the number of victims to the year of 1992 weighted by the population. I define the 50 percentile of the number of victims and above as high-death districts, whereas the opposite low-death districts. I also use quartiles of the same variable as a robustness check. Duffo (2001) and Godlonton and Okeke (2016) use a similar procedure for the definition of high and low intensity areas in their DD estimations. For the case of Godlonton and Okeke (2016) they use different thresholds for the historical prevalence of their main explanatory variable as a robustness check.

The empirical model is the following:

$$Religion_{idt} = \alpha_d + \alpha_1 Post_{1992} + \delta_1 High_d + \theta_1 High_d * Post_{1992} + \beta X_{idt} + \nu_t + \gamma_p + \mu_{idt} ,$$

where $Religion_{idt}$ is a dummy variable which denotes whether individual i in district d at year t self-identify as Evangelical²². $Post_t$ is a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 if the period of time is post 1992. $High_d$ is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the district registers more normalised number of deaths than the median value prior to 1992²³. As I mentioned before, I consider the year of 1993 as a pre-treatment year as I hypothesize that self-report religion affiliation is not likely to change dramatically in the year following our natural experiment. X_{idt} is a vector of individual characteristics (education, sex, age, among others), γ_p is district fixed effects, which allows me to control for unobserved characteristics that are time invariant across districts, ν_t is time year fixed effect, which allows me to control for shocks that affects all geographical areas but change across years, and μ_{idt} is a random error term. My standard errors are clustered at the district level in all specifications. I control for individual- socio demographic characteristics as well. Here, θ is my parameter of interest that measures the causal-effect of the decrease in violence on religious affiliation.

1993 took place in July, 1993. There is a difference of less than one year between both.

²²I also estimate for the remaining categories of religious affiliation (Catholic, having other religion and no religion) using a different dummy for each category.

²³The value is normalised per thousand inhabitants per district.

4 Findings

4.1 Difference-in-Difference Estimation

Table 1 shows the results of the estimation of the difference-in-difference method. The dependent variables are binaries and identify the self-reported religious affiliation of the interviewed. Each column represent a religious affiliation. There are three panels, namely Total, Military Forces and Shining Path. This division seeks to analyse whether there is a differential effect of high and low death districts per perpetrator on religious affiliation. The coefficient associated with the interaction term *High Death*Year 1993* measures the differential effect of the high-death districts versus low-death districts before the capture of the leader, and this is a way for providing a test of the parallel trends assumption. The coefficient associated with the interaction term *High Death*Year 2007* measure the causal differential effect between high and low deaths districts after the capture of the leader. All the specifications control for district fixed effects, year fixed effects, controls variables at the individual level. All standard errors are clusters at the district level.

Table 1 presents suggestive evidence that the parallel trend assumption holds for all types of perpetrator estimations for Catholics and Evangelicals with the exception of the coefficient associated with Shining Path for being Evangelicals as there is indeed a differential growth rate between high and low death areas before the capture of the leader at the 10% level (Panel C, column 2). I should expect that this coefficient is not neither statistical nor economical significance. If so, the way of interpreting is that the evolution of the dependent variable is the same across high-death and low-death districts. It is worth mentioning that there is indeed differential growth rate in the religious affiliation of atheism and other religion for the two types of perpetrator (Shining Path and Military Forces) and Total (column 3 and 4). In particular, these negatives and highly statistically significance coefficients mean that high-death exposure districts grew less in atheism and other religions than low-death exposure ones.

Table 1 also shows information of my main estimation. There is a differential growth rate in Evangelical affiliation between high-death and low-death exposure districts after the capture of the terrorist leader and this result is highly statistical significant at the 1 and 5 percent level. In particular, Panel A, column 2, in districts that experienced high terrorists murders rather than lower ones, Evangelicalism was 9.3 pp higher after the capture of the SP leader. This accounts for an increase of 148 percent with respect to the mean (6.3%). Similarly, Evangelicalism was 10.8 pp (Panel B, column 2) and 11.1 pp (Panel C, column 2) higher ones

Table 1: Impact of Civil Conflict Murders on Religious Affiliation

Dependent variable:	Religious Affiliation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Catholic	Evangelical	Atheist	Other Religion
<i>Panel A: Total</i>				
High Death*Year 1993	-0.00475 (0.0368)	0.0577 (0.0435)	-0.0130*** (0.00421)	-0.00947** (0.00478)
High Death*Year 2007	-0.0396 (0.037)	0.0932*** (0.0342)	-0.00356 (0.00579)	-0.0194*** (0.00474)
<i>Panel B: Military Forces</i>				
High Death*Year 1993	0.00713 (0.0400)	0.0475 (0.0487)	-0.0109*** (0.00414)	-0.0115*** (0.00429)
High Death*Year 2007	-0.0548 (0.0406)	0.108** (0.0419)	-0.00416 (0.00586)	-0.0169*** (0.00453)
<i>Panel C: Shining Path</i>				
High Death*Year 1993	-0.0507 (0.0369)	0.0864* (0.0461)	-0.0173*** (0.00448)	-0.00987** (0.00449)
High Death*Year 2007	-0.0773** (0.0301)	0.111*** (0.032)	-0.00477 (0.00564)	-0.0197*** (0.00452)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Districts)	562	562	562	562
Observations	298596	298596	298596	298596
Within R2	0.0144	0.0137	0.0063	0.0025
1993 mean	89.6	6.3	1.5	2.6

Notes: Table 1 shows the results of the DiD estimation. The dependant variables are dummy variables which are equal to 1 if the individual self-report being Catholic, Evangelist, Atheist and Other Religion. The low (high) districts are defined as the normalised number of deaths and missings from 1980 to 1992 below (above) the median. Census years are 1981, 1993 and 2007. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.

in high-death districts in comparison to low-deaths ones, which are increases of 171 percent and 176 percent relative to the average percentage of Evangelicalism in 1993, respectively. Related to the Catholicism, column 1 from Panel C shows that it decreased by 7.7 pp Catholicism affiliation in Shining-Path-high deaths districts compared to their counterparts, which accounts for a reduction of 9% of the percentage of Catholics in 1993 for the low-death exposure districts. Since the parallel trend assumption seems to not hold for the two remaining religious affiliations (columns 3 and 4), the interpretation of the magnitudes as causal estimates is not credible.

Table 2 presents complementary estimates of equation 1, but with the value-added of interact each quartile of the number of deaths before 1992 with the year crime. Lower quartiles mean lower number of deaths per district, whereas higher quartiles the opposite. This analysis allows us to know whether higher-death intensity areas are more likely to being Evangelicals in comparison to the first quartile number of deaths, which is the reference group and is omitted due to the interpretation. Controlling for the same variables as Table 1, we can see that Evangelicalism were 8.1 pp, 13.7 pp and 10.7 pp higher than first-quartile districts (Panel A, B C, column 2). These results are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level. The magnitude of these coefficients are relatively higher than the first two quartiles for the Military Forces and Shining Path deaths. In particular, the coefficients associated with the fourth quartile are even larger in magnitude for Panel A and C, though they are not statistically significant at the conventional levels (column 2). This is suggestive that they are imprecisely estimated due to the lack of power for these groups explained by either for a small size or lack of variation in the outcome. Related to Catholicism, there was a sizeable and differential reduction of the proportion of it in the third quartile in comparison with the base group for the deaths perpetrated by military forces and Shining Path (Panel B and C, column 1), which makes sense with the differential increase of Evangelical affiliation.

Both Evangelical and Catholic estimates have a coefficient associated with the pre-trends which is not statistically significant, which again provides evidence that there was not differential evolution of these two religious affiliation before the occurrence of the natural experiment. Thus, I can interpret my estimations for these groups as causals.

4.2 Mechanisms

I investigate supply and demand side mechanisms through which the civil conflict perpetrated by Military Forces and Shining Path lead to the increase of Evangelicalism. Table 3 shows the estimation of the supply-side mechanism which measures the relationship between

Table 2: Impact of Civil Conflict Murders on Religious Affiliation per Quartiles of Deaths

Dependent variable:	Religious Affiliation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Catholic	Evangelical	Atheist	Other Religion
<i>Panel A: Total</i>				
Q2 Deaths* Year 1993	-0.106*** (0.0219)	0.152*** (0.0284)	0.00687 (0.00921)	-0.0104** (0.00516)
Q2 Deaths* Year 2007	-0.137*** (0.0244)	0.160*** (0.0326)	0.0247** (0.00962)	-0.0051 (0.00577)
Q3 Deaths* Year 1993	-0.000718 (0.0418)	0.0447 (0.0471)	-0.0137*** (0.00411)	-0.0106** (0.00488)
Q3 Deaths* Year 2007	-0.036 (0.0423)	0.0811** (0.0356)	-0.00443 (0.00554)	-0.0212*** (0.00504)
Q4 Deaths* Year 1993	-0.0321 (0.103)	0.12 (0.118)	-0.0208*** (0.00454)	-0.0137*** (0.00512)
Q4 Deaths* Year 2007	-0.0146 (0.0845)	0.105 (0.0994)	-0.0158*** (0.00207)	-0.0206*** (0.00438)
<i>Panel B: Military Forces</i>				
Q2 Deaths* Year 1993	-0.00276 (0.0294)	0.0411 (0.0351)	-0.00804** (0.00399)	-0.00909 (0.00568)
Q2 Deaths* Year 2007	-0.00987 (0.0333)	0.0389 (0.037)	0.00213 (0.0048)	-0.00994* (0.00512)
Q3 Deaths* Year 1993	-0.0221 (0.0429)	0.0585 (0.0561)	-0.00970* (0.0052)	-0.0105** (0.00501)
Q3 Deaths* Year 2007	-0.106*** (0.0391)	0.137*** (0.0476)	-0.00102 (0.00838)	-0.0163*** (0.00556)
Q4 Deaths* Year 1993	0.0547 (0.107)	0.0523 (0.116)	-0.0149*** (0.00359)	-0.0169*** (0.00471)
Q4 Deaths* Year 2007	0.0596 (0.0955)	0.052 (0.101)	-0.0108** (0.00425)	-0.0221*** (0.00466)
<i>Panel C: Shining Path</i>				
Q2 Deaths* Year 1993	0.00613 (0.064)	0.0746 (0.0584)	0.0026 (0.00896)	-0.0141** (0.00551)
Q2 Deaths* Year 2007	-0.0132 (0.0686)	0.0779 (0.0611)	0.0135 (0.0105)	-0.00868 (0.00628)
Q3 Deaths* Year 1993	-0.0533 (0.0409)	0.079 (0.0491)	-0.0164*** (0.00479)	-0.00890* (0.00484)
Q3 Deaths* Year 2007	-0.0865*** (0.0303)	0.107*** (0.031)	-0.000864 (0.00677)	-0.0197*** (0.00487)
Q4 Deaths* Year 1993	-0.0257 (0.108)	0.121 (0.122)	-0.0162*** (0.00291)	-0.0162*** (0.00577)
Q4 Deaths* Year 2007	-0.0246 (0.0912)	0.126 (0.105)	-0.0173*** (0.0017)	-0.0195*** (0.00455)
Clusters (Districts)	562	562	562	562
Observations	298596	298596	298596	298596
Within R2	0.0144	0.0138	0.0064	0.0025
1993 mean				

Notes: Table 2 shows the results of the DiD estimation per quartiles. The dependant variables are the same as Table 1. All the specifications control for district FE, time FE, and individual-level characteristics. Census years are 1981, 1993 and 2007. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.

the number of Evangelical churches and my original treatment variable of high and low death districts of equation 1. Instead of using as a dependent variable the binary variables of religious affiliation, I use the normalised number of churches per province. Since my dependent variable is at the province level, this means that my treatment variable should be at least at the same level. Therefore, I generate again the high-death and low-death based on the total number of deaths summed up at the province level before the capture of the leader. Since my dependent variable is only a cross-section, I cannot control for province fixed effects. Thus, my control variables are at the individual level and year fixed effects and clustered errors at the province level in all specifications.

I fail to find evidence that the number of Evangelical churches is a mechanism as in high-death exposure districts grew less than low-death exposure ones after the capture of the leader. This result is the opposite of what I expected²⁴. Although this negative coefficient associated with the differential growth rate is not statistically significant at the conventional levels for the Total and Military Forces estimations after 1992 (column 1 and 2), it is for the Shining Path (column 3). However, the differential negative growth pattern occurred prior to 1992 and is highly statistical significance (column 3).

Table 3: Testing Supply-Side Mechanism: Number of Churches

Dependent variable:	Number of Churches per Province		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Total	Military Forces	Shining Path
High death*Year 1993	-0.446*	-0.305	-0.433**
	(0.248)	(0.186)	(0.199)
High death*Year 2007	-0.397	-0.292	-0.423**
	(0.240)	(0.188)	(0.168)
Clusters (province)	110	110	110
Observations	500,203	500,203	500,203
Within R2	0.154	0.185	0.165

Notes: Table 3 shows the estimates of the DiD estimation. The dependant variables are the normalised number of Evangelical churches per province. All the specifications controls for time FE and individual-level characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 4 shows the estimation of my second mechanism that considers a demand-side perspective. Lecaros (2016) points out that Evangelicals seek for their acknowledgement of being

²⁴In an interview with professor Amat y Leon, he says that Evangelicals usually decide the allocation of the number of churches per geographical area based on the number of members. Thus, my finding is consistent with his opinion.

equal members of society and this is especially true for the rural-urban migrants²⁵. Thus, I breakdown my sample in people who were migrant and not in order to see whether the magnitude of the differential effect in high-death districts are higher in migrant individuals. Although I cannot test entirely Lecaros's theory from a quantitative perspective, seeing that migrant people has a larger magnitude to being Evangelicals is an approximation to it.

Indeed, I found that Evangelicalism was 12.1 pp differentially higher than low-death districts after the capture of the leader for those individuals who migrated. This result is statistically significant at the 10% level and sizeable for Panel A and C. The same does not happen for the individuals who live in their birthplace at the conventional levels of statistical significance. Before the capture of the leader, the evolution of the proportion of Evangelicalism was the same for high-death and low-death districts, which is indicative that the parallel trend assumption seems to hold.

There is anecdotal evidence that many Catholic authorities in the main affected region Ayacucho abandoned their work as Shining Path threatened them to do it (CVR, 2004; Quispe, 2011). This implies that individuals could move gradually from Catholicism to Evangelicalism or other religious affiliation. Table 5, left side, indicates the percentage of Catholics and Evangelicals across time from 1940 to 2017. The proportion of Catholics decreases across time in the whole country, and in Ayacucho, there was a slight decrease of 0.3 pp from 88.4% to 88.1% between 1981 and 1993 compared to the reduction of 9.5 pp from 1972 to 1981. While the proportion of Evangelicalism increased by 2.5 pp between 1981 and 1993, this increase was even larger for Ayacucho (6.4 pp), in which Catholicism remains roughly the same²⁶. Overall, these figures suggest that the abandonment of Catholic authorities did not have an effect on people's catholic affiliation. Likewise, evangelicals gain more members either from a demand or supply side. Table 5, right side, reports the number of evangelical churches per 10000 inhabitants for the fourth most affected regions due to Shining Path and Military Forces crimes (Ayacucho, Junin, Huanuco and Huancavelica), as well as Lima and the whole country. It is worthwhile seeing that the normalised number of churches almost double the national average for the most affected regions and grew differentially in Ayaaucho (150%) compared to the national level (55%) between 1989 and 2003. This

²⁵As I mentioned before, the author called theory of recognition based on the qualitative research which took place in Lima and in many part of her book she refers to the rural migrants that live in Lima.

²⁶In the 1981 census questionnaire, the religious affiliation question is asked without showing the fourth affiliation choices, whereas the choices are mentioned explicitly for the remaining Censuses. Thus, the percentage of not specified religion increased abruptly in 1981, whereas for the rest of census is minor. Without considering "not specified" religion the proportion of Catholics is 95.7% for Ayacucho, whereas the proportion of evangelicals 4.1%. This means that the reduction of Catholicism was 7.6 pp from 1981 to 1993, whereas it was 2.2 pp between 1972 and 1981.

Table 4: Impact of Civil Conflict Murders on Religious Affiliation per Migration Status

Dependent variable:	Religious Affiliation							
	Migrants				No Migrants			
	(1) Catholic	(2) Evangelic	(3) Atheist	(4) Other	(5) Catholic	(6) Evangelic	(7) Atheist	(8) Other
<i>Panel A: Total</i>								
High death*Year 1993	-0.0215 (0.0612)	0.101 (0.0633)	0.0163 (0.0115)	-0.0169* (0.00904)	0.0111 (0.0381)	0.0199 (0.0446)	-0.0133** (0.00551)	-0.00195 (0.00663)
High death*Year 2007	-0.0217 (0.0517)	0.121* (0.0633)	0.00356 (0.0109)	-0.0233*** (0.00841)	-0.00653 (0.0348)	0.0341 (0.0409)	-0.00572 (0.00492)	-0.00508 (0.00635)
<i>Panel B: Military Forces</i>								
High death*Year 1993	0.0400 (0.0567)	0.0592 (0.0693)	0.000477 (0.00749)	-0.0221*** (0.00790)	0.0335 (0.0369)	0.00204 (0.0516)	-0.0114*** (0.00326)	-0.00545 (0.00605)
High death*Year 2007	0.00690 (0.0529)	0.0809 (0.0709)	0.00899 (0.0115)	-0.0195** (0.00796)	-0.00639 (0.0378)	0.0403 (0.0500)	-0.00942** (0.00396)	-0.00639 (0.00646)
<i>Panel C: Shining Path</i>								
High death*Year 1993	-0.0996* (0.0573)	0.0943 (0.0648)	0.0179 (0.0117)	-0.0169* (0.00889)	-0.0168 (0.0385)	0.0425 (0.0458)	-0.0164*** (0.00629)	-0.00395 (0.00624)
High death*Year 2007	-0.0909* (0.0505)	0.109* (0.0617)	-0.000557 (0.00814)	-0.0213*** (0.00809)	-0.0403 (0.0332)	0.0529 (0.0401)	0.000439 (0.00736)	-0.00659 (0.00614)
Clusters (Districts)	501	501	501	501	560	560	560	560
Observations	118,340	118,340	118,340	118,340	178,920	178,920	178,920	178,920
Within R2	0.0135	0.0134	0.0053	0.0026	0.0118	0.0101	0.0078	0.0020
1993 mean	89.6	6.0	1.5	3.0	89.7	6.4	1.5	2.5

Notes: Table 4 shows the results of the DiD estimation per migration status. The dependant variables are dummy variables which are equal to 1 if the individual self-report being Catholic, Evangelist, Atheist and Other Religion. All specifications control for district FE, time FE, and individual-level characteristics. The low (high) districts are defined as the normalised number of deaths and missing people from 1980 to 1992 below (above) the median. Census years are 1981, 1993 and 2007. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.

suggests that it may be plausible to think that a supply-side perspective may explain why Evangelicalism increases in Ayacucho, although this is not necessarily true for the whole country as I test before (Table 3).

Table 5: Religious Affiliation and Regional Evolution of Evangelical Churches

Years	National		Ayacucho		Regions	1989	1994	2003
	Catholics	Evangelicals	Catholics	Evangelicals				
1940	98.5	0.88	99.9	0.03	Ayacucho	5.2	10.3	13.0
1961	98.1	1.6	99.5	0.4	Junin	4.2	6.0	9.8
1972	96.1	2.5	97.9	1.3	Huanuco	5.3	10.9	13.5
1981	89.1	4.7	88.4	3.8	Huancavelica	5.9	14.3	13.4
1993	88.6	7.2	88.1	10.2	Lima	1.9	1.7	2.6
2007	81.3	12.5	81.1	16.3	National	4.5	5.8	7.0
2017	76.0	14.1	75.6	20.5				

5 Concluding Remarks

In this thesis, I show that terrorist events lead to a differential and major increase of Evangelicalism between high-death and low-death districts in the most violent historical episode occurred in Peru in 1980-2000. At the same time, Catholicism reduces differentially for the same two types of districts and time. In particular, I found evidence that this was especially noticeable for the crimes perpetrated by State terrorism through its military forces, who are responsible for more than one-third of all deaths in that period, whereas Shining Path above one-half. I suggest that the main driver of the increase of Evangelicalism may be demand-driven as the number of Evangelical churches per province does not explain it with available data.

According to the theory of recognition (Lecaros, 2016), Evangelicals seek to be recognized as members of society, where discrimination and racism affects them and thus, the necessity to strengthen social ties becomes important, especially when they migrate outside their birthplace. Although I cannot test empirically each part of this theory, I provide evidence that indeed Evangelicalism grew faster in high-death districts compared to low-death ones for migrants. The same does not happen for people who did not migrate from a statistically and economically significant perspective. Furthermore, alternative demand explanation is that affected people request more religious services as negative shocks that endanger their lives cause them considerable consternation. I argue that Evangelicalism is the religious affiliation that provides these types of support differentially to the Catholic church although qualitative evidence suggests that both Catholic and Evangelical organizations were supportive towards

affected populations. However, CVR (2014) and Quispe (2011) point out that the religious Catholic priests moved away from Ayacucho, the most affected region, as Shining Path threatened to harm them, otherwise.

There is room for more research as a next stage. First, I can explore alternative data sets to complement my mechanism findings. In particular, I would consider using a time-varying data set of the number of Evangelical and Catholic churches in fine levels of geographic disaggregation as I work with only one cross-section data set for the supply side. To do so, I can digitize the *Registro de Entidades Religiosas* which registers information of the most formal Evangelical organizations per denomination and mission. Second, using Census 1972 and 1961 could be worthwhile as they would allow me to analyse religious outcomes pre-trends. I could also explore the evolution of the remaining religious affiliations (other religions and atheism), as the available data for these affiliations failed the parallel trend assumption. This enables to have a bigger picture what happened to these religious affiliations during terrorist actions as well. Finally, new research questions that intend to study the long-lasting effects of this civil conflict can analyse differential impacts on multiple economic outcomes per type of perpetrator. This would lead to more empirical evidence of the effects of State terrorism on political institutions.

6 Figures and Tables

Figure 1





Figure 2






Figure 3: Catholicism Evolution




Figure 4: Evangelicalism Evolution

References

- [1] AURIOL, E., LASSÉBIE, J., PANIN, A., RAIBER, E. AND SEABRIGHT, P. (2020) *God insures those who pay? Formal insurance and religious offerings in Ghana*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(4): 1799-1848.
- [2] AMANECER PERU (2004) *Investigación socio-religiosa, Manual estadístico 2003, Iglesia evangélica*. Lima: Nuevo Rumbo Editorial.
- [3] BELLOC, M., DRAGO, F. AND GALBIATI, R. (2016) *Earthquakes, religion, and transition to self-government in Italian cities*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(4): 1875-1926.
- [4] BENTZEN, J. (2019) *Acts of God? Religiosity and natural disasters across subnational world districts*. The Economic Journal 129(622): 2295–2321.
- [5] BUSER, T. (2015) *The effect of income on religiousness*. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7(3): 178-195.
- [6] CESUR, R. FREIDMAN, T. AND SABIA, J. (2020) *War, traumatic health shocks and religiosity*. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 179: 475-502.
- [7] COMISIÓN DE LA VERDAD Y RECONCILIACIÓN (2004) *La Iglesia Católica y las Iglesias Evangélicas*. Final Report's Chapter 3.3: 1-106.
- [8] DEATON, A. (2009) *Aging, religion and health*. National Bureau of Economic Research 15271.
- [9] DEGREGORI, C. (2010) *Qué difícil es ser Dios. El Partido Comunista del Peru- Sendero Luminoso y el conflicto armado interno en el Peru 1980-1999*. Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1-325.
- [10] DEL PINO, P. (1995) *Las rondas campesinas y la derrota de Sendero Lumino. Chapter III: Tiempos de guerra y de dioses: ronderos, evangélicos y senderistas en el valle del rio Apurimac*. Instituto de Estudios Peruanos: Lima.
- [11] DUFLO, E. (2001) *Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment*. American Economic Journal 91 (4): 795-813.
- [12] FALSETTI, S., RESICH, P., AND DAVIS, J. (2003) *Changes in religious beliefs following trauma*. Journal of Traumatic Stress 16(4): 391-398.

- [13] GALDO, J. (2013) *The long-run labor market consequences of civil war: evidence from the Shining Path in Peru*. *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 61(4): 789-823.
- [14] GODLONTON, S. AND OKEKE, E. (2016) *Does a ban on informal health providers save lives? Evidence from Malawi*. *Journal of Development Economics* 118(1): 112-132.
- [15] GRIMARD, F. AND LASZLO, S. (2014) *Long-term effects of civil conflict on women's health outcomes in Peru*. *World Development* 54: 139-55.
- [16] HENRICH, J., BAUER, M., CASSAR, A., CHYTILOVÁ, J. AND GRANT PURZYCKI, B. (2019) *War increases religiosity*. *Nature Human Behaviour* 3(2): 129-135.
- [17] HUSSAIN, A., WEISAETH, L., AND HEIR, T. (2011) *Changes in religious beliefs and the relation of religiosity to posttraumatic stress and life satisfaction after a natural disaster*. *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology* 46(10): 1027-1032.
- [18] KLAIBER, J. (2002) *Iglesia, religión y Sendero Luminoso*. *Ius Et Veritas* 13(25): 390-393. Retrieved from <https://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/iusetveritas/article/view/16224>
- [19] LECAROS, V. (2011) *Du catholicisme populaire aux groupes évangéliques a Lima, Perou*. *Revue des sciences religieuses* 85(4): 601-619.
- [20] LECAROS, V. (2016) *La Conversión al Evangelismo*. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
- [21] LEON, G. (2018) *Civil Conflict and Human Capital Accumulation the Long-Term Effects of Political Violence in Perú*. *Journal of Human Resources* 47(4), 991-1022.
- [22] MEIERRIEKS, D. AND SCHNEIDER, F. (2021) *Terrorism and international economic policy*. *European Journal of Political Economy*, article in press: 1-15.
- [23] PEREZ-GUADALUPE, J. (2017) *Entre Dios y el César: el impacto político de los evangélicos en el Perú y América Latina*. Biblioteca Nacional del Perú.
- [24] QUISPE, U. (2011) *Relaciones de poder y violencia política en las comunidades campesinas de Ayacucho*. PhD Thesis Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos.

- [25] VALENCIA, F. (2019) *The mission: Human capital transmission, economic persistence, and culture in South America*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(1): 507–556.
- [26] ZUSSMAN, A. (2014) *The effect of political violence on religiosity*. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 104: 64-83.